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ABSTRACT

Émigrés as Aneks: Polish Intellectuals between East and West, 1968-1989
by
Łukasz Chełmiński

Advisor: Richard Wolin
This work focuses on Aneks (1973-1989), a publication that a small group of post-1968 émigrés,
mostly Polish Jews, created in exile. Conceptualized as an “annex” to intellectual life in Poland,
the publication was founded to help Polish intellectuals look beyond the country to better
understand national problems. At the core of the enterprise were the Smolar brothers, who were
in a unique position to offer such help: soon after their forced emigration due to rising
antisemitism in communist Poland, Aleksander began to study with the great French liberal,
Raymond Aron, and Eugeniusz began a career at the Polish section of the BBC. Like the older
émigré journal Kultura, Aneks was printed in France for the majority of its publication run though
its target audience was in Poland. What follows is an intellectual history or history of ideas
framed by societal and generational trauma (war, antisemitism, genocide); by people grappling
with Polishness and Jewishness both within themselves and society; by identity as something
people struggle against and something they make for themselves.
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March 1968 has never ended for me.
-Aleksander Smolar, in conversation with Konrad Matyjaszek, October
20181
If he is honourable he cannot fail
To end up in Siberia or in gaol;
Who knows, he’ll find us here still, if he waits.
I like sons—they’re our future prison-mates.
-Feliks Kółakowski in Part III of Dziady by Adam Mickiewicz

Introduction
This work focuses on Aneks (1973-1989), a publication that a small group of post-1968
émigrés, mostly Polish Jews, created in exile.2 Conceptualized as an “annex” to intellectual life
in Poland, the publication was founded to help Polish intellectuals look beyond the country to
better understand national problems. At the core of the enterprise were the Smolar brothers,
who were in a unique position to offer such help: soon after their forced emigration due to
rising antisemitism in communist Poland, Aleksander began to study with the great French
liberal, Raymond Aron, and Eugeniusz began a career at the Polish section of the BBC. Like the
older émigré journal Kultura, Aneks was printed in France for the majority of its publication run
though its target audience was in Poland. What follows is an intellectual history or history of

1

Konrad Matyjaszek and Aleksander Smolar, “„To nie jest kwestia wyboru”. Z Aleksandrem
Smolarem rozmawia Konrad Matyjaszek [‘It’s not a matter of choice.’ Aleksander Smolar
interviewed by Konrad Matyjaszek],” Studia Litteraria et Historica, no. 7 (October 22, 2018): 12,
https://doi.org/10.11649/slh.1862.
2
The word émigré in this case is used as a less awkward version of emigrant. The people who
this work is about are not emigrants in the traditional sense. They are exiles, but to use the
word exile may (just slightly) overstate the existential drama of their departure. To be sure it
was difficult and painful, but it was also thus for those who remained in Poland fully conscious
of the hardships that awaited them. Émigré will be used throughout to convey the complexity
of this experience.
1

ideas framed by societal and generational trauma (war, antisemitism, genocide); by people
grappling with Polishness and Jewishness both within themselves and society; by identity as
something people struggle against and something they make for themselves.3 The latter idea is
crucial, as the people I write about made a conscious choice to define themselves. The more
cynically their identity was denied by the state, the more fully they embodied (and renewed)
the most classic of post-partition Polish national archetypes.
The personal and the intellectual affect each other throughout this work (though, again,
the former does not determine the latter). In the first four biographical chapters, I focus on the
interplay of civic, cultural and ethnic conceptions of Polishness, Jewishness and PolishJewishness. Identity was the pathway through which the personal and political were flattened
in Poland in 1968 and antisemitism was the vehicle. While communist states were novel
creation whose progenitors reached for ultimate human freedom through the merging of public
and private life in a new society, these states—and the development of Marxist ideology
itself—were both deeply affected by longstanding local realities. Marxists did not become new
people but rather read theory (then utilized and built on by others) and ruled with minds

3

Superlative books of collected interviews documenting introspection about Polish-Jewish
identity along with the Oxford “Around 1968” interview project have allowed me to explore this
topic. For the former, see: Anna Mieszczanek, Krajobraz po szoku, AO VI/1711 (Ośrodek KARTA,
1989); Joanna Wiszniewicz, Zycie przeciete. Opowiesci pokolenia Marca, wydanie 3 (Wołowiec:
Czarne, 2018); See also on 1968 through oral history but not focused on antisemitism: “Around
1968” at https://around1968.history.ox.ac.uk/#/ and Piotr Osęka, My, ludzie z Marca:
autoportret pokolenia ’68 (Warszawa: Wydawn. Czarne, 2015); For memoirs & biographical
interviews that bring up identity: Karol Modzelewski, Zajeździmy kobyłę historii: wyznania
poobijanego jeźdźca (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo “Iskry,” 2013); Viktoria Grevemeyer-Korb, Ni
pies, ni wydra--: marzec ’68 we wspomnieniach warszawskiej studentki (Warszawa: Studio
Emka, 2006); Anna Bikont and Helena Łuczywo, Jacek (Warszawa: Agora, 2018); Jan Tomasz
Gross and Aleksandra Pawlicka, ......bardzo dawno temu, mniej więcej w zeszły piątek...
(Warszawa: Wydawnictwo WAB, 2018).
2

shaped by local beliefs and prejudices in addition to philosophy. In Poland during 1968 there
was only a thin veneer of ideology left. And anyway, as the last Polish Marxists emphasized,
Marxism was about power and not ideas. Anything not useful in the quest for power was
discarded as Marxist states evolved. This totalitarian drive mixed with antisemitism long
present in Eastern Europe to create an experience in 1968 that was at once surprising and
familiar.
Personal experiences of discrimination and emigration were through activism and
publishing directed toward the positive goals of helping friends and enriching intellectual life.
The second half of this dissertation presents the issues that were important to these Polish
intellectuals as they participated in a transnational intellectual world in the waning decades of
the Cold War. Political protests and arrests in mid-1960s Poland marked the end of belief in
Marxist ideology there and the logical beginning of this narrative about émigré political
activism—about imagining a non-authoritarian future. Through Aneks the editors sought to
keep their Polish friends and colleagues abreast of broader European intellectual debates in
order to counter the sopor induced by vast censorship in the Eastern bloc. Early issues also
document a struggle to unravel the personal and political—to reframe the existential danger
many parents of this younger generation felt and passed on into something that could be
confronted. Aneks is a central point of reference for this project because it links the émigré
editors with their peers in Poland, with groups of intellectuals in the West, and with those older
Polish intellectuals who mentored them. I use the content of Aneks to examine the interests
and concerns of a group that is both connected to Western intellectuals and representative of
Polish intellectual trends in the waning decades of the Cold War.

3

Though Aneks is first published in 1973, the social web it is created within, spanning
what was then Eastern and Western Europe, begins to coalesce in the 1960s. Central to the
creation of the journal are: editor-in-chief, Aleksander Smolar (b. 1940); his younger brother
Eugeniusz (b. 1945) and the biologist Nina (future editor-in-chief of the Wydawnictwo Aneks
book publishing house, which is adjacent to and outlasts the publication), a married couple; as
well as the economist Irena Grosfeld-Smolar (b. 1948), whom Aleksander married after
emigration.4 Beyond them is a constellation of scholars, writers, sometimes editors. The editors
of Aneks published texts written by friends, colleagues—sometimes also texts by those they
disagreed with. Most notable are fellow émigrés: the essayist and journalist Krzysztof Dorosz (b.
1945), literary scholar Irena Grudzińska-Gross (b. 1946), historian Jan Gross (b. 1947), and the
philosopher Leszek Kołakowski (b. 1927), their mentor (and the subject of Chapter Four). The
most-often published person who did not emigrate is Adam Michnik (b. 1946), a friend,
collaborator and fellow 1968 activist.5 The print run of each Aneks issue was fairly small.
Eugeniusz Smolar was surprised that the printers they worked with in Paris gave them good
prices on runs of 2,000-3,000 copies. But the circle of intellectuals that it reached in Poland was

4

Polish historian Andrzej Paczkowski, in one of the few pieces published on Aneks, writes that
Jan Gross and Krzysztof Dorosz were a constant editorial presence, but Aleksander Smolar says
in a later interview that they were representative of an orbit just beyond the core group.
Andrzej Paczkowski, “‘Aneks’ 1973-89,” Res Publica 9 (1990): 29; Aleksander Smolar, Who was
contributing material to “Aneks”?, 2018, 152, Web of Stories,
https://www.webofstories.com/play/57469?o=SH.
5
People like Leszek Kołakowski and Adam Michnik are so well-known and prolific that to think
of them as part of one of these circles trivializes their accomplishments. They have their own
gravity and transcend this systematization. They are a part of this story but their connection to
the publication is complicated due to their extraordinary historical stature.
4

greater. Issues were passed around, articles were copied, and the journal was actually reprinted in Poland in later years.
The historian Andrzej Paczkowski notes that Aneks is the publication of the 1968
generation. Paczkowski is one of the few to have written about it. The historian in fact read
Aneks and published in it.6 Paczkowski is right: to write about Aneks is to study not only the
émigrés but the Polish 1968 generation more broadly. Aneks was created no more than five
years after student protests in Poland in 1968 that threatened (but did not produce) a national
crisis as major as what occurred during May ’68 in France two months later—and the
emigration of the founders of the journal is a direct result of the events of that year.
While a particular generation is at the center of this work, it is not solely about this
generation. University of Warsaw professor and activist Andrzej Janowski wrote in Aneks in
1986 that the intelligentsia of the country had risen from the dead over a period of twenty-five
years, using the dates 1956—the beginning of relaxation of the apparatus of repression in
Communist states as a result of the denunciation by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev of Stalin’s
brutal style of rule—and the founding of official dissident organizations in 1976-1981 as points
of demarcation.7 The reader can see this process of rebirth in the pages of the journal and by
the virtue of its existence. The editors both looked in at the process and participated in it since

6

Many scholars of communist era Polish history themselves participated in the history that
they write about. As a result, I often cite those who are themselves a part of the story that
unfolds in the following pages. What on the face of it is a secondary source can at the same
time serve as a primary document composed by a witness or contemporary.
7
Wacław Wyrwa [Andrzej Janowski], “„Historia Lat Siedemnastu” – Książka, Której Nie Ma,”
Aneks, no. 43 (1986): 224–30.
5

they occupied a liminal space as émigrés (at times also able to bring outside perspectives into
intellectual discourse in Poland).
Many of those at the center of this rebirth were Warsaw University scholars at various
stages of their careers in the years leading up to 1968. The publication was one way of coping
with the severing of a lively intellectual community. Asked about Aneks and this intellectual
community forty years later, Aleksander Smolar, the editor-in-chief, says:
I’m thinking, trying to find names from outside the University, and indeed it is difficult.
Yes, I wasn't thinking in these terms, but in fact, that's how it was. That is, starting from
those who were directly involved in producing the publication—they were mostly family
and a few friends who helped a bit—to the people who actually… those who supplied
the texts, those whom we considered to be the greatest authorities, right, such as
Kolakowski, Brus, Bauman, Hirszowiczowa. Right, this was the circle that was associated
with '68… expelled professors, etc... It is true that they were indeed—interesting- [they
were from] Warsaw University, yes.8
Those named by Smolar were all professors at Warsaw University and all emigrated.
This study emphasizes a distinction between Polish intellectual life in Poland and the
contributions of Polish émigrés or exiles abroad to it in order to highlight the latter. Emigration
is itself both a profound event in a person’s life and for centuries a major part of Polish politics
& culture. Much Polish intellectual life—political developments, cultural debates, the creation
of literature and art—has taken place abroad, physically elsewhere but firmly embedded within
Polish culture. 9 One cannot speak about 1968 in Poland without considering the associated

8

Aleksander Smolar, Around 1968 - Aleksander Smolar, interview by Piotr Osęka, February 19,
2009,
https://sharepoint.nexus.ox.ac.uk/sites/around1968/SitePages/Aleksander%20Smolar.aspx.
9
While emigration is a common thread in Polish history, the reasons that individuals choose to
go through with it differ depending on the period, as does the severity of coercion affecting the
freedom to move or remain. That it is sometimes underemphasized is understandable, as exile
or emigration is so typically Polish that it is often not given the attention it deserves as a major
event in people’s lives.
6

emigration, which was the result of antisemitic discrimination enacted by the Polish Communist
Party. Government propaganda accused student protestors and older intellectuals opposed to
the rule of the party of dual loyalties by virtue of Zionism. This was a diplomatically convenient
charge in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War during which an American-supported Israel
defeated Soviet-backed Arab states, but also one that was sure to be a popular domestic dogwhistle.
While émigré Polish intellectuals debated in a number of journals published in exile,
most notably the Paris Kultura, it was Aneks that was the journal of those deeply affected by
1968. Its content often reflected the trauma of that year (that trauma in turn was informed by
generational trauma passed down from an older generation that experienced the Second World
War and the Holocaust). Kultura, the émigré publication par excellence, was created not only by
an older generation but by earlier émigrés that had no personal experience with Communist
Poland. Those who published Aneks are the heirs of the generation that created communism in
Poland and then lived in fear of their creation, largely destroyed by it. This younger generation
had no illusions about the inefficacy of the system and no firsthand experience with its more
brutal Stalinist form (nor with the Nazi horrors of decades past), so they were motivated to
challenge it. Their protests in the 1960s concerned basic freedoms. Yet the authorities
responded non sequitur with rhetoric which threatened to strip many of Polish citizenship
according to crude genealogical reasoning.
While the physical uprooting of a human life is intensely personal, it was made
particularly so in the aftermath of 1968 in Poland due to the simultaneous questioning of the
identity of those persecuted. My inquiries led to wondering about the personal ways in which

7

the people I was reading about experienced broad political concepts of the type that often
dominate historical narratives; anti-communism (in philosophical terms, a struggle against
totalitarianism) in the case of postwar Poland. As emigration due to antisemitic policies defines
1968, so that year defines the later democratic opposition. There were also those—like Adam
Michnik—who personally experienced antisemitism but consciously chose to stay and make a
stand against authoritarianism and ethnonationalism. People well-known from ’68—both
émigrés and those that decided to stay in Poland—participated in the creation and functioning
of the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR), founded in 1976, without which there would be no
Solidarność. I think throughout of political and intellectual motivations as rooted in identity and
lived experiences, but not determined by the latter. Conversations in Aneks often exemplify
into this schema. This approach has enhanced my understanding of Polish culture moving
through and departing communism, a trajectory shaped by individuals seeking to limit the
encroachment of History on life.
Historian Mikołaj Tyrchan notes in his 2009 article on Aneks that the publication has not
received much scholarly attention. This oversight is understandable as the publication does not
neatly fit into the usual categories of study of Polish history or the communist period in Eastern
Europe. The publication’s name only appears here and there, acknowledged as a dissident
quarterly in a sentence or a footnote in some of the expansive secondary source literature on
the political opposition in communist Poland. Aneks has only been the subject of a couple of
short articles and hardly receives a mention in volumes written about Poles in emigration with

8

an emphasis on political life.10 The only other scholar to write a piece that focuses on Aneks is
Paczkowski. His 1990 article on the publication appears in a “Class of ‘68” subsection in the
journal Res Publica, founded by 1968 participants Marcin Król and Wojciech Karpiński (both Król
and Karpiński were published in Aneks. Król was a frequent collaborator).11 Paczkowski’s 2003
article, titled “About Aneks after all these years” appears in Zeszyty Literackie, a journal
founded by another 1968 participant, Barbara Toruńczyk.12 Just before the article in the journal
are memorial tributes to the then-recently deceased Jakub Karpiński, brother of activist and
intellectual Wojciech and another persona from the history of the 1968 events in Poland.
Paczkowski’s article appears under the section heading of przypomnienia; translated as
remembrances, recollections, or for the record.
This Polish intellectual milieu moved away from the idea that the communist state could
be reformed (referred to as revisionism) while embracing the intellectual traditions surrounding
them in Europe and the Western world more broadly. But they did not move toward the
breathtaking events of 1989 because until very shortly before this year, no one could have
imagined that communism in Poland would have ended that way. Yet much of Polish history
written in the past couple of decades has looked back on the communist period from the

10

See the three-part series: Andrzej Friszke and Instytut Studiów Politycznych (Polska Akademia
Nauk), Warszawa nad Tamizą: z dziejów polskiej emigracji politycznej po drugiej wojnie
światowej (Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1994); Paweł
Machcewicz, Emigracja w polityce międzynarodowej (Warszawa: Biblioteka Więzi, 1999); Rafał
Habielski, Życie społeczne i kulturalne emigracji (Warszawa: Biblioteka Więzi, 1999); See also:
Friszke and Instytut Studiów Politycznych (Polska Akademia Nauk), Warszawa nad Tamizą;
Andrzej Friszke and Instytut Studiów Politycznych (Polska Akademia Nauk), Myśl polityczna na
wygnaniu: publicyści i politycy polskiej emigracji powojennej (Warszawa: Instytut Studiów
Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1995).
11
Paczkowski, “‘Aneks’ 1973-89.”
12
Andrzej Paczkowski, “„O «Aneksie» Po Latach”,” Zeszyty Literackie, no. 83 (2003): 136–42.
9

transitions to democracy of 1989, writing with that year as an end goal in order to attempt to
understand how it occurred.13 The extraordinary nature of those events can obscure
understanding of processes occurring on a longer wavelength.
If limiting this study to a now thirty-year-old narrative that ends with the collapse of
communism, I would claim that studying the publication helps to make clearer the links
between 1968 and 1989. However, anti-communism was only one of the major themes
discussed in Aneks. Looking back at the 1960s from the (1973-1989) print run of Aneks and then
toward the future aids in understanding not just the 1970s and 1980s but also Poland’s
transformation after 1989. The place of Christianity in European culture (Chapter Seven), the
relationship of the intellectual to utopia (Chapter Six), Poland’s relationship to the West
(Chapter Nine) and to Russia (Chapter Five), Polish-Jewish relations (Chapter Eight)— these
questions continue to spark debate.
Despite the scant historical writing on Aneks, it was the founders of the publication who
experienced the events of 1968 in all of that year’s layered complexity. They experienced
political activism and prison; antisemitism and emigration. One reason that Aneks is not well
remembered may be because by virtue of representing the 1968 emigration it contests the idea
of Polish identity as “Polish-Catholic,” as purely biological or ethnic. Despite being somewhat

13

Among scholars that have written a plethora of publications devoted to the study of 1989
and the period leading up to it are Timothy Garton Ash, Jan Kubik, David Ost, and Padraic
Kenney (Kenney and Ash are historians, though Ash also covered Eastern Europe as a
journalist). Polish historians like Marcin Zaremba, Andrzej Paczkowski, Jerzy Eisler and Andrzej
Friszke have associated less with the transformative year of 1989 and more with the concept of
the communist period of Polish history as a whole—often considering whether or in what way it
is unique, different, separate from the rest of Polish history rather than whether or what
progress was made in the years leading up to 1989.
10

well-known in Poland (and some, like Michnik, internationally), many among this milieu
themselves do not fit neatly into Polish history as it has unfolded over the past half century.
Because contemporary conceptions of Polishness are so homogenous, writing about
Polish Jews (or Jewish Poles, and anything in between) is difficult. Already a historian at the
Polish Academy of Sciences in 1968, Krystyna Kersten left the Polish Communist Party (PZPR)
after the invasion of Czechoslovakia that year. On the history of Poles and Jews, Kersten writes
in 1992
In short: it is permissible and necessary to research the history of Polish Jews, as well as
the negative and positive ties that they had with Poland. However, it would be difficult,
ignoring all other reasons for which dividing Poles into Poles-Poles and Poles-Jews or
Poles of Jewish origin seems dangerous to me, to count… firstly, [who] had Jewish roots,
and secondly - maintained a bond with Jewishness, described [themselves] as a Jew and
function as such in [their] surroundings.14
Prior to 1968, those with Jewish family backgrounds were aware of it as something to consider
a few times a year or bring up in certain specific situations while others were not aware of it at
all. This sort of casual hyphenated identity is something familiar to many people across the
world who, in the first decades of the twenty-first century, live in multicultural environments at
a time when diversity is celebrated. The young people I write about were well-traveled,
cosmopolitan, modern; they learned French, English, sometimes German. For these reasons
1968 was a great shock to them. The communist authorities were using the antisemitic slogans
of the pre-war right and it took some time before these young people came to believe
something that their parents felt immediately: that the harnessing of this hatred went beyond
political utility, that it was sincere. March 1968 in Poland showed that a major division of pre-
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war Polish politics remained within a political system whose perhaps only remaining unbroken
promise was that it had overcome such prejudice.
Looking at the longue durée of 20th-century Polish politics and society makes the
antisemitic campaign of 1968 seem less surprising. There is a lingering fault line between
inclusionary politics and exclusionary movements, namely ethnic nationalism promoted by
those who claim that nation-states are the domain of one group. This is not to say that Endecja
politicians were in the Polish Communist Party (PZPR) leading up to 1968. The idea of an
ethnically pure Poland—with no Germans, Ukrainians, Jews, or any other minority groups that
have historically called the lands that it currently encompasses home—appealed to nationalist
Polish communists (aligning with the dominant evolution of Marxism according to the idea of
socialism in one country) just as it had appealed to nationalists in decades past.
Modern history is often written from state or even police records and that is especially
the case when writing about events that occurred in a police state. While researching this
intellectual milieu, I have thought of Aneks as linking individuals in a positive way (compared to
a mark on record in a police archive).15 The publication is something tangible against the absurd
but consequential theories about students participating in Zionist conspiracies and seditious
organizations that were formulated by agents of the state in the 1960s and are described in the
following chapter.
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Aneks milieu?
“For us Aneks was important, it was the voice of our milieu,” says Adam Michnik.16 The
phrase “Aneks milieu” is used throughout to refer to the extended web of people who
consciously contributed to the journal. It is comprised of the editorial core (those who helped
the publication go from idea to reality) with two rings around it. Outside of the core is a ring of
frequent contributors and helpers: those who compiled special sections, translated work, or
frequently contributed articles. People who were sometimes published in Aneks, or who were
aware of it and had good contacts with its editors, form the outer ring. The list expands from
there. It encompasses some of the most well-known participants in the Polish anti-communist
opposition and a number of émigrés who helped spread knowledge about this domestic
opposition in the West. Aneks is thus a rich repository of information allowing for a deeper
understanding of people who had a significant impact on not just Polish but—because they are
part of the story of the decline of communism, a critical Western ideology—European history.
Describing or outlining who is for the purpose of this work considered a member of the
Aneks milieu has been a daunting challenge in writing it. I have plainly asked the question to
some of the protagonists, and all have responded—still living, I think, with the accusations of
conspiracy leveled against them in 1968—that an Aneks “group” did not exist. The only name
that eventually appears in the publication’s front matter is that of Aleksander Smolar as editor.
Though he uses the idea of an Aneks milieu, Michnik expresses reservations similar to the
above about a Polish secular left intellectual milieu (lewica laicka in Polish) that the editors of
Aneks belong to during a 2012 interview: “the existence of the secular left could be called into
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question. After all, there were no clubs uniting it... [Jarosław Kuisz:] But you mentioned specific
people. [Adam Michnik:] Yes, but many of them would raise objections if you asked them.”17
Irena Grudzińska, scholar of Polish literature and 1968 émigré, writes in a retrospective piece
on 1968 in Poland: “There is a problem here, and throughout, with my use of the pronoun
“we.”18
While there may be no Aneks milieu, it is worthwhile to imagine one. In the scant Polish
literature on Aneks, the noun grono is used to refer to those who participated in the creation of
the journal. It translates most directly to “group.” Grono can refer to a social circle, but this
does not seem fitting for a loosely affiliated milieu and neither does “group.” Members of this
milieu did not all have to know each other and the journal (or others in the milieu) did not have
to hold a particularly important place in their lives. Most of the names associated with Aneks
are considered part of the aforementioned secular left. Prior to 1968 the editors of the
publication belonged to a group of Warsaw University students who opposed to a rightward
turn toward both anti-intellectualism and working-class repression, then antisemitism and
ethnic nationalism, that the communist government was taking as rival factions fought for
control of the party. Though most largely got involved because they wanted to defend their
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university (or even childhood) friends from repression, the force of that repression removed
any doubt about whether a better communist state would come to be.
The journal targeted this small but influential elite, comprised of the pre-1968
intellectual circles that the émigrés left behind, in part because the founders had scant financial
resources. People in this audience would (increasingly) over the years also be contributors.
Reaching this audience was the means by which to make the biggest impact with the small
production run that Aneks could manage. The cost of printing wasn’t the only logistical hurdle
when making this decision. The journal also had to make it into Poland across borders where
guards checked for unauthorized publications. This is one aspect of the communist world where
politically inspired works like George Orwell’s classic 1984 (the subject of a 1974 thematic issue
of Aneks) were documentary rather than fiction. Enemy publications—often literally referred to
as such in the files of the security services—had to be smuggled to Poland using a variety of
methods (described in Chapter Five). There was also an audience of interested intellectuals
scattered across the western world. The language of the publication was Polish and so many of
those reading abroad were émigrés themselves. In the pages of Aneks over the years there are
a number of émigré authors from as far away as Australia who participate in debates.
The people I write about seek hope amidst more or less timeless personal and political
crises within what some perceived as dystopian civilizational circumstances. While on the face
of it the crises are specific to communist Poland or Cold War Europe, I also believe that their
stories are more widely relatable. The collapse of communism in Europe was as well an
inflection point for the growth of the European Union—a triumph of this multilateral national
model. Yet it was not only the EU that grew after 1989. People, ideas and politics that had not
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gained much traction in Cold War Europe were empowered as well. The topics broached by
thematic issues of Aneks—analyzed in the chapters that comprise the second half of the
dissertation—foreshadowed not only Polish politics in the wake of 1989 but the key issues
(cultural tolerance, migration, the place of Christianity in Western society and the definition of
the West itself) facing Europe in the decades since. This milieu was a transmission belt that
both helped to keep the scattered Polish intellectual scene healthy after 1968 and enriched a
broader Western world of ideas.
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Part I: Biographical Chapters
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Chapter One: From Scouting and Clubs to 1968
It was a purely Polish phenomenon. We were Communists despite everything. Mickiewicz
wasn’t a Communist: he was a nineteenth-century romantic author. Nor was he a chauvinist.
He was very anti-Russian, but in the anti-czarist sense. He wrote a poem called “To My
Muscovite Friends” for the Decembrists. He suited our state of mind: he allowed us to be both
patriots and internationalists, to be anti-Russian while being Russophiles. And Czechoslovakia
represented a new perspective for us.
-Adam Michnik, in conversation with Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Warsaw, May
19871
To me, it came as a shock. To my parents, it didn't.
-Nina Smolar
The 1960s are the pre-history of Aneks, which was created in 1973. The impetus for
starting Aneks and its editorial rationale can better be understood by first demarcating the
broader intellectual community that this handful of people participated in before they were
forced to leave Poland. Most of those mentioned in this chapter will over the years publish in
Aneks. The chapter begins by describing the upbringing of the core of the Aneks milieu, which
puts them on the path to being political actors in communist Poland. I describe their first taste
of anti-authoritarian activism, connections with western intellectuals and trips abroad. I
conclude by exploring the experience of prison, which those born into prewar Communist
families envisioned then as fate.
The spark for the cycle of events culminating in prison and emigration was a genuine
revolutionary call: the development of a program designed to foment popular protest in order
to affect political change. “It is true, however, that the present criminal code, created or
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maintained by the bureaucracy, allows for police persecution for such activities,” wrote
graduate students and activists Jacek Kuroń and Karol Modzelewski in their 1966 Open Letter to
the Party.2 That an open letter would attract such immense attention and land people in jail
might seem difficult to believe but, as leaders of an authoritarian state, communist party
functionaries assigned great importance to and simultaneously feared ideas. Kuroń,
Modzelewski and their protégé Adam Michnik were punished before the eyes of a generation
entering the university in the middle of the 1960s. Among those watching were the future
editors of Aneks.
These arrests led to an increase of protest activity around Warsaw University over the
second half of the decade. The young people I write about were not, however, swept up in
revolutionary fervor. Rather, they chose to stand by their friends and were harassed for it.
Meanwhile, the Communist Party sitting on top of a vast security apparatus was rolling back
freedoms that had been expected in the wake of reforms after the end of Stalinism in Eastern
Europe. Rights which the students had anticipated were scorned and met with repression. Born
into the intelligentsia, the student activists used their privilege to make connections with
western peers, publicizing the plight of those in prison in trips they were able to make abroad
for other reasons. These early Western connections would bear fruit and lead to decades of
transnational engagement.
Beyond providing a relatively privileged place in society for these young people, their
parents transmitted a particular attitude toward political activism which was punctuated by
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prison. It was a rite of passage during the first half of the twentieth century in Eastern Europe,
especially for the prewar communists who had participated in shaping postwar Poland out of
the ashes of war. These sentiments mixed with the inherited trauma all Poles had inculcated
from mid-century catastrophe: war, genocide and loss of national sovereignty. The actions and
identities of these young people were based on this multi-faceted mental foundation. To it
would soon be added the trauma of exile.
Before trials and prison, there was a communist upbringing; there were youth camps
and then discussion clubs. In discussion clubs at university, and even already at secondaryschool age, the future editors of Aneks developed bonds with former members of the so-called
red scouts, or walterowcy, a communist youth organization. Along with his university friend
Karol Modzelewski, scouting activist Jacek Kuroń became a mentor to this group of young
people that would coalesce at the university in the middle of the 1960s. Adam Michnik,
entering university in 1964 though having moved in intellectual circles with academics and
graduate students for years prior, was a protégé of Kuroń since he was a child in the
walterowcy. Michnik chose not to emigrate after 1968, and in the ten years prior to the
formation of civil society organizations in Poland in 1976 became the central figure of this
Warsaw intellectual milieu. Both his peers and graduate students like Modzelewski and
Aleksander Smolar were influenced by him, and he by them. These names are well-known but
less-so are some of the intricacies of their story, which unfolds below.
Aleksander Smolar, future editor-in-chief of Aneks, arrived as a child from the Soviet
Union not knowing Polish—like the slightly older Karol Modzelewski (b. 1937). The older
brother of Eugeniusz Smolar, Aleksander was born in Białystok, located in the Lithuanian and
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Belarussian borderlands (or kresy) in 1940, at a time when it was a part of the Soviet Union. Like
many other children of parents devoted to communism who were coming back to help rebuild
a war-ravaged Poland that had been shifted West by several hundred kilometers, he was in the
Union of Polish Youth (ZMP) and became the campus vice-president of the Union of Socialist
Youth (ZMS) at Warsaw University.3 Aleksander Smolar met Modzelewski for the first time in
1962 when he came to ask the ZMS vice-president if it would be possible to start a political
discussion club for students.4 They would go on to become friends and allies, but Smolar recalls
that even then Modzelewski was too radical—too wedded to Marxist dogma—for the Aneks
founder’s reformist (later liberal) sensibilities.
The Smolar brothers are notable exceptions in this milieu, because contrary to later
government propaganda, they are the only people who actually recall growing up within Jewish
cultural life (attending summer camps with other children being raised close to Jewish cultural
institutions rather than in Kuroń’s red scouts, for example) rather than being fully assimilated
but having ethnic Jewish ancestry. Their father was by profession a leader of Jewish life in
Poland from the war to 1968: editor of a Yiddish publication and head of the The Social and
Cultural Association of Jews in Poland (TSKŻ). The elder Smolar had spent decades shaping
Jewish culture within the Soviet sphere but as a committed communist, molding Jewishness to
communism: “He was very hostile towards what you could call traditional Judaism, Jewishness,
religion… right up to the end… his attitude was hostile, extraordinarily allergic,” Aleksander
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Smolar says.5 Their mother was a scholar of Polish history. The brothers identified as Polish
citizens of Jewish background, were never taught Yiddish, and Polish was the language spoken
at home.
Many of those that the Smolar brothers would meet in the intellectual scene around
Warsaw University, like Adam Michnik, had instead passed through the Jacek Kuroń’s
walterowcy. Jacek Kuroń (b. 1934) met Karol Modzelewski when Kuroń began studying in the
History department at Warsaw University in 1955, after the school of pedagogy he was
attending was dissolved. Kuroń was also a pedagogue in the Polish Scouting Association (ZHP),
which operated under the auspices of the ZMP. There he would develop the walterowcy
scouting program between 1954 and 1961, which gained a measure of independence within the
ZHP. Kuroń modeled his program on the theories of Soviet pedagogue Anton Makarenko.
Meanwhile the program’s name was derived from the nom de guerre of Karol Świerczewski, a
Polish communist who as General commanded an International Brigade during the Spanish Civil
War.6 Kuroń would be distanced from and eventually thrown out of scouting between 1961 and
1963 after some of his walterowcy protégés began to agitate not only against institutions like
the church—which was an outcome that was expected and desired from the radical communist
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branch of the scouting movement—but also the shortcomings of the Communist Party itself.7
The paths of Kuroń and Modzelewski crossed just before news of Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev’s speech that dismantled Stalinism shook Poland in 1956—an event that would
become an inflection point in their lives. They held on to this hopeful moment of reform in the
communist system until it was extinguished in 1968. Modzelewski was contemplative,
academic, while Kuroń was loud, uninhibited, which could initially upset people (Aleksander
Smolar’s first impressions of Kuroń were that he was a “rally-speaker… a demagogue”).8
As walterowcy scouts, the youth were taught values that are today recognizable both as
communist and as universal: shared goals and responsibilities; self-organization; looking out for
the wellbeing of others, especially those who are weaker; multiculturalism with an Eastern
European sensibility (singing Russian, Ukrainian, and Jewish songs in addition to Polish ones).
Former scouts recall also singing revolutionary songs: not only from the Spanish Civil War but
from as far away as China and Cuba. They learned about ethnicities within Soviet culture with
many becoming devotees of the Georgian-Armenian folk singer Bulat Okudzhava, whose
ambiguously anti-communist art was marginalized in the Soviet Union. “This outraged us,”
recalls former member of Kuroń’s scouting troop and 1968 émigré Marta Petrusewicz.9
Kuroń wanted to create miniature societies that the youth would have to learn to
cultivate on their own. The goal was to create model citizens in the communist mold. Kuroń’s
idea of a model citizen was exceptional, however, and turned out to deviate from the trajectory
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of communism in Eastern Europe. “We want to raise people who will want to and know how to
change the world,” he wrote in 1961. Kuroń rankled the ZHP with his extraordinary program
after a promotion within the organization. Simultaneously, his scouts started to realize the
mission of changing the world: a theater group “sought to find contradictions between Marxism
and the reality of People’s Poland.”10 The walterowcy were dissolved at the end of 1961.
Because Aneks published people from the generation of 1968 who were mentored by Kuroń, it
carries within it the values of his experimental walterowcy scouting troop, the ethos of the
Open Letter to the Party that he penned with Karol Modzelewski in 1965 (which helped awaken
a student movement in Poland) and the various mostly student-led discussion clubs that
sprouted up in Warsaw over the course of the 1960s.
Discussion Clubs
Jan Gross did not have a scouting background. He was friends with Adam Michnik from
school: the Warsaw secondary school called the Lyceum Batorego. In the fall of 1961 Aniela
Steinsbergowa, a lawyer and friend of Gross’s mother, told them about the Club of the Crooked
Circle (of which she was a member).11 This club was one of a number that would be created,
officially sanctioned and quickly shut down, with the intention of highlighting new perspectives,
questioning the status quo and sparking debate. The two teenagers were still at lyceum—along
with Irena Grudzińska—when they started to attend. At the Club of the Crooked Circle, people
gathered who after the collapse of Stalinism wanted to think about social, political, and
philosophical questions without the burden of the state ideology—among them the
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philosopher Leszek Kołakowski and historian Jan Józef Lipski. The club had been created just
prior to 1956 and its members, many involved with Po Prostu (the official publication of the
ZMP youth organization), had actually helped to precipitate post-Stalinist reforms in Poland.
Bigger and with clearer intentions than a dinner party or discussion group, discussion
clubs were popular among intellectuals and students that were becoming intellectuals. They
took place at cafés and university spaces. Many of the young people who gathered in them
retained values from their scouting experience like helping those in need and coming to the aid
of friends. As arenas of free thought and discussion that both hosted and were regularly
attended by prominent intellectuals, they presented a danger to the leading role of the
Communist Party.
The Club of the Crooked Circle was closed in early 1962 and the participation of Gross
and Michnik—14 and 15 years old, respectively—was part of the pretext for it. After consulting
with longtime chair of the club, Jan Józef Lipski, and Jacek Kuroń, his mentor from the scouts,
Michnik decided to form his own club. Michnik’s club became the Club of the Seekers of
Contradictions.12 A club planning document notes that it will have general, sociological, and
philosophical sections. Though these grand plans did not come to fruition in the context of the
club, Michnik imagined that it would have sections focused on contact with the Club of Catholic
Intelligentsia (KIK); pedagogy; contacts with Soviet youth; and a romance section focused on
contact with young Italian communists. The overarching goal was to “storm the schools:” the
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club leaders wanted “to create an atmosphere of intellectual agitation” among students, “to
free young people from the stagnation and apathy that prevails,” a premonition of 1968.13 With
this rationale, the club hoped to “place before [Polish] youth the problems of the 20th century,”
which in 1960s Poland meant the problems of a post-Stalinist Poland still committed to
Marxism.
Michnik’s outline both echoes the values of the walterowcy and foreshadows the
intellectual life of Poland after 1968. The free, inquisitive and pedagogical spirit of Michnik’s
club echoes the pedagogy of Jacek Kuroń’s walterowcy. A glance at the thematic chapters of
this dissertation reveals that the goals and aspirations imagined by Michnik are visible in the
content and mission of Aneks and at the same time a sketch of the intellectual landscape of the
organized opposition of the 1970s and 1980s in Poland.14 Dialogue with Catholic intellectuals,
along with Russian, French and Italian peers (specifically French leftists and Italian Communists)
all materializes several years after the club is closed and correlates directly to colorful special
editions of Aneks.
While the clubs of the early 1960s in large part bear the mark of Adam Michnik, a
decade later Aneks was published largely at the initiative of the Smolar families, who came to
know Michnik’s social circle through the informal groups described in this chapter. After
forming the club in March of 1962 with the support of Professor Adam Schaff of the Warsaw
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University philosophy department, Michnik was directed to get support from the ZMS at the
university, where he met Aleksander Smolar, who was deputy director in the organization.
Irena Grudzińska would join the board of the club alongside Michnik and Gross by the end of
the year. Thus a core contingent of the Aneks milieu already knew each other a decade prior to
its founding.
Karol Modzelewski had just been allowed a year of academic research in Italy over the
course of 1961-1962 when he came to speak to the Club of the Seekers of Contradiction about
the Italian worker’s movement. While in Italy, he not only did research in his professional field
of Medieval history but made contacts with Italian leftists of all stripes: Eurocommunists,
socialists and Trotsky-inspired internationalists (he even met liberal Christian democrats).15 He
attended leftist protests and political meetings organized by both students and Italian
Communist Party members. While Italy was not a communist country, he saw that these
oppositional manifestations of political expression were open and tolerated—just normal, he
later wrote—and he came back to Poland determined to carve out the political freedom he had
felt in the West.16
As soon as he returned from Italy, Modzelewski had conferred with his friend Jacek
Kuroń about how to find more like-minded people. He decided to start a discussion club of his
own at Warsaw University, and in November of 1962 met Aleksander Smolar for the first time
when he sought out the ZMS leadership to talk about setting one up. This club, called the
Political Discussion Club, differed from Michnik’s in that it was set up for older participants,
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mainly graduate students like Modzelewski and Aleksander Smolar. Professor Włodzimierz
Brus, Aleksander Smolar’s advisor and a future Aneks contributor, helped set up the club by
giving his blessing as a Communist Party representative at the University and would participate
as well. In a few years they would all find themselves beyond the Party, beyond official
organizations, and sometimes in jail.
Both Michnik’s club and the club set up by Modzelewski barely made it one year before
being ordered to close by the authorities. Modzelewski’s Political Discussion Club was dissolved
at the end of 1963. Michnik’s Club of the Seekers of Contradiction had managed to be chastised
publicly by first secretary Władysław Gomułka in July (the club had previously attracted some
media attention which gave it a very public profile. Michnik was not yet eighteen years old).
The Open Letter to the Party
In late 1964 Karol Modzelewski and Jacek Kuroń were kicked out of the Party and the
ZMS youth organization for writing a statement critical of the communist system (but also
ostensibly for their alleged contacts with foreign Trotskyists, namely a Belgian activist who
traveled to Poland on several occasions named Georges Dobbeler). With their original and only
manuscripts confiscated during this 1964 police raid, Kuroń and Modzelewski re-created from
memory and distributed their Open Letter to the Party in March of 1965, hoping to spark a
debate about social and political stagnation in the communist system. The two of them and
Adam Michnik, who had helped distribute the letter, were arrested within days. “This is a
document of political battle calling for counterrevolution, containing a negation of everything
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that has been created in people’s Poland,” then proclaimed Andrzej Werblan, a historian then
in charge of education in the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party.17
In the Open Letter, Kuroń and Modzelewski formulate their argument as communists:
they place the working class in its traditional leading role in a future revolution. Their argument
is based in Marxist economic thinking. But the Open Letter criticizes the Polish communist
system as exploitative of the working class by a Party bureaucracy, suggesting the overthrow of
the latter, which invited a dangerous comparison to communist bête noire Leon Trotsky’s
criticisms of the Soviet Union. In addition to inequality, the system Kuroń and Modzelewski
describe is inefficient, economically stagnant and results in a low standard of living for most
citizens. All solutions proposed by the intelligentsia to social and economic problems facing
Poland must suggest overthrowing the ruling bureaucracy if they are to be effective, the
authors write.
The Open Letter contains a section linking issues in Poland to internationalism. “Every
independent and victorious revolution is dangerous to bureaucracy,” the authors write,
describing an international bureaucratic monolith connected to an internal one.18 They call
“police thinking” the idea—promoted by the government—that Polish reformers should not
rock the boat in a nuclear-armed Europe. Not just the Polish bureaucracy but world leaders
who control the nuclear arsenals use the idea of nuclear annihilation to force obedience but do
not hesitate to use tanks when the status quo is threatened, they write, echoing Western
leftists of the era.
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Kuroń and Modzelewski suggest that a worker’s state should be organized around
factory councils that will also serve to rationalize production (compared to central planning of
the economy), a system of direct rather than parliamentary democracy. They argue for doing
away with the military and instead arming workers and peasants. The authors argue for a multiparty system of government, and to do away with censorship. Kuroń and Modzelewski style this
as the program of an international anti-bureaucratic revolution that can unite the working class
of the world. Finally, the authors write that they realize their call for protest and political
discussion is illegal in Poland. They assert that such is the price of commitment. Since they live
in a country that employs both a criminal code created by the pre-war right-wing government
of Poland and a communist code created in the time of Stalin, all independent political action is
illegal. After being arrested in March of 1965, Kuroń and Modzelewski were sentenced to three
and a half and three years in prison, respectively, for their protest. Adam Michnik was also
arrested but released, after a few months, in May of the same year.
Before the end of 1966, many more people whose names would appear in Aneks in the
coming decades were kicked out of the Party, as the fire Kuroń and Modzelewski had lit was
spreading with the help of the younger students supporting them. “And it was all social at that
time rather than ‘scheming,’” recalls Aneks co-founder Nina Smolar.19 Adam Michnik, advised
by Jan Józef Lipski, organized a talk for the 10th anniversary of 1956, a date that in communist
Poland symbolized both the end of Stalinism and the constant danger of regressing to that prior
era. The aim of the talk was to review whether the promises of the post-Stalinist reforms of
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1956 had been kept. Michnik had met Leszek Kołakowski soon before the student’s arrest in
1965. A year on from their introduction, he asked the philosopher to speak at the anniversary
event. Kołakowski’s student, the philosopher Krzysztof Pomian, would speak as well. The talk
took place on October 21.20
In the spirit of the Open Letter, Kołakowski blasted the party for not upholding the
reforms of 1956. Pomian followed in much the same tenor. Kołakowski was kicked out of the
PZPR by the 27th. Pomian by the end of November. Many prominent intellectuals either left or
were kicked out of the party after coming to Kołakowski and Pomian’s defense. Among them
the philosopher Bronisław Baczko, a colleague of Kołakowski that had been critical of Kuroń and
Modzelewski just a year prior, and Włodzimierz Brus, who Aleksander Smolar had selected over
the future world-renowned sociologist Zygmunt Bauman to pursue graduate work with. Brus
would emigrate as well, and his work appears numerous times in Aneks over the years.
Smolar got himself kicked out of the PZPR in December after making a critical speech at
a party conference at the University. He recalls calling the party totalitarian, consciously using
language that could only have been gleaned from Radio Free Europe and so basically admitting
to what was considered sedition. He also described the rising atmosphere of antisemitism
within the party bureaucracy in Poland. Smolar was immediately accused of Zionism. He
describes his approach to the speech as “vaguely suicidal,” in the sense that it would at the
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least end his career. Already then in 1966, when the committee of the party organization at
Warsaw University was in the process of formally kicking him out, Smolar recalls the
reprimands of the First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party at the University already
“underlined with antisemitism.”21
Michnik had been suspended from university as a result of alleged bad behavior during
the retrospective. A petition drive was started by both undergraduate and graduate students to
reinstate him. Among those gathering signatures were Irena Grudzińska and Eugeniusz Smolar.
Aleksander Smolar, now without his party card, was among the graduate students who helped.
This latest reaction by the authorities brought the graduate students, like Smolar, close to the
discussion club youth around Michnik. Szlajfer and others who had not been close to Michnik’s
friends also joined in. The vision of people like Kuroń, Modzelewski, and Michnik—who wanted
to stimulate into existence an engaged student body—was being realized. At the same time,
there was pressure from above to stifle these young troublemakers. As a response to this
defensive petition drive, over a dozen students were kicked out of the ZMS, among them some
of the protagonists who would later work on Aneks: Eugeniusz Smolar and Irena Grudzińska.
Irena Grosfeld, one of the co-founders of Aneks, received a mark on her record.
There were political differences among these young activists, who in the context of 1968
are usually thought of as a monolithic group. Aleksander was more of a democratizing,
liberalizing revisionist then, while the slightly older Kuroń and Modzelewski took after the
Trotskyist mold, similar to that of Milovan Đilas in Yugoslavia. While Smolar may not have
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agreed with Kuroń and Modzelewski about solutions, he agreed about the problems that the
latter raised and supported them (and a piece by Đilas even appears in the first issue of
Aneks).22 Smolar and the two older activists became friends and allies, but their political
outlook never changed at the core: “to tell the truth, radical left-wing language still works on
me like a red rag to a bull,” the Aneks editor-in-chief said decades later.23
Aleksander’s political position moved toward that of Leszek Kołakowski and Krzysztof
Pomian, the latter not only a student of Kołakowski but a friend and colleague of Smolar.24
Fellow graduate students Marcin Król and Andrzej Mencwel saw eye-to-eye with Smolar and
the émigré publisher would later call them conservative-liberals, taking the term from the title
of a 1978 Leszek Kołakowski essay.25 The younger Jan Gross also aligned more with these
political views prior to his emigration and participated in a discussion circle with the older
academics. Nina Smolar was part of this group as well; she helped with activism but was less
interested in the political minutiae. “For me, it was simply ridiculous. Just ridiculous,” Nina
Smolar says of a disagreement about protesting at the American embassy against the Vietnam
War that at that time divided liberal and radical students, thinking that the split was petty.26
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Transnational Connections before 1968
Connections between this milieu and western journalists began after the 1956
retrospective. Peter Raina, a British-Indian historian working on his doctorate at Warsaw
University at the time, was one of the students who raised their voice at the talk. He would
become friendly with the Michnik group around this time, and put Henryk Szlajfer, a more
radical student activist engaged in anticolonial causes—specifically the plight of the
Vietnamese—in touch with Associated Press journalist Eugene Kramer. Szlajfer met Kramer in
December of 1966 to relay information about the repressions occurring at the university.
Kramer expressed interest in meeting Michnik, and Szlajfer eventually convinced his fellow
student to acquiesce. Eugeniusz Smolar and Irena Grudzińska were part of a small handful of
other students who helped translate the meeting, during which Kramer was joined by New York
Times correspondent Henry Kamm.
The older mentor Modzelewski developed contacts in the West before the Open Letter
and prison made it difficult for him to leave the country. And he was not the only one among
this group of young intellectuals who traveled abroad long before Aneks existed, before 1968
and political trouble. Adam Michnik, fellow discussion club participant Barbara Toruńczyk and
Jan Gross took trips abroad prior to 1968, during which they made connections which would
subsequently help the Polish opposition. Westerners would also come to Poland and connect
with this precocious and multilingual social milieu.
Between completing his secondary school and beginning his studies at the University of
Warsaw in the fall of 1964, Adam Michnik went abroad for several months. Through Vienna, he
visited Munich, Rome and Paris before returning to Poland before the start of the academic
year. In Munich he was introduced to employees of the Polish section of Radio Free Europe,
34

including the director, Jan Nowak-Jeziorański. The latter in turn introduced Michnik to Zbigniew
Brzeziński, Polish-American political scientist and future National Security Advisor for President
Carter between 1977-1981 (years frenetic with oppositional political activity in Poland).
Brzeziński was impressed that the young Michnik had managed to get his hands on and read his
recently published book.27 The young Pole also met Ukrainian publicists and intellectuals Borys
Lewytskyj and Bohdan Osadczuk, who had connections to the Paris émigré journal Kultura. In
Rome, Michnik, like Modzelewski before him, met people with an array of beliefs. He spoke to
Italian communists and had several meetings with Polish Catholic intellectual Janusz Zabłocki,
who happened to be in Rome at the time as well. In Paris, Michnik developed contacts with
French students, among them Trotskyists, and Jerzy Giedroyc of the Paris Kultura—on whom
the 18-year-old Michnik left a positive impression.
Before he was caught with possession of Kuroń and Modzelewski’s Open Letter after
Modzelewski had asked him to try to get it abroad, Michnik had given a copy to one of his
mentors, Jan Józef Lipski. Barbara Toruńczyk received a copy of the letter from Lipski, who
handed it to her in public, wrapping a bouquet of daffodils. Michnik asked an acquaintance,
fellow student Jerzy Mink, to take the text with him on a monthlong trip to France in February
of 1966, but Mink did not want to incur the risk. Instead, Mink spread word in Paris about the
letter and its contents. As news about the repressions in Warsaw spread, Mink was introduced
to Socialisme ou Barbarie group members Claude Lefort, Cornelius Castoriadis, Edgar Morin and
Jean-François Lyotard as well as Trotskyites Charles Urjewicz and Hubert Krivine.28 Retrieving
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the open letter from Toruńczyk, Urjewicz and future Mouvement du 22 mars member Bernard
Conein smuggled it out of Poland in the summer of 1966.
Jan Gross too would go to Rome, one year after Michnik, to see his uncle Feliks Gross.29
The Polish-American sociologist Feliks, before escaping the Second World War and settling in
New York, was a leftist political activist, member of the Polish Socialist Party (which he
belonged to in exile as well), and doctoral student of the anthropologist Bronisław Malinowski.
In 1966, Jan Gross spent time in Paris, where he supported himself by working at a clothing
store and helped to translate Kuroń and Modzelewski’s Open Letter into French. It was
published abroad first by Kultura in Polish and by French Trotskyists soon after. Eugeniusz
Smolar spent time in France during the summers in the years between 1964 and 1967, visiting
his aunt and doing what could be called a work-study program. Because his mother was a
historian, he would also visit Moscow for weeks at a time.30
Barbara Toruńczyk, a discussion club participant, made it to Paris in 1967, allowed out of
the country due to the death of her father, who was a commander of the Polish international
brigade during the Spanish Civil War. She too went to Munich and briefed Radio Free Europe
extensively on the repressions that had occurred to the young political activists in Warsaw up
to that point. Toruńczyk met with Italian communists in Rome and leftists of many stripes in
Paris, including representatives of the Jeunesse Communiste Revolutionaire and the French
section of the Fourth International, among them young activists Charles Urjewicz, Pierre
Goldman, Hubert Krivine and his twin brother Alain. She met not only with Jerzy Giedroyc but
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Konstanty Jeleński and Gustaw Herling-Grudziński, prominent Polish émigré intellectuals also
associated with the Paris Kultura. Toruńczyk wanted to publicize the plight of the opposition in
Poland, especially the imprisonment of Kuroń and Modzelewski. She wrote letters to Amnesty
International and even wrote for the Polish section of French radio at the urging of one of its
editors, Jan Winczakiewicz.31
“The problem was that the text was leaked abroad and was published there. It became
easily available,” writes Andrzej Werblan in a book he co-published with Karol Modzelewski in
2017.32 Due in part to western contacts developed by the above Polish student activists, the
letter made a profound impact on leftist politics—and not only in Italy and France. Trotskyist
connections in the West ensured that the letter appeared in French and English by 1967. By
1969 it was also published in German, Swedish, Japanese and Czech.33
This Polish crowd was not just looking West. Russian bard Bulat Okudzhava, whose
uncle had entered Russia with Lenin in 1917 and whose father was executed in the Stalinist
purges, visited Poland in June of 1967. His songs were devoid of political content but had a
melancholy subtext reflecting the Soviet experience, an alternative and breath of fresh air in a
sociopolitical system in which art had to be officially sanctioned and was approved most readily
when it celebrated the virtues of the Soviet state. Okudzhava’s parents had been rehabilitated
after Stalin’s death, and he was able to join the Communist Party. As was the case with the
parents of these Polish student activists and the activists themselves, he was not trusted by
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hardliners in the Party due to his family background and the content of his art, which
challenged the status quo. Okudzhava met Karol Modzelewski and Jacek Kuroń on a trip to
Poland in 1964, where they shared their mutual perspectives about the social and political
situations in their countries. The Russian and the Poles even took a trip to the Polish mountains
together.
Modzelewski was still in jail when Okudzhava visited in 1967, but the artist met Kuroń
and others, including Leszek Kołakowski. Eugeniusz Smolar through his connections to people in
the world of youth culture arranged Okudzhava’s performance at a Warsaw club called Stodoła,
(or “the barn”).34 He performed publicly, but also met with the students in Michnik’s circle
privately. Among the students, Irena Grudzińska had already met Okudzhava on a trip to
Moscow in 1965. She was asked then to bring him a letter by Natalia Modzelewska, mother of
Karol Modzelewski, and inform him of Kuroń and Modzelewski’s troubles.35 From Poland,
Okudzhava went to Paris and met with some Polish contacts of the students there as well. In a
1971 special issue dedicated to Russia, the editors of Kultura began an essay with an epigraph
from an Okudzhava song entitled “Farewell to Poland.” The poet Wiktor Woroszylski, an old
friend of Leszek Kołakowski who would in 1976 work on a Russian issue of Aneks, was a
translator of Okudzhava’s work.
March 1968
The two key events of 1968 in Poland occur in 1967. Dziady, directed by playwright
Kazimierz Dejmek, debuted at the end of November 1967 and an Israel equipped with western
weaponry defeated Soviet-backed Arab countries in the Six Day War in June. The Dejmek play
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was a production of a drama by Adam Mickiewicz, a nineteenth-century Romantic poet on
whose prose Polish identity is built. The play is loaded with anti-Tsarist sentiment (though not
anti-Russian—Mickiewicz was friends with Pushkin), with protagonists lamenting the fate of
student activists, prisoners and those exiled by the Russian empire. The Soviet proxy defeat in
the middle east in June meanwhile turned Soviet policy sharply against Israel, creating fertile
ground for accusations of Zionism against political enemies in Eastern Europe. Mere weeks
after its debut the communist authorities deemed Dziady anti-Russian and banned it. Protests
by student groups were organized in response. At the same time, opposition to a government
that seemed to be getting more repressive after post-Stalinist reforms in 1956 had been
steadily building in intellectual circles over the course of the decade.
“To me, it came as a shock. To my parents, it didn't,” says Nina Smolar.36 She was
speaking about the instrumentalization of antisemitism by the authorities, which to people who
had grown up in interwar Poland and lived through the Holocaust was like pouring salt on a
wound. The instrumentalization of anti-Zionist rhetoric blossomed on fertile ground: even
before the June 1967 Six Day War, members of the Polish security services were formulating
antisemitic theories about the student protestors. Internal documents show that by May of
1967 the security services divided students into groups based on a crude understanding of
ethnicity: some labeled as claiming to be Polish, or as “actually Jewish.”37 Government
documents corroborate what Aleksander Smolar heard and experienced from his superior in
the party when he was kicked out in 1966. Then in June, after the war, First Secretary
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Władysław Gomułka publicly described what he called a fifth column. “The fact that it was
declared by the government, not some dregs or people in the streets – that was what shocked
me,” Nina Smolar continues. In the Polish context, the phrase “fifth column” had last been used
to describe supporters of the Third Reich who would carry out sabotage behind Polish lines
during the early months of the Second World War. It was now being used to characterize Polish
citizens with a Jewish background as foreign.
Increasing public chauvinism in government ranks was upsetting to these young
intellectuals. But they themselves did not immediately feel attacked. They had been repressed
on administrative grounds and as rabble-rousers but not on the basis of being part of another
nationality or ethnicity. Even in June of 1967 it would have been a ridiculous thought for these
avant-garde children, largely from communist homes, to think of themselves as anything but
Polish. They and their parents were Polish citizens working for the good of their country. And so
the chauvinism, even the overt antisemitism of June, was taken by the younger generation as
an unsophisticated ploy by an authoritarian government and nothing more. It was troubling,
but not catastrophic.
Jacek Kuroń met Leszek Kołakowski for coffee on May 3, 1967, not 24 hours after being
released from prison. Karol Modzelewski left prison a few months later, in September of that
year. This group of intelligentsia was being closely monitored now, though it also seemed like
momentum was gathering and it was on their side. They had done their time in prison for their
political heresy. The university students were considering how to show solidarity with the
intellectuals who had supported Kuroń, Modzelewski, Michnik and Kołakowski; with those
others who were also kicked out of the Party.
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In another premonition of the transnational publishing initiative to come, a small group
that included Jan Gross and Adam Michnik had the idea of creating a Polish edition of the
French publication Les Temps Modernes. Jan Gross recalls it decades later as a bit of hubris, but
there was precedent for the project.38 Ten years earlier, in the wake of the Stalinist thaw of
1956, Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre’s publication released an issue of pieces by
Polish authors, entitled le socialisme polonaise. Toruńczyk had just returned from France at this
point in 1967 and reported great interest in Poland there. It was an entirely realistic project but
the students thought that it might be too radical for the time; that it would result in more jail
time with not enough to gain from it.
Throughout November and December, students at Warsaw University, among them a
core associated with Michnik that were pejoratively called the komandosi (Commandos),
participated in lively discussions about imperialism abroad and Polish nationalism at home
during events at the university. Not allowed to form discussion clubs and under surveillance,
groups now met during social occasions like people’s birthdays. To meet with no alibi could
mean further harassment, though their bonds were informal and often contentious. Jan Gross
and Adam Michnik, for example, were not on speaking terms at the end of 1967 for both
personal reasons and because Gross wanted less direct confrontation with the authorities than
Michnik did. Gross at the time was closer to Aleksander Smolar, who had similar liberal but not
radical ideas about how to respond to the political climate. Nevertheless, the historian Andrzej
Friszke writes that the general position among this group by 1967 was that they were socialists
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(who disagreed with communist orthodoxy like the historian and activist Lipski did) and western
democracy was a model Poland should learn from because it gave more freedom to workers.39
In December of 1967 they attended a talk by Marian Dobrosielski, then an assistant professor at
the university, and asked the hardline communist politically provocative questions.40
In the middle of January 1968, it was announced that the calendar of Dziady
performances would be cut short. There would only be two more. Around the same time, the
security services had prepared a plan for surveilling what they called Adam Michnik’s group—
that is, the Warsaw University students who had for years been forming discussion clubs,
speaking up for friends who had been punished and loudly questioning the rising tide of
nationalism and repression in Poland. This group to which future Aneks editors belonged was
considered Jewish: “due to the specific nature of the group, which due to the concentration of
people of Jewish nationality in it is closed, the above-mentioned sources did not manage to
achieve a sufficient degree of trust to enter the strict group of people inspiring and steering the
activity of the group of A. Michnik and others.”41
Małgorzata Dziewulska, a student at the national theater school (PWST), asked Irena
Grudzińska and Jan Gross, among other students who were not afraid of raising their voice, to
convince their friends to support a protest of the closing of the play. Upon hearing about the
action Kuroń was wary, but Karol Modzelewski jumped into action. Asked for advice by the
students, he came up with a slogan: Independence without censorship. While a petition drive
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was also started in support of the play, the physical protest within the theater and on the street
immediately following the last performance marked the crossing of another line by the
students. Nina Smolar recalls that the January protest as important in another way: “I felt there
was something to protest against—censorship, antisemitism...” She helped to prepare for the
protest but did not make it, revealing concern with a responsibility that does not often make it
into books about political opposition: “Someone had to stay home with the child.”42
The day after the performance, Michnik and Szlajfer met with a foreign journalist again.
This time it was a correspondent of Le Monde, Bernard Margueritte, whose wife was a friend of
the wife one of the graduate students involved in the protests. The Polish students told him
about the prominent intellectuals, like Brus and Bauman, who had just left or been kicked out
of the party, and about the protest at the theater. Margueritte’s article based on the
information was published a couple of days later.
Communicating with Margueritte was characterized by the security services as
spreading false information to the western media: an offense insinuating treason. Over the
course of February, Michnik and Szlajfer were harangued by the security services: stopped,
detained, questioned numerous times and finally suspended from university. Other students in
this social circle were called in for questioning as well. Michnik, Szlajfer and Petrusewicz were
suspended and put before the university disciplinary commission. Numerous students were
punished with fines, or had scholarships taken away for being identified with the protests and
petition campaign. A flyer campaign on campus was initiated by some of the students, which
provided information about everything that had transpired.
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In February, students that were stopped reported that the security services were using
the word “Jew” as a pejorative term. Officers told students who were being interrogated that
the protests were organized by Jews, and that Jews (i.e. foreign agents) ran the Polish
Communist Party. Friszke gives an example of a security services report that depicts students
with names that sound Jewish as provoking antisemitism themselves by allegedly distributing
antisemitic flyers on campus.43 This confounded the students, as while many had some degree
of Jewish background, they were also largely from communist families who worked for People’s
Poland. It wasn’t even a matter of selecting an identity, as there was no other choice of identity
for communist youth in postwar Poland who were being raised to be model citizens and
intellectuals. They were now in trouble because of their desire to fix the country that they were
born in—that had nurtured and educated them. Their motivations were fostered by the
ideology of the state whose security apparatus was now creating a foreign identity for them.
Even more insidious was victim-blaming done by state representatives like Franciszek
Szlachcic, a high-ranking general coordinating the security services. Szlachcic accused those
targeted in the antisemitic campaign in 1968 of—among other things—„szantaż
antysemityzmu” (the blackmail of antisemitism) and „terroryzowanie antysemityzmem”
(terrorizing with antisemitism).44 The idea that Jews make Poland look bad (which assumes that
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someone considered Jewish is either not Polish or betraying their Polishness) follows the 1968
émigrés and is contested head-on in the pages of the journal in the 1980s (described in Chapter
Nine).45 Jacek Kuroń had taught the walterowcy that as long as there are antisemites in the
world, every decent person is a Jew.46 Modzelewski now repeated in defense of the students in
1968 that identity was a matter of self-determination.
In Poland, protests reached a crescendo at the beginning of March 1968. A large group
came together early that month to consider a protest against the expulsion of Michnik and
Szlajfer. Jan Gross was there although he had not been on speaking terms with Michnik earlier
in the year. Among others present were Irena Grudzińska, the Smolar brothers and Nina
Smolar. Earlier in the day, Leszek Kołakowski and his student Krzysztof Pomian had visited
Kuroń and asked him not to organize a protest as it would lead to more repression.
Nevertheless a date was set: Friday, March 8th. On March 7th, Assistant Professor Dobrosielski,
who had previously been a target of the students’ debate interventions, let students know that
the protest—now publicly announced—was organized by people serving foreign interests and

47, 465, 485 Notatkę poprzedzono pismem przewodnim zastępcy komendanta stołecznego MO
ds. SB płk. Stanisława Sławińskiego do dyrektora Gabinetu Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych płk.
Stanisława Kończewicza z dnia 3 IV 1968 r. AIPN, 1585/968, k. 259., Wniosek w sprawie
odwołania z funkcji redaktora naczelnego „Fołks Sztyme” Grzegorza Smolara, Informacja dot.
kontroli operacyjnej obywateli państw kapitalistycznych, uczestników uroczystości rocznicy
powstania w getcie.
45
At the same time, not everyone experienced antisemitism and imposition of identity the
same way. Among the founders of Aneks, a publication created by people swept out of Poland
on this wave of antisemitism, the reader for instance also finds Krzysztof Dorosz, who was a
Warsaw University student but was not involved in the protests and could not be made Jewish
by the state. Wiktoria, the woman he married, had Jewish roots and the two decided to leave
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had been deemed illegal by the university. Nina Smolar recalls making copies of the fliers that
evening using her scientific training:
I realized that the fastest method would be to make photo prints… I had the darkroom
available for the night on the 7th… [but] It made no sense, so we did it at home. I
brought [the chemicals home] from the institute…. And we made photocopies at home
at night. With [Eugeniusz] Smolar. I warned both gentlemen it was not funny business–
we’re putting on gloves, this is serious. I can remember my child sleeping in one room,
and the other room being covered with drying photo prints...47
On March 8th, as a crowd of over a thousand gathered, Dobrosielski warned them to
disperse. Soon after, riot police and plainclothes contingents of men with clubs arrived and
started beat students. Dobrosielski aided in the hunt, at one point slamming a door in the face
of students looking for a place to hide—actions that Kołakowski would remind the future
ambassador to Great Britain of at Oxford years later.
Prison Culture and Political Protest
Aleksander Smolar recalls sensing the weight of Modzelewski’s conviction as the
younger activists debated the March protest against censorship and for their friend Adam
Michnik. Modzelewski had jumped right in to planning the January protest of the play, but
something was different this time: “I saw Karol's face…I had the feeling that he realized that this
meant going to prison again, that he was one of the few people who realized...”48 Though
perhaps it was Smolar himself who felt the weight of responsibility for their collective decision:
“I also noticed this because I had a feeling that… the time for paying [the price for my
convictions], to use the language I'd picked up from Brus, was coming closer.”49 Smolar and
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many of his friends had been raised and educated at a time and in a place where the price for
political activism was often paid by sitting in prison. His intuition was accurate: Smolar was
arrested the day after the March 8, 1968, protest and would not be freed until the following
year. The future founders of Aneks were among dozens of students who were part of the
discussion club intelligentsia milieu that would be arrested during the events of 1968.
“Similar to Jacek Kuroń, I was raised with the conviction that jail ennobles,”
Modzelewski writes in his memoirs.50 “Living in our system and not sitting in jail is like being in
Rome and not seeing the pope.”51 Going to prison was part of the communist political tradition.
Both the young opposition and the people putting them in prison understood these unspoken
rules. “Many people walked the streets then who did the same in their youth,” the former Party
historian Werblan wrote later.52 “We were born… after the war: my friends and me. They were
the children of my parents' friends—from this milieu of pre-war Jewish communists who
already knew each other from Sanacja prisons,” says Marta Petrusewicz.53 In interwar Poland,
the only place for Jews in politics was on the left as the platforms of right-wing parties were
built largely on ethnic nationalism (and so antisemitism) which the government in power also
increasingly approached.
While there were mass arrests during 1968 protests in the West, the stakes and
rationale for internment were different for this group. To act against the system was personal
and visceral not something picked up in textbooks or in newspapers; it was a part of their

50

Modzelewski, Zajeździmy kobyłę historii, 147.
Friszke, Anatomia buntu, 329.
52
Walenciak, Modzelewski, and Werblan, Modzelewski -- Werblan, 204.
53
Wiszniewicz, Życie przecięte, 36.
51

47

identity, embedded in their history and the history of their families. Westerners that the
émigrés had and would interact with had little idea of how close the experience of communism
(inclusive of prison) was for this particular group of people. When the British historian E.P.
Thompson begged Leszek Kołakowski not to renounce Marxism in 1971, could he comprehend
the experiences and identities of the philosopher’s pupils, who spent time in jail and whose
parents spent years, collectively decades or even more in prison, or in concentration camps
(Kołakowski in his youth himself narrowly escaped being assassinated for communist
organizing)? The political opinions of Polish activists were far from uniform, but they were
united in having tangibly experienced a system of rule derived from Marx’s philosophy. Prison
and imprisonment are not unique to communist states but they became a major part of the
communist experience as soon as a person abutted the political process, which reached deep
into life. It ought to be considered alongside its economic structure or democratic potential.
Recognizing this personal perspective informs our understanding of both the trajectory of this
generation and of communism itself, which are one and the same.
It is true that politics and prison in Poland mixed already in the time of Tsarist rule.54 The
third and most influential part of the Adam Mickiewicz drama Dziady, the banning of which
inspired the March 1968 protests, was in turn inspired by the crushing of the 1830 so-called
November uprising by Warsaw military academy students against the rule of Tsarist Russia
within the territories of what was once Poland. Mickiewicz had himself been imprisoned for
conspiratorial activity as a student. His 1828 poem about a pagan raised as a Christian by
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However, wherever in the world communist states have existed, political imprisonment has
followed. Prison likewise haunts all authoritarian regimes but is not always endowed with the
same nobility.
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Teutonic Knights who then begins to sabotage their military campaigns, entitled Konrad
Wallenrod, had contributed to sparking the uprising that in turn inspired part three of Dziady.
The third part of Dziady opens with a dedication
To the sacred memory of Jan Sobolewski, Cyprian Daszkiewicz, Felix Kolakowski, my
school-fellows, gaol-mates, and fellow-exiles; who were persecuted for their love of
their Fatherland, and died of longing for their country, in Archangelsk, Moscow and
Petersburg, martyrs of the national cause.55
Prisoners in the drama sing often of the power and honor possessed by their cellmates, as well
as the generational nature of their suffering for a more just homeland
If he is honourable he cannot fail
To end up in Siberia or in gaol;
Who knows, he’ll find us here still, if he waits.
I like sons—they’re our future prison-mates.56
Those jailed in 1968 however do not mention Mickiewicz in the context of imprisonment but
rather center the political experiences of their parents. As politics in Eastern Europe became
Marxist, this history of righteous imprisonment was folded into the political tradition of Poland
passing through communism.
Eugeniusz Smolar, Aleksander’s younger brother, was at the March planning meeting as
well: “there was a vote. Karol Modzelewski and my brother were against. I was ‘for’.”57
Eugeniusz was not arrested in March but his time came in October. Their father, Grzegorz
(Hersz), a devoted communist who had twice survived Stalinist purges (and the Nazi genocide),
wrote a desperate letter to Władisław Gomułka in 1969 fearing for the lives of his children and
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Aleksander’s wife, also imprisoned, the mother of the couple’s young child.58 After Irena
Grudzińska was asked by theater student Małgorzata Dziewulska to convince her friends to
protest the closing of the play, fellow protestor Aleksander Perski bet Jan Gross’s mother a
bottle of wine that more than one hundred people would show up to their protest.59 Jacek
Kuroń meanwhile bet Grudzińska a bottle of cognac that they would all be arrested—but she
was adamant.60 She was thrown into prison on March 10th.
Adam Michnik stayed away from the protests but was arrested on March 9th, along with
Aleksander Smolar. Jan Gross would be arrested a few days after the protest, wearing
prescription sunglasses that he had hoped to use (recalling his youthful naïveté) to disguise his
gestures and emotions from his interrogators when he was called to the police headquarters in
Warsaw’s Mostowski Palace. Rather than being held for a day or two—the law allowed for 48
hours of internment—he was imprisoned until just before his 21st birthday in August of 1968.
His mother had lobbied for his release through a pre-war connection—a man that had once
been close to Poland’s first communist leader, Bolesław Bierut.
Gross slept at Nina Smolar’s apartment the night after the March 8th protest in an
attempt to avoid arrest. She had previously suggested to him that students at the university
should do a sit-in if trouble arose—physically block the entrance of the authorities through the
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gates at the university—as had been occurring on American campuses. Barbara Toruńczyk, a
friend who did not emigrate, had the same idea.61 Nina Smolar avoided arrest until the
following year, June of 1969. She could not stand to see her friends in jail. And to add insult to
injury, the Polish media was lying about what had transpired. To defend her friends, Nina
Smolar got involved in transmitting information about what was happening beyond Poland, for
which she spent several months in prison.62
In his memoirs, Modzelewski writes of being inspired by his father not breaking under
torture by the Soviet NKVD at Lubyanka prison in Moscow in the 1930s. When she was still a
child, Petrusewicz’s father told her not to smoke and to learn to sleep without a pillow, because
he learned in jail that these things could be taken away in order to discipline prisoners. “And, of
course, a communist is always with all the oppressed and sits in prison—so you have to
prepare!” In Kuroń’s scouts, children were taught not to inform on others. “You do not tattle: it
was like training for later police interrogations! Of course, back then, at the turn of the 50s and
60s, Jacek wasn’t at all thinking about preparing of us for opposition, he only raised us in the
way he thought we should be raised,” says Petrusewicz.63
“Because mother was from Lviv, mother was a communist. She was imprisoned and left
jail in ’39, after which she was also in Lviv,” says 1968 student protestor Jan Lityński.64 The third
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largest city in interwar Poland, both rich in industry and culture & housing a vast underclass,
bordering the Soviet Union with over a third of its inhabitants being Jewish, Lviv (currently
Ukraine) was a hotbed of leftist activity. Lityński’s father had been a socialist but was drawn to
Soviet communism and fled to Lviv in 1939 as well to escape arrest—the two met toward the
end of the war. Aleksander Smolar recalls how his parents met: “Both of them spent many
years in prison – my mother was incarcerated for eight years before the war and my father was
sentenced twice. Both of them were, so to speak, freed by the war, meaning that the prisons
were abandoned, the guards ran off, the prisons were left unguarded…. they met in Białystok….
I was born in Białystok.”65 They had been from different social worlds: his father’s Yiddish, his
mother’s Polonized. Their release from prison brought the two communists together. Nina
Smolar’s father met her mother because he was tasked with keeping her in hiding after she had
been arrested. He was a factory manager and member of a Moscow-based organization that
helped political prisoners, and she was a communist activist—the daughter of a poor
shoemaker.
Nina Smolar met Adam Michnik and his friends through her parents long before
university. Many pre-war communists knew each other. In fact, her father knew Władysław
Gomułka too (as her husband’s father did): before the war he had hidden the future First
Secretary of the Polish Communist Party and his wife from arrest in his factory. The children of
people who had experienced mid-century totalitarianism, though receiving lessons based on
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the experiences of their elders, were not as fearful as their parents.66 The young protestors
were convinced that post-Stalinist Poland was different. Nina Smolar had the idea to copy fliers
for the March protests using her access to the university photo lab: “[Piotr Osęka]: When you
were copying fliers, did you realize that you could go to prison for what you were doing? [Nina
Smolar]: No, I didn't. What I knew... Jacek and Karol were imprisoned for writing the text…
Adam [Michnik] and [Seweryn] Blumsztajn were arrested for a month. Well, not really... I
wasn't about crossing boundaries.”67 Aleksander Smolar says of his father:
To be honest, he was deeply convinced that we’d never leave prison which for me was
totally absurd. I mean, the PRL was of course an unpleasant, authoritarian place
although it’s hard to say it was totalitarian then. But to be honest, I was never afraid
that they’d do something to me. I didn’t know how long I’d be in prison for. I stayed
there for a year. To be honest, I’d expected to be there much longer than that, but even
so. However, he had an apocalyptic vision meaning that these old-style communists
were fascinated and dedicated on the one hand while on the other, they knew that this
was a monster that would devour human lives; he had no illusions about that.68
Prison is never pleasant, but the young dissidents of the 1960s assumed that they were dealing
with a farcical version of what their parents’ generation had been through. Eugeniusz Smolar
too drew on his family history when thinking about whether he might end up in prison. He
recalls his feelings about prison after his brother’s arrest but before his own: “Here a whole
family tradition—meaning that decent people go to prisons—played some part. Please
remember, Alik was in jail. And for me as his younger brother—for whom he was a reference
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point in many things—this was a very important element…” Eugeniusz was preparing mentally
for the eventuality.69
In the conclusion of his book about the 1960s opposition, Andrzej Friszke wonders if the
blasé attitude expressed by them perhaps understates the trauma of prison, even if it wasn’t
the Stalinist version in which beatings, torture and death were common.70 “Modzelewski eats
very selectively and does not drink, 11 years of prison did that,” Petrusewicz wrote in 2017.71
Those incarcerated after 1968 recall being experimented on psychologically in jail in novel
ways. Prison authorities would tap morse code messages through walls, hide messages to them
in prison books, and try—in some cases succeed—to turn friends against each other by forging
secret messages between them (attempting to pass written messages was a common practice.
It even had a name: grypsy).72 This was in addition to long interrogations and other timeless
physically and mentally debilitating aspects of being jailed.
In addition to physical and psychological effects on those in jail, those around them
suffered. Jan Gross recalls that the mothers of students jailed in 1968 would exchange
information and read each other letters that their children had written: “a sign of life.” But his
mother also “was fed up with the repeated anguish… of awaiting when (if?) [her] beloved men
will leave prison…. She, of course, recalled most of all her first husband and father. The March
[1968] persecutions and my imprisonment was [no big deal] by [local] standards—but she was
fed up with it.” Gross echoes a common perspective among the young prisoners: “These were
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incomparable situations,” he says, thinking about the pre-war and wartime experiences of their
parents. While Michnik was in jail, his mother communicated to him word from his father: that
he was proud of how his son had held up while under interrogation by the security services.
Gross’s mother, meanwhile, “no longer wanted to witness the next generation of men in her
life—metaphorically speaking—biting the dust.”73
The psychotherapist Anna Dodziuk, a 1968 participant from Warsaw, recalls the
moment she realized that both her father and all three of her successive husbands spent time
in prison. Her father had been imprisoned by Poland’s increasingly right-wing pre-war Sanacja
regime while her husbands had been jailed in communist Poland:
I realized at one point that all my husbands, and there were three of them, were
political prisoners… I realized, as [my last husband] began to talk with my father, it
turned out that they were charged under the same article. What father had before the
war, Piotrek had after the war—an attempt to overthrow the regime by force. So I
thought "oh gosh!,” I looked back at my marriages and I told myself, "Well, yes, yes". Dr.
Freud was talking about other things as the criteria for selecting a partner, but here I
clearly fell on some such track.74
Dodziuk recalls that when her second husband realized that he spent time in the same prison as
her father, the two bonded over the experience:
…so the guys had something to talk about. They talked about blinds, what kind were in
the windows. Whether they were the same before the war or different. This pre-war
prison in Łęczyca. [My father] was also in Grudziadz. Well, communists were jailed in
those places, so that I think reaffirmed his communism, tied such strong bonds.
In prison, Dodziuk’s father had also bonded with imprisoned communists, further reinforcing
the idea of prison as a communist rite.
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Modzelewski says in a 2017 interview that when he wrote his Open Letter, he expected
the communist system in Poland would last another two or three years, and so a long jail
sentence did not scare him. To speed up the collapse, they had to push the system as hard as
they could, and this meant doing enough to go to prison. He miscalculated the collapse of the
government in communist Poland, of course. Asked if it was worth going to prison, he answers
affirmatively: “I know that we were cruel to our families. But that is unfortunately how this
goes.”75 Barbara Toruńczyk recalls a premonition of hers from the 1960s:
…with the help of binoculars I saw the top floor of the prison. I saw Pavilion X, which
was a historic pavilion even then. Because we knew that during Stalinist times it was
there that our uncles and aunts… were jailed. Or mothers... I saw the top floor, and I
saw in one window a woman with curlers [in her hair] made of paper. And I had this
absolute premonition that I will be there [one day] and that I will probably wear these
curlers. And it happened. I landed there, I saw it from the other side. And they rolled
these curlers for me because that was the prison style. Prison was on the way of our life.
And the more you had this consciousness, the better it was.76
Students without communist activism in their family background recall prison
differently. Imprisoned in Krakow, Bogusław Sobczuk recalls his time behind bars both as a
formative event in his life and a trauma. He makes no comparisons to prewar imprisonment,
though his father was interned in a German POW camp for officers. Like Aleksander Smolar,
Sobczuk thinks of it in terms of paying a price for his beliefs (“We took a stand, the system said:
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‘Okay, then pay’").77 While Smolar thought he withstood prison well, Sobczuk considers it the
most important component of 1968:
Your wife will never tell what she felt while giving birth. Because you won't
comprehend. Because it is incomprehensible. Of course, her eloquence, your empathy,
your intelligence will... but we won't feel it… Just as I won't tell you what the essence of
imprisonment is. Psychologists say that the greatest traumas a human experiences [are]
deprivation of liberty, death of a close family member and divorce. This is untranslatable
into conceptual language, you need to experience it. It's not felt by the coarse blanket
and terrible food, and that it stinks. No, it's felt by something beyond verbalization… we
can't put it into words because it slips away.
Sobczuk became an actor and so perhaps he dramatizes his experiences slightly. He also had no
Jewish background and so did not feel the antisemitism of the time. Nor was his path through
life in Poland severely limited. Anna Dodziuk’s father was hysterical over the issue of
antisemitism and not the imprisonment of protestors. She recalls a feeling of hope in 1968:
“But [only] some ten of them were arrested while there was, I don't know, one thousand
strikers, for example… Then those people got out of prison!” What came next was more
traumatic: Warsaw was being emptied of many of her friends as a result of post-1968
emigration:
“I lived in a state of utter shock, because every now and then someone came and said:
‘we're leaving, we're leaving’… Jews responded with such a Holocaust-related fear… And
so many people left also under pressure from parents… My brother left for example. My
father followed me and my older sister around the house saying, "I beg you, leave. I beg
you, leave! " He went on saying, I don't know, a hundred times a day, for instance. He
just walked behind us…
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Eugeniusz Smolar remembers this complex mix of feelings as well. He was not deeply troubled
by predictable consequences, especially after the 1965 arrests of Kuroń and Modzelewski
showed them that they might end up in prison: ”…we had a feeling, a sense of well-being.”
Prison was an unpleasant place, but survivable. In all of these cases, both parents and
children made it out. Alongside this fearlessness Smolar mentions that he and others carried a
different burden: “…but rather on the basis of being children of the Holocaust, [we had] some
complexes, a delicate self-awareness and [sense of the] fragility of existence.”78 The Holocaust
is largely missing from these accounts, however. His older brother Aleksander offers one clue as
to why this may have been the case: “I lived in a house with my father where there were lots of
books about the death camps or the ghetto. I saw them, I knew about this. In other Jewish
homes in Poland, the parents often concealed the truth, even their own identity,” he says.79
Their father Hersz (Grzegorz) Smolar had fought in the resistance in the Minsk ghetto and wrote
about it in Yiddish extensively after the war. It was 1968 that brought the trauma of the
Holocaust to the surface for Polish citizens with Jewish heritage that was less public. Other
possible explanations are that these imprisoned students were largely the children of
Communists who managed to flee East and so escape the grasp of the Nazis. Nevertheless, all
likely lost family and friends.
The 1965 arrests of Kuroń and Modzelewski energized the student youth who had
participated in the various discussion clubs centered around Warsaw University. In his 1989
memoir, the older Jacek Kuroń recalled Adam Michnik and a few other students visiting him on
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the evening after he left prison in May of 1967: “They talked loudly, disregarding surveillance,
about their activities at the University. They were laughing, confident, shouting over each
other. The shock of freedom I was then experiencing was combined with joy and euphoria. That
[protest was continuing].”80 Just a year later the events of 1968 threatened to break up this
group of young people. The combination of political shock and prison sentences along with a
resurgence of antisemitism left a mark on a generation of Polish youth: “The pre-March period
of treating these things as being at the border of… lifestyle and politics had gone, completely.
This was a passage to the other side,” says Eugeniusz Smolar.81 While steps toward that border
were certainly taken, in another sense the opposite had happened. The border had moved
toward them.
Marx had wanted authentic life (humanity fulfilling its essence, devoid of alienation) to
overcome politics. But when the border between the two disappeared in 1968 Poland it was
politics that encroached on life. While prison ennobled, official antisemitism was at once easy
to grasp in the Polish political landscape and an incomprehensible eventuality for those who
grew up in the post-1956 communist thaw. These young people—many assimilated Jews from
communist families (that is, thinking of themselves as progressive Polish citizens first and
foremost)—were momentarily paralyzed by the combination. What defense could there be
and, anyway, in post-Holocaust Poland was it even possible to attempt one? After prison there
was emigration.
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Between 1964 and 1965 many of the students who had gone through the walterowcy
and discussion clubs joined their mentors at university. They collected petitions in support of
those who had been imprisoned or expelled and would show up to court for the trial dates of
those arrested. Just like the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR) would a decade later, they
collected money for the families of those arrested and to cover legal fees or life expenses for
people who were facing fines, trials, or had lost sources of income. Among authors from Poland
in Aneks, the reader largely finds those who had participated in 1968 protests. They are part of
a large social web which developed throughout the 1960s that the publication represents and
who undoubtedly made up its most devoted readership. Aneks played a part in keeping this
social web together in the coming years. In the process, the editors explored questions arising
from the conditions that had forced their emigration and so the very same conditions that led
to the creation of the journal. As a result of their experiences, this group of young people
became at once politically confident and conscious of the precarity of existence.
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Chapter Two: Emigration
I realized, in any case, that we are a very fragile milieu, exposed on all sides, subject to the
power of the communist Leviathan. The fun was over, basic questions about life appeared.
Hopes associated with the Prague spring vanished, and we saw no prospect of liberalization in
Poland.1
-Eugeniusz Smolar
On March 19th, 1968, First Secretary Władysław Gomułka removed all doubt about what
was taking place in Poland. The trials of students that would ensue would lay it out in detail:
foreign agitator was synonymous with Jew. People with alleged dual loyalties (that is, to Poland
and to Israel) were not wanted in Poland, and thus were being offered special documents for
emigration. This was not antisemitism, said Gomułka: it was anti-Zionism. In the wake of this
announcement approximately 13,000 people—approximately half of Polish people with Jewish
ancestry—declared themselves explicitly to be Jewish and not Polish between 1968 and 1970 in
order to receive one-way visas stripping their Polish citizenship and granting travel only to Israel
(though only a fraction actually emigrated there).2 In pushing this manipulation of identity,
Gomułka and others in the Party made politics & bureaucracy encroach deeply into the sphere
of personal, private matters. To Jews who had lived through the Holocaust, the first secretary’s
words were not only discriminatory but conveyed the threat of existential danger.
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The campaign was also distinctly anti-intellectual, and so many of those who emigrated
were some of the most educated and most skilled citizens that postwar Poland had produced.
Those who considered themselves neither Poles nor Jews were cosmopolitans who should be
removed from important positions, Gomułka said. Professors like Włodzimierz Brus, Zygmunt
Bauman, Bronisław Baczko and Leszek Kołakowski inspired the students to do these troubling
things. These professors and many others were now relieved of their jobs (all of those
mentioned above would leave Poland as well). Though the most prominent people among the
Warsaw University activists had been arrested in March, protests would continue throughout
the year and spread to other cities in the country.
As at the beginning of 1968 liberalization in neighboring Czechoslovakia had given the
students hope that communism would be reformed, the entrance of Polish tanks alongside
Soviet Russian ones into Prague in August of that year destroyed any remaining faith in the
system. Adam Michnik read the news from jail. Eugeniusz Smolar, meanwhile, would go to jail
in the wake of the occupation. They had written petitions, protested, gone to prison—and now
their countrymen were crushing liberalization next door. Any hope to fix the communist
system, so-called revisionism, died in August of 1968. For many politically active people, this
made the decision to emigrate easier. Czechoslovakia too resonated beyond political
abstractions like the idea of saving socialism. Adam Ringer, who became active as a Trotskyist in
Sweden and had contact with the Aneks group, recalls:
And suddenly Czechoslovakia… the invasion… everything completely collapsed.
Completely. That’s when the thought came... we listened to a Czech radio, radio
Ostrava. They said “[the Warsaw Pact troops] are approaching.” Someone is reading
statements from factories and workplaces: “long live socialism, Dubček and freedom….
they are approaching, contact us—the troops are here,” and then static. The broadcast
was cut… that was simply a much stronger experience than anything yet... because it
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showed a totally new scale. A horrifying scale. A scale with no future, even life
threatening.... There was no information [in the media]. Those dying radios—dying
Czechoslovakia. Horrible. That was absolutely horrible. That was when I said that I am
leaving... 3
Any hope to fix the communist system, so-called revisionism, died in August of 1968. For many
politically active people, this made the decision to emigrate easier. This event too caused
feelings of existential dread.
Antisemitism in Poland, the moral collapse of the system many of their parents had
sacrificed for, the atomization of a friendship group and intellectual community along with
emigration are all issues experienced viscerally (personally rather than on the plane of politics)
by those within the Aneks milieu at this critical juncture between 1968 and the publication of
the first issue of Aneks. The historian Andrzej Friszke quips in the concluding paragraphs of his
900-page tome about the 1968 protests that the group of young people who met around
Warsaw University in the 1960s grew a thick skin in the wake of their persecution and trials by
the security services and courts of Poland. “Disputes and conflicts, natural in all milieus, were
dealt with quietly and among themselves… They remained able to cooperate with others and—
despite the baggage of experience—to contribute to the creation of a democratic state
system,” Friszke writes.4 It is more probable that it was precisely because of the baggage of
experience that the 1968 activists so comprehensively recoiled from the ruling system
perpetuating the ugliness.
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The Trials
The first arrests occurred in March, but the trials of the main figures like Kuroń,
Modzelewski, and Michnik did not begin until the fall. The imprisoned were held for a period
before trial during which evidence against them was gathered. Among them were Jan Gross,
Irena Grudzińska, Aleksander Smolar (later Eugeniusz and Nina Smolar as well). Gross, age 20,
was not yet legally an adult and received extra food rations. During the trials, prosecutors
created a narrative of formal anti-government associations based on student discussion groups
and protest actions.
The so-called Zionism of students was not invoked publicly during the trials. However,
internal documents created at the time of the trials that were reviewed by Friszke are rife with
antisemitic tropes ranging from those traditionally used to attack leftists to those invoked by
Stalin’s Soviet Union. A security service note characterizes many of the arrested as having some
Jewish background, being part of an elite that has taken trips abroad, and even accuses these
people of participating in some sort of Zionist training outside of Poland. The author of the note
suggests that a further investigation will uncover secret financial aid and connections to a
global Zionist movement, alongside ties to the Trotskyist Fourth International. The author of a
September 1968 security services document writes about Trotskyist and Maoist student protest
groups run by Zionists (“Zionist” being used constantly as a stand-in for “Jew”), basing this
assertion on the last names of Western student leaders.
Students encountered antisemitism during interrogations as agents sought out a Zionist
plot. Such antisemitic attacks were at once personal and bureaucratic. It is on this basis that a
subset of the 1968 activists were denied schooling, employment and participation in official
public life—left with little choice about what to do if they wanted a relatively normal existence.
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They and many others who were identified as Jews were effectively being pushed to leave
Poland.
By the end of 1968 Eugeniusz Smolar was gathering lists of students arrested across
Poland. Nina meanwhile was communicating them abroad through people traveling outside the
country. At first she wanted information to reach neither Radio Free Europe nor Kultura, as
these were considered enemy organizations and being tied to them could result in severe
consequences. Eventually she grew more comfortable with sending information to Kultura, as it
could be excused as more an intellectual initiative than a purely political one. But couriers
sometimes wouldn’t co-operate: her reports made it to Radio Free Europe too. They would
continue to make known to the West the names of those detained throughout the 1970s and
1980s. Aleksander Mackiewicz, a collaborator of Nina and Eugeniusz from Poland, recalls:
it all happened from a need to publicize the protests and to pass [information] on to
public opinion and abroad. After March we were still somehow motivated to issue a
newsletter, to inform—these were such homebred concepts—the seeds of what later
developed into a solid movement in the seventies… it seemed to us that it was possible
to create positive press, inform people, stimulate their thinking, thus building a new
consciousness, because that was actually the point, because this indoctrination was
unacceptable, intolerable.5
The language that Mackiewicz (who did not emigrate) uses to describe the activity of this group
of protestors between 1968 and emigration echoes the rationale given by the founders of the
publication a few years later. Aneks too was supposed to counteract censorship; to stimulate
and inform.
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Communicating with Radio Free Europe was unwanted and not only because it was a
very serious offense. It also had the taint of foreign government involvement, manipulation—of
the United States and the C.I.A. The chief accusations leveled against the imprisoned were that
they communicated with enemies of the state abroad (which included émigré cultural
institutions like the Paris Kultura, alongside institutions like Radio Free Europe and the Fourth
International), with capitalist press agencies, and spread false information about events in the
socialist countries. These allegations were based on laws against treason but evidence was
lacking and the narrative of the prosecution didn’t hold up to scrutiny (for example, being
agents both of the anti-imperialist Fourth International and the American-funded Radio Free
Europe—a counterfactual likeness of actual tension that Barbara Toruńczyk had experienced
between her and French Trotskyists during her 1967 trip). Nina Smolar recalls Jacek Kuroń being
upset that reports of his arrest made it to the radio waves. She reached an ambivalent stance
toward the latter organization: “…everyone knew the facts from Free Europe. But it was
dangerous and the aftertaste of cooperating with C.I.A. was quite bad... So, sometimes I was
content, and sometimes I wasn't...”6
The author of the September 1968 internal security services document quoted above,
Department director Henryk Sokolak, also asserted that the C.I.A. was behind student unrest in
Western Europe. According to Sokolak’s narrative, Polish student protestors were tied to the
Western protest movement not only through their Trotskyist contacts but also because the
majority of them were of the “Jewish nation” (this claim of an ethnic Jewish cabal was based on
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an interpretation of surnames as Jewish).7 The émigrés that will start Aneks a few years later
went on to hear similar accusations to those that the Polish government had made against
them from Westerners: that they are part of an imperialist effort orchestrated by the C.I.A. (or
simply the United States) and that they communicate with reactionary organizations like Radio
Free Europe. When Westerners asserted such accusations, they both bought into government
propaganda and disregarded the political trajectories of the Polish activists. This milieu had
investigated every permutation of reform communism—tried every available option. They had
deep personal experience with communism. They had been jailed and been the targets of
antisemitic persecution. To disregard these factors was to disregard the intellectual acumen
and agency of this milieu.
The flimsiness of the show trials resulted in few convictions and jail sentences that were
short by Eastern European standards. For this reason and because of an amnesty for the
commemorations of the 25th anniversary of the Polish People’s Republic in the summer of 1969
meant that most of the students were out of prison by that time. Jan Gross was released in
August of 1968, just before his 21st birthday, and Irena Grudzińska in September. Eugeniusz
Smolar wasn’t arrested until October, and Nina Smolar only in 1969 for defending those already
imprisoned. Aleksander Smolar, arrested in March 1968, was held until February of the
following year.
The accusations of the prosecutors reveal that the Polish government felt challenged in
part by matters as innocent as contacts that these young intellectuals were making abroad
from the mid-1960s on. What contacts existed were for the most part natural and organic social
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relations with students and youth from different European countries. Allowing free movement
of people and ideas was threatening to the authorities as is often the case for authoritarian
regimes. A prosecutor stated during the trials that: “the propaganda support given to the
komandosi by these centers [Author’s note: Radio Free Europe, Kultura, etc.] indicates the
convergence of the objectives of the komandosi and these centers, on the plane of their joint
intention to harm the interests of the Polish People's Republic.”8 At the same time, the Polish
state accidentally magnified the very threat it seemed to want to punish these young people
for. Émigrés strengthened connections between Polish activists and the outside world. This
outcome was not a certainty, since these young people were tired of the cruel realities that had
been thrust upon them. Stripped of their citizenship upon leaving the country of their birth,
they had every right to likewise turns their back on it.
Emigration
To emigrate, people and families had to—at the very least—fill out a questionnaire that
allowed access to a passport, supply a photo in triplicate, apply for a change of citizenship, pay
5,000 złoty for travel documents (over two months gross wages for the average Pole—historian
Dariusz Stola points out that this fee had been raised from 300 złoty in 1967, when the Six-day
war broke out), apply for an Israeli visa and guarantee that costs of travel could be met, pay any
debts or taxes, and officially give up one’s apartment.9 After this, a person had one month to
leave the country. This process itself was deliberately demeaning. It added to the sensation of
not being wanted in your own home. Aleksander Perski, Jan Gross’s childhood friend and a
fellow 1968 activist who emigrated to Sweden, notes that the emigration process from the
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Polish People’s Republic had a near perfect likeness to Nazi Adolf Eichmann’s plan to force
Jewish emigration from Austria as deputy of the Jewish affairs department of the Nazi security
services (more commonly known as the SD).10
Marta Petrusewicz, a friend of Gross and the Smolar family, emigrated shortly after
Gross and stayed in Italy much longer than her friends. Before leaving, she would meet
Aleksander Smolar for coffee and avoid thinking about emigration while they both worked at
the boring jobs they were relegated to after being thrown out of university. Petrusewicz recalls
the urging of her mother to leave. She too had been harassed and arrested in 1968. She
married the man she was dating at the time, an Italian, and so was able to leave Poland with
him for Bologna without the demeaning process of giving up her citizenship. Petrusewicz, like
Adam Michnik, Jan Gross, and many of the other student activists, considered efforts to
maintain control of their identity to be important acts of resistance.
The mother of Jan Gross insisted that the family leave Poland, remembering the murder
of her brother and first husband, given up to the Nazis by an informer in exchange for a liter of
vodka. Gross was the first of this group of Aneks editors out of prison and the first to emigrate.
The entire Gross family left Poland in March of 1969. Irena Grudzińska, who would later marry
Gross, was thrown into prison that March, on the 10th. She was let out in September and left for
Italy a little over one year later. Both Irena Grudzińska and Marta Petrusewicz went without
their parents. Gross and Petrusewicz would sometimes meet after emigrating despite living in
different Italian cities.
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Nina Smolar, involved in transmitting information about what was happening out of
Poland, spent several months in prison for doing so before leaving. Studying biochemistry, she
had received an offer to finish her doctorate at Uppsala University. But this was hardly the most
important factor. Nina also had to consider her young daughter: “But I must admit they gave
me a choice… the investigator hinted that I either leave the country or get sentenced to
minimum five years… Please, don't forget that I had a small child.”11 She was released without a
trial. Eugeniusz and Nina Smolar took the ferry to Ystad in January of 1970. Grzegorz, the father
of the Smolar brothers, would leave the country and the community that he had devoted his
life to building that year as well, settling in Israel.
Aleksander however was determined to stay after being let out of prison in early 1969.
He was ready and willing to spend more time in jail because of his convictions and expected to
be held longer than the almost full year he had served. Since he had been kicked out of
university, Smolar found a job as a central planner. But he concluded that he could not pursue
political activism without doing more harm than good to the causes he supported. His job was
unfulfilling and, to add insult to injury, he was denounced both as a political agitator and a
“Zionist” by a colleague and fired. An academic career was also closed off to him. After a year of
work, he decided to leave too. He was accepted at the European branch of Johns Hopkins
University’s School of Advanced International Studies in Bologna in 1971 after applying at the
suggestion of Petrusewicz, who was already working at the university library there. He was the
last among these core Aneks co-creators to leave besides Irena Grosfeld.
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Thrown out of university like many of his friends, Irena Grosfeld had first met
Aleksander Smolar a few years prior to 1968, when she was taking the entrance exam for the
Economics department at Warsaw University.12 Grosfeld took part in the intellectual milieu
sparked to life by the graduate and older undergraduate students. She was highlighted by the
authorities as one of the instigators of the petition campaign informing students about the
Mickiewicz play Dziady and repression of students who protested against its forced closing on
January 30, 1968. She too would not be allowed to continue her studies at the university but
was reinstated after two years. Grosfeld would join Aleksander Smolar abroad in 1972 when he
was awarded a fellowship at the University of London. She then began a PhD at the London
School of Economics.
Emigration caused bitter feelings among friends who were living through trauma in
several other distinct modes. That their political protests were brutally repressed was one
thing, but in doing so they had spent time in jail, had their path to careers severed, and had
identities that didn’t fit imposed on them through the mechanism of antisemitism—the latter
of which had resonated in an ostensibly socialist—that is, modern and progressive—society.
Seweryn Blumsztajn, a friend and participant, did not emigrate in the wake of 1968. But he
describes the climate of 1968 in Poland and how it affected those that did leave. Blumsztajn like
many of his former student colleagues rationalizes his trauma by comparing his imprisonment
to Nazi and Stalinist crimes of decades past. Rather than pushing him to leave, prison blinded
Blumsztajn to the ugly antisemitism that people on the outside were seeing and experiencing:
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…what happened in March was so awful, so repulsive… And it's not the question of the
scale of repressions which was considerable, but they were not such [great] repressions.
There was no killing, people were released quickly, were thrown out of work but nobody
died of hunger. The worst was the shit that came with it. It was so loathsome, such a
blatantly antisemitic campaign. Those security agents queuing in the housing offices
asking if there are [apartments]—because Jewish apartments were being taken. All that
hysteria. I always repeat that I can't say whether I would have emigrated had I not been
in jail. From certain point of view jail was the best place to live through this—through
March. Meaning simply that it was quiet. I would for example cut out the March press—
about March—but I didn’t read it for some time. I didn’t experience the hysteria, right,
that climate in which people decided to emigrate, that hysteria that they would set up
ghettoes, or something. All that was so despicable.13
On top of this figurative shit, the future founders of Aneks and many others were about to
undergo an unwanted emigration.
Blumsztajn thinks that he would have emigrated if he had not been in prison as the
propaganda campaign resonated with society. Aleksander Smolar meanwhile recalls Adam
Michnik telling him that Kuroń and Modzelewski, were they not in jail, would disapprove of his
leaving. Michnik says his opinion then was that those who were leaving were allowing the
regime (and antisemitism) to win.14 Even nearly two decades later, in 1985, Michnik was still
easing bitterness between 1968 exiles and himself after his strong reactions to their
emigration.15 In a letter from prison, Michnik wrote that the decision to emigrate was personal.
No one can hold against others the decision to face imprisonment and other hardships. It was
only in his own case that Michnik could judge emigration as an escape from danger that he
could not go through with on those grounds.
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Leonard Neuger, a scholar of Polish studies, was a student protestor in Krakow, targeted
largely because the security services in that city “needed a Jew,” he says. Neuger’s position on
emigration was similar to Michnik’s, but he phrases the decision based on his identity rather
than couching it in political language: “I made the conscious decision to stay, I didn't want to
leave. This was a question of identity, which for me was unequivocal. I had no Jewish identity. I
had Polish identity and didn't see the slightest reason why I should leave. Today I see more
reasons, but then I didn't.”16 Unlike Michnik—whom he was acquainted with through Bronisław
Świderski, a 1968 participant from Warsaw who left for Denmark—Neuger was not interested
in overt political activity. Similar to Michnik, Neuger saw the antisemitism as abhorrent but not
something to be personally concerned with on an existential level (though his parents tried to
convince him to leave Poland). His father had been in the Bund and was imprisoned in the
Soviet gulag system during the war.17 His mother had survived a series of German
concentration camps and had lost her first husband.
Between jail and emigration, Aleksander Smolar came to the conclusion that he had no
future in Poland due to the ease with which antisemitism could be used as a mechanism against
him and against political dissent; how easily it was received by Polish society. Jan Gross is
retrospectively less dour: the security apparatus could not decide who was Polish or not and
should not be given authority to tell him what to do. Emigration was the obvious choice in
order to avert this false authority, and he felt no less a Pole for leaving. Nevertheless, Gross fell
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into a deep depression simultaneous with his official designation as a stateless person (he
would only receive a passport again—American—in 1976). On the day he left Poland, Gross
experienced debilitating back pain and had to be given anesthetic shots to make it to the train.
His mother had decided that the family was leaving while she listened to the March 19, 1968,
Władysław Gomułka speech in which the first secretary of the Communist Party created
enemies out of Zionists and intellectuals.18 They left only a few months after Gross was let out
of prison.
Eugeniusz remembers people who he knew well crossing the street to avoid him after
getting out of jail for his efforts to protest the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by
Warsaw Pact (including Polish) troops. Just before Smolar left Poland, a friend told him that it
was good Jewish people were emigrating because the authorities would not be able to use
antisemitism against the opposition anymore. Nina had a similar experience when she was
rejected as a liability from an opposition group because members found out that she had a
Jewish background. An attitude of wanting to fight exactly this erasure but not having the
energy or means to do it was a large part of the motivation for leaving.
“This is a very agreeable circle… they have created something… from… a catastrophe. A
complete catastrophe. I mean, suddenly all that was important to them: friends, school, etc.,
everything went bang,” Neuger says of the émigré group that started Aneks. “They stayed in
touch… but suddenly found themselves somewhere else and with some odium at that, a
stigma.” The émigrés were to some degree aware of stigma in the form of the casual
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antisemitic remarks they had heard from some acquaintances before leaving, if not physical
manifestations of it like former friends ignoring them on the street when they approached.
They also faced disapproval, at least for a time, from some friends from university who thought
that it was inappropriate to leave for political reasons. In creating Aneks, they contributed in a
very tangible way to maintaining the social circle Neuger identifies, which was at once a
political or politically active circle in the sense that they took responsibility for the state that
had raised them. The contestation of their identities would come up again just as the Aneks
founders had arranged their lives enough to start the publication. First they had to find a place
to call home outside of Poland.
Sweden and Italy as intermediary countries
Sweden’s proximity (with ferry connections from Poland) and tolerant social & political
climate made it a common destination for the 1968 exodus.19 Though they were not yet
acquainted with the Smolar family, Krzysztof Dorosz also emigrated to Sweden, where Wiktoria
Dorosz, whom Krzysztof was married to, had family. Wiktoria, with whom he would work on
Aneks in the future, was considered Jewish according to the Nuremberg law-like criteria of the
Polish government and it was she who insisted that they leave. They left in 1969 as Krzysztof
wanted to do all he could for his wife, but also because he was disgusted with the Polish
government. Though Krzysztof Dorosz’s family had leftist political leanings and religious
sentiments he calls agnostic, they were not communist believers and he was not a Marxist. He
was studying English at Warsaw University when the 1968 protests occurred.
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Jan Gross was the first of this group to emigrate through Vienna, which was the most
common path out of the country in the aftermath of 1968 (Irena Grudzińska and Aleksander
Smolar would also go this way)—from the Dworzec Gdański train station in Warsaw.20 Gross,
like all travelers at the time, recalls not knowing what awaited them beyond Poland. At the
train station in Vienna were various Jewish charities: the Jewish Agency for Israel offered weary
travelers temporary lodging along with arranging transit to Israel. The Gross family (like many
other travelers) was not planning on doing this. They sought out the American-based non-profit
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), which was helping people go to countries other than
Israel. With help from this organization they were allowed to travel on to Italy, where they also
received help from the New York-based American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (Joint).
There Gross got a job with HIAS. Gross, who had translated Kuroń and Modzelewski’s Open
Letter to French, was now providing translation services to refugees. He managed to get a visa
to enter the United States because he was accepted as a doctoral student at Yale with, he
thinks, help from his uncle Feliks Gross and fellow émigré Leszek Kołakowski among a handful
of Poles with ties to that university. Gross flew to New York City in August of 1969.
Irena Grudzińska followed Gross’s path in October of 1969, several months after he had
left for Yale. She recalls the competing Jewish charities and crossing the border between
Austria and Italy in a sealed car due to the uncertain legal status of the refugees inside. The
travelers were first allowed to open their windows only at the mainland Venice-Mestre station,
on the way to Rome. In Rome, Grudzińska too found employment as a translator—but at Joint.
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When Gross was leaving for America, he asked Petrusewicz to look after Grudzińska, who had
by then decided to leave Poland but had not yet made it to Italy. When Grudzińska fell in love
with an Italian and married him, Gross wrote Petrusewicz an angry letter.21 Grudzińska would
join Gross in America in December of 1972. They would marry in 1976, at which point Gross
ceased being a stateless person, having obtained American citizenship.
Aleksander Smolar had hoped to make it to The University of Wisconsin, where he was
offered employment, when he finally left Poland in 1971. At the American embassy in Vienna,
he was asked to lie about his past membership in the Communist Party. The older Smolar
brother refused to disavow what was at one point in his life a conscious and sensible choice. To
lie would be to lie about a part of his identity. His parents had gone to prison for being
Communists. He had gone to prison to try to improve the People’s Republic. Even if he held no
illusions about it after 1968 in Poland and the crackdown in Czechoslovakia, this was still
untenable. In Vienna the trajectory of his life veered toward Europe rather than the United
States.
While the feeling of being erased by one’s own society was crushing and it was difficult
moving to a place that was not truly home, the emigration experience itself for this Polish youth
was fairly straightforward—in part because these young people had the resources and potential
to find their way in the world. Grudzińska remembers her emigration experience as
psychologically traumatic, but easy. Even while working as a translator in Rome soon after her
own emigration, she recalls being shocked by the difficulties faced by some of the refugees she
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was helping. Looking back, she weighs her comparatively easy emigration against the difficulties
that have faced refugees to Europe coming from the Middle East and North Africa decades
after her experience.22
These émigrés, especially the ones who went to Italy, were put off by the ideological
motivations of their western peers. Aleksander Smolar recalls being among Trotskyists, Maoists,
and pro-Soviet students in Italy. Petrusewicz writes that the Marxist-Leninist language used by
her fellow students irritated her. Grudzińska recalls that at the time all -isms scared her. “Is
there much common ground between the New Left in the West and the Polish Left?” Leszek
Kołakowski was asked in 1971. His negative response prompted E.P. Thompson to write a
voluminous open letter to Kołakowski, who was by then employed at Oxford University. “The
Polish students who demonstrated in March 1968 had been attempting to secure traditional
liberties—freedom of speech, of the press, of learning and assembly—which to some elements
of the New Left were nothing but "treacherous bourgeois snares,” Kołakowski responded,
before quoting one of the young émigrés to Sweden as saying that dealing with the New Left
was like watching a film that they had already seen the end of.23 Polish émigrés understood the
language and motivations of leftist students and intellectuals but were frustrated that their
peers in the West seemed to want to run into the same ideological dead ends that the Poles
had just fled. While the more liberal-minded Aleksander Smolar felt isolated by radical
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students, Petrusewicz recalls participating in strikes and going to factories to hand out leaflets
to Italian workers in Bologna. Those who had considered themselves opposed to the politics of
the communist leadership in Poland were well-read in the most promising variations of
Marxism and were now looking toward different horizons.
The start of Aneks as overcoming trauma
Aleksander Smolar recalls a conversation with two friends who had both been part of
the discussion club culture at Warsaw University when it became clear that he was going to
emigrate—before his departure in 1971 but after he got out of jail in 1969. The two friends,
Wojciech Karpiński and Marcin Król, had not sat in jail, likely in large part because a lack of
Jewish heritage in their families spared them from being associated with the “Zionist”
conspiracy that the security services had conjured up.24 Which is why Smolar was surprised by
how obvious it was to them that he had to contact Jerzy Giedroyc at the Paris Kultura after he
made it abroad and plan what kind of publication Smolar was going to create. “I saw two
ordinary people, normal Poles, for whom it was perfectly natural that I should be continuing
activities that had their roots in my history, in my passions and it mattered to them and to the
people who were politically active in Poland.”25
Eugeniusz Smolar too recalls almost immediately being invited into the transnational
fray of Polish politics as it had played out for centuries. Nina Smolar and he met Kultura editor
Jerzy Giedroyc in Paris already in 1970, months after leaving Poland. In early 1971 Giedroyc
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asked the Smolar family in Scandinavia for help retrieving tape recordings of workers meeting
with the new First Secretary, Edward Gierek, in the wake of violent protests in December of
1970. Swedish friends of the family retrieved the tapes, and Giedroyc asked Eugeniusz and Nina
to transcribe them. Soon after, Giedroyc asked Eugeniusz Smolar to set up a meeting with the
young émigrés that had settled in Sweden.26
Prior to and beyond creating their own periodical, Eugeniusz and Nina were also active
in helping transmit copies of publications like Kultura to Poland through their friendships with
Scandinavian students, for whom Poland was a cheap place to vacation. Nina Smolar recalls the
Trotskyists in Sweden again being the only people eager to smuggle material into and out of
Poland for the Poles, even though the Polish émigrés constantly argued with them about
politics: “Who was the most eager to help without any hesitation? The Trotskyites were,
because there was a need to fight the dictatorship of bureaucracy.”27 Despite ideological
disagreements, they shared a common language. Trotskyists would later smuggle Aneks too.
While the émigrés appreciated what Giedroyc was doing, their idea of a political
program was different. Giedroyc assumed that clear-headed decisions could not be made in a
totalitarian Poland and the emigration had to take a leading role in formulating ideas. The new
émigrés knew this not to be true: they had been there engaging in political activism just a
couple of years prior and wanted only to give their friends in Poland a broader perspective with
which to plan and make decisions. Eugeniusz Smolar says that this was the mindset from which
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the founders decided on the name Aneks: literally an annex of information to be added to the
regular, censored pool.
Though there was also another reason for taking this subordinate role: the contested
identity of the émigrés. Gustaw Herling-Grudziński, a close confidant of Giedroyc, Second World
War anti-fascist resistance organizer, ex-gulag prisoner, and prolific writer, went to Sweden to
speak to the new arrivals from the East. Eugeniusz Smolar recalls
[Herling] had an unexpected shock. The gathered people began to explain to him: we
value you very much, we read your books, but what do you expect from us? We left as
non-Poles, we were stigmatized as Jews, we have no basis or intention to take
responsibility for the fate of Poland, act as leaders. For those young people who left for
emigration without such plans, deeply offended, even broken by antisemitism,
rebuilding their lives as Jews, such a call was emotionally unacceptable. The meeting
ended with underwhelming sympathies, Herling shouted: "You are not any Jews! You
are Polish!,” but he did not convince his shocked listeners…. He completely did not
understand the situation in which we found ourselves.28
Herling-Grudziński later wrote about his experience in Sweden, describing a meeting with one
of the new émigrés in Stockholm
But also my young guest… feels very uncomfortable in the “émigré” outfit: whenever
this term is used, a quick contraction passes across his face…. Maybe he should not have
left at all, maybe he just had to “wait,” like his colleagues, for whom “racial purity” did
not give rise to “packing of bags” and “unfastening oneself from this police nobility
under the brand of socialism...” The thing is that “Zionism” was attached to
“revisionism,” and something was suddenly [revealed], “which it is difficult to defend
against...” After a moment’s reflection, he adds: “Our fathers planned and helped build
this [order], it is impossible to deny.” And the fathers of “Aryan” colleagues did not? (I
use the words “Aryan” on my own initiative, in Stockholm you hear most often about
“Poles of Jewish descent” and “Poles of Polish origin”—proof that Gomułka’s March
speech was not in vain). He answers: “Yes, yes, you understand it’s the same, but not
the same.“ In other words, he touches a deep wound somewhere…29
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The collapsing of personal and political under communism had both attacked their sense of self
and made it possible for the consequences of political action to destroy lives. But as a result of
this collapsing, seemingly apolitical acts could at the same time threaten the state—the
simultaneous power and fragility of authoritarian government. Starting the journal was both a
political act and part of overcoming an identity crisis. It would help this group of émigrés
rebuild their sense of self; to return to a time before 1968 when their Polishness was not
questioned—when they did not question it themselves.
Eugeniusz Smolar describes overcoming a shock of loneliness, lack of prospects, and
being labeled a Jew rather than Polish as reasons for his emigration. “It is important that many
people from the new emigration who previously thought that Poland should be forgotten found
out that it is possible to do something meaningful,” he says.30 Encountering antisemitism in
personal life as well as emanating from the state after 1968, ultimately being stripped of Polish
citizenship, was a comprehensive rejection which proved difficult to overcome. To this was
added the trauma of emigration itself. For the politically astute there was also the tragic end of
revisionist politics symbolized not only by 1968 in Poland but the invasion of Czechoslovakia by
Warsaw Pact troops. That a person would want little to do with Poland or political activity in
emigration after such bitter experiences is sensible. Many of those tens of thousands identified
as Jews who lost their Polish citizenship on the way out of Poland in the wake of 1968 did not
want to work through these events at all.
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Jan Gross fell into a deep depression in the years after 1968. At the same time, he never
allowed the so-called police nobility to have the last word about his identity. Emigration, he
accurately reasoned, has been a constant in the history of Poland. “Political emigration is—and
people from the core of the March events, I think, all left with the conviction that they were
political émigrés—an eternal Polish paradigm. The essence of patriotism in a way, isn’t it?"31
Gross specifies political emigration. The state had mixed an ethnic conception of Jewishness
with a civic one (Zionism) in its reasoning for forcing the departure of most of Poland’s
remaining population with Jewish roots. Though this was the mechanism for their persecution,
Gross and his friends had acted out of a civic duty to Poland—to their forefathers in the sense
that Mickiewicz had described in the banned play of the same name (Dziady).
Continuing to act as members of the civic nation by supporting their politically active
friends while in emigration was perhaps more typically Polish than remaining in the country
(unless, of course, one was sitting in jail). Irena Grudzińska describes these romantic notions in
the form of tangible acts
We were a team armed with pens. We believed that our role was to publicize the
wrongs happening in Poland. We promoted the work of our friends to build a cocoon of
international interest around the most vulnerable…. we made and distributed
translations, we created our own magazines, such as Aneks, we nurtured contacts with
journalists, trade unions and politicians. I got involved in Italy, it helped me mentally.32
The political and the personal were thus deeply connected; one reinforced the other.
Friendship became the basis for civic participation. It was all a conscious choice, a selfless
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sacrifice of time and effort and so a sign of devotion to matters deeply felt. In another
interview, Grudzińska asks: "Who am I then? In the case of us, the 1968 émigrés, the question
of identity is a very important element of our biography…. I belong to a historical current from
which I simply cannot exit. It pushes me just as it pushes others like me."33 The émigrés had
recognized their place in the current of Polish history, both in the negative sense when
identified as Jews and in the positive as almost stereotypical models of this civic nation.
Initiatives to help their friends in Poland were a way to regain a sense of control over where
that current was taking them. Eugeniusz Smolar says in a 2009 interview: “…apart for the value
of magazine and book publishing, Aneks had a very important organizational value. It brought
back these battered people to Polish issues.”34
That the cause highlighted by Eugeniusz was not so much Poland as Polish issues is
important, as the patriotism of this group was not a typical one. Here was a civic nation that
was a homeland, but the best one could hope for from it was tolerance. The homeland
contained these people’s lives and was at its best when it did not encroach upon those lives. It
was allegiance to friends that was the primary motivation, not the defense of an intangible
nation. This was no imagined community but one made up of friends and family. Such a
tolerant nation would be a wonderful thing indeed.
Aleksander Smolar says that he had made up his mind about taking action during his
first year abroad, a time during which he felt utterly alone: “it was a time of reflection on what
to do next, what I can do alone, what the new emigration can do…. [M]y decision was less
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influenced by political calculations, and more by a sense of duty towards my friends… active
and brave people in [Poland].35 Both Smolar brothers echo friendship as the primary motivation
for doing what may seem from the outside to be primarily political, focusing on them as the
point of reference for such activity. Eugeniusz says in retrospect: “From the beginning our main
point of reference were the friends who stayed in Poland.”36 Aleksander Smolar paraphrases
the Romanian-born writer and Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel: “’my friends are my real
homeland.’ My point of reference were my friends and my responsibility towards them.”37
Friendship was one thing but supportive material acts were another significant step:
prior to and beyond creating a periodical, Eugeniusz and Nina would send money to their
friends in Poland as foreign currency went very far there. Similarly, fellow 1968 participant
Aleksander Perski recalls a letter and a check for one hundred dollars from his friend Jan Gross
waiting for him when he arrived as an exile in Sweden: “We always knew that despite the
kilometers separating us and different fates we can count on each other.”38 It was then
especially, in the years after 1968 but before opposition organizations were created in Poland,
that the émigrés played a vital supporting role. Sending a political quarterly into communist
Poland was thus a result of personal motivations combining with political interests, just as the
pre-1968 discussion clubs were. It was for their friends, for the community that formed around
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the Warsaw discussion clubs and even for a broader Polish intelligentsia community of
opposition to the state that they were jailed for trying to improve that they started Aneks.
Friends of the Aneks editors who stayed in Poland were broken as well. It wasn’t simply
the material conditions of the system that were bankrupt. It felt rotten on a spiritual, human,
level. Those that were allowed to continue their studies were not allowed to do so in Warsaw.
They had been jailed, split up and for the moment silenced. The émigrés who decided to
publish Aneks hoped that their journal would help those who stayed in Poland feel less isolated
too. Eugeniusz Smolar thinks: "Aneks being the intellectual publication of their generation—
read and discussed—to some extent helped them sort themselves out mentally. They had us
and Aneks, which they considered their own.”
Aleksander Smolar saw Jan Gross abroad for the first time when Gross came to London
in 1972 to do research for his doctoral dissertation. Aleksander had a grant at the University of
London that year as he sought stable employment. Irena Grosfeld was able to join him in
London without giving up her Polish citizenship by marrying a British friend of his. Gross recalls
seeing Eugeniusz Smolar and Nina Smolar then too. They would soon compile the first issue of
Aneks.
Issue one was published in the spring of 1973, to be printed on a quarterly schedule. But
the shadow of 1968 and of antisemitism almost put an end to the project created as a response
to this rejection. “To hell with this whole publication and work for the opposition,” Aleksander
Smolar recalls thinking. Smolar and some of the editorial team, including Jan Gross, had worked
on a statement introducing Aneks for the first issue, and sent a proof their friends in Poland.
They received back a handful of replies saying that the introduction was unacceptable. “We are
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emigrants, but we do not accept the traditional division between the country and emigration
according to geographic boundaries,” the founders of Aneks state in the first sentence of the
second paragraph, just after introducing the very idea of the journal. “We are emigrants on a
similar basis to all those who consider the existing political system in Poland to be foreign,”
they write, describing an internal emigration often referenced in writing about communist
Poland. Emigration, whether internal or physical, was thus the patriotic Polish thing to do.
Neither those who feel at home in “police socialism” nor those who have emigrated and do
nothing can call themselves émigrés, they continue. Smolar recalls this carving out of identity as
mainly a distinction between supporting authoritarianism or democracy, but the statement also
flips the idea of emigration on its head: the émigrés are those who truly want to improve the
country. This definition aligns with the long history of Polish politics in emigration. It taps into
the nineteenth-century Polish Romantic nationalism before it “began to hate”—when anyone
in solidarity with the downtrodden could call themselves Polish—as the historian Brian PorterSzücs puts it.39
Yet this idea presented by the émigrés, rooted in the essence of Polish patriotism, was
untenable to those who remained in Poland because, as Aleksander Smolar recalls, “our critics
saw the danger of identifying the nascent democratic opposition with Jewish emigration." It
was a repetition of the hurtful words many had heard as they prepared for exile: that it was a
good thing they were leaving because the authorities wouldn’t be able to associate the
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opposition with Jews any longer. A deep wound was grazed again, but the first issue had
already been printed when the criticism came. Aleksander Smolar and Irena Grosfeld cut this
introduction out of 1,500 issues by hand with a razor blade.
Historian Krystyna Kersten—herself older than the young people who start Aneks—
wrote about the 1968 émigrés:
The psychosis of leaving, caused not only by antisemitism in Poland, but reviving after
each eruption of antisemitism and especially violence, was resisted primarily by those
who felt themselves Poles in every way, who had nothing or little connection with the
Jewish community, with the Jewish tradition, because they left it completely to live in
Polishness. Their Polishness was a conscious choice. Often - but not always and not
necessarily - this choice resulted in the loss of ties with Jewish roots. This does not mean
that they were denied or concealed, but in many cases the process of Polonization was
so total that they simply lost their importance. Rather, one should write: they would
have lost it, if not for the pressure of their surroundings. In the eyes of a large part of
the Polish community, one remained a Jew, strictly according to the criteria of the
Nuremberg Laws, seemingly completely compromised and condemned by the civilized
world. Perhaps he is liked, respected, sometimes even admired ... but a Jew, therefore a
bit foreign. Is it any wonder that more than one, when a patch was pinned to his coat,
slowly began to wear it—whether he wanted it or not.40
Overcoming despair, émigrés nevertheless returned to political life with a forcibly changed
identity. Aneks is introduced as an annex—not an equal partner in Polish political life—in part
because of this. Its editors voluntarily and consciously took up a secondary role in Polish
intellectual life. Outwardly and primarily this was because they had left Poland. But personally,
from the perspective of identity, they were given little choice in the matter because the 1968
emigration was considered Jewish.
Soon after this demoralizing experience, still in 1973, Irena Grosfeld visited Poland. This
was possible due to her leaving without giving up her Polish passport by marrying a British
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friend of the Smolar family. She met the conservative-liberal Marcin Król and Wojciech
Karpiński, who had encouraged Aleksander to start Aneks before he left Poland. They and other
members of the Warsaw University milieu reported great interest in the first issues of Aneks.
Król and Karpiński also proposed and gave her materials for a thematic issue on George Orwell
that would appear the following year. “[There was] satisfaction that something like this was
even appearing, but at the same time fear of contact with émigré publications. Contact with me
alone could be dangerous for some,” Irena Grosfeld-Smolar later said. Indeed she was hounded
out of the country and would lose her passport until 1981. Aneks continued to be printed and
smuggled into the country.
1968 as a Political Emigration?
Why was it so natural for Aleksander Smolar’s friends to assume that he should continue
his activism abroad? Jan Gross too has framed his emigration and that of his peers as political.
And though it was also more than that, the 1968 émigrés—most of them fresh out of jail—were
following in the footsteps of many politically-engaged people who had to flee their home since
the territories of Poland were swallowed up by the kingdom’s neighbors in the late 18th
century. Early revolutionaries at the time of the partitions, like Kazimierz Pułaski and Tadeusz
Kościuszko, are tied not only to Polish nationhood but the idea of nationhood and patriotism in
general; celebrated abroad and in Poland. Literary progenitors of Polish nationhood—writers
like Mickiewicz, Słowacki, Norwid, and Krasiński—were part of the Great Emigration after the
failed November 1830 uprising against Russian rule on which Dziady, the drama whose
performance was banned in Warsaw in 1968, was in large part based. Paris, London, Chicago
and New York have been filled over recent centuries with writers and publishers, cultural
organizations and diplomatic missions where Polishness was cultivated and constructed.
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Smolar’s friends and Gross were so sure in their assertions about political action
because the construction of Polish nationhood and much Polish politics in recent centuries has
happened outside of even the imagined borders of the country. During the Second World War a
comprehensive government-in-exile settled in London, the recognition of which was only
overcome by Stalin after the war. The important cultural institution that was the Paris-based
Kultura run by Jerzy Giedroyc, publishers of great Polish writers like Gombrowicz and Miłosz,
was also the product of wartime emigration from Poland.
Emigration in 1968, even when thought of in the context of this rich Polish political
tradition, was not an easy choice. To justify emigration is at the same time to disregard the
difficult decision to remain. Though it was no Tsarist prison, those who compared their fate to
earlier political activists had paths to careers blocked, faced constant surveillance and the
possibility of spending more time in jail. At the same time, to leave meant being cut off from
friends and family—sometimes leading to feelings of abandonment or guilt for it. Writing from
prison in 1982, Adam Michnik said (about continued emigration): “I can just hear you say that it
is not in my character… that the decision to emigrate is a very personal one. All this is true.” He
went on: “But the decision… [to stay] has also been personal, and it has affected others as well.
It is important to keep in mind the existence of those other people… their reaction to the
news—which will reach them in their hiding places and prison cells—that you are leaving
Poland.”41
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Antisemitic sentiments in 1968 came from communist politicians. But they too were
Poles working to remake Polish nationhood in their image. Forcing politically-minded people
into exile was for these nationalists—who also happened to be emboldened by signals about
anti-Zionism from the Soviet Union—a dangerous outcome. Physical dislocation can move
politically-minded people beyond the grasp of a government but take away none of their
legitimacy. Delegitimization can take other forms. In 1968 it was not enough to force people to
leave the country—bonds of civic nationhood had to be broken too. The Polish authorities
attempted to strip people of their Polishness on primitive ethnic terms to accomplish this
break.
Even when thought of as primarily politically motivated, emigration is incredibly
personal. Political commitment was in this case being contested at the same time as belonging
to a civic nation. Also at stake were personal identity, commitments to friends and family,
schooling and employment: a vast part of a person’s life. A person confronts diametrically
opposed paths when choosing between their well-being and that of others. The perception of
emigration as self-serving (whether true or not) motivates people to action in exile as a result.
Beyond working through the trauma of antisemitism it was only gaining a measure of personal
stability after emigration that initially held this émigré milieu back from an initiative like
Aneks—one which they hoped would in turn comfort those who made the difficult decision to
continue political activism in Poland.

91

Chapter Three: The First Years of Aneks
Actions for the benefit of a country that—I was convinced—I would never in my life see again.
-Aleksander Smolar
The journal is published in a neat, almost luxurious edition (good paper, glossy cover, crisp
typeface—relatively few typographical errors). There is no doubt that its publishing is
supervised by people who have an understanding of editorial work. The stylistic level of the
translations is generally good—you can see the concern for the language, for the accuracy of
terminology, for the maintenance of sociological terms already introduced into the Polish
language and for the introduction of new ones, [which are] still without the ‘right of
citizenship.’
-“W.S”
While the previous chapter was about leaving Poland, this one is about the immigrant
experience. Settling in a new environment—taking care of personal needs—came first for the
émigrés. The group that would start Aneks in 1973 was split between a number of countries as
individuals and families finished their education and started careers. Aleksander Smolar would
end up in Paris while Eugeniusz Smolar found employment at the BBC in London. It was not only
the publication but the contacts they developed in their professional life that would benefit
those they knew in Poland.
The Aronistes
It was Marta Petrusewicz who introduced Aleksander Smolar to the Romanian-French
political philosopher Pierre Hassner, who was a professor at Johns Hopkins in Bologna. Smolar
was visiting his brother in Sweden at the time, and Hassner asked him if he could make it to
Paris for an interview at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique. Hassner knew about a
position working under the French philosopher Raymond Aron and could get Smolar an
interview. Smolar recalls the phone call decades later: “[Aron] was one of the most important
people in the field of humanities in the world, to say nothing of France – he was a philosopher,
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sociologist, strategist, expert in international relations who had a first-rate knowledge of
economics. He knew everything about social sciences, he was an exceptional man…. ‘Of course
I’ll come’.”1
Smolar met Hassner in Paris and along with Sciences Po professor and Commentaire (in
the future also Contrepoint) editor Jean-Claude Casanova walked to Aron’s office (during the
walk Smolar learned that no one told Aron that Smolar didn’t speak French—they would
converse in English). Smolar made a good impression and was invited back for dinner the
following night. “At the end of the conversation,” Smolar recalls, “right, well, we’ve taken care
of this year, you‘ll get your grant. As to the future, we’ll see,” Aron said the next night.2 And like
that Smolar had secured a place in an intellectual group that would become a major part of his
life, thinking, and career.
“Anti-communism was very strong among that group of people, not just intellectually
but also emotionally,” Aleksander Smolar said of the aronistes.3 Beyond Casanova, and Hassner,
Aron was a highly influential French intellectual representing a liberal perspective that was not
without controversy. While they had been friends since youth, Aron became an ideological rival
to Jean-Paul Sartre shortly after the Second World War. Sartre came to represent the antiAmerican left, while Aron saw the Cold War as too important a conflict to make such ideological
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gestures. They had both started their intellectual journeys interested in Marx.4 Both became
anti-Communists, though just several years after Aron wrote his perhaps best-known work and
critique of Marxism, The Opium of the Intellectuals, Sartre in his Search for a Method declared
existentialism a category within Marxism and continued to be guided by Marxist thought. Aron
and Sartre embodied opposing poles of the French intellectual spectrum.
Raymond Aron had been involved with the Congress for Cultural Freedom, attending its
inaugural conference in West Berlin in 1950. The Congress was an American answer to Soviet
efforts to convince Europe’s intellectuals that Soviet Communism was the future of mankind.
Aron was in rarified company. Also in attendance was a who’s who of anti-communist
intellectuals, most of whom had come from the socialist tradition or the left more broadly: the
likes of Arthur Koestler, Karl Jaspers, Ignazio Silone, Bertrand Russell, Jacques Maritain, John
Dewey, Hugh Trevor-Roper, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, Alfred J. Ayer, Benedetto Croce, Richard
Löwenthal, James Burnham and Sidney Hook.5
The depth of American involvement in the Congress was not made known until a series
of exposés were printed starting with a 1967 article in the San Francisco-based New Leftassociated Ramparts magazine. Historian Giles Scott-Smith breaks the arguments about the
Congress for Cultural Freedom down into three positions: justification of the ties between the
C.I.A. and the Congress, moral critique, and middle-ground arguments about the Westernizing
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effect that Congress publications had on Europe. 6 One historian taking the middle ground is
Volker Berghahn, who writes that members of the Congress were primarily concerned with
convincing anti-American Western European intellectuals that Soviet dominance was a greater
danger to Europe.7
As one of the goals of the Congress was to combat anti-Americanism in Western Europe,
the revelations about it were at once shocking and unsurprising. After all, who else would have
had the resources to put together such an institution in war-ravaged Europe? On the other
hand, the depth of American involvement—clumsy sleight-of-hand by the C.I.A.—were difficult
to shake off. Aron was just one of many people and organizations who were embarrassed by
being tied to covert American money. Aron was a longtime proponent of the need for American
presence in Europe. When deliberating about the revelations in the Paris office of the Congress
in 1967, Aron “withdrew stormily from the meeting, slamming the door as he left the room.”8
Iain Stewart, a biographer of Aron, argues in his 2020 book that the Frenchman influenced the
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Congress of Cultural Freedom more than it could have influenced him.9 Stewart writes that
Aron’s push to inculcate intellectuals against pursuing ideology with religious fervor—as
presented in his 1955 The Opium of the Intellectuals—became the strategy of the Congress that
very year.
While Sartre embraced the student revolt in France in 1968, Aron became a loud critic.
“[Aron] had a very negative view of [1968], a bit hysterical… he saw it in a somewhat
apocalyptic light,” Aleksander Smolar says.10 The journal Contrepoint was founded by Aron in
May of 1970, deliberately timed to coincide with the second anniversary of the French May. In
the radical leftist revolt of French students Aron saw exactly the things that bothered the Polish
émigrés. While the revolutions of the Westerners were anti-authoritarian, they took an
authoritarian tone by embracing Marxist revolutionary violence in their struggle. To both Aron
and the Poles this was at best counterintuitive and at worst dangerous, either inviting an
authoritarianism from the left or ineffective nihilism to replace the authority that they were
protesting against. Aleksander Smolar therefore appeared before Aron in Paris in 1972 as a
perfect candidate at a critical time for Western intellectuals. Here was an intelligent young
former communist, a 1968 protestor who had been fighting in Poland for the same values that
Aron believed were important, and who too found the radicalism of Western students
unpalatable.11
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Both Smolar and Aron saw a New Left, often destructively radical, focused on the third
world rather than more tangible problems closer to home. Smolar recalls his first impressions of
Western leftists: “it was… difficult [in Bologna] because of the leftist group around me, and the
sympathy everyone, even some of the professors, had for terrorists. There was a rather wellknown political scientist there… who was a leftist from '68… he was very fiery and he said,
'Listen, [El] Salvador or Nicaragua are much closer to me than East Germany'.” Smolar replied to
the West German professor: “I looked at him and said, 'You're mad. You've gone mad. This is…
you're not being true to yourself'.”12 Here Smolar highlights the link between political and
personal considerations, emphasizing the importance of the latter when interrogating the
former.
This climate of contestation among Western intellectuals—the interplay of anticolonialism and anti-communism—had more of an impact on Smolar’s life and career than even
he initially thought. As Smolar’s one-year post under Aron was coming to an end, he applied for
a regular position at CNRS. Later in his career, he was caught up on the stakes of his
readmission as a permanent employee: the committee had in part selected him for political
reasons. Smolar was selected at the time of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet’s coup, and the
Marxist contingent of the CNRS committee wanted to bring on some leftist Chilean exiles. In
exchange, their anti-communist colleagues advocated for a refugee from Eastern Europe—and
so Smolar was brought on board. Soon after his initial acceptance, Smolar learned that his

agents even before they emigrated. This issue too was tied with the attack on their identity.
And now, in the West, supporting the same people and issues, what did it matter that the
money of one empire was being used to hurt another?
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hiring was in contravention to the rules: hiring someone who had just held a visiting post was
not allowed. It was already summer and positions began in the Fall. Smolar was without
prospects and about to become a father. He pleaded with Aron, reasoning that neither the
decision to hire him nor the mistake was his. He was allowed to receive the position.
Alongside the aronistes and also through Pierre Hassner, Aleksander Smolar got
involved with the Christian personalist journal Esprit, then edited by Jean-Marie Domenach,
participating in an Esprit discussion club alongside Hassner. The Jewish-Romanian émigré
Hassner had just started publishing in Esprit in 1972 and would write in the journal regularly for
the rest of his life. Aleksander Smolar appreciated that the Esprit group were close to
personalist Catholic organizations in Poland. Over the coming years, Christian personalism
would play a major role in Polish politics through groups around publications like Tygodnik
Powszechny, Znak and Więź that Esprit maintained ties with.13
He also helped publish l’Alternative with leftist publisher François Maspero (Smolar sat
on the editorial board alongside fellow émigré and student of Leszek Kołakowski, Krzysztof
Pomian). The full title of the journal explains its purpose: L'Alternative : pour les droits et les
libertés démocratiques en Europe de l'Est (or “The Alternative: for rights and democratic
liberties in Eastern Europe”). Smolar considered both l’Alternative and Esprit part of socialist
politician Michel Rocard’s deuxieme gauche, which the Pole describes as left-liberal, on the
right of socialist politics. Rocard was anti-communist, believed in market forces over
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nationalization of industry, and his second left had a longstanding openness toward progressive
Catholics.14
Though Smolar was considered a leftist compared to Aron’s other admirers, he shared
with a significant percentage of them a communist past. He felt closest to Hassner, Casanova,
and the historian Alain Besançon—the latter of whom would also become a good friend
(Smolar’s son, meanwhile, is named after Hassner).15 Of those three only Besançon had been a
communist, changing his mind when reading Khrushchev’s revelations about Stalin in 1956. But
among Aron’s followers more broadly, Smolar recalls a number of formerly card-carrying
communists: the French-Greek philosopher Kostas Papaioannu, historians Annie Kriegel and
Jean-Jacques Becker, and political scientist Pierre Manent. Hassner would appear in Aneks
often over the years. Alongside him in the pages of Aneks the reader also finds Aron himself,
Besançon, and Manent.
Ever since the 1960s, the Polish milieu served by Aneks had maintained connections
with leftists, mainly Trotskyists, in the West. These Westerners had always been eager to help,
though even before 1968 their ideological attachments could be seen as naïve. “One could
count more on the left-wingers than on those on the right,” Eugeniusz Smolar recalls. While he
had contact with Aron’s circle and groups that were even more Gaullist, “most of my contact
were with socialists,” Smolar recalls. This was especially true after the founding of the civil
society group KOR in Poland, because Smolar and Leszek Kołakowski were asked by members of
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the organization to be its representatives in the Socialist International. Smolar had good
relations with Felipé Gonzalez, longtime vice president of the Socialist International and later
the prime minister of Spain. The same could be said of his relations with Lionel Jospin, a highranking politician in the French Socialist Party and later French prime minister; and Italian
Socialist Party leader Bettino Craxi. He also maintained contacts with French trade union
leaders, namely Edmond Maire and Jacques Chérèque of the Confédération française
démocratique du travail (CFDT), and the anti-communist Force Ouvrière. He knew the socialist
politician and French president François Mitterrand, though the two became distant after the
Pole wrote a scathing editorial for the French press about Mitterand’s 1985 invitation to Paris
of Polish general Wojciech Jaruzelski, who had imposed martial law in Poland only a few years
earlier. Likewise, the Confédération générale du travail (CGT) was on good terms with Jaruzelski
and unfriendly toward Smolar.16
Aleksander Smolar called Aron his intellectual master after he left Warsaw University.
He credits to Aron a cool detachment when analyzing a situation, attempting to see its
ambiguities, to view problems from as many angles as possible.17 This analytical approach
sometimes resulted in interpersonal difficulties when the subject was his homeland and the
people close to him—very dear and personal issues. Smolar recalls Adam Michnik being upset
upon hearing one of Smolar’s radio broadcasts into Poland—something the émigrés did in

16

The head of the CGT at the time of Smolar’s contacts was Henri Krasucki, whose parents had
been communist activists in Poland until their immigration to France in the 1920s. Both
Krasucki and his father were in the resistance during the war and were interned in Nazi camps.
Only the son survived.
17
Smolar likewise took after the Polish philosopher and mentor to the 1968 generation of
intellectuals, Leszek Kołakowski, who expressed himself with a similar distance.
100

addition to publishing—read and compiled “with the gaze of an ichthyologist.” It wasn’t only
Smolar’s dispassionate way of assessing the situation that bothered Michnik but also that he
had the luxury of being able to do so from a distance. He was detached from Poland—he was
not there. “[This] wasn’t true – I was very engaged with the events,” Smolar explains.18 But it
was often not apparent to his friends in Poland from a distance and through the analytical style
he picked up in France, with little else besides an intellectual analysis from which to base the
sentiments of a friend.
To Smolar, liberalism is an openness to many ideas at once—an antidote to ideology.
But in the end “I always made a choice,” Smolar says.19 Perceptions of liberalism usually do not
emphasize the choice: to be for something in the end, rather than forever exploring the myriad
possibilities with an open mind. “There is this conviction that one needs to be intellectually
honest, in other words, show all of the world's complexities–and to know how to make choices
if we don't want to end up as clerks who only describe the world and essentially turn their
backs on reality. You have to get involved,” he continues. His emphasis on making a choice
might be a key difference between what liberalism means for émigrés like him versus what
liberalism means for Westerners. Smolar says that he was not able to achieve this ideal, but his
work in Aneks comes close. His dedication to his friends betrays his attempts at ichthyology.
Just before Aleksander Smolar was accepted at the CNRS, he applied for a position in
Sociology at the University of Brighton and was accepted. Smolar recalls speaking to a faculty
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member who specialized in Poland, George Kolankiewicz, who told him that he was very
unhappy that Smolar had been accepted. “Well, because you're going to complicate my
dealings with Poland,” Kolankiewicz said.20 Smolar was taken aback, later calling the response
of Kolankiewicz brutally cynical and one reason that he chose to stay in France. This fateful
decision was composed of personal motivations related to Smolar’s cold reception but also the
desire to be closer, by a little bit, to his friends in Poland—and political events there. But—he
says almost in the same breath—he would nevertheless have taken the position in Brighton had
he known that his brother’s family would soon be living there. This would have altered a life
trajectory that took him toward the aronistes and personalists in France. But just as with his
departure from Poland, a mix of personal and practical concerns kept Aleksander Smolar on the
European continent.
London and the BBC
Eugeniusz and Nina Smolar meanwhile moved from Sweden to London in 1975. They
had visited the United States in 1973 while considering where they would settle after Nina
finished her studies. She had been invited to several American institutes. Eugeniusz Smolar
meanwhile was offered by academic and political advisor Zbigniew Brzeziński to begin a
doctorate at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., ostensibly under Second World War
anti-fascist resistance fighter Jan Karski. But like Leszek Kołakowski had decided a few years
before, they felt a need to be closer to Poland—to their friends. Eugeniusz had also been
offered work by Radio Free Europe in Munich but did not want to uproot the family. The
inherited trauma of genocide and war was a major factor as well: “living among Germans was
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out of the question for emotional reasons.” In London, Nina was offered a position at the
Imperial Cancer Research Fund and Eugeniusz at the BBC.
Though he would simultaneously go through a year or two of training, Eugeniusz began
work at the Polish desk of the BBC at the beginning of November 1975. He recalls his personal
network shaking up the way things had been done almost immediately. In December, Jacek
Kuroń dictated to the Smolar families a statement via telephone. It was information about a
growing protest movement in Poland. Eugeniusz went to his boss, who said that the
information had to come through the regional BBC correspondent: a man in Vienna name Noel
Clark. Smolar grew impatient and called Clark, which was against protocol. The BBC did not
want people with nationalistic tendencies influencing the news. Clark got in touch with one of
his contacts, a signatory of the document that Kuroń had dictated to Smolar, and it was
publicized in the West.
An important communications channel was created. The Workers’ Defense Committee,
or KOR, was born in September of 1976. Among those who helped start it were university
friends of Smolar. This committee had a direct line to the Smolar families in Paris and London.
People calling from Poland would leave messages on answering machines at the homes of both
Nina & Eugeniusz Smolar and Irena & Aleksander Smolar. The émigrés would write down news
from Poland and communicate it not only in Aneks but to the BBC, Radio Free Europe (to be
broadcast back into Poland over the radio waves), Kultura and French news agencies. “And we
did all this simultaneously with our normal professional work, taking care of our daughter,
publishing Aneks and books [through the Aneks publishing house led by Nina], searching for
money and political support for the opposition in the West, and contacts with Czech or
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Hungarian oppositionists.” This is an extraordinary effort that goes beyond politics. It was
activism in support of friends and a continuation of activities they had pursued before leaving
Poland.
The BBC eventually accepted Eugeniusz Smolar as a reliable source for information
about the Polish opposition (the BBC usually requires confirmation about a story from two
sources, but this was waived for information from him). Eugeniusz had good contacts with
British journalists at the Observer (Neal Ascherson) and Times of London (Richard Davy and
Timothy Garton Ash—the latter of whom became a respected author on the topic of Poland
and Eastern Europe more broadly). Through Zbigniew Brzeziński and Jan Nowak-Jeziorański of
Radio Free Europe he was connected to Washington, D.C., political circles. But the émigrés
were merely “ambassadors,” Smolar says. “We didn’t have any political or personal goals of our
own.”21
Aleksander Smolar in 2009 said: “Aneks was something more as a milieu than a
publication.”22 Nina Smolar describes their apartment after 1976 as an information center for
KOR. Through the connections of the Smolar families in both Paris and London, a news article
with information about the situation in Poland would sometimes appear simultaneously in The
New York Times, Le Monde, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, The London Times, Dagens Nyheter in
Sweden and even in the Australian press. With their former professors, Włodzimierz Brus and
Leszek Kołakowski, Eugeniusz started a fund for the Polish opposition called the “Appeal for
Polish Workers.” Beyond the publication itself, whose goal was to reach a particular audience in
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Poland, the Aneks editors were intermediaries connecting Western intellectuals—academics,
politicians and journalists especially—with the Polish opposition as it blossomed over the
course of the 1970s.
Nina Smolar notes that some people of her generation found Kultura, created by older
intellectuals who had never experienced postwar Poland, to be foreign to them. Aneks
meanwhile was a publication of their milieu (a “pismo środowiskowe” she said). Being
representative of a social circle meant also selecting content that was pertinent to the interests
and needs of their peers in Poland. It meant collaborating with acquaintances in Poland on
thematic issues, as they did with Marcin Król and Wojciech Karpiński. It meant taking the ideas
of people in Poland seriously, as only those who stayed could know best what was needed to
change the situation in the capital, Warsaw, and the country as a whole. This position as
ambassadors, representatives, or intermediaries also meant that identity issues, built in the
Polish context on Polish-Jewish relations, would not openly be discussed in Aneks until the mid
1980s.
After receiving critical feedback from acquaintances in Poland on their original
introductory statement for Aneks, the editors replaced it with one that embodying a far
different tone. The new introduction is less forceful, says less about the émigrés and their role,
and focuses more on the type of content the creators of Aneks wanted to provide for their
readership in Poland. In the new introduction, the editors wrote about themselves only to
mention that most of them were “closest to the socialist tradition.” They expanded on this only
slightly, writing that the conceptions of the Aneks editors differed regarding what socialism is.
The only reason that they mention this at all, they wrote, was to emphasize that they would
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under no circumstances try to convince readers to adopt any opinions or positions. The old
introduction describes the points of view that would appear in the publication as ranging from
classic liberalism to writing from the New Left, while the new introduction is less specific but
perhaps true to the range of their future editorial choices: the introduction that appeared in
the first issue states that there will be a variety of traditions and ideologies represented in the
pages of the journal and the sole criteria would be the “cognitive value” of the text, i.e.
whether it imparts knowledge on the reader.
The original introduction stated that the editors were interested in work done by the
Praxis group in Yugoslavia and writing created or published during the Prague Spring in
Czechoslovakia as far as literature from “so-called” socialist countries was concerned. The
editors wrote that theoretical, scholarly or academic texts were important for learning about
the “mechanisms ruling police socialism,” alongside strictly political critique. They wrote that
the world was developing in the direction of socialism and so texts would be selected with that
in mind—ostensibly a humanistic socialism, one which values the individual person over a
utopian collective vision.23
The new introduction was missing such specific editorializing. The goal of Aneks was
now simply to help create a “modern political consciousness” that could inform about
important issues facing Poland (and the emigration, the editors added). The editors concluded
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by writing that the quarterly would launch by providing writing translated from languages used
in Western countries and other communist states, but that with time the editors hoped to
publish original work as well. Compared to the original text, the one that ended up being
published uses almost no proper nouns: gone is Yugoslavia and the New Left. Rather it focuses
on describing a rationale. Most importantly, gone are all mentions of an émigré identity besides
the reference of being close to a socialist tradition. Even that was given only as a confession
underpinning the promise not to impart any particular editorial slant on the publication.
Likely because of a combination of factors, including wishing neither to influence nor
expose their friends, the names of the editors did not appear in Aneks until 1976.24 Issue
number 11 is the first with Aleksander Smolar’s name on it. This change coincided with the
emergence in Poland of an organized opposition movement to proposed changes to the Polish
constitution that would within this legal document make the country more dependent on the
Soviet Union. While the names of the Aneks editors did not appear in Aneks for years, an article
attributed to the philosopher Leszek Kołakowski—by the time of publishing an émigré for half a
decade—appeared already in the second issue. So does an article by the sociologist Zygmunt
Bauman. Both were relieved of their professorships at Warsaw University and emigrated. They
both appear again in issue four of Aneks, along with a piece by Raymond Aron. Kołakowski left
the country in 1968 after being invited to McGill University in Montreal. He eventually settled
at All Souls College, Oxford. Bauman was targeted in Poland both as a critical intellectual and a

24

This coincided with the adoption that year of the Polish dissident strategy of practicing
politics honestly and openly in the face of the Polish government in Warsaw. Dissidents now
signed their writing with their full names and sometimes their full address. They had decided to
“live in truth,” as Czech dissident Vaclav Havel distilled the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl’s
philosophy.
107

“Zionist.” Like Kołakowski, Bauman settled in the United Kingdom, at Leeds University—but by
way of Tel Aviv. Kołakowski is published in Aneks 17 times, more than any other person.25 The
prolific Adam Michnik—arguably the most exemplary figure of 1968 in Poland—is the most
published author from within Poland, appearing in the pages of Aneks ten times but only
beginning in 1977.
Polish historian Andrzej Paczkowski asserts that it took the 1968 émigrés some time to
find their voice, first deferring to the intellectuals mentioned above, who were their mentors.26
After all, the 1968 émigrés had just finished their academic education and experienced a severe
trial, both literally and figuratively, as they entered political life in the mid-to-late-1960s. The
early choices of the editorial team highlight the interests and concerns of the Aneks editors and,
more broadly, the generation of Polish intellectuals that came of age in 1968 that the
publication represents.
Uniting the authors selected for the first issue of Aneks first and foremost is a critical
stance toward communist Eastern European governments. Despite the variety of ideas
expressed in its pages over the years, Aneks does have an editorial slant: it represents the
intellectual interests of people raised and educated in a communist state who are actively
soaking up liberal values, chief among them individual rights, freedom of expression, and
market forces in the realm of economics. The first two articles published in Aneks are
translations of works by economist Robert Heilbronner and the political scientist Samuel P.
Huntington. These academic pieces are followed by translations from English of communist
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dissidents Milovan Đilas and a Czech writing under the pseudonym George Moldau. Completing
the issue are an economic piece on the Polish economy published in the Cambridge Review by
Italian scholar D. M. Nuti; a review of historian Robert Conquest’s The Great Terror by French
historian Alain Besançon—a student of Raymond Aron—and musings on Maxim Gorky by
Berlin-based American intellectual and journal editor Melvin J. Lasky, based on a then-newly
released English translations of Gorky’s oeuvre. A brief summary of the first ten issues follows
(from the years 1973 to 1975), published in the years prior to major changes to Aneks and to
the Polish political scene.
The Early Years of Aneks
The first issue of Aneks exemplifies values that remain persistent through its whole
publication run. It brings together a milieu of writers who represent a variety of ideas,
motivations, and goals applicable to the situation of open-minded Polish intellectuals of the
time. Anti-communism is a prerequisite. Both the Huntington and Heilbronner works are
reprinted from academic publishing. The former offers a comparative study of what were then
contemporary one-party systems, while the latter examines the ideological mooring of
socialism and suggests that the policies which result should compensate for the limits to the
perfectibility of man identified by traditional conservatism. The tone of Domenico Mario Nuti’s
Cambridge Review article is similarly academic in tone to the first two translations than to the
other pieces in the first issue. Nuti asserts that Poland’s economic planners made a mistake
when they sloppily integrated simple capitalist principles into the communist system by
announcing a drastic increase in the price of many basic food products in order to try to balance
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their ledgers, resulting in the December 1970 strikes and their deadly suppression by the
government.27
The theme of issue two is “The Left and Utopia,” with an introduction to the thematic
section written by Aleksander Smolar but signed with a pseudonym (the concept of utopia is a
constant in Aneks and is the subject of the seventh chapter of this dissertation).28 Prior to the
thematic section of this issue, there appears the first piece of original writing from Poland: an
article written pseudonymously by another student from the Warsaw University 1968 milieu,
the sociologist and philosopher Jakub Karpiński.29 A re-print of a Zygmunt Bauman article
follows, one of two in this issue of Aneks by one of the émigré professors thrown out of
Warsaw University. The thematic section contains the other such article; this one by Leszek
Kołakowski.
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Issue three contains a thematic section on the Prague Spring, the 1968 reform moment
in Czechoslovakia suppressed by Warsaw Pact armies, entitled: “Hopes and bitterness, On the
fifth anniversary of the Czechoslovak experiment.”30 The first article in the issue is by
Aleksander Smolar’s friend Pierre Hassner, and originally appeared in the Paris-based Catholic
journal Esprit, with which both Hassner and Smolar are linked. Aleksander Smolar wrote an
introduction for the special section on Czechoslovakia, positioning it as the last attempt to
reform Communism. He compares it to Polish worker protests similarly crushed by tanks in
1970 during which, Smolar wrote, neither the protesting workers, the authorities, nor the
people in-between any longer had hope for a better future: “A New Era in which the elite, no
longer believing in the possibility of reforming the system, follows the motto of the English
conservative of the last century….”31 The communist authorities are compared by Smolar to an
entrenched ruling class that is nevertheless losing authority and incapable of leading society in
a changing world. So long as they control society, no one has hope of a better future—not even
the elites.
Issue four, the first of 1974, is centered around an argument between Leszek
Kołakowski and Zygmunt Bauman, mediated by Raymond Aron. It continues the utopian theme
from the second issue and opens with a Kołakowski essay about revolution. The essay precedes
a thematic section entitled: “Eastern Europe: the chances of a revolution.”32 The section is
composed of articles from a debate that took place over two issues of the European Journal of

30

“NADZIEJE I GORYCZ: W Piątą Rocznicę Czechosłowackiego Eksperymentu,” Aneks, no. 3
(Jesie 1973): 37–136.
31
Adam Kalm [Aleksander Smolar], “Zamiast Wstępu,” Aneks, no. 3 (Jesie 1973): 39.
32
“Europa Wschodnia: Szanse Na Rewolucję,” Aneks, no. 4 (Winter 1974): 16–125.
111

Sociology a couple of years prior.33 The journal was launched in 1960 and had been co-edited by
Raymond Aron since that time.
While the fifth issue of Aneks has no special theme, it includes the first piece of writing
from a Catholic intellectual: Jacek Salij, a member of the Warsaw branch of the Club of Catholic
intelligentsia (KIK). A careful consideration of the role of religion in society and a fragile alliance
between these ex-socialists with progressive Catholic intellectuals becomes evident beginning
in 1976 in Aneks, when the first of several thematic issues on religion appeared. The longtime
Aneks editor Krzysztof Dorosz is responsible for a significant amount of content on the topic of
religion in the publication. Dorosz had never been a Marxist and as a student at Warsaw
University did not know the student activists. He met the Smolar family in Sweden after
emigration.
The Salij essay in the fifth issue is also the second piece of original writing from Poland.
Salij asked if Poles in general needed “political eschatology,” or in layman’s terms some kind of
raison d’être to structure their lives around. Salij wrote that Poles no longer knew they were
unfree. This stemmed from an approach to life learned during centuries of occupation,
summarized by him as “a philosophy of opportunism and self-sacrifice” that served people well
in difficult times. What worried Salij most was a “universal readiness to degrade one’s dignity
when… demanded.” Maybe an eschatology needed to be created to fill this vacuum in the soul
before it could be abused again. Salij presents the antisemitic slogans used during 1968 as an
example of the authorities harnessing this human weakness. Perhaps next time it would be
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utilized against Russians or Black students, Salij writes, concluding that, “[i]t is not so difficult to
invent an idea of brotherhood in the name of which one can avenge, kill and destroy.”34
This issue also includes a piece by Italian communist Rossana Rossanda: an appeal to the
Western left, entitled “A Lonely Man,” in support of anti-Soviet dissident Aleksander
Solzhenitsyn. (In February of 1974, Solzhenitsyn was arrested and quickly expelled from the
Soviet Union.) This article foreshadows the communiques between a fledgling Polish opposition
and the Italian Communist Party (PCI) sent only a few years later and collected in the 1977
Aneks double issue on Eurocommunism. Her defense of Solzhenitsyn is also a prelude to the
first double-issue of Aneks (number 7-8), which will be dedicated to anti-Soviet dissidents. “You
have to be as stupid or as mendacious as the Communist Party of France, or some intellectuals
from the Communist Party of Italy” to insist that Solzhenitsyn made no difference in Soviet
politics, Rossanda wrote, specifically addressing her appeal to these segments of the left. What
had anyone done, but particularly the left, that was an adequate response to Solzhenitsyn’s
message, she asked.35 “Almost nothing…. It is the same responsibility we have to
Czechoslovakia. It is a heavy responsibility,” said Rossanda, who was expelled from the Italian
Communist Party after criticizing it for its silence regarding the 1968 invasion of the former
country. “We would like it if today to many of our weaknesses and wickedness not be added
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the shrugging off of the fate of Solzhenitsyn because he did not get off the plane in Frankfurt
with a revolutionary appeal in his pocket,” Rossanda concluded.36 In other words, though
Solzhenitsyn did not present a revolutionary utopia, his message was worth listening to because
he described the problems of lived reality in his country.
Issue six, meanwhile, has as its theme the writing of George Orwell. Nina Smolar had
smuggled the Orwell section, curated by university friends of the Aneks editors, out of Poland
the year prior. “Orwell naturally became a very important author for us,” says Aleksander
Smolar.37 Scholar of philosophy Marcin Król, a participant in the 1968 protests at Warsaw
University who did not emigrate, wrote the introduction to the Orwell section under a
pseudonym.38 Król described Orwell as neither a Marxist nor even a socialist, but sympathetic
to socialist ideals, echoing the ideological position of many others from the Pole’s Warsaw
University milieu.
Like a number of people adjacent to Aneks, family ties initially brought Orwell close to
government (closeness more as a feeling of responsibility than as access to power)—in his case
colonial Britain—but he rebelled as a non-conforming leftist. Król recalls Orwell writing as early
as 1947 that given the choice between the United States and the Soviet Union: “everyone
would choose America.” The Pole made an argument here that there are very seldom easy
decisions between good and bad in life. More likely, especially when it comes to political
choices, people select a lesser evil. Sometimes even a lesser evil is not available, Król says. He
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calls to mind the specific dilemmas that faced him and his friends just a few years prior:
“[When] deciding to emigrate and not to stay in the country, or… choosing compromise instead
of an open fight, we are guided by our moral intuitions, personal predilections rather than
rational reasoning. Reason can do little in the face of irrational reality.”39 The most important
thing is to not turn one’s back on reality at these moments, Król wrote—to stay engaged (here
he echoes Aleksander Smolar).
The Orwell selections in this thematic issue also espouse engagement over resignation.
Orwell wrote a series of columns entitled “As I Please,” in the left-wing London Tribune in the
1940s. Two of them were selected for this issue of Aneks. In 1943, Orwell wrote that it is easy
to be a pessimist because events rarely go as planned, leaving plenty of fodder for criticism. But
pessimism is a component of utopian thinking: stemming in part from an assumption that the
world will proceed according to a certain plan. Already in 1943, after his experiences in the
Spanish Civil War, Orwell is concerned with creating a viable position for disillusioned leftists:
“The real answer is to dissociate Socialism from Utopianism,” Orwell writes—arguing for antiutopian socialism.40
In the Orwell selections this constant engagement with reality is also a search for truth.
The opposite of truth to Orwell is a reliance on explaining things through a chosen political
ideology. In a 1944 column Orwell complains that often people avoid “searching for the truth”
in arguments, instead thinking dogmatically to score rhetorical points for preconceived notions.
In the next selected essay, Orwell urges writers to seek “the true nature” of the things they
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write about.41 Many instead try to further a political agenda and become entangled in the
contradictions of their chosen orthodoxy rather than challenging it.
In the final reprinted Orwell essay, he notes that “the issue truth-versus-untruth is as far
as possible kept in the background” when people discuss intellectual liberty and freedom of
expression. Orwell is throughout his work concerned with the idea of totalitarianism, which he
defines in this essay: “A society becomes totalitarian when its structure becomes flagrantly
artificial… when its ruling class has lost its function but succeeds in clinging to power by force or
fraud.”42 Society in this state has reached a dead end. It could “never afford to become either
tolerant or intellectually stable.” The Aneks editors would return to Orwell with a thematic
section in the year 1984. Speaking about Orwell in Aneks, Aleksander Smolar says: “We were
particularly passionate about the problem of totalitarian language and, more broadly, language
and politics.”43
While working on a degree in English at Warsaw University prior to 1968, Krzysztof
Dorosz too recalls coming across clandestine copies of the work of George Orwell:
I lived in shock for several days because I had before me a description of the reality that
I was stuck in, which I hadn't perceived. It made me feel a wall between myself and the
People's Republic of Poland—maybe transparent, but it was a wall.
Dorosz wanted nothing to do with the world that had revealed itself as brutally dystopian
through Orwell. He could only think to get out of it: “My life attitude became: ‘as far away from
this as possible.’" Here the Pole’s lonely description of himself differs from that of the student
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activists at the time. Whereas the selections for the Orwell section highlight engagement with
reality, Dorosz could not muster the conviction within himself. “I couldn't imagine fighting
because I thought it was [already] lost,” he says.
The editors of Aneks were, as they had been prior to emigration, interested in political
and social developments in the Soviet Union. The vast thematic section in issue 7-8 is about
anti-Soviet dissidents. This was the first double issue of Aneks and another created in
conjunction with acquaintances residing in Poland. This was more than intellectual curiosity, as
the Soviet Union was the leviathan looming over Poland. Moscow was the nerve center of
power for Eastern Europe and large parts of the world beyond. The section was largely created
by Andrzej Drawicz and Wiktor Woroszylski. Drawicz was as essayist and member of
Modzelewski’s Political Discussion Club at Warsaw University in the early 1960s, while
Woroszylski was a poet and longtime revisionist communist. The latter was a few years older
than Drawicz, the same age as and a good friend of the philosopher Leszek Kołakowski. Rossana
Rossanda’s 1974 appeal testifies to the reach of Soviet power into Western Europe as well. The
editors had already published anti-Soviet Russian dissidents or articles about them in each
previous issue.
The ninth issue begins with an essay by Peter Kende, a Hungarian émigré, an aroniste,
and a friend of Aleksander Smolar, who would start a Hungarian journal on the model of Aneks
in 1978.44 An ex-communist reformer, Kende was a supporter of Hungarian politician Imre
Nagy, and fled Hungary after the crushing of the anti-communist revolution there in 1956. Like
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Smolar, Kende worked at the CNRS. This issue also includes an article by sociologist Maria
Hirszowicz, another professor who was expelled from Warsaw University in 1968 and
emigrated—also ending up in the United Kingdom. Finally, the issue includes a piece about the
reception of Russian dissident Aleksander Solzhenitsyn in France, likely written by Aleksander
Smolar but not attributed to any author (the intellectual reception of Eastern Europeans in the
West is the topic of chapter nine).
The tenth issue, the final one without Aleksander Smolar’s name in it (and final issue of
1975), marks the beginning of an editorial shift that Aneks will undergo in 1976. This issue
contains far more original content than any prior issue: three original articles written by
émigrés, in addition to a note of congratulations sent from Poland, addressed to the Russian
dissident Andrei Sakharov (who had just won a Nobel prize) signed by five of the people
involved in the Warsaw protests of 1968: Barbara Toruńczyk, Seweryn Blumsztajn, Jacek Kuroń,
Jan Lityński, and Adam Michnik. The issue also contains a section of unpublished essays by
Paweł Beylin, a professor that was expelled from the Communist Party for protesting the
philosopher Leszek Kołakowski’s removal in 1966 and firing from Warsaw University in 1968.
While the Beylin pieces are also originals from Poland, they are posthumous as the author had
died in 1971. Their publication carried no danger for the author as it did for the living.
Two of the three authors of original work in the tenth issue have connections to the
BBC, where Eugeniusz Smolar had just begun working in 1975: Andrzej Świdlicki was able to
leave Poland for London after graduating from Warsaw University in 1972 and freelanced for
the BBC Polish section before graduating from the London School of Economics in 1977. His
article, entitled “Farewell to the University,” is about his experiences at Warsaw University in
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the wake of the 1968 protests. In 1981 Świdlicki went on to work for Radio Free Europe in
Munich and beginning in the 1990s, as Eugeniusz Smolar was ending his stint as the Polish
section chief, would again work for the BBC. The other, Andrzej Koraszewski, was thrown out of
work in 1967 and emigrated to Sweden in 1971, where he helped with Aneks. In 1986 he would
join Eugeniusz Smolar at the BBC in London. Koraszewski reviews a book by Hirszowicz, who
had appeared in issue nine.
Between 1976 and 1981 the role of Aneks as a source of information and social cohesion
became less important. Publications were being created in Poland, a development made
possible by a societal and political space carved out by the opposition in those years. Polish
intellectuals had voiced a powerful criticism with their protest against changes to the
constitution. With the creation of the Worker’s Defense Committee, an intellectual group that
had the former 1968 protestors at the core managed to engage with a broader part of the
population in Poland. And they had support abroad, in part because of their friends in Aneks,
some of whom also happened to work at or have excellent connections with a plethora of news
organizations across Western Europe. The publication and its editors were also part of a larger
picture which included the signing of the Helsinki Accords a year prior (the accords popularized
human rights discourse as a tool of opposition groups in Eastern Europe).45 In the protest
against changes to the constitution, in fact, the signatories referred to the Helsinki Final Act as
part of their argument. Without media contacts in the West, though, how far would these
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complaints spread? Adam Michnik at a 1985 trial addressed Western activists, saying “your
presence might be decisive to our fate.”46
With Polish activists now signing their names publicly on writing published both by
unofficial printing presses inside the country and abroad, it would have been odd for the Aneks
editors to remain anonymous. Krzysztof Dorosz was afraid to use his name for fear of getting
his family in trouble in Poland:
In the early years, I was accompanied by a—probably exaggerated—fear for my family...
It had its roots in [my] decision to leave the country. In family conversations, there was
an argument that my departure could harm my sister in getting into university.
For his colleagues in the Aneks milieu, such fear would have manifested differently, as many of
their family members and acquaintances had already been targeted either in antisemitic “antiZionist” actions or related to earlier protests at university. Dorosz recalls that his impetus for
ceasing to publish under a pseudonym came from Adam Michnik when he visited the West in
1976 as a representative of the Workers’ Defense Committee:
I still lived in Sweden, but as doctoral student of English I would go to London—these
were cultural pilgrimages. I would visit [Eugeniusz] and Nina Smolar and met Adam
Michnik there. And Michnik chewed me out. He said: "how is it that we act publicly, we
in KOR give names, telephone numbers, addresses, we are not afraid, and you?" It made
an impression on me and I wrote subsequent articles under my name.
The journal’s program unfolds from these early issues. While the operating principle of Aneks is
to bear no editorial slant, the idea that the Soviet regimes could not be reformed is treated as
self-evident. The path to change in Eastern Europe would lead through mobilizing society. The
dissident groups attempting this task were greatly aided by Western attention to their cause.
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Aneks in the eyes of Polish security services
The Polish government cared a great deal about Western reception because during the
1970s and 1980s Poland relied on Western loans and credits to keep its economy going. Bad
press could jeopardize the finances of the state, and so lead to instability. Documents created
by the security services show that they kept track of what was being published about Poland
abroad. Publications from abroad and those later printed in the underground in Poland were
tracked, seized, and catalogued with most captured copies destroyed. A look at the archives of
the Ministry of the Interior (MSW)—including research done by students graduating from its
Officers’ School—reveals this peculiar type of reception.
The Ministry of the Interior was the main security organ of communist Poland, and its
concerns went far beyond monitoring the internal situation in the country. Aneks quickly gained
a reputation as an important Western émigré publication. The publication was the subject of a
memo at the ministry as early as July of 1973, just one month after the first issue was printed.
The author of the memo describes the high quality of the content and of the physical copies
themselves, impressed with the know-how of the editors.47 A memo from December of 1978
describes a panel about the impact of Radio Free Europe on intellectuals in Poland from the
annual American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies conference, which took
place in Columbus, Ohio that year. The first page of the memo is heavily annotated, showing
that it was sent to at least half a dozen people within the security services.48 Though Aneks is
not mentioned by name, the report notes that Radio Free Europe receives information both
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from émigré publications and illegal publications created in Eastern Europe. Sharing
information with Radio Free Europe was common practice for the Aneks editors as their friends
in Poland had a direct line to them by which to communicate news from Poland.
At the Officers’ School that same year, meanwhile, Aneks is mentioned alongside the
Paris Kultura—by far the most influential Polish publication of the postwar era—in a study of
what the security services called “western ideological sabotage.”49 The publication is described
to be acting in concert with long-term bogeymen shared by Marxist-Leninist Eastern European
states and many Western intellectuals who most concerned themselves with Western
imperialism, which they saw as perpetrated in part by American research foundations or,
worse, the C.I.A. directly. The intelligence agency is seen as the nefarious backer of most anticommunist initiatives. The 1978 document calls institutions like the Ford Foundation “classic
centers of ideological sabotage,” intermediaries through which initiatives like émigré
publications “draw financial subsidies… from secret services in the leading capitalist
countries”—a belief also expressed by E.P. Thompson in his 1973 argument with Leszek
Kołakowski. Aneks appears on a list of the most important Polish publishers in the West in this
Polish study. The author provides a chart that shows the change in quantity of illegal
publications entering Poland occurring between 1976 and 1977, when the first independent
opposition organization was created. Just over 10,000 copies of illegal publications were
stopped at the border in both 1975 and 1976, the study shows, while in 1977 that number grew
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to over 17,000.50
But the above numbers tell only a fraction of the story. Illegal publishing inside Poland
grew by magnitudes over the course of the late 1970s and worried the authorities. For the
editors of Aneks this was a positive development, as they had not created the journal for
personal gain. Their work outside of publishing Aneks—contacts in the media and among
Western intellectuals—was in part responsible for creating this new sphere of press freedom.
The goal was to support their friends in Poland, who were responsible for some of the popular
publications of that time. A 1979 memo shows the change perceived from the side of the Polish
state. While in 1976 only 1,662 copies of illegal publications were confiscated in Poland, that
number grew to over 13,000 in 1977. By 1978 it grew to over 155,000 and in 1979 over 223,000
“anti-socialist” works were found. Warsaw was the epicenter, with over 167,000 being
requisitioned there over those years (the next closest city in quantity, Radom, only accounted
for 38,000, while the fewest, 13,000 were found in the Eastern borderland area of Lublin).51
Yet Aneks remained important not only to readers in Poland—it was frequently reprinted by publishing houses in the country—but also to the security services. A 1985 study
analyzes the publication as a contributor to rise of the “Solidarity” movement in 1980.52
Another study follows in 1986, this one about the years 1983-1985. The author makes a
connection between psychological warfare directives created by the US military in the 1950s
and the creation of Aneks. “[T]he people gathered around it are part of the "resources" used by
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the West, thrown on the front lines of the ideological struggle with communism,” the security
services officer writes at the end of his analysis.53 In a study the following year, the author
writes: …the propaganda machine of the West… apart from the subversive radio stations BBC,
[Radio Free Europe, Voice of America]… has embedded emigration publications… such as the
Paris Kultura, Aneks…54 This analysis of course completely wipes out the agency of the editors,
who had chosen to act against the Polish state already in their university years or earlier.
There is another characteristic present from beginning to end in the files of the security
services, beside a desire to link Aneks to foreign intelligence or global capital: antisemitism. The
author of the 1973 memo that fawns over the glossiness of the cover also writes that the
publication is popular in “revisionist-Zionist” circles.55 The author of a 1988 study, another in
the line of above-cited works on Aneks that begin to appear in the 1980s, states that the
publication promotes “social-democratic-liberal-Zionist” views. 56 Even twenty years after 1968,
antisemitism is a programmatic component of the Polish security state. The author mentions
the 1968 protests and the pre-1968 discussion clubs in his analysis, clinging to the original
government interpretation of those events. With few exceptions, most of those kicked out of
Poland in 1968 were in 1988 not yet allowed to travel to Poland and could not claim Polish
citizenship.
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The above report too contrasts the seemingly ample funding of the publication with
mocking descriptions of how it promotes itself: “independent,” “non-partisan,” the author
writes in quotation marks. A second 1988 report cuts through the sarcasm: “since in the
capitalist world it is difficult to make a living from selflessness, it can be assumed that the main
sources [of support], and they must be considerable, represent the well-disguised interests of
the hostile subversive centers of the West.”57 Along with the anti-Semitic accusations from
1968, the idea that the founders of Aneks were agents of foreign powers follows them as well.
There are associations that make these accusations easy, but a contextualization of Aneks and
its founders within the time, place and situation that they were thrust into contradict the
narratives of the security services—narratives that some Westerners would in part adopt as
well.
Aleksander Smolar’s French mentor, Raymond Aron, had been involved with the
Congress for Cultural Freedom for many years. Its ties to American intelligence embarrassed
him when they were revealed, but these connections would matter very little to an activist
from the East like Smolar. Trading one intelligence service for another left a bad aftertaste, as
Nina Smolar said, but that wasn’t what was occurring. While both great world powers in the
bipolar Cold War world were violators of human rights, there was an ideological difference
between a superpower that stood for liberal freedoms and one that denied them outright.
This may seem like a trivial difference but it is crucial: in the communist system it was
very difficult to defend rights that were taken for granted in liberal democracies simply because
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mechanisms to do so were not functioning in the former.58 In democracies of the time,
however imperfect (of course people also sat in jail for political reasons), improving society by
legal means still seemed possible. In Poland, 1968 became a gravestone for the final attempts
to do the same. Second, the Aneks founders had felt these violations on their own person. And
their friends in Poland were still in the thick of it. Third, there was no ideological convincing or
manipulation that had to be done. The émigrés who started Aneks were continuing work that
they had been doing before they were forced to leave. These educated, resourceful and
opinionated people were taking advantage of the vast resources of one superpower in order to
do damage to another—for the sake of helping people dear to them.
Especially in the early years, many articles in Aneks were re-printed from other
publications. The editors admitted as much in their introductory statement in the first issue.
The initial and primary goal of the journal was, after all, to send translations of pieces published
in other countries and deemed useful for Polish intellectuals into Poland. The Lasky and Moldau
pieces found in the first issue of Aneks were published in Encounter and Survey journals,
respectively. In the minds of many Westerners these publications were connected as they were
both flagship journals associated with the Congress for Cultural Freedom.59 Most of those
involved in this activism in the West were Eastern Europeans (many of them Jews) who had
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personal experience with the illiberal whirlwind of twentieth-century central and Eastern
Europe and had found existential safety in the West.
Lasky, a Bronx, New York-born anti-communist—by virtue of his loathing of Stalinism—
had also served in the US army during the Second World War and criticized the lackluster
Western response to the Holocaust. He was a staunch proponent of individual rights, especially
intellectual freedom, and took over the editorship of Encounter in 1958 from Irving Kristol. The
latter would play a large part in constructing neo-conservatism with his journals The Public
Interest and The National Interest.60 Survey was established in 1956 by Walter Laqueur, a
German Jew born in Breslau—postwar Wrocław—who fled to Israel in 1938 (his parents were
murdered by the Nazis) and became a journalist. It was taken over by Leo Łabędz, who grew up
in Warsaw and survived Soviet labor camps during the war. He was friends form childhood with
Richard Krygier, a journalist who founded the journal Quadrant in Australia, also associated
with the Congress.
Certainly, the covert nature of funding for the Congress pointed to nefarious goals and
likened it more to Cold War espionage than a conscious ideological choice in the eyes of many.
At the same time, the editors of these journals had their own motivations, which were deeply
rooted in personal experience. As nearly every scholar who writes about the Congress point
outs, the cultural products of this funding relationship were well-respected on their own merits.
The magazine Encounter, a frequent source for material to be reprinted in Aneks, outlived the
scandal of being funded by the congress by decades.
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While tapping into these resources, the editors of Aneks were pursuing a trajectory that
they had embarked on even prior to 1968. Hersh, father of the Smolar brothers, had been an
activist and publicist for most of his life. Having been part of an attempt to reform a communist
state themselves and ultimately rejecting the ideology, the émigrés found natural allies with
anti-communist Westerners—often ex-Marxists—who were associated with the Congress. The
first Western journal to publish Leszek Kołakowski—the intellectual master of the ’68
generation and most-published persona in Aneks—was Survey. The following chapter details
the personal and intellectual journey of this patron-saint of Aneks.
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Chapter Four: Leszek Kołakowski
I would like to thank you (not only on my own behalf) for speaking out… about what we say
here privately. Listening to you, we had the consciousness and feeling that you are speaking on
behalf of all of us ... [I hope that] that there will be a situation in which we could again learn
from you personally the history of human thought and the difficult skill of life in dignity.1
-Adam Michnik in a letter to Leszek Kołakowski
Alas, poor idea. I knew it, Edward. This skull will never smile again.
Yours in friendship,
Leszek Kolakowski2
Leszek Kołakowski created the intellectual foundation of the Polish dissident movement,
and was closely tied to the Aneks group of émigrés. He appeared in the pages of Aneks more
than any other author and was close with the Smolar family—Eugeniusz and Nina moved to
London in 1975 when Eugeniusz got a job at the BBC. While authors and commentators have
long ascribed Kołakowski an important place in the intellectual history of 20th century Poland,
his role as a mentor and aide to the 1968 student generation has received more praise than
academic consideration. The connection is both apparent and oblique because he positioned
himself as a Polish citizen that wanted nothing to do with politics in the years after his exit from
Poland in 1968. His most faithful biographer, Dr. Wiesław Chudoba, notes that after 1968
Kołakowski’s life becomes “less-documented” and “less rich.”3 Kołakowski however lived for
most of his adult life, over four decades, outside of Poland. In addition to describing
Kołakowski’s importance for the young post-1968 dissidents, I wish to add richness to the
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narrative of his life as an émigré. Kołakowski like all of the émigrés in this dissertation is
motivated by intertwined personal and political considerations.
He has been described as a mentor to the students most closely associated with 1968 in
Poland. He supported them before 1968 and stayed in contact after. Partly through émigré
publications like Aneks and Kultura, he was able to help and guide this scattered group of
pupils. Born between the generation of 1968 and the people who grew up in interwar Poland—
like Nobel laureate Czesław Miłosz and Kultura publisher Jerzy Giedroyc—Kołakowski
maintained connections with engaged intellectuals both older and younger than him. But his
correspondence with Giedroyc, his Polish security service file, and his public writing of the time
demonstrate that over the course of the 1970s he drifted closer to the younger generation that
he mentored and further from those older than him who had experienced more of interwar
politics and society.
The Kołakowski I am interested in is emerging out of a period of personal turmoil
associated with the fallout from 1968 protests in Poland. He seeks a place to collect himself—a
place where Tamara, his wife, can work as a psychiatrist and where their daughter can get a
good education. For a combination of reasons—practical concerns like his daughter’s schooling
mixing with personal sentiments and political concerns—they end up living most of their life in
Oxford. He is the subject of this chapter because it is difficult to understand the motivations,
goals and deeds of the group associated with Aneks without Kołakowski.
A combination of the personal, the political, and the philosophical shape Kołakowski’s
vision of how one ought to act, which he in turn passed on to the post-1968 generation of
dissidents and beyond. Both through the people he influenced and on his own accord,
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Kołakowski bridged East and West during the Cold War with his intellectual engagement.
Chudoba writes that “continuing old friendships became difficult, and new friendships [were]
already based on different foundations.” Indeed, spending half of his life in exile, Kołakowski’s
influence is detected within people in a myriad of places. If his personal life became less rich, as
Chudoba claims, then the publications and correspondence that Kołakowski left behind from
that period make up for it—revealing an abundant landscape of ideas and keen understanding
of his place in the world.
Unlike, for example, his contemporary and fellow 1968 exile, Zygmunt Bauman,
Kołakowski was not Jewish. But he experienced some of the same things and was a witness to
most of the turmoil of that period. His wife Tamara was Jewish, though, at least as far as the
authorities were concerned.4 And so were many of his pupils and peers, many of whom left
Poland as a result of the government anti-Semitic campaign of that year. He cited witnessing
antisemitism in interwar Poland as some of his formative childhood memories. An aversion to
antisemitism creeping back into politics, just as present as it was during interwar period in
Poland, was something he shared with members of the Polish left both younger and older than
himself. As with the rest of his thought, there is a broad mix of sentiments combining to form
this aversion: a personal connection, a political legacy, and philosophical rationality.
Biography
Kołakowski was born in 1927 in Radom, Poland, to well-educated parents who
registered him as a “non-believer” rather than baptize him. His mother died of cancer in 1930.
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As a fifteen-year-old during the war, he tried to join the Polish Worker’s Party and its armed
wing, the People’s Army (Gwardia Ludowa, then an underground organization), but was
rejected.5 In 1943 his request to be taken away by the gestapo together with his father was
ignored; the young Kołakowski would never see him again. During the war years he was an
autodidact, received tutoring and attended clandestine schooling at times—paid for by friends
and family. He said later that he was convinced he would live through the war, and at its end
felt like he had defeated Hitler not only because he had lived but because he managed to get a
proper education despite the annihilation of schooling in Poland—adding that he would never
have passed his matura (secondary education exam) before the war because as a non-believer
exempt from religion class as a youth he would not have passed that portion of the exam.6
He took to communism from a young age. In early 1945, before the Second World War’s
end, Kołakowski ventured to Warsaw to see the destruction with his own eyes and try to join
the Communist Union of Youth Struggle (Związek Walki Młodych). Returning to Garbatka, a
town in South Central Poland where he spent a large chunk of the war thanks to his late
mother’s family, the Pietrusiewicze, Kołakowski was active in setting up a ZWM chapter. One
day he was almost killed because of this activism when he was accosted by two members of an
anti-Nazi and anti-Soviet Polish resistance organization who were sent to shoot him.7 He was
then walking with a friend, Witek Popielewicz, who happened to know the attackers. With
Popielewicz present as witness, the “cursed soldiers” had to choose between killing two people
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or abandoning their mission. Kołakowski was threatened at gunpoint and told to disappear for a
while.
In February of 1946 he was finally accepted to the Polish Communist Party (PPR, later
the PZPR). One of his sponsors was the poet and writer Wiktor Woroszylski, a peer of his whom
he had met a year prior and would become lifelong friends with. With the war now over, he
was able to study philosophy at Łódź University before graduating with a doctorate from
Warsaw University in 1953. He married Tamara Dynenson, a psychiatrist, with whom he had a
daughter, Agnieszka. For many years, Kołakowski was a Marxist celebrated in the West for his
communist revisionism.
He was expelled from the Communist Party of Poland in 1966 after giving a critical
speech at a Union of Socialist Youth (Związek Młodzieży Socjalistycznej or ZMS) event to which a
young Adam Michnik invited him as a speaker—noting a lack of freedom, material goods,
“negative selection” of individuals for Party positions. He was now a vocal critic of the
communist authorities or, as Wladyslaw Gomulka put it in 1968, “a spiritual initiator of
incendiary acts.” He was chair of Modern Philosophy at Warsaw University from 1957 until
1968, when he was let go from his position at the university and left Poland. Kołakowski could
not publish or teach, he said later that he was left with nothing to do. The authorities had good
reason to act against him, of course, as he did publicly support the initiatives of the protesting
students.
Officially, he was kicked out of the party for being photographed exchanging documents
in a Warsaw park with Zbigniew Brzeziński, then working for the American State Department.
The authorities said it was state secrets, while Kołakowski later explained that they were
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looking over Brzeziński’s schedule for his visit to Poland. This episode is worth nothing mostly to
highlight his interlocutor, as Kołakowski had not believed in the ideology for at least a decade
by then. As he said later, him and many others had only remained in the party because they did
not want to leave it to “the worst crowd.”8 Being kicked out was “a relief,” he later said. It was
“the end of this fiction.”9
What was it, then, that motivated Leszek Kołakowski to leave Poland in 1968? Tens of
thousands of others left, mostly those with Jewish backgrounds, because they were explicitly
denied a future in Poland. But Kołakowski already had a successful career. He was not Jewish.
While he was kicked out of the party and expelled from Warsaw University, he was not let go
from his position at the Polish Academy of Sciences (Polska Akademia Nauk or PAN) until 1970.
When he left, it was not—like so many others—on a one-way travel document by way of an
Israeli Visa after giving up Polish citizenship, but on a Polish passport. He later said that he did
not think his departure had a political meaning. He thought he was leaving for a year or
possibly for two.
While he left in 1968 along with many exiles, the circumstances of his departure were
different. By his own account, Kołakowski only decided to leave the country in 1968 because he
was then invited to teach at McGill University in Montreal. He decided that he would take the
offer if the Polish government allowed his whole family to obtain passports, which was not a
common practice as it risked the person never returning to Poland. On the other hand, his

8
9

Kołakowski and Mentzel, Czas ciekawy, czas niespokojny. Część I., 143.
Kołakowski and Mentzel, 244.
134

decision was sparked by the same political campaign, his name invoked by Władysław Gomułka
at the same time as the First Secretary was denouncing so-called Zionists.
Kołakowski abroad
The Security Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa or SB) of the Ministry of the Interior
(Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrzych or MSW) kept operational materials on individuals and
groups that were thought to conduct “hostile activity” towards the Polish state. Kołakowski’s
file is helpful for sketching his early years abroad, between 1968—when he left Poland—and his
public polemic (concerning leftist politics) with E.P. Thompson in 1974. The latter confirmed his
position as no longer a fellow traveler and thrust him further into the public eye outside of
Poland.
In the 2000s, Kołakowski called the file indecent, because it was Illegally gathered, the
“ubeki” (slang for security services derived from the Stalinist Urząd Bezpieczństwa or “UB”)
could be lying indiscriminately, and so on.10 Though compiled and sometimes written from the
perspective of informants and case officers, the file sketches Kołakowski’s initial impression of
the Western intellectual environment and his reception within it. He consistently appears to be
toeing the line between his need for academic freedom and his desire to return to Poland. The
file depicts Kołakowski after 1968 at first as meek and distant but becoming increasingly
concerned and increasingly re-engaged with the political scene in Poland after reassurances to
the authorities that he wanted to stay far away from politics. He had of course been a public
intellectual and troublemaker while in Poland, but the way that he engaged with Polish politics
changed due to his position outside of the physical borders of Poland and so a different public
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persona. Over these years and despite his best efforts, Kołakowski settled into life as an émigré
still politically engaged with Poland—an almost stereotypical role for a Polish intellectual.
His departure was hastily planned, aided by European exiles of persecution and war
already residing in the West. From 1965 Raymond Klibansky, a historian of philosophy at McGill
University, had been trying to persuade Kołakowski to come there as a visiting professor.11
Klibansky had been a professor at Heidelberg University until 1933 when, during Hitler’s rise to
power, the school became a hotbed of Nazism and Klibansky had to emigrate due to his Jewish
background. They had become acquainted at a conference in 1957. The Polish security services
noted that Polish-American diplomat Zbigniew Brzeziński, when he visited the country in 1966,
told Kołakowski that he could be sure of a job at McGill if he left Poland, as this was Brzeziński’s
alma mater.12 Finally, in 1968 Klibansky succeeded in getting Kołakowski to come. Klibansky and
McGill put pressure on the Polish state to ensure that Kołakowski’s wife and daughter could
join him, something that the Polish authorities typically did not allow for fear of a citizen not
returning. The files of the Polish security services allege that Kołakowski’s papers were
smuggled out by the Canadian embassy in Poland.
During his early years in exile, the security services monitoring Kołakowski thought that
he had no overt interest in politics. The Polish authorities concluded that he did not try to make
contact with “reactionary” or “anti-Polish” groups while in Montreal.13 In a Spiegel interview
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shortly after leaving Poland, he said he found it “wrong” when people focused on philosophy as
a way to politics. He told the interviewer that even in Poland he could teach philosophy the way
he wanted. This statement seemed slightly counter to his biography since Kołakowski had been
let go from his position at Warsaw University after being kicked out of the party. His public
statements during his first years abroad were worded in such a way that he could excuse them
to the Polish authorities in case he wished to return. At the same time, he was keenly
interested in the fate of Poland, framing the issue from a perspective encompassing politics but
above it. He cared for the minds and souls of people, urging the preservation of thinking itself
and of living with dignity: “Political thinking itself is an act of opposition to a situation that kills
thought. In this sense, all forms of political thought contribute to a certain common cause,
simply because they exist.”14 As against a state wishing for conformity, thinking itself was a
political act.
Kołakowski had difficulties adjusting to life in America when he arrived in the winter of
1968-1969. He was not yet confident in his English language skills, and at McGill he also had
trouble with the Quebecois accent. It is alleged in the documents of Polish security services that
he was unpopular with the student body at McGill. The Montreal notes appear to be created
based on conversations that Kołakowski had with an old friend from university employed at the
Polish Consulate in Montreal, conveniently located adjacent to the McGill campus. An early
note based on this intelligence states that Maoist students at McGill intended to boycott him,
though it is unclear if any boycott or protest ever occurred.
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Quebec in the year of Kołakowski’s tenure was a society fraying at the seams. The
Quebec Liberation Front (Front de libération du Québec or FLQ) carried out over 50 bombings in
the 1968-1969 timeframe of Kołakowski’s stay in Canada alone. The historically anglophone
McGill University saw a protest of over 10,000, calling for the anglophone university to adopt
French, turn into a riot in March of 1969. Kołakowski thus witnessed the crescendo of violence
culminating in the Canadian government suspending civil liberties to pacify the Quebecois
separatists. He was unhappy in Canada and wished to obtain a professorship in the USA—at
either Berkeley or Columbia, according to his MSW file.15
Kołakowski did indeed make it to Berkeley in 1969, invited by renowned mathematician
Alfred Tarski, who left Poland in August of 1939 for a brief trip to a science conference in
Harvard but ended up never returning to Poland because of the outbreak of war. At Berkeley he
encountered a more extreme version of 1968 New Left culture. In May of 1969 a part of the
University property was occupied and called the People’s Park, which led to numerous protests
and police actions over the following months. In May of 1970, during the middle of
Kołakowski’s year in Berkeley, the United States invaded Cambodia. Protests at Berkeley and
other Universities were so intense that national guard troops were called to break them up.
Classes were often held off-campus due to protests, boycotts, occupations, and school closings.
Kołakowski during this time invited students to his home for lessons.
In letters to friends he framed student activists as so critical of their own institutions
that they found even émigrés from communist countries to the corrupt West to be suspect. He
wrote a number of letters to Poland expressing his disdain: “These days I am beginning to
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lecture at the university to a crowd of bearded madmen and drugged nudists, who circle
Berkley en masse predicting civil war. I read boring books, pornographic publications, and speak
to a multitude of useless people.”16 The security services took joy in both his assessment of the
West and in Kołakowski’s lack of a breakthrough with Western students.17 A 1972 memo based
on an informant’s conversation with Polish essayist Ewa Bieńkowska notes: “…he was heckled
several times at Berkley, even receiving shouts of “traitor to socialism.”18
Tamara and Leszek eventually sent their daughter to a private school, writing to Poland
that their daughter’s original school lacked discipline and was “liberal and 'creative'” to the
detriment of all other standards of education.19 Combining his assessment of primary and
higher education, Kołakowski asked: “How can so many truly outstanding scholars exist in this
country with such an education system?”20 Kołakowski sought a place where his wife, his
daughter and he could develop and be productive. “I still cannot boast of impressive results in
academic creativity,” Kołakowski wrote to philosopher Krzysztof Pomian in January of 1970.21
As when they departed Poland, political considerations would in this period again mix with
personal and practical ones for the Kołakowski family.
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By March of 1970 Kołakowski had received several job offers. The three American ones
“worthy of attention” were at the University of Chicago, New York University, and Berkeley. But
despite having “gotten a little used to America,” Kołakowski wanted—with some reservations—
to return to Europe. In a May 1970 letter to the philosopher Irena Krońska, Kołakowski wrote
that he did not want to take a job offer in France because it was even worse at the Universities
there than it was in America. He was not talking about the pay, which was one of his few
complaints when he eventually moved from the United States to England.
He had been offered the late Theodor Adorno’s position in Frankfurt as well.22 “My
ability to cause a scandal revealed itself again but completely without my active participation,”
he mused to friends while describing the accompanying student protest against his
appointment there. The German philosopher Jürgen Habermas insisted that Kołakowski accept
it despite the protests of the student body, some of whom argued that one of Adorno’s
students should take the chair and that Kołakowski was “not a Marxist or not Marxist
enough.”23 An open letter from students saying that the chair should be taken by a committed
Marxist was sent to Kołakowski and published in the German press. Ultimately Kołakowski
would not come to Frankfurt, alleging that he had not intended to “for many reasons” even
before the protests.
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To Kołakowski’s delight, he was offered a fellowship at Oxford’s All Souls College, which
he described to his friends in Poland as “being appointed a genius.”24 He was invited by another
exile—Isiah Berlin—whom he had met in 1958, and Allan Montefiore, with whom Kołakowski
later mentioned he had previously spent many hours talking at a conference in France. The
Kołakowski family moved to Oxford in August of 1970. He liked that he was be back “on the
map of Europe” and closer to Poland, he wrote to friends.25 Besides this, he was happy to be
expected to give only 16 lectures a year and for his daughter to attend a “solid” school. The
Kołakowski family moved to Oxford in the summer of 1970. Years later, Kołakowski would write
to Kultura chief, Jerzy Giedroyc, about returning from Yale to Oxford rather than staying in the
United States for good: “I am therefore a rare case of someone who returns easterly across the
Atlantic on their own free will. One of the reasons for this decision is the need for closer and
better contact with Poland and Polish issues. Tough.”26
Once in the United Kingdom, Kołakowski began to engage with the European press.
Kołakowski’s essay on the “Revolutionary Spirit” was published in Der Spiegel in October of
1970. Publishing more on Polish issues, Kołakowski’s security file beginning in 1970 depicts him
orbiting closer to the Polish state. Zygmunt Bauman in a letter to Kołakowski written in
September of 1970 wrote that he was very happy to see Kołakowski publishing again.27 While
he claimed numerous times that he was not a politician, Kołakowski’s public expressions were
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intended to have an effect on politics and society. Speaking to the press and being published in
non-academic periodicals is not in the job description of a professor of philosophy. In defining
this not explicitly political role for himself, Kołakowski practiced what would later be called antipolitics—acting as a citizen, on a moral basis, rather than politicians on a platform—a position
that the younger 1968 generation of dissidents would later embrace in the late 1970s and
1980s.
November 1970 transcriptions of Radio Free Europe Polish radio services and
subsequent debriefs of witnesses describe Kołakowski engaging in a polemic with the Polish
ambassador to England at an Oxford Union talk about the situation in Poland. While describing
the events of the November 4-6 “Polish Days” student event at the Union, the radio transcript
makes note of a student participant, Christopher Hitchens, “sketching as anti-social and antihuman the politics of the present Polish government.”28
As Kołakowski later described it in a letter to Poland, the Oxford Union exchange was
sparked by an article in the Times about a resolution protesting the Polish government that was
put forth by Polish Oxford students.29 Kołakowski was used as an example of academic
repression in Poland in the article. The ambassador, Dobrosielski, responded to these
accusations during the “Polish Days” event with an embellished assessment of the state of
academic freedom in Poland and said he would debate Kołakowski, at which point the course of
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events becomes muddled.30 Nevertheless, at the November Oxford Union “Polish Days”
Kołakowski accused the ambassador of lying about the amount of repression students and
faculty faced in 1968 at Warsaw University, which led Kołakowski to be relieved of his job while
Dobrosielski was First Secretary of the party at the university. Kołakowski intended to set the
record straight, noting that despite the ambassador’s claims of academic freedom in Poland,
there was heavy repression of students and faculty at the university in 1968 and that repression
continued. A note from Kołakowski’s file by Polish consul Tadeusz Piwiński reads: “at the
meeting in Oxford during the discussion Kołakowski, at his own initiative and carefully
prepared, attacked in an aggressive and biased way Ambassador Dobrosielski, trying to
undermine his theses.”31
Kołakowski had known Dobrosielski since the 1950s when they were both at Warsaw
University. Dobrosielski was then studying logic under Professor Tadeusz Kotarbinski.
Kołakowski recalled in an interview shortly before his death that he even attended
Dobrosielski’s habilitation on the American philosopher Charles Pierce.32 Dobrosielski was five
years Kołakowski’s senior and between 1957 and 1964 worked as a First Secretary and
Counselor at the Polish embassy in Washington, D.C. He returned to Warsaw University as First
Secretary and Deputy Dean between 1964 and 1969. In December of 1966 at a party meeting,
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Dobrosielski argued to expel Leszek Kołakowski from the Communist Party.33 In 1967 he
participated in a Union of Socialist Youth debate on the 50th anniversary of Soviet foreign
relations in the Auditorium Maximum at Warsaw University during which the young
“komandosi”—future editors and contributors to Aneks—asked provocative questions about
the Katyń massacre and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.
Jerzy Eisler’s book about the events of March 1968 depict Dobrosielski attempting to
convince students to disperse on March 8; pointing unruly students out to be beaten by the
militia that had invaded the Warsaw University campus; and locking the door to the philosophy
department in front of students trying to escape being beaten. In October of 1968 at a Warsaw
meeting Dobrosielski noted that dozens of people had been removed from the party at Warsaw
University and 27 employees relieved of work so that they could not influence the youth.34
Among them of course was Kołakowski.
Dobrosielski claimed in a 1996 article that ten years before Kołakowski’s removal, in
March of 1956, Dobrosielski as party secretary in the philosophy department had convinced
him not to turn in his party card. Kołakowski denied this, saying that neither Dobrosielski nor
the revelations of the 1956 party Congress were a factor in his decision to leave or remain in
the party. Rather, it was a tactical decision “…to not leave the party to the worst crowd.”35 At
Oxford in 1970, just two years after the events of 1968, it was against this background of
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personal, political, and professional relations that Kołakowski contested Dobrosielski’s
whitewashed account of 1968.
Activism abroad
Kołakowski’s activism included publishing on the topic of Poland, helping Poles abroad
with practical issues, and participating in opposition organizations when they began to form in
the mid-1970s. As Kołakowski was a prolific and multilingual writer, his published works are a
record of efforts to narrate the situation in Poland to Westerners and, for the benefit of Poles,
work through problems that the opposition in Poland faced. Though his social and political
commentary is forceful and clear, it seldom feels like he is entering the political sphere himself.
Rather, he sketches problems from outside, only inserting himself into them when absolutely
forced to by, for example, a direct personal connection to an issue.
A letter to the Times by Kołakowski was published days after the December 1970
protests in Poland, during which dozens of people were killed in workers’ protests. In it, he
pointed out that these protests were for once occurring in a time of repression rather than
increased freedom. For the workers to act in 1970 came from a different motivation than when
protests occurred during the heady post-Stalinist days of 1956, though in both instances the
protests ended with violent repression.36 On the third of January, 1971, Kołakowski received a
letter from Adam Michnik, a 1968 activist who did not emigrate, that was intercepted by Polish
intelligence. An excerpt from the letter quotes Michnik: “I would like to thank you (not only on
my own behalf) for speaking out twice about what we say here privately. Listening to you, we
had the consciousness and feeling that you are speaking on behalf of all of us ... [I hope that]
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that there will be a situation in which we could again learn from you personally the history of
human thought and the difficult skill of life in dignity.”37 Michnik appears to refer to the two
public comments about Poland that Kołakowski had made just prior to the letter: to
Ambassador Dobrosielski and to the Times about December 1970. Already in 1970/1971, then,
Kołakowski was able to mentor from a distance. Living in dignity would be a core theme of the
Polish opposition in the late 1970s and into the era of Solidarność. In February 1971,
Kołakowski wrote to philosopher Krzysztof Pomian (who himself would leave Poland in 1972):
“News from Poland is not plentiful….”38 The Western press wrote little about Poland and there
was no mail due to a postal strike, he said. “I think about you all and am not happy.”
By early 1971 Kołakowski appeared re-invigorated as a public intellectual. In March of
1971 an interview with him was published in Die Zeit. Separately, in a televised debate on
March 9 he discussed Marxism with Henri Lefebvre at the University of Amsterdam.39 Another
article appeared in Der Spiegel in September, republished from the intellectual review Merkur.
In it Kołakowski criticizes portions of the Western left who were still uncritical of the Soviet
regime, along with the Soviets themselves.40 It is during this period of activity that Kołakowski
and Jerzy Giedroyc, chief of the émigré journal Kultura, began to exchange letters on a regular
basis.
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Kultura and Kołakowski
At the end of March 1971 Giedroyc wrote to Kołakowski about recent contact with a
group of young 1968 exiles in Sweden out of which some would go on to start Aneks. Though
Giedroyc and Kołakowski had diverging points of view on how to engage in political life, the two
had a cordial epistolary relationship. That relationship generated over 250 letters from the
period between 1971 and 1978.41 It illuminates from a different angle Kołakowski’s personal
travails, his motivations for writing some of his published works, his relationship to Polish
politics and to other émigrés. Though I argue that by the end of the 1970s, Kołakowski’s point
of view was closer to that of Aneks than Kultura.
In that March 1971 letter, Giedroyc described to Kołakowski a trip that Gustaw HerlingGrudziński, co-founder of Kultura, had taken to what Giedroyc called “the centers of new
emigration in Sweden and Denmark.” Giedroyc was worried about “lack of any political
thought” among the Polish intelligentsia—with the 1968 émigrés in mind—and asked
Kołakowski if the two could discuss this “threatening and dangerous” situation.42 The visit by
Herling-Grudziński was recalled by a co-founder of Aneks, Eugeniusz Smolar in a 2006 interview
and by Herling-Grudziński in his journals, Dziennik pisany nocą.43 In a follow-up letter, Giedroyc
wrote: “I think that this is a unique opportunity for you to raise your voice, because this will
allow you to define a position above all on the moral plane…. It is significant that you are silent,
and at the same time appear in the Western press… causing confusion with [your] silence….”44
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Giedroyc continued, writing that he wanted to awaken the Polish intelligentsia to support the
workers or their revolt would end in catastrophe or anarchy.
In June of 1971, in no small part due to the constant urging of Giedroyc, Kołakowski
decided to have an article published in Kultura for the first time. Kołakowski’s well-known
“Theses on Hope and Hopelessness,” became his most clear re-engagement with Polish politics.
In this essay, Kołakowski argued for positivity in the face of pessimists, specifically those who
thought that the status quo could only be toppled in Eastern Europe by a cataclysmic battle in
which it would have to be completely eradicated—an idea which the disheartened shared with
the regimes. He said, instead, that “the rigidity of a system depends in part on the degree to
which the men who live within that system are convinced of its rigidity.”45 Pressuring the
government with democratic claims would eventually result in a snowball effect by which
change would come.
The intelligentsia specifically, who were so passive during the workers revolt in Poland in
1970, needed to create a movement that would give people hope, which in turn would make
that hope a reality: “a coincidence of subject and object,” Kołakowski said, borrowing the
language of phenomenology.46 Kołakowski took a stand against revisionism, saying that if it
were an effective strategy then it would be labeled as illegal by the authorities: ”…the notion of
political legality no longer has any meaning. The best way of reacting against prosecutions for
“crimes”… is to commit them on a very large scale.”47 In “Hope and Hopelessness” Kołakowski
announces a new strategy for attempting to change the status quo in Eastern Europe. Yet he
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still found value in the core idea of socialism, just as much as he rejected chauvinistic
nationalism.48
Eminent scholars of dissident intellectual thought refer to the essay as the germ of the
anti-political program of later Polish civil society groups. Political scientist Barbara Falk called it
“so critical to the political-theoretical development of younger activists, such as Adam
Michnik,” while Political scientist David Ost wrote: “It would be no exaggeration to call it the
fundamental theoretical text of the Polish democratic opposition of the 1970s.”49 Gale Stokes,
American historian of Eastern Europe, noted that “…an antipolitical form of resistance began to
emerge in the early 1970s almost without Poles being aware of it…. Inspired in part by
Kołakowski’s article “Hope and Hopelessness”….”50 The essay was not only celebrated later, but
immediately widely published and thus widely read at the time: It appeared in Kultura in Polish
and Survey in English during the summer of that year. The Parisian New Left publication
Politique Aujourd’hui, founded in 1969, also ran the essay in French in its July-August 1971
issue.51
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A security services memo about the then-recently-published “Theses on Hope and
Hopelessness” accused Kołakowski of libel.52 Concerned about its reception in Poland,
Kołakowski wrote a letter to friends in Poland warning them about the article and framing it
from his perspective. In the letter, Kołakowski writes: “I do not know, of course, whether
barking will start in the papers for this reason, a triumphant discovery that according to the
latest materials I am a C.I.A. agent or that already in 1905 I served in the Okhrana, etc.”53
Wishing to motivate people to act but by inspiring free will rather than coercion, he emphasized
that a “reformist” position when it came to Eastern European states was “sensible and not
hopeless.” Publishing an article in Kultura was not a sign that he was cutting ties with Poland
and forever becoming an émigré. On the contrary, this was an attempt to engage with the
political situation.
Kultura was a “large and very important component of Polish national culture,” and so
Kołakowski saw it as the best way to put before a Polish audience “what cannot be announced
elsewhere [in Polish publishing], but what regardless should be published in Polish.” He added
that Kultura was “the only publication in which I can [publish] without writing in an "emigre"
publication in contrast to a "national" one.” Kołakowski was engaging politics not as a politician
but as a self-described ideologue, wishing to “detoxify consciousness, obscured by the
depraved ritual language of official ideology.” Finally, addressing the motivations behind writing
for Kultura, Kołakowski wrote: “…I refer with respect to those who write to Kultura from Poland
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and also think that those who are more permanently or (like me) more temporarily abroad
should do it.”54 Despite publishing in Kultura, Kołakowski’s letter informed friends that this did
not mean he was planning to stay abroad forever.
Similarly, Tamara, Kołakowski’s wife and a psychiatrist by training, wrote to Warsaw that
summer wanting to quell further sour feelings between friends while “temporarily outside of
Warsaw.”55 Kołakowska wrote that appearing in Kultura was “an engagement (in a way that is
maybe unfortunate, tactless, uncomfortable, unpleasant, bad because of immediate
consequences and for various reasons—but the only one possible), emanating from a
conviction about the value of free expression in matters of principle and from the feeling that
the further exclusive dealing with writing thick books and articles for foreign readers would
have something of (much!) falseness, comfort, indifference in them.” This plea is a deep
manifestation of loyalty to friends; of responsibility and guilt. She added: ”Of course, this looks
different in Warsaw.”
Kołakowski’s engagement was supposed to combat hopelessness: ”…you (we) have an
attitude that it is not worth it, because nothing will change in a better way, because you cannot
influence it, because everything from A to Z, once and for all, has been rigidly determined on
high.” Even worse, this same hopelessness became nihilism that justified bad behavior: ”[i]t
seems that there are many others—passive from resignation, ready due to resignation [to
commit] active and passive crimes and that they are important, i.e. that everyday hope is
necessary.” Without hope even well-meaning people would continue to reinforce the status
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quo, which was counter-productive to the goal of bettering their society. Because Kołakowski
wanted to inspire people to think and act freely, how exactly that betterment would occur is
left unsaid. But it was important for him that people would do something rather than
perpetuate their present unfavorable situation through inaction and resignation.
Where a piece concerning Polish issues appeared had as much or more meaning than
the content of the piece itself. In July of 1971 Kołakowski wrote to Giedroyc that he had
received a lot of reactions to his essay from Poland—mostly negative and mostly on account of
the fact that he had published in Kultura rather than because of the content of the essay.
Common was the idea that, "It is fine for him to write when he's safely in Oxford," Kołakowski
frustratingly expressed to Giedroyc in Paris. “This is, of course, nonsense, because it would
result in the fact that those who can enjoy the freedom of speech should not use it in the face
of the fact that they can,” he continued.56 As they were both Poles who wanted to engage with
the intellectual life of the country, Kołakowski and Giedroyc harmonized on this point. But the
philosopher did not wish to dirty himself with politics. Likewise, this tone kept alive the
possibility of his return to Poland. As he saw it himself, Kołakowski was simply writing what he
would have written if he had been able to remain in Poland.
While a person in Poland might hear the content of a piece published in an English or
German publication on Radio Free Europe, or see it re-printed in some publication sent into
Poland, it is important to note that to publish in western (i.e. not Polish-language) publications
was seen as significantly different than publishing in émigré (Polish language but not published
in Poland) ones. To publish in Kultura especially communicated that one was aligned with its
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particular political stance: accepting its leading role in Polish culture and Giedroyc’s desire to
steer opposition to the Polish government from abroad based on the reasoning that dissidence
inside the country could not be effective. This is why Kołakowski went to great lengths to
explain to his friends specifically why he wished to appear in Kultura this time, and likely why he
would in the future more often appear in Aneks—a publication explicitly not wishing to chart a
bullish political course—when publishing in Polish.
Kołakowski wrote to his friend, the poet Wiktor Woroszylski, in July of 1971: “We try to
know what is going on in Poland, if it so happens we read some newspapers and learn from
travelers. Our image is definitely deformed slightly, but maybe not completely misleading. In
any case, we do not think that big things will happen in the near future.” Both Leszek and
Tamara wrote to friends at home as if their return was imminent and as if to some degree the
issues their friends faced were also faced by the Kołakowski family. And why not? After all,
pangs of hopelessness and a concern with degradation of ideas are not restricted by borders.
But at the same time, these feelings were weighed alongside practical concerns about academic
repression and having a means of financial support, as well as holding on to a valid passport.
They had Poland and their friends in their thoughts, but also had to look out for their own wellbeing.
In September of 1971 a “candidate for secret collaboration” told a security officer that
Kołakowski was now worried that his association with Giedroyc, the publisher of Kultura, put
his return in jeopardy.57 The decision to publish in Kultura clearly weighed heavily on
Kołakowski’s mind. While it was a fantastic platform and he saw in it something noble and
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necessary, Kołakowski also knew that perceptions would vary. Especially the perceptions of
those in Poland, whom he thought about constantly and wished to help. Giedroyc also
increasingly asked Kołakowski for specific writing or endorsement of ideas that Kołakowski did
not fully support. It is no wonder then that Kołakowski did not appear often in Kultura,
publishing in it selectively over the years. This is important for understanding why he appeared
so often in Aneks, a publication with a goal that aligned with Kołakowski’s ideas on Polish
issues: to be part of the conversation but somewhat insulated from politics.
Passport issues and questions of engaged citizenship
Return to Poland, to Warsaw, is a central narrative in the Kołakowski file. On more than
one occasion during these years Kołakowski referred to his status as temporarily abroad.
Kołakowski did not wish to leave the Communist Party to “the worst crowd,” because it was the
sole space in which to conduct politics in Poland. He took the same approach toward his Polish
citizenship. But as Kołakowski moved closer to Poland physically and in his public remarks, his
return became more endangered. Kołakowski’s MSW file reveals a constant concern with
passport status, as much on his part as on the part of the security services.58
In the 1970s, this manifested itself as passport trouble as Kołakowski worked hard to
hold on to his Polish documents. Kołakowski wanted the legitimacy of being able to say that he
was a Polish citizen and not just a helper or an ally that was abroad forever. As Polish citizen
temporarily abroad, he was a citizen representative of people in Poland. The trouble that he
went through in maintaining a valid Polish passport was a part of this legitimacy. He
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experienced in solidarity with allies in Poland at least the bureaucratic curtailment of his
freedom of movement.
Giving up his citizenship without putting up a fight would contrast unfavorably with the
tens of thousands that left with him who had to renounce theirs in order to leave a country that
had left them no future. It also sat on his conscience that participants in the nascent opposition
in Poland were actively in harm’s way.59 The young 1968 exiles accused of being “Zionists” were
faced with a much starker choice when leaving Poland. To renounce his Polish citizenship and
leave the country to that same “worst crowd,” to give up something many other people had
recalled giving up with tears in their eyes, was something of a last resort to Kołakowski.
As in Michnik’s letter to him about a year earlier, desire and ability to mentor or
influence the youth appears in the Kołakowski file. In September of 1971, an informant told the
MSW that the “komandosi” (the nickname for the group of 1968 student protestors and who
Kołakowski mentored)—presumably those that remained in Poland after 1968—were making
Kołakowski look bad in the eyes of the state by saying that he was their professor, and that the
rest of the Warsaw intelligentsia thought the state was trying to keep Kołakowski away from
Poland for as long as possible. An informant with the pseudonym “Marek Dembicki” said to the
MSW in late 1971 that Kołakowski “longed” to return to Poland and was “interested in the
attitude of the youth in the country (especially at Warsaw University).”60
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In April of 1972 the MSW noted that Kołakowski had just been to Mexico, where he
gave a series of readings “during which he attacked, among others, the socialist countries.”61 It
was recommended in this memo that Kołakowski’s passport only be renewed for 1 year and not
2 as requested and “issuing further passports should be refused, unless other considerations
would be in favor of issuing such clauses to them.” His passport had also come up at the time of
the Oxford Union confrontation, as Kołakowski had just gone to retrieve renewed passports
earlier in the day.
In a later memo about the Oxford Union incident, Kołakowski explained to Polish consul,
Piwiński, that he understood the invitation to debate as having come from the Ambassador
himself. Piwiński informed him that it was a participant in the discussion who proposed the
debate between Kołakowski and the ambassador, to which Kołakowski replied that he had been
“misled,” that he “does not intend to provoke discussions by his own initiative,” and “that he
does not like and does not want controversy during public meetings to arise because of him.”
Piwiński writes that Kołakowski was very happy to receive his and Tamara’s passports. He
concludes: “I received the impression that he was afraid until the last minute. However, it is
difficult for me to say whether his statements are completely honest….”62
In January 1974 Kołakowski wrote to Giedroyc in Paris: “We could not make it to Paris,
to our regret, because of normal passport troubles, which almost never abandon us. This week
we were to go to America (I'm supposed to lecture at Yale, where they want to hire me; they
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will probably decide not to do so), but again I had to postpone due to visa difficulties.”63
Passport troubles come up again in October of 1974, when Kołakowski said that Tamara and he
would be in Paris for the holidays at the end of the year, “if we don’t again have problems with
passports.”64 In November, he wrote: “Perhaps I will be in Paris for the holidays, but it is not
certain because I have another halt with passports; I have already been waiting four months for
a renewal and until I get it I cannot move from England.”65 In a December letter, Kołakowski
again mentioned that he was stuck in England: “For now I cannot go anywhere, because I am
waiting a fifth month for an extension on my passport.”66
Kołakowski wanted the legitimacy of being able to say that he was a Polish citizen and
not just a helper or an ally that was abroad forever. As Polish citizen temporarily abroad, he
was a citizen representative of people in Poland. The trouble that he went through in
maintaining a valid Polish passport was a part of this legitimacy. He experienced in solidarity
with allies in Poland at least the bureaucratic curtailment of his freedom of movement.
Whereas for the first years of his time abroad, Kołakowski kept his Polish passport and
citizenship because he fully intended to return to Poland, by the late 1970s he also did it out of
a sense of obligation. In a March 1977 letter, likely also distancing himself from Giedroyc and
his political pronouncements, Kołakowski again underlined that he was not an émigré but an
exiled Polish citizen. Giedroyc had asked him to sign a statement of solidarity drafted by Polish,
Ukrainian, Hungarian, Russian and Czechoslovak émigrés but organized by the Polish publisher

63

Letter 112, 1/16/1974. Giedroyc et al., Listy 1957-2000, 2016, 126.
Letter 130, 8/10/1974, Giedroyc et al., 144.
65
Letter 183, 11/7/1976. Giedroyc et al., 218.
66
Letter 186, 12/14/1976. Giedroyc et al., 222.
64

157

according to his Promethean vision of Eastern Europe where there is unity but Poland takes a
prominent role. Kołakowski may have had broader misgivings about Giedroyc’s plan, but
refused to sign; “unfortunately… for a simple reason: this text states from the beginning that it
is a document of emigrants. just about everything I did in the last year on Polish matters—all
interviews on television, radio and the press, press conferences, talks with politicians, lectures,
etc.—all this was based on assumption, many times emphasized by me that I am not an émigré;
this is important, only for this reason I have authority to speak as if, though informally, of
course, on behalf of the Polish opposition. I cannot, therefore, ditch it all by declaring that I am
an émigré (which is not true in the "technical" sense, but as it now turns out, has its political
significance).”67
The Polish government seemed to be trapped between rejecting Kołakowski’s passport
renewals and appearing fair in the eyes of the West, which would then allow Kołakowski to do
what he pleased with no repercussions. He would say later that when the Workers’ Defense
Committee (KOR) formed in 1976 he had to be convinced to join it because he was not in
danger of being arrested or beaten like people in Poland were. Had he applied for residence
and for a passport from another country, though it would make his life much easier, he would
be losing the position of being considered a Pole temporarily abroad—of a citizen with a stake
in the country. He would also be completely free of the reach of the Polish government.
Tamara and Poland
In addition to Kołakowski’s desire to return, the MSW file contains a convincing
narrative about Tamara’s wish to come back as well. A Captain Stanisław Borowski extracted
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from a source code-named “Ksiaże” information about a conversation between the source and
Wacław Zawadzki, a Polish historian and dissident. Zawadzki told the source that Tamara
Kołakowska, “cannot assimilate in [the new] environment and constantly persuades Leszek to
return to the country.” The source notes that as of 1973 Tamara had not met with much
professional success abroad and missed her mother and aunt. Finally, the source noted:
“Tamara would like to redeem herself in the eyes of those who believe that Tamara persuaded
Leszek to leave.”68
This information is consistent with Tamara’s woes about her career in an earlier letter
found in the file.69 Nowhere in the file is it explained why Tamara would want to leave Poland
or need to seek redemption from acquaintances—this is left unsaid by the agents of the state.
But Tamara’s Jewish heritage looms large in the background of such reasoning, and so mentions
in the file of her alleged desire to leave the country in 1968 must be thought of in this context.
Tamara gives no reasons or excuses—she doesn’t need to, after all—but like Kołakowski she did
write to friends of only being outside of Warsaw temporarily.
Main Currents of Marxism
Even before leaving Poland, Kołakowski began composing the work that would become
Main Currents of Marxism.70 This three-volume work is his best-known outside of Poland. The
file first mentions the work in 1971, when an informant noted that Kołakowski was writing a
“History of Marxism” and would stay in the West until the book was published.71 Indeed, it
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would not be printed in Poland for some time, though it appeared in Polish before 1989 first
due to the efforts of Jerzy Giedroyc and in a second edition by the Aneks publishing house. Both
editions were printed outside of Poland.72 Publishing this work was indeed a task for Giedroyc,
as Kołakowski wanted it to be read by people in Poland, and the Kultura publishing house was
the only press capable of accomplishing the feat of publishing such a voluminous work in his
native language. Completion of the work became tied with Kołakowski’s desire to return to the
country as well.
The MSW file was over the course of 1972 peppered with notes about Kołakowski’s
work-in-progress about Marxism. Speaking with Polish essayist Ewa Bieńkowska in March of
1972, an informant with the pseudonym “WACŁAW” was told that Kołakowski was “writing in
Oxford an expansive book extending to 700 pages, a “History of Marxisms.”73 Bieńkowska knew
about sections about French philosopher Georges Sorel, Prague-born Marxist Karl Kautsky, and
Polish Marxist Rosa Luxembourg. The thesis of the work was said to be “the analysis of
deviations from the thought of Karl Marx,” an inaccurate description (Kołakowski treats
Marxism as something constantly changing but loyal to core tenets). Bieńkowska was certain
Kołakowski would return within three to four years, and “does everything with the thought of
returning to the country.”74 This included the possibility of return trips to the United States
“where there are much better financial conditions so that… he can put away significantly more
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cash in order to sustain himself in Poland after his return when [or if] (gdy) he will have trouble
with work.”
A note in the file based on a debrief of “Wacław” after a talk he had with Jacek Kuroń in
June of 1972 indicated that the informant was lent a copy of Kołakowski’s book manuscript by
Kuroń for ten days.75 At the time Kuroń was said to recommend the book “with reservations,”
but found it useful as a “compendium of Marxism” for his well-known work, “Teoria Działania.”
From the materials of another informant, “T,” the security services gleaned that Kuroń’s circle
was discussing Kołakowski’s book from late 1971 to mid-1972 and that they had six copies of
the manuscript.76 Those who read and commented on the work are a who’s who of the future
dissident movement. Among them Seweryn Blumsztajm, Teresa Bogucka, Andrzej Klimowicz,
Jan Litynski, Adam Michnik, Mirosław Sawicki, Wiktor Woroszylski and Janina Woroszylska.77
Because these people helped to shape it and were influenced by it—in effect approved its
content—the work also represents the attitude toward Marxism of a generation of Polish
intelligentsia.
Main Currents of Marxism seems innocuous when mentions of it appear in the MSW
file. It is not written as an assault, but painstakingly describes the evolution of Marxist thought,
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highlighting continuities and contradictions. A review of Kołakowski’s manuscript from a source,
“J,” in the MSW file summarizes Kołakowski’s book as “[pointing] out that Marxism is the
continuation of the entire history of European intellectual culture, simply being the next answer
to "certain fundamental questions that philosophy has been asking for centuries in new
articulations.”78 Though Kołakowski puts Marx at the level of other European philosophers, this
was not enough to cause the reviewer concern: “The writer maybe for the first time in his life
really studied Marxism not through his preconceived notions or imagination or publishing
needs,” “J” wrote.79 “It is therefore the most orthodox interpretation of Marxism that the
author has ever presented.” The reviewer wrote that Kołakowski “tries desperately to reconcile
Marxist communist collectivism with liberal or existential individualism,” adding that the author
had a point of view that is “remarkably bourgeois-intelligentsia, and not worker-proletarian,
like Marx.”80
“J” noted that Kołakowski had been influenced by Catholicism and had “existential
tendencies which therefore are bourgeois.”81 He wrote that Kołakowski compared those who
have a “communist mentality” with “dogmatic religious mentality” and warned that Kołakowski
wrote “his history of Marxism completely not in a Marxist way,” meaning that he eschewed the
compromised methodology favored by party-loyal Eastern bloc communist writers at the time.
“J” concluded: “the book in its current form doesn’t have any political or ideologically negative
revelations and could even be useful in practice, but as a textbook devoid of imagination.”82
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And so what would become Main Currents of Marxism seemed rather uncontroversial to the
MSW at first glance. Kołakowski’s tact was sufficiently philosophical and apolitical and indeed at
least the first two volumes of the work are meticulously academic.
In a January 1974 letter, Kołakowski wrote to Giedroyc that he wanted Kultura to
publish what would become Main Currents of Marxism. ”I do not have to say that it matters a
lot to me to publish this in Polish (i.e. in Kultura, of course), but I do not count on it, to tell you
the truth, because I suppose that you will not be able to invest a sum as great as the publication
of a text so long requires and, admittedly, it's hard to count on big return (complete, it will have
three volumes, the second volume has 400 dense pages, in English about 180,000 words).
Nevertheless, I send you the case for consideration.” The three volumes of the first edition of
Main Currents of Marxism would be published by Giedroyc between 1976 and 1978, with a
second Polish edition printed by Aneks ten years later.
Delaying the printing of Kołakowski’s book was the printing of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s
Gulag Archipelago in Polish by Giedroyc. Alongside this undertaking, Giedroyc was haranguing
Kołakowski in October of 1974 to open a dialogue with Solzhenitsyn, the latter book’s author,
or simply write something about him for Kultura. “As I look more and more closely to
Solzhenitsyn, I am convinced that this is not a politician but a moralist, and in this respect there
is a great similarity to you,” Giedroyc wrote to Kołakowski. “I tried to think about Solzhenitsyn,
but it is not going very well.... There is no way I can do it in the near future, it is an enormous
task,” Kołakowski wrote back.
Kołakowski did not think highly of Main Currents of Marxism. It was neither his favorite
nor his best work. Rather, it became a labor he wanted to complete in order to be done with
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Marxism as a topic of research once and for all. And what a labor it was: Kołakowski began
writing the first volume in 1968 and completed the third, final, book in 1976. It did not have a
profound effect on his relations with the Polish authorities or the political scene in the country,
but it solidified his place (more due to misunderstanding than based on the content of the
book) in Western circles as an enemy of Marxism. No more than four years after Bieńkowska’s
prediction for Kołakowski’s return to Poland there began to unfold a series of events far more
controversial than his work on Marxism. And he was no less an instigator for them than he was
the book’s author.
Kołakowski and KOR
The path of Kołakowski and older, more established Polish exiles like Giedroyc began to
diverge as opposition organizations coalesced in Poland. Kołakowski wanted to assist the
opposition movement growing within the borders of the country rather than dictate the
strategies it would employ from his position abroad. Avenues to fulfill this support role were
being created within the Polish opposition-émigré transmission belt over the course of the
1970s.
Even Giedroyc recognized the novelty of Kołakowski’s position at that time, though he
did not deduce from this that Kołakowski would diverge from the sort of overt attempts at
political decision-making in the name of Poland that Giedroyc often pursued. Kołakowski’s
status as a citizen of Poland abroad personified this idea of transnational activism: Kołakowski
had legitimacy both with Poles and Westerners. While early into their relationship (prior to
Kołakowski’s permanent exile) Giedroyc was pulling strings for Kołakowski in the West, by the
mid-1970s Giedroyc was asking Kołakowski about gaining the ear of Polish-American academic
and diplomat Zbigniew Brzeziński: “I am a dirty reactionary emigrant who nobody is interested
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in. Polish nationals—despite the fact that they do not have such an excellent status as the new
Russian emigration, have much greater opportunities, and you are considered to be the porte
parole of national ‘dissidents,’” Giedroyc wrote.83
In June of 1975, just months after Giedroyc’s late-1974 pleas about engaging
Solzhenitsyn and inspiring opposition in Poland, Kołakowski did write an article for Kultura that
called to mind Solzhenitsyn’s idea to not participate in the Soviet falsification of reality,
addressing the Polish intelligentsia specifically. In the article, he noted specifically that the
intelligentsia had to look beyond what is rational and what seemed possible, to “maximalist”
dreams—in other words to utopia as a motivating force.84 Still Giedroyc was not satisfied,
chastising Kołakowski for not giving him what he wanted: a call for the intelligentsia to support
the workers and do so by believing in their own power.
As it turned out, the Polish opposition did not need a forceful paean penned by
Kołakowski—as Giedroyc had envisioned—in order to make effective advances toward Polish
workers. Beginning in 1976, even as Kołakowski moved closer to Aneks in his strategic
assessment of how best to help, Giedroyc and Kołakowski would coordinate where they could
in order to assist the fledgling efforts of the post-1968 intelligentsia to support workers after
another round of repressions. In October of 1976 Giedroyc wrote to Kołakowski: “It is especially
important now that the Endecja campaign begins its denunciations that Jews and Freemasons
along with the C.I.A. are provoking a revolution in Poland.” (Here Giedroyc both likens the
Polish communist state to interwar nationalists and pokes fun at what was a common refrain
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about the Polish opposition among Western leftists).85 In a letter the following month,
Kołakowski told Giedroyc about the efforts of Czesław Miłosz to open a bank account for
donations to the Polish opposition in London.
In a December 1976 letter, Kołakowski informed Giedroyc of a press conference he was
involved in, conducted in London with Aneks editor Eugeniusz Smolar and Adam Michnik (who
was temporarily abroad) on behalf of the opposition. English police visited Kołakowski’s home
that month, as Adam Michnik was staying there: “at the request of the Polish secret police they
want to keep an eye on people who could protest here during Jaroszewicz's visit to London….
Michnik assured that he would not shoot at Jaroszewicz.” Giedroyc wrote back, saying that the
visit by Michnik (that “amiable mess,” he wrote) and press conference were critical: “this is not
just big money, but most importantly publicity, and Warsaw must account for this more and
more.”86 Both Giedroyc and government functionaries like Dobrosielski were keenly aware of
the power of publicity, of international attention being paid to the political opposition in
Poland.
A report on the press conference in Kultura outlined the program of the dissidents and
its basis: the conference participants and founders of the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR)
were all Polish citizens (nota bene: this includes Kołakowski), they did not want to gain power
and were not a political party. They were citizens who opposed the anti-democratic politics of
the state and party. They were part of a social grouping including the Catholic church and the
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working class who wanted to open a dialogue with the state.87 The opposition took the antipolitical tack of Kołakowski, communicating that they were healing society and above the
political fray. At the same time, they were working on very tangible projects like rendering legal
aid to imprisoned workers.
With the help of older émigrés like Kołakowski, Giedroyc, and Miłosz, donations to the
fledgling opposition organization in Poland were increasing, but this was occurring despite vast
logistical issues. In a 1976 letter, Eugeniusz Smolar asked Kołakowski if money solicited for the
“Appeal for Polish Workers” fund could be sent to him because “publishing your name gives
[people] a guarantee that the money will not disappear and will reach the proper hands in
Poland.”88 In late 1976, Giedroyc wrote to inform Kołakowski that the editorship of Der Spiegel
was making an anonymous donation and they must not be identified.
In January of 1977 Kołakowski wrote back, reporting on the situation with donations:
Large-scale coordination was difficult because donations came from different countries and
there was no sure way to get the money into Poland. Despite the largest amount of
coordination occurring in London (“[Eugeniusz] Smolar deals with everything but is very
overworked”), pounds could not be used because it was illegal to take that currency out of
England—so donations had to be converted into dollars. But the American bank where Miłosz
had opened an account would not allow its information to be publicized again.89 Wiring money
would result in seizures or huge taxes. Only trustworthy people could at random be asked to
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smuggle dollars into the country, Kołakowski concluded. In February of 1977, Giedroyc sent
word that the writer Saul Bellow wanted to send his honoraria to KOR and be publicly identified
only after the money reached its destination.
While the clandestine and piecemeal nature of this support network makes it almost
impossible to describe by quantifying the number of people involved or the sums sent, it is
possible to get an idea of how it operated based on exchanges like the ones above. This
correspondence shows that while the opposition in Poland had vast support outside of Poland,
the logistical net that made it possible was both flexible and fraught. It was difficult to send
support to Poland because reliable channels did not exist. But because these channels did not
exist, the diverse and dispersed means used to smuggle money were very difficult for the Polish
authorities to clamp down on. Both the amount of people helping and the ways in which money
and goods were sent into Poland were diverse and scattered.
Kołakowski’s pupils assert themselves
In March of 1976, Leszek Kołakowski and Adam Michnik organized press conferences in
Koln and Bonn to raise support for the opposition. During the conference, Kołakowski
addressed anxious Westerners, referring to “some circles in the West” who feared that
“opposition activity in Eastern Europe… might lead to an explosive situation in one or more
countries at once, and thus to the destabilization of the entire European order.”90 Kołakowski’s
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Kołakowski also read a message to the Czechoslovak opposition movement in honor of Jan
Patočka, a former student of phenomenologist Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, and
mentor to future Czechoslovak president Václav Havel. Patočka had just died in custody after a
long interrogation. This message is worth quoting in full because it shows the incredible
importance that the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger had for these
intellectuals: "The sudden death of Prof. Jan Patočka was a deep shock for all his friends. Jan
Patočka, an outstanding philosopher and thinker, co-author of “Charter 77" was from 1939
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statement built on the ideas he expressed when arguing with E.P. Thompson years earlier, at
which time he chastised the English historian for not accepting the ideas and experiences—the
agency—of eastern Europeans as valid (this exchange is described in the following chapter).
Translating the internal struggle against hopelessness to address the concerns of a
Western audience, he noted that: “as long as the societies of the East European countries feel
deprived of their national sovereignty, lack of democratic institutions and guarantees of civil
rights, and have been forced into a system in which the exercise of power is not bound by any
responsibility, these systems will never be stable, and the possibilities and even the probability
of explosive situations will never be removed.” In other words, the people of Eastern Europe
could not continue to live passively in order to not disturb the comfortable lives of Westerners.
In addition, the proposition of destabilization as a result of opposition activity was nonsensical
because change was demanded of Eastern European systems but they were immutably static.
Compared to the mechanisms of power in countries like the United States, where freedom of
speech and expression, freedom of the press and freedom to publish were protected and
relatively easy to exercise, countries like Poland had no mechanisms for dealing with the
changing needs and desires of society.
In April of 1977 Giedroyc wrote that Michnik (in his “unconscious running around,” he
added) had finished his book and it would appear in mid-May. This book, Kośćiół, Lewica, Dialog

constantly persecuted by totalitarian regimes, but never succumbed to pressure and constant
threats. Hounded to death, he remained until the end a spokesman for freedom in a world of
lies and violence. Together with our Czech, Slovak and Polish friends - we will not forget his
person and his activities. " For these intellectuals, life and philosophy were very clearly
intertwined. The “maximalist” utopian goal of living in truth—living with hope and a belief that
change was possible, in Kołakowski’s words—was a matter of everyday practice which in
Patočka’s case led to his death.
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(The Church and the Left in English translation—curiously missing the “dialogue”), became one
of the most influential works on the strategy of the Polish opposition. In May, Giedroyc wrote
of rumors swirling about the London bank account and suggested that it was time to clear the
air by issuing a statement about how much money had been collected and from whom.
Kołakowski responded, saying that after speaking to Eugeniusz Smolar and another émigré
deeply involved in this matter, Włodzimierz Brus, that with the shifting goals of KOR (after
fulfilling the goal of supporting suppressed workers, the organization re-branded as a more
general “Committee for Social Self-Defense”) it should be announced that the money would
continue to be used for the purpose of supporting the organization.
In late 1977 Kołakowski gave a lecture at the Venice Biennale, dubbed the “Biennale of
Dissent.” Simultaneously, on November 11-13, 1977, in Venice, Italian communist Rossana
Rossanda, director of the publication Il Manifesto, hosted a conference titled “Historical Roots
of Dissent,” of which many contributors were Eastern European émigrés. In December of 1978
Kołakowski participated in a conference organized by the Italian Socialist Party. In a moment of
duality representative of Kołakowski’s intellectual journey, he also visited the Vatican and had a
personal audience with the new Polish Pope—a fellow devotee of phenomenology whom
Kołakowski had long been familiar but not acquainted with. Wojtyła had been favored by the
communist party as a modern candidate for leadership of the church in Poland.
With his “komandosi” pupils—Adam Michnik and the people working with Aneks among
them—now running opposition organizations and formulating their own visions for the future,
Kołakowski settled into a less didactic role, dealing more with practical matters related to
supporting the opposition in Poland. Beginning roughly in 1978 the letters between Kołakowski
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and Giedroyc get less frequent, consisting increasingly of Giedroyc asking Kołakowski to write a
piece on a specific topic or person and Kołakowski usually talking his way out of it. Kołakowski
was his own man but he would drift closer to the orbit of the younger 1968 opposition he
mentored via his writing and involvement with Aneks. The leadership of Aneks and Kołakowski
by this point were collaborating quite closely to aid their friends in Poland.
Kołakowski’s letters to Giedroyc and publications to do with Poland show that he was
getting closer to the realm of Aneks. In January Kołakowski wrote to Giedroyc of restructuring
in the opposition organizations. He prefaced his opinion by saying “nevertheless we—i.e. the
Smolars and I—were of the opinion….”91 In March he noted that as “the sole member of KOR in
England,” he would be part of a chain that would get money into the hands of people going to
Poland or coming to the west.92 In May of 1978 Kołakowski asked Giedroyc if he might be able
to publish a collection of his essays that had not yet appeared in Polish. Giedroyc responded
that he did not have the means to do so, especially when it came to translation (though
Kołakowski noted that Aneks could probably help). This collection was eventually translated and
published by Aneks.93
Kołakowski’s post-1968 experiences motivated him to act and shaped his writing. He
publicly left revisionism behind, along with Marxism in general. But he never considered himself
a conservative or reactionary. His writing was directed at the left or what he thought remained
of it. By 1978 his relationship with the younger émigrés was not merely a student-teacher one
but a collaboration in support of friends in Poland. Kołakowski’s support differed in tone from
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that provided by an older liberal intelligentsia emigration exemplified by Giedroyc and his Paris
Kultura—who wished to shape policy more directly—and who Kołakowski maintained a
carefully delineated relationship with. Between 1968 and 1978 both Kołakowski and the 1968
student émigrés who founded Aneks dealt with personal challenges that shaped their life and
work. Their efforts in turn shaped the political landscape in Poland. Politically and
philosophically Kołakowski and this younger group were intertwined, acting as influences on
each-other (although this was an uneven exchange as Kołakowski was a mentor par excellence
for this group). His influence is seen throughout the thematic chapters that follow in part II of
the dissertation.
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Part II: Thematic Chapters
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Chapter Five: “It made me happy that they took these things on.” The Russian
issue of Aneks and the World of Émigré publishing
We are bound, Poles, for a long time by the same fate…
-Bulat Okudzhava
The Autumn 1974-Winter 1975 issue of Aneks, entitled “The archipelago of free
thought,” is about the Russian experience with Soviet rule. 1 Analyzing Aneks as one journal
among others who had over the years dedicated issues to the culture of another nation situates
it in the rich world of émigré publishing. This world was not well-understood in the West: the
people inhabiting it were thought of by some Western intellectuals as stooges for Western
imperialism. But émigré publishers were motivated by their own particular goals based on
profound life experiences and a deep understanding of politics and society in their part of
Europe. Facing the same accusations from the Polish authorities before their emigration, the
émigrés bristled at hearing them from Westerners. After describing the position of Aneks
among other émigré journals, this first thematic chapter explores the tension between Eastern
European émigré intellectuals and their Western peers—a tension that this dissertation returns
to repeatedly.
For the young Aneks editors, publishing this fraternal issue was a way by which to define
their (and their generation’s) relationship to the Russian world—to the entangled history of
Poland and Russia. Rather than viewing the Soviet Union as a monolithic empire, the issue
traces cracks in its edifice that ran the whole way from Warsaw to Moscow. The idea of
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“Russian” and “Soviet” are not interchangeable in this context. Whereas Russian here refers to
hundreds of years of history and culture, Soviet refers specifically to the government that came
to be after the Bolshevik revolution and sometimes to its citizens.
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international solidarity was turned against the Soviet bureaucracy. Soviet fraternity was in the
eyes of these émigrés a cover for imperialism. Fraternity with the Russian people subverted the
status quo in a dignified way. There is a long tradition of publishing in exile not only in Polish
culture but also that of other Eastern European countries. The editors of Aneks were inspired in
this endeavor by examples of fraternal issues going back decades, published both by Russian
publications about Poland and Polish ones about Russia.
Writing about the Aneks “Russian” issue, the Polish émigré philosopher, Leszek
Kołakowski, wrote in a 1975 letter to Kultura chief Jerzy Giedroyc: “It made me happy that they
took these things on.”2 In publishing this issue, the younger émigrés were not only an “annex”
of information to their peers in Poland but to the Paris émigré publisher Kultura, which had
already—among over a dozen books by Russian authors—printed translations of work by
prominent dissidents Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov. Without Kultura, there
would be no Aneks, which was founded in 1973 at the urging of Giedroyc and Kultura cofounder Gustaw Herling-Grudziński. Founded in 1947, Kultura had already published two
Russian issues of its journal before the inaugural issue of Aneks. The editorial staff of Kultura
believed that fraternity across national lines would free Eastern Europe from Soviet
domination.3
The Russian issue of Aneks appeared in the winter of 1974-1975, corresponding with an
international groundswell of support for Russian dissidents. A further sign of solidarity between
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Polish and Russian émigré circles came when Russian dissident writer Vladimir Maksimov
launched the émigré journal Kontinent in Paris in 1974—aided by and modeled on Kultura.
Kontinent would publish an issue with several Polish authors in 1977. The double-issue (number
7-8) is centered around the Russian dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. His Gulag Archipelago
had just been published in Russian in December of 1973, following by English, French and Polish
translations of the first volume by Fall of 1974, just before this Autumn 1974-Winter 1975
double-issue of Aneks.4 Having already published a piece of samizdat written by Solzhenitsyn,
the Aneks editors were familiar with his work and used the introduction to this issue to
proliferate information about his latest book.
A guiding idea of the Soviet experiment was fraternity of nations, a utopian notion. In
this chapter I compare the fraternal issues of these three dissident publications in order to
highlight the unique mission and different hopes for the future that the editors of Aneks
conceptualized as compared to the other two journals. I summarize the fraternal issues of
Kultura and Kontinent then compare them with the Aneks issue. These issues performed and
contemplated a brotherhood of nations that did not depend on the Soviet vision for the future.
Devoid of Marxist orthodoxy, they offer competing utopias.
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Kultura founder Jerzy Giedroyc had been seeking the Russian manuscripts of Gulag
Archipelago for years before its publication. Already in 1969, he wrote to Russian historian
Mikhail Geller, in exile in Paris from 1968, asking about their rumored existence. (Source: letter
from Giedroyc to Geller, Kultura archive, Paris). Once the Russian version was published,
Giedroyc asked Russophile Polish writer Jerzy Pomianowski for help. Under the pseudonym
Michał Kaniowski, Pomianowski had translated the first volume by June of 1974, when Giedroyc
mailed a copy to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who was by that time exiled from the Soviet Union.
(Source: letter from Giedroyc to Geller, Kultura archive, Paris). A preface to the Polish
translation by German writer Heinrich Böll appeared in the June 1974 issue of Kultura.
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“We are bound, Poles, for a long time by the same fate…” (Kultura in Russian)
Kultura was arguably the most influential eastern European émigré journal and
publisher in any language. Without Kultura, the other two publications would not exist. Started
by Jerzy Giedroyc in 1947, Kultura sought to create authentic Polish culture. Giedroyc believed
that real culture could not be created in postwar Poland due to the rigidity imposed by Soviet
Communism. The Russian issues of Kultura were translated and printed in Russian. The first
Russian issue was published in 1960, with subsequent issues in 1971 and 1981.5 Each says
“Issue Dedicated to Polish-Russian Relations” on the cover, in Russian. The Russian issues
represent the raison d’être of Kultura: aside from its quotidian goal of creating culture
independent of what was approved by the government in Poland, they symbolize a desire to
weaken the influence of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. They were more important to
Giedroyc than regular Polish-language issues.
Though the journal is much more than this—it was, after all, an important platform for
free expression for the Polish literary world during the second half of the twentieth century—
the editorial staff of Kultura promoted a cosmopolitan version of Polish Prometheism.6 At its
core, Prometheism is the idea of promoting national sovereignty in the Russian—or Soviet—
sphere of influence in order to weaken the empire. For Giedroyc, Polish culture would play a
central role in this strategy. In a private 1975 letter to philosopher Leszek Kołakowski, Giedroyc
wrote: “This country… which could not be a superpower and cannot be Czech must find sense

5

I focus on the 1971 issue.
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quarterlies, he remained influenced by Promethean thought. Paweł Libera, II Rzeczpospolita
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in its existence within history…. We now have the chance to play a role in shaping the future of
eastern Europe and it isn’t national megalomania. We are a middleman with western culture,
film, art. The Russian emigration of Solzhenitsyn and Etkind looks to Poles, Ukrainians, and
Lithuanians.”7
A preface used in the 1960 Russian issue and re-used in the 1971 issue—a “letter from
the editors”—describes the motivations behind publishing the Russian issues. The editors of
Kultura acknowledged that the Polish-Russian relationship has often been hostile. They called
for dialogue based on shared experience. Kultura had been the first in the West to translate
Russian authors like Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn, Sinyavsky, and Daniel, the editors wrote. They
concluded: “We would like to continue to print the works of Russian writers and thereby
become a link between them and the rest of the world.”8
Supporting this mission is a brief history of Kultura by writer Jerzy Pomianowski (né
Birnbaum, himself a 1968 émigré). Pomianowski enumerated the publication’s impressive
record of publishing translations of books and articles by Russian writers, mentioning the group
of writers listed above, as well as Kultura’s record of writing articles about Russia.9 Aside from
listing Kultura’s Russian bona fides, Pomianowski—writing under the pseudonym Hanna
Kostek—appealed to Russian readers at the end of his piece to fight nationalism in their culture
just as he hoped the Polish intelligentsia would in Poland.
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A second editorial essay is entitled, “We Need Each Other.” Underneath the title is an
epigraph: “We are bound, Poles, for a long time by the same fate…” It is the opening line of a
song, “Farewell to Poland,” by Russian poet and musician Bulat Okudzhava.10 Because Poles and
Russians shared a common fate, the editorial states, the Polish and Russian intelligentsia also
shared common interests and goals. The editors admitted that they couldn’t make a big
difference to the geopolitical status quo, but at least they could have an effect on the mood
between Russians and Poles so as to be ready for cooperation if an opportunity were to arise.
The three pieces described above form a narrative about the purpose of the special
issue. The rest of the selections are gift-wrapped within this push for fraternity. Included
authors are the future Nobel laureate Czesław Miłosz, philosopher Leszek Kołakowski, Kultura
co-editors Gustaw Herling-Grudziński and Juliusz Mieroszewski, writers Witold Gombrowicz and
Marian Pankowski, historian Wiktor Weintraub, a translation of a Milovan Đilas piece and a
commentary about it by Russian historian Mikhail Heller, and a piece by Polish writer Andrzej
Stawar—an interwar Marxist activist who had once written about Tadeusz Boy-Żeleński—
accompanied by Stawar’s obituary.
Kontinent
Kontinent was founded in 1974 in Paris by Vladimir Maksimov. Maksimov was a critic of
the Soviet government who had been expelled from the Writers’ Union in 1973 and placed in a
psychiatric ward as punishment, before being exiled to France. Maksimov immediately wanted
to start a publication. While Solzhenitsyn gave Kontinent its name, its founding is also directly
tied to Kultura. When asked by Maksimov for advice about how to start a journal, Aleksandr
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Solzhenitsyn told him to talk to the people behind the Polish publication.11 Jerzy Giedroyc wrote
in a June 1974 personal letter that Maksimov had asked him for “training.”12 He was happy to
oblige. The founders of Kultura were actually listed on the editorial board of Kontinent when it
was launched in October of that year and remained there.13 As part of a cause célèbre of
Russian dissidents newly exiled to the West at the time, Maksimov received immense support
to start the publication. It was well-funded by the Ullstein publishing house in West Germany,
owned by the (infamous) Axel Springer company.14
With Kontinent, Maksimov intended to represent the ‘continent’ of Eastern Europe as a
whole. This goal seems megalomaniacal in contrast with the deferential posture of Aneks and
the scale of its ambition dwarfs even the Promethean program of Giedroyc’s Kultura. The first
issue set out a mission: “1) unconditional religious idealism, 2) unconditional antitotalitarianism, 3) unconditional democracy and 4) unconditional nonpartisanship….” Its
purpose was to counter the “[totalitarian]… archipelago of cruelty and violence… in the spiritual
struggle for freedom and dignity.”15 It is worth pointing out that Maksimov deemed it necessary
to print the mission in all capital letters.
Maksimov was a staunch anti-communist whose point of view was closer to the
romantic Slavophilism of Solzhenitsyn than the liberalism of Andrei Sakharov or another
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prominent dissident, Andrei Sinyavsky. The editorial bent of Kontinent reflected Maksimov’s
perspective. Just as Sakharov disagreed with Solzhenitsyn, Sinyavsky was actually stricken from
the editorial board of Kontinent because he could not accept Maksimov’s Solzhenitsyninfluenced perspective on nationalism and on religious questions. “I am surprised by the
inappropriateness of the style by which Kontinent demonstrates its tolerance,” Sinyavsky wrote
in 1978.16 “I am a liberal Slavophile as opposed to the conservatives.”
In 1977 Kontinent published an issue that Jerzy Giedroyc of Kultura referred to in private
correspondence as the “Polish” issue, though it was published in Russian.17 From Maksimov’s
perspective, the impetus to acknowledge Polish intellectuals was the 30th anniversary of
Kultura. Polish dissident Adam Michnik is one of five people (the only Pole) on the cover of the
issue, owing to an interview with him contained within. In an afterword to the interview, three
Russian editors of Kontinent—Maksimov among them—praise Michnik for making the
realization that,”[i]t was only on the way to overcoming the age-old grievances of the Polish
and Russian, Polish and Ukrainian, Ukrainian and Russian peoples that [Michnik] saw our future
liberation.”18 The ideas attributed here to Michnik echo the Promethean mission of Kultura. The
afterword contains words of support for the fledgling dissident movement in Poland (The
Workers Defense Committee, KOR, had just been formed) and concludes with the hope that the
freedom the movement represents spreads through Eastern Europe and to the Soviet Union.
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The issue also contains a copy of a telegram of congratulations sent to Kultura by the
editorial board of Kontinent and an editorial by Maksimov summarizing how he had heard of
the journal: a visit in 1958 by plainclothes agents warning him not to make contact with
Giedroyc, a man he had not heard of at the time; how through emigration and nudging by
Solzhenitsyn he had got to know Kultura very personally; and how influential it was among the
Russian intelligentsia. Scattered throughout the issue is work by well-known Polish poet
Stanisław Barańczak; a tribute to Kultura by Józef Czapski, one of its editors, who was also put
on the editorial board of Kontinent; an essay by Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, the head of the Polish
section of Radio Free Europe; and a section of a book by writer Kazimierz Orłoś.19
In a letter to a Kontinent editor, Natasha Gorbanevskaya, Giedroyc wrote that the issue
moved him. He sent thanks to her and Maksimov. While Giedroyc referred to it as a “Polish”
issue, it was really a tribute to Kultura. About 70 pages of the 436-page issue were devoted to
Poland or Polish authors. Giedroyc had made a number of suggestions as to what should appear
in the issue, but none were followed.20 From Maksimov’s perspective these editorial choices
made sense. He had been generously aided by the Polish publisher. But in attempting to
represent all of Eastern Europe (“choosing to speak for the entire continent,” as one critic put it
in 1976) his ambition with Kontinent was immense.21 Sacrificing 70 pages to one satellite of the
empire was surely a significant gesture.
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Aneks

With their “Russian” issue, the editors of Aneks sought to inform readers about Russian

dissident culture by way of providing “a sample, a signal, a contoured map of this second
Russian archipelago: the liberated thoughts of people in captivity, their moral instincts,
research agility and culture-forming impetus.”22 The editors of Aneks had to position the journal
with regard to Polish-Russian relations. As a self-described ‘annex’ it endeavored to avoid being
prescriptive: “All in all - it is difficult to predict how things will turn out, and at this transitional
moment it is more appropriate to focus on patient, careful observation, rather than one or
other firm judgment about anything,” the editors suggested in this issue.23 One might think that
Polish anti-communists held ill-will toward the Soviet Union as a whole (Vladimir Maksimov
himself expressed such disbelief regarding Kultura), but the introduction makes it clear that the
Polish intelligentsia was in awe of Soviet dissidents and wished the best for the Russian people.
The “Russian” issue of Aneks was written in Polish and contained translations of texts by
Russian dissidents. A text by writer Andrzej Drawicz and poet Wiktor Woroszylski introduces the
translated texts, but not before the Poles outlined recent dissident activity in the Soviet
Union.24 Soviet dissidents were more numerous, more well-known, more prolific, and the Poles
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were in no position to be patrons to them or to teach them. Rather, since they were publishing
in the Polish language, they wished to inform their Polish readers about key Soviet dissidents
and their texts. Many noteworthy events had happened, Woroszylski and Drawicz wrote,
between the germination of the idea to present to Polish readers the Soviet dissident
movement (by compiling translations from key thinkers) and its fruition. Most important of all,
Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago had been published: “a Nuremberg process brought and
carried out against the Soviet Union by one man,” the awed authors wrote.25
The authors chronicled new arrests, repressions, and forced emigration—including that
of Solzhenitsyn himself. They feared that a decrease in samizdat was a sign that that the Soviet
authorities were succeeding in destroying the dissident movement there. At the same time, the
exile forced upon many prominent Soviet dissidents at this time could be a miscalculation by
the authorities. In emigration those same dissidents might be able to form “a resilient center of
free thought trusted by their countrymen… to succeed in creating magazines that, smuggled to
Russia, will cause their policemen sleepless nights.”26 They saw this hope in Kontinent which
had by this point in early 1975 published two issues.
They noted that Arkadiy Belinkov, a writer included in this compilation who was initially
sentenced to death in the Soviet Union and jailed for over a decade, had at the same time
proved unacceptably close to the Soviet idea for “old émigré editors” of many Russian journals.

their academic positions for defending protestors in 1968 and soon decided on exile. Hirszowicz
would revise this original essay into a book chapter with the same title in a work called The
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25
Woroszylski, Autorzy wyboru, and Drawicz, “Archipelag Wolnej Myśli. Wstęp,” 27.
26
Woroszylski, Autorzy wyboru, and Drawicz, 29.
184

Familiar with emigration politics themselves, Poles would resist the temptation to censor. And
not just in Belinkov’s case: the special issue includes a piece by Vladimir Osipov, a Russophile
nationalist. While the authors did not agree with his views, they recognized both that it was not
their place to polemicize with him and that his views were part of “the choir of the
contemporary Soviet opposition.”27 They had similar misgivings about Solzhenitsyn’s
Slavophilism (though that verdict is not mentioned in this issue).28 For the collection to be a
representative account of the Soviet opposition, even Osipov had to be included. Defending
Osipov’s inclusion, the authors cited Leszek Kołakowski’s ideas put forth in his 1973 essay
entitled “The Polish Case.” In that essay, Kołakowski noted that the most important cultural
task within a society is to maintain and empower free thinking—to support the right to exist of
many opposing ideas—even if one may disagree with where some of that thinking leads.
Thinking combats “desperation, resignation, indifference, and consent” vis-à-vis a state that
hopes for “graveyard peace”—a brutal lack of plurality.29
The first piece after this introduction is Solzhenitsyn’s “Letter to Soviet Leaders,” written
in September of 1973 and sent to the Soviet leadership only. In late 1974, after the publication
of Gulag Archipelago and his subsequent exile from the Soviet Union, Solzhenitsyn decided to
have a slightly modified version of the letter published. In this letter, Solzhenitsyn wished to
correct the course of the Soviet Union so that it and the world itself were not soon lost, as he
put it.
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He warned against war with China, environmental and resource depletion based on
infinite economic progress, and the “Progressive Ideology” of Marxism that he saw behind it all.
Solzhenitsyn’s motivation was his desire to save the Russian people. He was openly patriotic,
nationalist, and authoritarian, exalting national pride and the idea of patriotism as a rallying
force. But contrary to a classic view of these forces as imperialistic, he only sought to turn their
energies inward. Solzhenitsyn lamented the loss in war and strife of 100 million Russians under
Soviet rule, as well as the moral scourge of alcoholism. He exalted the Russian land as a savior
with regard to both imperialism and urban life; he suggested focusing expenditures not on arms
but on developing technology to thaw Siberia for this purpose.
Overall, Solzhenitsyn was viewed by the Polish émigrés more as a moral force than a
political one—some of his propositions sounded as far-fetched to them then as they do now.
The proposals that may have resonated most with the Poles who valued him was Solzhenitsyn’s
desire for Russia to decamp from its imperial possessions and his plea to abandon the idea
communism.30 Solzhenitsyn criticized Marxism as unscientific and consistently wrong in its
attempts to plan for the present and predict the future. It could only be maintained by lies, he
wrote, but paradoxically no one believed them any longer and so society’s energy was simply
wasted on maintaining the ruse.
Andrei Sakharov’s response to Solzhenitsyn was closer to the progressive and measured
point of view of the Aneks editors. Sakharov noted that Solzhenitsyn did not mention the
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sufferings of non-Russians in the Soviet Union: “forced evictions, genocide, the fight against
national liberation movements, and the suppression of the national culture were the exclusive
"privilege" of non-Russians.”31 He likewise did not agree that ideas could be divided into
“Western” or Russian, and so Marxism should not be thought of as a foreign concept brought to
Russia—as Solzhenitsyn suggested. Sakharov feared Solzhenitsyn’s criticism of progress itself,
writing that scientific and democratic regulation of the economy is “not a utopia.”32 He warned
that slowing down progress in science and technology would be devastating for all people of
the world.
Sakharov thought the idea of war with China weakened democratization,
demilitarization and dehumanized the Chinese people. He lauded Solzhenitsyn for asking the
Soviet Union to leave Eastern Europe and the Soviet Republics, disarm to a reasonable point,
enact democratic freedoms, tolerance, free political prisoners, strengthen the family, and allow
religious freedom—but isolation in any form was not an option. “Only on a global scale is it
possible to develop and implement the strategy of development of human society on earth that
is not contradictory to the continuation of human existence,” Sakharov wrote.33
Sakharov concluded by writing that Solzhenitsyn’s nationalism, isolationism, and
“religious patriarchal romanticism” made his ideas “utopian and potentially dangerous.” But
Sakharov was grateful for being able to freely discuss “basic problems” with Solzhenitsyn. He
also considered Solzhenitsyn to be “a giant in the struggle for human dignity in the tragic
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modern world.”34 The idea that free discussion of issues could bring about progress was also
the idea behind Aneks and itself utopian, but intentionally less prescriptive—self-limiting, in the
language of 1970s dissidents—compared to the utopias of nationalism or religious romanticism
promoted by Solzhenitsyn and challenged by Sakharov.35
This exchange was followed in Aneks with a summary written by Aneks editors of
Solzhenitsyn’s defense against Sakharov’s comments.36 Solzhenitsyn took issue with being
accused of promoting “Great Russian” nationalism, putting too much value in ideology,
undemocratic solutions, and of wanting to isolate Russia from intellectual, ideological, cultural
and economic contacts with the world. He wrote that if no one believes in ideology but they
surrender to it anyway, it should be seen as terribly strong; that modern totalitarianism was a
crisis of democracy and atheist humanism, and that Russia was not ready to be democratic yet.
He did not defend himself against Sakharov’s charge of sounding utopian, writing: “in our deadend situation why not try utopia sometimes?”
The editors of Aneks pulled out the following points of agreement with Sakharov from
Solzhenitsyn’s response: “the failure of socialism in Russia stems not from a specific Russian
tradition, but from the essential ideas”; “it is necessary to reject socialist messianism and the
overt and covert support by Russia of uprisings in various parts of the world”; “it is necessary to
separate Marxism from the state”; “permission should be given for the national republics to
leave [the USSR]”; “serious disarmament is necessary”; and “political prisoners must be freed,

34

Sacharow, 100.
Sakharov and Aneks were for limited utopias, whereas Solzhenitsyn, Maksimov, Kontinent
and Kultura were dreaming on a grand scale.
36
This defense was published in the second issue of Kontinent.
35

188

tolerance for supporters of other ideologies assured, strengthen the role of the family,
upbringing, rebuild interpersonal relations and heal people’s souls.”37
To allow Solzhenitsyn’s ideas to speak for themselves rather than paraphrasing or
omitting his unique perspective altogether was characteristic of Aneks. This document-bydocument re-printing of the public debate of two Russian émigré intellectuals may seem
unremarkable today. But Solzhenitsyn’s letter was originally published in Russian in Paris,
Sakharov’s response was a statement to the Western press, and Solzhenitsyn’s follow up
appeared in Kontinent. In 1974, Aneks may have been the only source where readers within
Poland could access some of these statements—and certainly the only one where they would
appear translated to Polish and compiled in one publication. Dispatches from Russian dissidents
tying their plight with the fate of satellite countries like Poland surely must have heartened
Polish-language readers. This was Aneks’s way of doing what Jerzy Giedroyc of Kultura wished
to accomplish when he urged writers to pen political manifestos for him. In the minds of the
Aneks publishers it would not be programmatic pronouncements that changed people’s
thinking, but rather knowledge, information, truth itself.
Aneks acted not as a mouthpiece, but rather as a conduit or repository for the ideas that
the 1968 generation found valuable. In this way, Aneks alone was a forum of the 1968
generation. Soon after the 1974-1975 Russian issue of Aneks, some of its closest collaborators
and the editorial group of Aneks would become part of organizations that defined the
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opposition movement in Poland and gained international renown alongside the Russian
dissidents, as Maksimov’s words of support in the Kontinent “Polish” issue attest.
Comparison
Aneks had modest aspirations when compared either to Kultura and Kontinent. The
latter was associated with Solzhenitsyn, had a wealthy public backer and wished to promote
Russian culture that could only appear underground. Kontinent modeled itself on Kultura at
Solzhenitsyn’s suggestion and received tutelage from that publication’s editors. Aneks too
received some guidance from Giedroyc. But while Kontinent had major geopolitical ambitions
and scope, Aneks wanted simply to educate, inform, supplement already existing knowledge.
With these special issues, Kultura and Kontinent were bringing Polish authors to Russian
readers, while Aneks was bringing a dissident Russian perspective to Poles. Aneks dispensed
with the Promethean politico-cultural diplomacy of Kultura (but its position as a transmission
belt for ideas remained). The Russian issue of Aneks is a fraternal gesture directed inward—to
fellow Poles—not a brotherly call to the other side.
While Aneks took the position of an observer wishing to contribute to the spread of
information, the editors of both Kultura and Kontinent strove to be in dialogue with geopolitical
issues more directly. This difference reflects the emigration experience of the Polish 1968ers,
which struck a nerve within them more raw than physical dislocation. The anti-Semitic
campaign had jarred their identities as Poles and as members of the Eastern European
intelligentsia. Both Kultura editor Gustaw Herling-Grudziński and one of the founders of Aneks
recalled a tense 1971 meeting in which, “The gathered people began to explain to [HerlingGrudziński]: we value you very much, we read your books, but what do you expect from us? We
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left as non-Poles, we were stigmatized as Jews, we have no basis or intention to take
responsibility for the fate of Poland, act as leaders.”38
The editors of Aneks did not want to tell Poles or Russians what to do. New ideas would
surely be born of their contributions, but the editors of the publication did not think that they
as émigrés should be the ones to take a leading role among the opposition to the Soviet-backed
Warsaw government. Rather than promoting a particular political agenda, the Aneks editors
believed that knowledge and truth would benefit society. They wished to enlighten; in this case
to bring to Poles the issues Russian (intellectuals) faced. This knowledge of Russian matters
would inform the Polish perspective and not only encourage tolerance but help those in Poland
make more informed decisions. By spreading knowledge and truth (the latter giving meaning to
words and concepts rather than claiming to be the sole arbiter of such meaning), the Aneks
group would help cleanse the social and political sphere, which would lead to a future that had
less danger of veering into dystopian fantasy.
It should be noted that Western intervention is missing from all these strategies. On
their own, Western ideas appeared inadequate to Eastern Europeans. The dialogue in these
fraternal issues is between Eastern Europeans about Eastern European problems, with Western
ideas only appearing when moderated by the émigré publishers. Giedroyc believed that the
West wouldn’t help central and Eastern Europeans deal with the Soviet empire and maybe even
couldn’t do so. Westerners were naïve. The United States and Western Europe also had their
own interests in mind. The editors of Aneks thought of Western institutions instrumentally
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rather than as potential emancipators. Eugeniusz Smolar explained in a 2018 letter to the
author: “In the US alone, there was no single decision-making center, and numerous tensions
and open conflicts between the White House, the State Department, the Department of
Defense, the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies were known. They had access to different
information, were guided by different 'organizational cultures' and often drew different
conclusions, which in turn led to different 'policy proposals' or policies…. Therefore, the point of
view and needs of recipients of this policy in communist countries deserve more serious,
autonomous treatment, and not only as a reflection of American policy.”39
As late as 1985, Giedroyc wrote a letter to Leszek Kołakowski, asking him to write a
Promethean appeal to “all of our neighbors, Germany, Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Hungary,
Belarus, explaining that our only chance is coordinated independence activity of these nations,
because we cannot count on the West.”40 Much as Giedroyc hoped these nations would
renounce various claims against each other, the philosopher renounced himself from this task,
seeing it as beyond his capabilities—but also likely outside of what would have been acceptable
for him to say in general. Maksimov, on the other hand, was a committed partner in the
endeavor to facilitate Eastern European intellectual fraternity. In a statement of
congratulations for the fortieth anniversary of Kultura from November of 1986, he celebrated
Giedroyc’s guiding principle of, “The abandonment of hope for assistance from the West.” He
continued, writing that “its editorial policy was based on principles that were without doubt
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laced with political heresy,” including, “Searching for ways to unite all forces of resistance and
liberation in Eastern Europe, and above all to include such forces in Russia.” It took “battling
hard with notions and ideas that seemed set in concrete, nationalistic prejudices and
intellectual mindsets – both in Poland and abroad” to achieve these, Maksimov wrote.
Giedroyc and Maksimov thus both believed that the West had nothing to offer Eastern
European intellectuals: they were in it alone, but together. Kultura’s first and second Russian
issues began with a statement about how Poland and Russia were bound to each other and
indeed needed each-other. Though the West allowed their voices to be heard—in Maksimov’s
case, to the jealousy of the Polish publishers, it was a budget of 250,000 Deutschmarks
provided by the Axel Springer publishing house—these émigré voices communicated ideas
rooted in their own intellectual traditions.
Although Kontinent’s issue was referred to as the Polish issue, it was as much of a
tribute to Kultura as it was an issue about Poland: Kontinent and Kultura were firmly linked by
personnel and had a mutual admiration for each-other. Kontinent published tributes to Poland
in Russian for a Russian audience, and the Kultura special issue appeared in Russian as well.41
After all, Russian was the language of the regional empire.42 But the interwar idea of
Prometheism remained: in the Russian issue of Kultura, Giedroyc and the editorial staff seemed
to speak to Russians as if Poland and the Soviet Union were in a position of parity. At times the
editorials in Kultura almost lectured the Russians on how they could be better to the Poles and
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other nations in their orbit. The idea was that the Poles would match them in a brotherly
effort—but if realized, such changes would be a huge victory for Poles.
This notion of Polish-Russian parity was completely missing from Kontinent. The
asymmetry evident by comparing Kultura and Kontinent was born not only of Maksimov’s
ambition but of a geopolitical reality Kultura’s Jerzy Giedroyc seems not to acknowledge. That is
not to say that he was not politically astute, but Giedroyc’s state of mind was rooted in the
Eastern Europe of the 1920s and early 1930s—an interwar world where the Wilsonian idea of
self-determination of nations was paramount and Poland could still dream of holding its own
against a weak Soviet Union.
Kultura and Kontinent taken together are a foil for Aneks in the sense that the editors of
the former two aspired to concrete geopolitical goals. In Maksimov’s ambition there is the tone
of empire, in Giedroyc’s strategy the plight of a noble nation. Aneks, in contrast to the other
Polish publication, was published in Polish for Poles and advanced no political ambitions toward
Poland’s neighbors. The editors of Aneks surely dreamed of changes in the political arena but
did not think it was their place to press for them directly. They also conceived of Eastern
European problems as being rooted in the minds of citizens rather than in political
machinations or the ebb and flow of borders.
Reticence: Funding and the C.I.A.
Another far more tangible difference is visible when these publications are compared
through an organizational lens; as entities that need staff; need to be printed; need subscribers.
To put it plainly, such endeavors require financial support. While Kontinent was funded by a
large publishing house, Aneks did not make money for its editors (Kultura too was a labor of
love, but a far more established one by the 1970s). In all likelihood the opposite was the case.
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The publication existed because its editors put in the hours to create it after their day-to-day
responsibilities. Eugeniusz Smolar recalls going to the BBC by day, coming home, working on
Aneks, going to bed, and repeating the process the next day. Aleksander Smolar initially asked
Jerzy Giedroyc, founder of the influential Paris émigré journal Kultura, to support Aneks under
his ‘Instytut Literacki’ imprint. Giedroyc countered with an offer to fund the first four issues of
Aneks, which he later rescinded amicably:
[Giedroyc communicated] that we are a younger generation, we have different
experiences, we are guided by different political motivations, so we should act alone. He
did so probably because he did not want competition. This, however, did not spoil our
relations.”43
At the outset, there was only a meager subscription fee that was intended to cover the actual
costs of printing the journal. Partly due to the suggestion of the Polish-American diplomat
Zbigniew Brzeziński, Eugeniusz Smolar contacted London publisher and postwar émigré Andrzej
Stypułkowski.
Stypułkowski had founded a publishing house, Polonia Book Fund, Ltd, in 1959. A
participant in the Warsaw Uprising and a postwar exile, he had worked at Free Europe Press
from 1953 to 1958. According to historian Alfred A. Reisch, Free Europe Press was a division of
the Free Europe Committee, an organization that was set up with federal government funding
in Albany, NY, in May of 1949.44 The mission of the Free Europe Committee aligned with a
National Security Council directive, NSC-4(a), which advised that American intelligence should
“initiate and conduct covert psychological operations to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired
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activities which constitute a threat to peace.”45 The Committee gave funds to many eastern
European émigré institutions, among them Kultura.46 Eugeniusz Smolar said in a 2006 interview
with Łukasz Bertram, the chief of the Aneks archive, that he knew Stypułkowski’s publishing
business received support from the International Literary Center, which he described as “an
American initiative invented in the 1950s to transfer western and émigré literature to
communist countries.”47
The founder of Polonia Book Fund, Ltd, Stypułkowski acted as coordinator of the Free
Europe Committee’s book distribution program in London, catering to Polish readers. The book
distribution program was the brainchild of Free Europe Committee vice president Sam S.
Walker, who started it in 1956. Walker became director of a New York organization called the
East Europe Institute in 1958. This was both a way of splitting the book distribution program
from the Free Europe Committee in case either was compromised, and a result of its success:
the book distribution program had received an overwhelming number of requests for literature
from its pilot Poland program since its inception.
Instead of reporting to the Committee, the East Europe Institute came into direct
contact with Cord Meyer Jr., who was on the payroll of the C.I.A. from 1951-1977. George C.
Minden, a postwar Romanian exile who started working for the Free Europe Committee after
immigrating to America in 1955, took over the book distribution program in 1959 and ran it
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until it ceased operations in 1991. His Polish section deputy was a postwar émigré named Adam
Rudzki who started working at the Free Europe Committee in 1952.48 Minden knew no Slavic
languages. A man named John G. Kirk became deputy director of the East European Institute
and assumed responsibility for communications with the book distribution program when it
ostensibly began to be run by a different entity, the East European Institute, in 1958.49 It was
Kirk who communicated with Stypułkowski in London.
Records for George Minden’s book distribution project are only available until 1973.50
As a result, there are few details about the support Aneks received from this network. But
Eugeniusz Smolar did confirm that his publication made use of these resources: “[Łukasz
Bertram:] Did you know then where the funds came from? [Eugeniusz Smolar:] Andrzej
Stypułkowski, with whom I made friends… described the whole mechanism to me. Honestly, we
did not care.” Though it mattered little to Smolar that the money came from the United States,
he was not aware that Stypułkowski may have had ties to American intelligence. Such
accusations had been a constant thorn in the side of the 1968 activists since before they even
left Poland. For people whose deeply held beliefs had been developed in part in prisons and
police questioning, the idea that some amount of money or help with getting their publication
to their readers could on some level could actually be aided by the C.I.A. would seem
patronizing—trivializing their problems and their situation.
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Besides knowing that the funds came from the dummy foundations run by Minden,
Smolar describes the mechanism of support that Aneks received: “It worked in such a way that
the Americans bought, for example, a thousand copies of a given item, from which they took
half, and the other they were left for free in the hands of publishers. Copies from their pool
were then sent to emigre bookshops—Polish or other—all over the world, mainly in Europe,
often visited by tourists from the country.” This is exactly how Reisch described the distribution
network in London based on Minden’s reports.51 Rather than the dreams of lavish funding that
Polish intelligence officers imagined for Aneks, outside support was largely logistical and
something that émigrés were also doing on their own when they handed stacks of publications
to friends heading to Poland.
Aside from funding leftist but anti-communist publications, Minden’s reports detail the
success of a program run by a man called Stanisław Błaszczyk in Edinburgh to distribute
publications to Polish sailors in Scotland, who often sold the books in Poland because they were
very valuable contraband. Rudzki’s son summarized one of his father’s favorite anecdotes: “I
remember how happy he was about a postman from Silesia. He stole books and ran a private
rental business, expanding the group of readers.”52 The goals of the Aneks editors, to get eyes
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on pages, aligned with the program here as well. Smolar mentioned that those who benefitted
from the distribution “were both intellectuals and those who later sold them profitably, which
did not matter, because it was important that books and magazines were on the Vistula River.”
According to Minden, the mailing program sent approximately ten million books to
Eastern Europe in its four decades of existence. Adam Rudzki’s son added in a 2000 Polishlanguage article that four million of those publications went to Poland. Reisch described
Minden’s book mailing program as being run like a non-profit that served both official
institutions in Poland and individuals: “a network of Polish cultural institutions, libraries,
bookshops, publishing houses, clubs, and cultural associations.”53 Smolar confirmed his
knowledge of this: “These bookstores also sent mail-order books to Poland, often horribly
expensive academic books in foreign languages - and they came! The recipients were, for
example, several universities, including Warsaw University or The Catholic University in Lublin,
but also private individuals.”
Smolar added that funding by Minden’s program was common among émigré
publicists: “All emigre publishers used this support, including the Instytut Literacki [the imprint
of Jerzy Giedroyc’s Paris Kultura], which served as a model: we accept help, but we remain fully
independent.” Reisch wrote that Minden ran his book distribution program and provided
“financial support for émigré newspapers and magazines… throughout the 1970s and 1980s.”54
Without a doubt, Aneks was one of these magazines. It therefore benefitted from a demand
generated by Minden’s program and was distributed by it. Adding to this the fact that many of
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the articles in Aneks were from publications that had at one point been supported by the
Congress of Cultural Freedom, the émigré 1968ers were part of a vast world of anti-communist
publishing. But this was not an operation masterminded by the Americans. This publication
network was largely run by people from Eastern Europe—many of them ex-communists.
Summarizing a Free Europe Committee memo from 1956, following the failed
Hungarian revolution, Reisch noted that the program was to “take no action that was
considered likely to provoke further bloodshed.”55 Reisch characterizes Minden, the long-term
head of the program, as a man who “abhorred violence.”56 Just as Smolar intended to provide
an annex to developments in Poland, Minden’s idea for the program was not to tell people
what to think. If that were the case, according to Minden, “the West would do no better than
the regimes it wanted to undermine.” Minden’s son wrote in a letter to Reisch that he thought
his father wanted to “present [Eastern Europeans] with options and give them access to what
they wanted.”57
The editors of Aneks wanted, broadly, to expose Poles to Western ideas. Reisch
described Minden’s objectives as “to help East Europeans move toward an open, democratic
society and self-determination, and to expose them through books to Western democratic
thought and developments in all fields.” A 1956 Free Europe Committee memo stated that
“[t]he possibilities for overthrowing the communist regimes either through ‘liberalization’ from
without or by revolution from within are becoming increasingly remote and the alternative
path to freedom in the satellite countries seems to be along a line of transformation of the
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communist system by an evolutionary process.”58 The 1956 memo conceives of political
evolution in the same way as Polish 1968er Adam Michnik in his 1978 essay “A New
Evolutionism,” which was a critical part of the programmatic development leading to the
creation of the “Solidarity” trade union in 1980.
Among Walker’s original missions for the program were “to destroy isolation and
apathy, stimulate ideas and thinking, and maintain people as an active political factor; and to
prevent false hopes and illusions,” which echoes the ideas of dignity and “living in truth” put
forth by many dissidents two decades later.59 A Free Europe Press memo read: “There should
be no total attacks on communism. Mailings should favor ‘revisionist’ trends among the new
elites. Practical alternatives to doctrinaire Marxist principles should receive high priority. Cross
reporting (i.e., reports on what was going on in the other East European countries) should be
used to demonstrate what might be possible in their country.”60 These sentiments are quite
similar to mission that the editors of Aneks set out to accomplish with the publication.
While there are similarities in the mission of both the book program and the publication
of Aneks, it was personal experience with so-called police communism that motivated the
Aneks editors and other émigrés who benefitted from this program. Even had they known that
some of the resources available to them were funded by an intelligence service, the money was
going toward publishing—and the publication of an intellectual journal at that. In the case of
Aneks, it was not nearly enough support to allow making the journal a job, nor even enough to
cover the costs of the journal to begin with.
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The intellectuals who left Poland in the wake of 1968, recently disillusioned with
Marxism, mostly Jewish, not willing or able to turn to political conservatism, were again in a
difficult position after leaving Poland. They were not trusted by the old Polish emigration and
for the most part also did not see eye-to-eye with many Western peers, especially those
affiliated with the Western New Left. Western leftists were wary that certain émigré goals
aligned with those of the United States; specifically the C.I.A. and organizations that either the
American government or western intelligence was thought to support. Émigrés on the other
hand were shocked by what they perceived to be the naïveté of the left in the West: continual
support of Marxism (even if many had after 1968 given up on the Soviet Union), not firmly
disavowing violence as a political tactic, protesting for utopian demands. Émigrés considered
the first point especially hypocritical, as they felt that many criticized the United States
government at the same time as they turned a blind eye to similar actions perpetrated by the
Soviet Union.
This mutual distrust, or reticence, was partly fueled by misunderstanding. The
intellectuals from both Eastern and western Europe involved in this dialogue broadly had the
same goals, however, which could be encapsulated in the idea of confronting the problems of
their societies. Westerners had a difficult time accepting that even if émigrés were treated well
by some unpalatable western elites, or their publications were partly supported by covert
organizations, this didn’t mean that people and publications naïvely supported the goals of the
sources of that support. Rather, publishers used the resources presented to them to publish
what they would have published anyway.
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Émigrés made an argument for the content being a separate matter from the source of
the money itself. At the same time as émigrés had criticisms of the New Left that hold up to
scrutiny, they did not see it as their responsibility to be encumbered by the gravity of the social
problems facing western countries: the post-colonial issues of metropolitan France, or civil
rights unrest in the United States, for example. Usually painted by its critics as identity politics,
these issues seemed secondary to the gross repression émigrés had faced, including statesanctioned antisemitism in Poland. This tension or reticence defines the environment in which
(and ideas against which) Eastern European émigrés worked to help friends and family in their
home countries. Funding was a central cause of reticence between émigré writers and
publishers, and their Western European peers. Ever present in accusations against
anticommunists was the Central Intelligence Agency.
The Central Intelligence Agency was created in 1947 to combat Communism. It launched
the Free Europe Committee in 1949. The committee is responsible for the well-known Radio
Free Europe and a program that distributed a wide variety of publications, émigré periodicals
among them, to Eastern Europeans, with Polish migration and trade acting as the key channel
for publications reaching Eastern Europe through this initiative. A Congress for Cultural
Freedom was hosted in Berlin in 1950 with C.I.A. aid, with the goal of countering Soviet events
like the 1949 World Congress of Peace Partisans in Paris (both were intended to sway or attract
western intellectuals).61 The Free Europe Committee, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and
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the Central Intelligence Agency itself are three key Western organizations whose meaning and
efficacy was often invoked in Cold War debates among engaged intellectuals.
It had just been revealed in 1967, shortly before the arrival of the 1968 émigrés, that the
C.I.A. had given money to various cultural organizations and institutions in order to counteract
similar programs by the Soviet Union. The revelations came as a shock to many Western leftists,
especially those working for or published in the leftist but non-communist organizations or
institutions revealed to have received funding, such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom and
the publications tied to it. The scandal began when the San Francisco-based left-Catholic
magazine Ramparts published an advertisement in The New York Times announcing that they
would reveal how the C.I.A. had infiltrated the National Student Association, the oldest student
association in the United States. The central concern was that the C.I.A. was operating on
American soil and manipulating American citizens, but further research by journalists from
several publications revealed one side in what came to be known as a cultural Cold War: a vast
array of dummy foundations sending money to many cultural organizations and institutions
both in the United States and abroad. Articles appeared in The New York Times, Washington
Post, Los Angeles Times, from the Village Voice to Congress’s Congressional Quarterly journal.
President Lynden B. Johnson demanded that the C.I.A. stop funding student groups.
In response to the allegations, Thomas Wardell Braden, a high-ranking C.I.A. officer,
plainly admitted that it was all true—and justified—In an editorial published in Philadelphia’s
Saturday Evening Post. He asked rhetorically whether the C.I.A. cultural Cold War efforts were
“immoral” or “disgraceful,” arguing that they were not and those who thought so were naïve,
or worse, “pretending to be naïve.” Braden was filled with joy when the Boston Symphony
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Orchestra—funded by the C.I.A.—did more for American prestige in Paris “than John Foster
Dulles or Dwight D. Eisenhower could have bought with a hundred speeches.” Such programs
were wrong “[o]nly in the sense that war itself is immoral, wrong and disgraceful. For the cold
war was and is a war, fought with ideas instead of bombs,” Braden wrote. And so in the late
1960s Western leftists were presented with both a clear choice—the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.—and
the difficult moral and intellectual quandary of how to maintain a semblance of autonomy in
this bipolar world. It is this situation that the 1968 émigrés entered as they settle in Western
intellectual spheres at the end of the 1960s and into the beginning of the 1970s.
Kołakowski-Thompson
The disclosures in Ramparts and The New York Times were referenced by the English
Marxist historian E.P. Thompson in his 1973 Open Letter to Leszek Kołakowski. E.P. Thompson
lambasted the Pole for publishing in journals like Encounter and Deadelus in the letter—
published in the British Socialist Register—because the former journals received funding from
the Ford Foundation. The Ford Foundation is a stand-in for the Congress for Cultural Freedom
and the C.I.A., as Thompson explains in a footnote at the end of his essay. Thompson makes a
plethora of arguments in the 100-page letter, but this one is among the few that are presented
as self-evident. Thompson does not explore what publishing in such a journal means for the
author or the content of a published piece. For Thompson the taint of support (however
indirect) by the C.I.A. was insurmountable. If the publication of Kołakowski’s Main Currents of
Marxism solidified his reputation in the West as no longer even a revisionist Marxist, this
exchange first broke the news to Westerners. Broadly, the open letter accused Kołakowski of
disappointing the Western left by turning his back on revisionist Marxism. The polemical
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exchange exemplified the misunderstandings between well-meaning Westerners and Polish
intellectuals wishing to bring some semblance of dignity to the people of Eastern Europe.
Two points stand out in Thompson’s piece. He quoted a Kołakowski interview from 1971
in which the latter noted: “A Polish friend... recently wrote to me from Sweden saying that
whenever he had dealings with the New Left he seemed to be watching a film of which he
already knew the end. That is exactly how I feel. The kind of language that was used in the past
to justify the most brutal oppression is now being repeated as though nothing had ever
happened." These ‘painful’ words, Thompson wrote, caused him to want to yell “apostate!” at
Kołakowski rather than have a dialogue.
The second thread is about the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Revelations about the
C.I.A. funding of arts and letters through various front organizations—mainly the Congress for
Cultural Freedom—began to appear in 1966. A handful of recent studies of the so-called
cultural Cold War explicate in granular detail that the Ford Foundation was part of a group of
“Bona fide” foundations closely tied to C.I.A. leadership through American high society and
foreign policy goals.62 Thompson’s argument rests, first, on considering the medium just as
much if not more than the message, and second, on funding; following the money. Earlier in the
essay Thompson sneered at the Ford Foundation, noting that when he wrote for the New Left
Review it did not receive funding from that organization or any other like it, and he personally
would not attend a conference funded with money from such a source. Thompson tied
censorship to the issue of funding, saying that “If you criticize, with stridency, any section of the
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Left in certain places—and Encounter is, by intention and by subsidy, the first of these places—
your criticism is not attended to for the sake of any particular discrimination which it may
contain.”63 Finally, he added that he would “abstain from writing for Encounter” just as
abstained from a conference on socialism that Kołakowski had organized at Reading University,
scheduled for April 1973.
He launched into a criticism of Cecil Rhodes, a former member of the British diplomatic
service and conference organizing committee member before attacking the conference’s
funding. To the statement about funding, Thompson attached a massive endnote providing a
narrative and historiography of the disclosures about Congress for Cultural Freedom
publications. The endnote begins at 1966 New York Times articles about the connection
between the C.I.A. and the Congress for Cultural Freedom, moves through the academic studies
that had been done on the theme so far, and ends in a 1972 letter to the aforementioned New
York newspaper in which the President of the Ford Foundation admits to purposely funding
publications which once received C.I.A. support.64
Kołakowski addressed the issue of guilt and responsibility head-on in his response,
which appeared in the Socialist Register in 1974 and was reprinted in Aneks in 1978. Kołakowski
asserted that many of Thompson’s arguments were Marxist dogma. He argued that ideological
purity was a laughable concept, but also that the Soviet system was objectively worse for
humanity than the one represented by the Ford Foundation: “…you say, e.g. that… you do not
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participate in meetings funded by the Ford Foundation.” Yet if the Ford Foundation was bad,
Kołakowski asked, then how was it possible that Thompson was able to live with the guilt of his
association with Stalin? His argument about guilt and responsibility rested on the idea that
Stalin’s regime had no equal in the western world: “O, blessed Innocence!,” Kołakowski wrote,
“You and I, we were both active in our respective Communist Parties in the 40s and 50s which
means that, whatever our noble intentions and our charming ignorance (or refusal to get rid of
ignorance) were, we supported, within our modest means, a regime based on mass slave labour
and police terror of the worst kind in human history.” Thompson wanted the choice to align
with Stalin to be put into the context of the time, but Kołakowski did not think that this excused
supporting what he called “conscious conversions to barbarism.”
Kołakowski sarcastically sketched the misunderstanding between Western and Eastern
leftists: “You are right, Edward, that we, people from Eastern Europe, have a tendency to
underestimate the gravity of the social issues democratic societies face and we may be blamed
for that.” Kołakowski continued, writing that it was hard to take Western leftists seriously when
they “teach us how liberated we are in the East,” by prescribing “a rigorously scientific solution
for humanity's illness and this solution consists in repeating a few phrases we could hear for
thirty years on each celebration of the 1 May and read in any party propaganda brochure.”65
Responding to Thompson’s plea that he continue to “help the blind to see” under his tutelage,
Kołakowski wrote that it was “difficult to apply when you have to do with people who are
omniscient and all-seeing anyway.”66 In plain English, Kołakowski felt that Thompson wanted
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something from him that he had been giving all along, but Thompson ignored because it did not
suit his way of interpreting the world.
If both Thompson and he had blood on their hands, did that make continuing to support
bloody (by Thompson’s reckoning) states tolerable? Kołakowski sidestepped Thompson by
shifting the debate into one about the ills of police communism (to Kołakowski, the logical end
of Marxism). This left Kołakowski open to Thompson claim that Kołakowski had not “given to
[Thompson’s] question a moment of serious historical imagination.” Thompson asked him to
consider the concerns that Western intellectuals had about their own governments. The two
talked past each other, but both make points that are worth considering, setting a precedent
repeated in future debates.
Kołakowski summed up the relations between Eastern Europeans and Western
progressives as he saw it: “The gulf dividing us is at the moment unlikely to be bridged. You still
seem to consider yourself as a dissident communist or as a sort of revisionist. I do not, and this
for a very long time.” He went on, giving Thompson a similar type of lecture to the one
Kołakowski received about the Ford Foundation: “You seem to define your position in terms of
discussions of 1956 and I do not. This was an important year and its illusions were important,
too. But they were crushed just after they had appeared. You probably realize that what was
labelled "revisionism” in the people's democracies is virtually dead (possibly with the exception
of Yugoslavia) which means that both young and old people in these countries stopped thinking
about their situation in terms of "genuine socialism'', "genuine Marxism" etc. They want (more
often than not in a passive way) more national independence, more political and social
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freedom, better life conditions- but not because there is anything specifically socialist in these
claims.”
The consequences of this sentiment were that the ideology Thompson was attempting
to revive was completely hollow in places of ‘actually existing socialism’. It was only used to
support rigid, unreformable governments, who themselves did not believe the ideas that were
their basis. “The official state ideology… is absolutely indispensable, for it is the only way in
which the ruling apparatus can legitimize its power; and it is believed by nobody—either the
rulers or the ruled (both well aware of the unbelief of the others and of their own),” Kołakowski
wrote.67 The Ford Foundation or the C.I.A. is largely irrelevant to Kołakowski’s view of the Cold
War world. What is omnipresent is his own personal experience with communist rule and his
desire to translate this for his Western audience.
The historian Tony Judt revisited this argument in 2006 and sociologist Scott Hamilton in
2011. Judt wrote about Thompson’s ‘open letter’ while promoting Kołakowski as a check on
Western enthusiasm for Marxism. Judt wrote that in Poland, Kołakowski rejected “clericalism,
chauvinism, anti-Semitism,” and, later, Marxism; “to the confusion, as we shall see, of some of
his admirers” in the West.68 Judt concluded his reprise of Kołakowski by writing that because no
one seemed to have had a good solution to the inequalities present in capitalism, Marxism was
poised for a comeback. Paradoxically, the collapse of the Soviet Union helped this trend rather
than discouraging attempts to implement these ideas again, he wrote. The “belief that Marxism
has an intellectual and political future,” Judt wrote, “not merely in spite of communism’s
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collapse but because of it” was a fantasy “[h]itherto found only at the international “periphery”
and in the margins of academia….”
Hamilton, in a book on E.P. Thompson, asserts that Kołakowski argued in a shallow
“Stalinist” manner. He calls Kołakowski’s treatment of the ‘Communists of the 1930s and 1940s’
“unjustly harsh,” though he does not address the Pole’s assessment that the Soviet regime,
which Western communists at the time supported, utilized ‘mass slave labor and police terror.’
Curiously, Hamilton outright dismisses the merit of Kołakowski’s argument because it rests on
first-hand experience not of having read about it—“from the safety of [Thompson’s] leafy perch
in middle England,” as Judt put it.69 What stands out most in the Kołakowski-Thompson
argument, as in Hamilton’s critique of Kołakowski and Judt, is that having actually experienced
the communist system (and even actively taking part in it) did not count for much to those who
were eager to defend socialism as an idea.
Hamilton calls Judt’s essay on Kołakowski “ambitious,” noting that Judt praised the Pole
for his first-hand experience with Communism. Kołakowski’s life experience within the system
was a demerit to analyzing it, according to Hamilton, who wrote that the latter’s argumentative
style remained unchanged: “Under the guise of intellectual history, the young Stalinist pursues
the crudest political polemic.”70 Hamilton mentions the 1200-page Main Currents of Marxism,
but immediately dismisses it as “long, hostile, and influential.” All Kołakowski was capable of
was “reduc[ing] Marx’s work to a few hackneyed formulations,” he continued, echoing the
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1972 analysis of Kołakowski’s work by the Polish secret police described in the preceding
chapter.71 What Kołakowski identified in Marxist theory as historical determinism that lacked
meaning, Hamilton praised as “concepts nuanced and contextual and open to continual
refinement,” or “dialectical abstractions, slices of an infinitely complex and continually changing
reality.”72
Moving to Judt, Hamilton wrote that the historian’s treatment of the debate is
“oblivious to the weaknesses in Kołakowski’s understanding of Marx and Marxism.” He added
that “the spectacular failure of Judt and Kołakowski to deal with Thompson fairly” could be
attributed to “an understanding of Marxism that is so simplistic that it cannot hope to
accommodate the nuances of Thompson’s thought, or the thought of most other important
Marxist thinkers.”73 Hamilton here seems to embody Judt’s description of an intellectual
emboldened, paradoxically, by the collapse of the Soviet empire, to return to Marxism.
From at least the time of the defection of the Polish poet Czesław Miłosz in 1951, to the
1968 emigration from Poland and through to the 21st century, a fundamental misunderstanding
existed between Eastern European and Western intellectuals. Westerners invested in politics
east of the Iron Curtain maintained a distrust of Western institutions that to newcomers from
the East often bordered on nonsense. If Easterners did not hold curious positions on religion
and nationalism that Westerners found easy to criticize, then it was their ambivalence when it
came to the ethics of Western institutions—like Kołakowski’s treatment of NATO and the Ford

71

Hamilton, 136.
Hamilton, 137.
73
Hamilton, 137, 148.
72

212

Foundation—that became an issue. Many émigrés refused to follow the Western moral
calculus.
Kołakowski’s argument in the Thompson polemic is based on absolute values, but he
applies them to flawed, man-made institutions. This way of thought is inspired by personal
experience with the communist system in Poland—by difficult life experiences. To Kołakowski,
both having a high regard for absolute values and the acceptance of a flawed reality are
important. Progress on an issue can only come when the former is applied to the latter. His
position was influenced by what Western progressives would commonly call conservative,
Christian, values–the very same ideas that influenced dissidents like Adam Michnik (analyzed in
Chapter Six). Both Western institutions and the Soviet Union were flawed, many dissidents
would say, but whereas the whole Soviet system seemed to be held together with human rights
abuses, the Western European and American experience held more promise for reform. The
Soviet system proved itself incapable of change in 1968, whereas Western institutions allowed
for a much greater scope of freedoms that could lead to the betterment of society.
The same revelations that made Western intellectuals like Thompson wary of C.I.A.
operations were known and used by Polish security services to attack the émigrés as well. The
Kołakowski-Thompson exchange came to the attention of the Polish security services
immediately. Colonel Z. Bielecki of division IV of Department III of the MSW wrote on June 28,
1974 that E.P. Thompson “English historian, ex-communist” had just published a lengthy letter
to Kołakowski, and in turn Kołakowski had published his own response.74 From the head of the
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third division of Department I, Bielecki requested “information about the content of the
polemic or access to the texts of E.P. Thompson and L. Kołakowski.”
Poles in the West who sought to influence the situation in Eastern Europe in this way
found themselves encircled when it came to public image. Within the “Documentation” section
of a June 1972 publication by the Polish Institute for the Study of East-West Relations is a
graphic entitled “Circle of the C.I.A.”75 The American agency’s initialism is in a circle in the
middle, surrounded by a ring of dozens of foundations, which are in turn surrounded by a layer
of institutions and organizations. Beyond these layers lie about two dozen bubbles, connected
to parts of the circle with dotted lines. One of the bubbles is labeled “Congress for Cultural
Freedom,” another represents “International Conferences,” and so on. Finally, orbiting the
bubbles are about a dozen general categories. The one closest to the Congress for Cultural
Freedom is “Artists/Writers.” Nearby one finds “Émigrés/Kultura.” The information depicted in
the C.I.A. to foundation-level of the graphic appears to come directly from the Western press
revelations about organizations that the C.I.A. funded in the 1960s. The chart is largely a visual
representation of a 1967 Los Angeles Times article listing the various organizations that took or
funneled C.I.A. money.76
As the dissident movement picked up steam in 1976, Kultura head Jerzy Giedroyc wrote
to Leszek Kołakowski that a “campaign has already begun denouncing that Jews, Masons and
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the C.I.A. are provoking revolutions in Poland.”77 As people viewed by the Polish state as
compromised for leaving the country and entering into the hands of the West, as intellectuals
and identified by others as Jews, the Polish émigrés associated with Aneks could fill any and all
of these roles for official state propaganda. The association of the anti-communist left with the
C.I.A. tainted relations not only with Westerners but with other émigrés, who could be
receptive not just to the Western press but to what was being written in Polish both abroad
and in the country.
Aneks benefitted from the ecosystem of Congress for Cultural Freedom publications and
American funding, but it should not be overstated. Eastern European émigrés were no puppets
and the aid extended to them was relatively minor, though incredibly helpful for people
struggling to make time and find money to help their friends. The support they received from
American foundations was not contingent on what they published. Aneks started off largely
publishing translations of articles from other journals. Smolar later said that the Congress for
Cultural Freedom-related journals naturally saw them as allies: “magazines such as
"Encounter,” "Survey" or "Deadalus" immediately treated us as partners in the work of
undermining the ideological foundations of Soviet communism.”78
Konstanty Jeleński, head of the Eastern European division of the Congress for Cultural
Freedom, confirmed that there were no efforts to dictate the line of the Congress and related
publications in a 1980 interview re-printed in Aneks. First published in the French journal Le
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Debat, which had just been started a year prior by historian Pierre Nora and had Aneks
contributor Krzysztof Pomian among its editors, the interview features a section in which
Jeleński seeks to ”correct here for the first time and once and for all the thesis that the Polish
authorities tried to spread in articles, in the police brochure on Kultura, as well as during the
political trials of opposition activists who were presented as agents inspired by Kultura, [and] by
the C.I.A.” Jeleński said in the interview that he too (like Aneks founder Aleksander Smolar) was
helped by Raymond Aron, the prominent liberal anticommunist French intellectual. The
Frenchman’s influence got Jeleński his post in the Congress while he was already writing for
Kultura.
While there, Jeleński’s efforts to divert money from the organization to Kultura had
never worked out, blocked by Michael Josselson, the executive secretary who later admitted to
being on the payroll of the C.I.A. Josselson is remembered as a protector of the integrity of
émigré journals: “I retained all my friendship and respect for this man who was able to ensure
complete independence for all the writings and other endeavors of Congress (Hannah Arendt
once told me that Josselson was in a real fight with the C.I.A. for this independence).” Jeleński
added that Josselson later told him: “You understand now why I never wanted to help Kultura.
For an émigré magazine it could one day become dangerous ... "79 The courtesy that Jeleński
describes Josselson extending to the Poles was corroborated by statements from C.I.A. Eastern
Europe chief Thomas Braden. The American outlined the strategy for supporting anticommunist leftists in 1967: “The money we spent was very little by Soviet standards. But that
was reflected in the first rule of our operational plan: "Limit the money to amounts private
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organizations can credibly spend." The other rules were equally obvious: "Use legitimate,
existing organizations; disguise the extent of American interest: protect the integrity of the
organization by not requiring it to support every aspect of official American policy."80
Contact with the C.I.A. was a constant trope encountered by dissidents, both in Poland
and abroad. Adam Michnik (under a pseudonym) wrote for Aneks in 1982 that he stood
accused of being on a list of people whom the C.I.A. had pitched collaboration to: “Just the
unchanging song of the Stalinist era,” he commented.81 In a 1983 issue, Irena Grudzińska-Gross
wrote that some Polish journalists were given access to the files of the Polish security services
in order to write articles accusing dissidents of collaboration with foreign powers. She pointed
to accusations in the Polish press that Solidarność activist Bogdan Lis was collaborating with the
C.I.A. These accusations were buttressed by typical xenophobia and nationalism: “[a dissident]
has an easy life, is not a native Pole, does not work, has dollars, is a traitor, goes abroad, is a
fraud, because he is not only against the party, but also against the Church.” 82 Having made
contact with the outside world, the dissident occupied a place of privilege in the minds of many
in Poland because they had betrayed their fellow Poles and, in a way, their true Polish selves.
The C.I.A. or other foreign powers did not create Polish dissidents, nor did it create
Polish émigrés. The unrest at Warsaw University in the mid-to-late 1960s was a spontaneous
reaction to issues the protestors had identified themselves, and it was the Polish government
that took an “anti-Zionist” but really antisemitic stance against them which led to the mass
emigration of most of the rest of Poland’s Jewish residents after 1968. But there is some truth

80

Braden, “I’m Glad the CIA Is ‘Immoral,’” 14.
Andrzej Zagozda [Adam Michnik], “Z Dziennika Stanu Wojny,” Aneks, no. 27 (1982): 41.
82
Irena Grudzińska-Gross, “Manipulacje Pod Płaszczykiem,” Aneks, no. 29–30 (1983): 219.
81

217

to the claims that foreign money was flowing to dissidents, and that émigré publications
benefitted from programs that supported intellectuals on the anti-communist left. Polish
émigrés did not think that there was anything peculiar or immoral about receiving aid to
combat an existential threat, especially in the realm of ideas. Eugeniusz Smolar today
emphasizes that he knew money was coming from American foundations (but knew nothing
about the relationship of that money to intelligence services). The Aneks émigrés had to flee
the country of their birth in order to continue their lives and disagreed with the course that the
country’s government was taking. Their publication was started with the goal of helping friends,
family—no doubt all Poles—live better, some would say normal lives. Their reasoning had
nothing to do with supporting the goals of the United States or anyone else.
Motivated by their personal experiences with the system in eastern Europe and the
desire to help friends and acquaintances overcome that order, émigrés found the criticisms of
the Western New Left simplistic and demeaning. They were not pawns in a bipolar world;
rather they sought out resources motivated by goals that many Westerners had a difficult time
understanding. Aneks and Kultura were thought up independently, with goals aligned to those
of Polish politics in emigration since at least the time of the partitions of Poland in the late 18th
century: either to contribute to the independence of the country or to aid Poles who wanted
the country to be independent. In this particular modern case, émigrés had anti-Communism in
common with the governments of Western powers, especially the United States. This mutual
anti-communist interest, in large part helped and moderated by French anti-communist
intellectuals like Aron and his circle, is what allowed them in some instances to benefit from
American aid. But that is about where the similarities in goals ended. There was disagreement
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over how much western countries could help, how much they actually wanted to, and even
whether Western governments cared for the people of Eastern Europe at all.
Utopia
“The Poland that Kultura fights for is not a utopia,” Kultura editor Józef Czapski wrote In
the Polish issue of Kontinent. Most of the time, utopia is seen as what led Eastern Europe to
profound problems in the twentieth century, hence the development of the idea of ‘selflimiting revolution.’ The idea of utopia is present throughout the Solzhenitsyn-Sakharov debate.
Sakharov saw utopia as something dangerous, while Solzhenitsyn expressed a belief in its
power to counter hopelessness. This tension between utopia as dangerous and at the same
time useful to spark hope within people is present throughout the writing of Eastern European
dissidents of this period. In the first Leszek Kołakowski reprint that appears in Aneks, “The
Concept of the Left,” the philosopher describes utopia as dangerous but necessary as a force
for change. Later, writing on hope in “Theses on Hope and Hopelessness” in 1971 and “The
Polish Case” in 1973, utopia is still present as a conceptualization of the world beyond the
hopeless reality that currently exists. This positive utopia now manifests itself as a call for
human dignity.
Competing utopias were created in these publications. They were not only in convivial
competition with each other but offered a competing vision to that of the communist state. The
communist utopian vision had proved inadequate and the people concerned with the future of
their societies were left with no choice but to present competing parallel visions. It is this antiutopian motivation to do radical things that was about to manifest itself in the formation of the
Worker’s Defense Committee (KOR) in 1976 and subsequently led to the creation of the
Solidarity Trade Union (Solidarność) in 1980. People I consider to be part of an Aneks milieu
219

were about to play critical roles in these organizations. Those in Poland only participated in the
creation of the theoretical underpinning of these organizations between 1968 and 1976 while
those abroad helped with practical matters by drawing money and attention to them in the
West. The success of these efforts simultaneously gave credibility in the West to their not
conservative but non-Marxist point of view. Giedroyc’s call for a fraternal federation of nations,
Maksimov’s unconditional religious idealism, anti-totalitarianism, democracy, and nonpartisanship, the belief of the Aneks editors that knowledge and understanding can better
society. They each have their particular strategies, but they all share a vision of a better world
without communist utopia.
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Chapter Six: Hope and Utopia
Perhaps in the above considerations I have indulged in a chimera, expressing yet another, more
or less private utopia.
-Krzysztof Dorosz
Utopia has passports.

-Stanisław Barańczak

Utopia is a notion that is constantly lurking below the surface in Aneks, becoming
apparent as intellectual currents ebb and flow. It is often thought of as an unworkable or
unrealistic idea, both in Aneks and in the colloquial lexicon of European thought. Marxism
receives scathing criticism in Aneks as a utopian construct. Writers criticize utopia based on
their life experiences with a state based on utopian premises. Yet, at the same time, the
thinkers published in the journal are also seldom able to do without a limited utopia. It is often
used positively even in pieces that have already used it pejoratively. Utopia is the imaginary of a
better future. Change is precarious, and previous attempts at changing the system in Eastern
Europe had gone wrong. After 1968 especially, the forecast for positive change seemed bleak.
Utopia first emerges as hope among this group because hope is the first pre-requisite necessary
for imagining a better future. Utopia creates hope when hope is scarce. But utopia must also be
limited.
Concern with utopia is not unique to Aneks or its milieu. Whenever we think about the
future we reach for utopia. But it resonated in a particular way with this intellectual community
because of the time and the place that they came from and the problems they were struggling
with during the 1970s and 1980s. These émigrés were introduced to Western intellectual circles
in the afterglow of 1968, often responding to or interacting with exponents of the New Left.
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Many émigrés found Western leftists naïve or hopelessly muddled in their analysis of society.1
Not able to lean on conservative or traditional anti-Communism but disillusioned with the
Marxism, their worldview was for the most part unavoidably different from their Western
peers. Their eutopia was grounded in reality, as opposed to a utopia that tears the present
down in order to rebuild it anew. Dystopia was the lived existing reality in Eastern Europe and,
in attempting to find a way out, their criticism of it was backed up by as broad an intellectual
approach as possible in an effort not to repeat its mistakes. Disillusioned with Marxism, living
its utopia to the end, their life experience bled into their intellectual efforts. Their work in turn
often ran over into activism. A concern with human dignity and a bond to friends in Poland
drove them to revise utopia, creating anti-utopian thought that wasn’t purely academic or
theoretical but rather badly needed by those seeking to affect change in Poland.
This chapter begins by considering that before 1968, within the utopian Marxist
experiment that was Poland, utopia was a subject of particular interest at Warsaw University—
over time subverting the guiding principles of the state ideology. In the 1970s, this critical
position was theorized by Eastern European dissidents as anti-utopia; not the opposite of
utopia but rather a revision of it. The process of revising utopia is, broadly, what Aneks is
concerned with, differing from the idea of revisionism (of Communism) that Polish intellectuals
had fully discarded in the wake of 1968.

1

At the same time, Westerners could accuse the newcomers of not understanding the society
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ideology in political affairs—a change that they were influenced by but also one to which they
contributed their cautious, but not right-wing, perspectives, and to which they offered their life
experiences as evidence.
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Because in Aneks one finds writing by Westerners (who were often colleagues), émigrés,
and Eastern Europeans who did not emigrate, analyzing the publication shows the influence
that the Poles had on Westerners in the places they settled, and the influence that this meeting
of ideas had on scholars and activists in Poland. The need for change in Eastern Europe charged
these ideas with urgency that resonated with Western intellectuals. While Aneks is little known
in the West, in Poland it had an influence far outpacing its print run because it deliberately
targeted the academic audience that the founders emerged from. On the other hand, utopia
and anti-utopia became popular academic themes in the 1970s and 1980s partly due to the
anti-communist left’s reception of ideas from Eastern Europe facilitated by these émigrés. I
survey influential Western academic writing on utopia from more recent decades after writing
about its popularity at Warsaw University prior to 1968.
The first two sections of the chapter—described above—serve as the historical context
for engaging with utopia in Aneks over its publication run. Utopia is a central motif of several
early thematic sections of Aneks. After a general overview of utopia in Aneks, I focus on three
such sections: “The Left and Utopia” appears already in issue number two. Readers only had to
wait until issue four, meanwhile, for a debate between Eastern European émigrés and
Westerners in which utopia appears is a central component. This chapter concludes by
highlighting the growing influence of Christian philosophy as a moderating force on utopia in
the context of writing on Christianity and socialism in Aneks, which is also the topic of the
following chapter.
The Warsaw School of Ideas
The influential émigrés at the core of this dissertation are largely from Warsaw
University, home of the Warsaw school prior to 1968. These core members, together with other
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exiled Warsaw University alumni who were not explicitly affiliated with the Warsaw school, are
a part of the milieu of intellectuals connected by Aneks. It is subset of the milieu that is
responsible for the most influential writing about utopia in Aneks. The founding members were
Leszek Kołakowski and colleague Bronisław Baczko.2 Baczko and Kołakowski mentored students
like philosopher Krzysztof Pomian, another Aneks contributor, and Aneks co-founder
Aleksander Smolar, whom Zygmunt Bauman also wanted to recruit as an assistant when they
were both still at Warsaw University.3
Since Aneks and the Warsaw school of ideas share a core group of authors, sketching
the connection between Warsaw University and this group of 1968 émigrés is one way to
delineate who this project is about. Political scientist Rubem Cesar Fernandes, a student at
Warsaw University between 1965-1969, wrote later in his doctoral dissertation about the
Warsaw school that he struggled in writing about the school because to write about it he
needed to “transform an intellectual movement that was consciously anti-systematic into a
quasi-system,” and this project suffers from the same dilemma.4 Less a formal club and more a
group brought together by a common way of thinking—broadly defined as an escape from the
doctrinaire toward the individual as an actor in history—the Warsaw school, or circle, drew
inspiration from the philosopher Tadeusz Kroński, a scholar of Hegel. The milieu that Aneks
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represents was not an official group either, but they are brought together in this work because
their writing appeared in the journal.
The “Department of History of Modem Philosophy and Social Thought” at the Polish
Academy of Sciences had among its faculty core members of the Warsaw School, notably
Kołakowski, Baczko, and historian Andrzej Walicki—a post-1968 émigré and Aneks contributor.
A partial list of seminars in the department between 1962 and 1964 shows thirteen on the topic
of utopia between 1962 and 1964, with one per year in the years leading to 1968, with the
exception of 1967.5 Leszek Kołakowski summed up the work of Warsaw School scholars in 1965,
writing: "All of these books are concerned with unrealizable utopias; all present certain types of
this search for a lost humanity in a rationalized world with the concomitant awareness of the
hopelessness of the effort. It is against this background that the relationships of man with God,
with History, and with the metaphysical order are treated.” As Kołakowski saw it then, utopia
was a constant background to a variety of philosophical dilemmas.
One of the core dilemmas of the Warsaw School, then, was how to overcome static
utopias that lead to dystopian universal solutions—in other words, what to replace utopia
with? Put yet another way, Rubem Cesar Fernandes summarized some of the Warsaw School’s
core aims as: “two questions… related to… world views as a project for action. The questions
are: "whose project?,” and "aiming at what?,” or, formulating the second again, "where to is
the project meant to lead society?"6 This formulation of the Warsaw School’s aims coincides
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with a large swath of the content found in Aneks. These goals of course take aim directly at the
philosophical dilemmas facing Eastern Europe emerging from Stalinism.
The methods with which these émigrés interrogate society are a result of their life
experience, their exile, the moment they find themselves in after leaving Poland, and (as I argue
here) their academic training. While a large swath of utopian studies is concerned with
literature, in Aneks it is used to guide political thinking. Polish émigrés appearing in Aneks had
an effect on intellectual discourse about politics and society in Western Europe from the 1970s
on. While there was an awareness of the existence of talented Polish scholars before 1968,
their emigration and appearance in European centers of learning sparked new debates and had
an influence on ongoing ones.
French intellectual circles, specifically liberal anti-communists under the influence of
Raymond Aron, were some of the most receptive interlocutors for Polish émigré intellectuals.
This was a reciprocal relationship, as Polish émigrés—even before they were émigrés—took a
great interest in certain French intellectual currents, like the Annales school and Christian
Personalism. Aleksander Smolar was introduced to Aron by Pierre Hassner, a former student of
Aron (Hassner mentions utopia often in his Aneks articles over the years). Baczko, the secondmost-well-known name of the Warsaw school, was introduced already in the 1950s (as a result
of trips sponsored by the Ford Foundation) to French historian François Furet—another Aron
admirer—by eminent Polish historian Witold Kula. Furet and Kula were likely acquainted
through their mutual enthusiasm for the Annales school. Witold Kula was married to Nina
Assorodobraj-Kula, a historical sociologist who was awarded a chair in the department of
sociology at Warsaw University in 1956 in the wake of the Stalinist thaw. Zygmunt Bauman and
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fellow émigré sociologist Maria Hirszowicz—the latter another frequent contributor to Aneks—
were beginning their careers in that department. Assorodobraj-Kula was one of Aleksander
Smolar’s mentors at Warsaw University.
Types of Utopia
Utopia is a mechanism for imagining the future. Scholars of utopia have in recent
decades shown the influence of or even directly cited Polish émigrés that have written on the
topic. They have also added to the language with which it is possible to think about utopia.
Considering the possible ways of imagining utopia allows us to better recognize how thinkers
published in Aneks chose to apply the concept in the rest of this chapter. While often
misconstrued as simply good (eutopia) and not realistic, Thomas More’s eponymous book is
ambivalent about that imagined future. Utopian visions did not start with More but his book is
the point of departure for the idea as we know it today. The only imaginary that utopia
struggles with is things remaining the way they are.
Sociologist Ruth Levitas, a prominent scholar of utopian studies, links utopia to desire
for a better world, while seeking to decouple it from the activity of realization.7 Lyman Tower
Sargent, founder of the journal Utopian Studies, writing four years after Levitas published her
1990 book, The Concept of Utopia, divides utopia into categories he would later call “literary
utopia, utopian practice, and utopian social theory.”8 Sargent’s definition of utopia is broad,
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including those who see utopia in the present and desire to remain there—basically, any
practice of imagining society: which Sargent calls “social dreaming.” While rejecting only the
idea of utopia as perfection, Sargent teases out the following categories of utopia in his 1994
article: Utopianism, Utopia, Eutopia, Dystopia, Utopian satire, Anti-utopia, and Critical utopia.9
The last two are most important for this chapter and, I argue, are actually partly formed and
influenced by the lively political discourse that Aneks-adjacent émigrés participated in during
the 1970s and 1980s.
Historian Gregory Claeys endeavors to create a more precise meaning for utopia by
focusing the definition on society rather than its institutions. Utopia to Claeys is not an internal
process such as desire or dreaming, nor is it primarily imaginary. It is the creation of realitybased proposals for molding social relations. The plausibility of utopia defined like this is a
celebrated by Claeys because it “conceiv[es] a realizable future.”10
Literature scholar Fátima Vieira identifies a shift to euchronia, “the good place in the
future,” during the Enlightenment. Inspired by seminal Sociologist Karl Mannheim’s conclusions
in his 1929 Ideology and Utopia, she assigns to nineteenth-century utopian socialists credit for
wanting to make euchronia real—to collapse the future onto the present. She includes Marx
under the utopian label, explaining that his scientific theories about the inevitability of a future
socialist world are as utopian as those socialists he criticized. Vieira defines utopia as “a
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strategy for questioning of reality and of the present.” Contemporary interpretations of utopia
“indicat[e] a direction for man to follow, but never a point to be reached.”11
Philosopher Jürgen Habermas in a 2012 article argues that human dignity is an effective
realistic utopia. He calls this mechanism the “portal” by which morality enters law.12 Human
rights discourse emerges out of the idea that all humans deserve the same dignity. He is critical
of contemporary liberalism, writing that the guarantee of autonomy for citizens through
economic liberties has failed. A just political order needs human dignity to support human
rights.
Political theorist Marit Böker in 2017 highlights the rise and popularity of the idea of
realistic utopia. To Böker, utopia is valuable because it “ignores existing assumptions and
feasibility constraints.”13 Böker notes that realistic utopias mainly guard against
authoritarianism, which they consider undesirable and thus not realistic. Otherwise unrealistic
content is encouraged because it is critical thinking required to “lay bare people’s wider
perspectives, values, and discourses around the issues at hand.”14
The influence of the Polish émigrés who appear in Aneks is palpable on the
contemporary scholars of utopia mentioned above. Habermas, for example, focuses on the
concept of human dignity that entered the language of Polish dissidents in the 1970s, while
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Böker is careful to warn against authoritarian utopia. Zygmunt Bauman’s oeuvre has become
associated with utopia (“a critically affirmative conception of and a longstanding engagement
with utopia, write Sociologists Martin Aidnik and Michael Hviid Jacobsen in 2019), while
Kołakowski is often cited by Sargent—a towering figure in utopian studies.15 It is also at the
same time evident that Polish thinkers were concerned with specific types of utopia—primarily
those that have to do with its influence on politics. Utopia was to them something that could
have profound effect on reality and when they invoked it, they were often linking it to lived
reality in Communist Eastern Europe.
Utopia in Aneks over time
Utopia in Aneks is generally used in two ways: to dismiss an unrealistic idea, and to
imagine a better future—sometimes by the same author in the same piece. Serious
consideration of utopia far outweighs casual pejorative use of the concept. In a collection of
works by the late Paweł Beylin, who had been kicked out of the Communist Party for defending
Leszek Kołakowski, the sociologist writes that utopia is a horizon for that which is not already
reality. Writing just before 1968, likely after he was kicked out of the Communist Party, Beylin
argues for the immanent value of utopia as a future vision. He concludes that as long as it is not
considered already fulfilled on earth, utopia—thought of as imagining the future—has a real
place in the world. An anonymous contributor to the Russian émigré journal Kontinent, reprinted in Aneks, writes that a society without utopian dreaming is sick: “Utopia—unrealistic in
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the sense of the possibility of its full realization—is a real force as a regulator of our
behavior.”16
Utopia is sometimes invoked as extreme negation: total destruction of the world as it is
in order to create it anew. In a 1977 issue, Zygmunt Bauman writes that socialist utopia in the
West had been created with such negation in mind—destroying in an effort to build.17 Utopia as
total negation is brought up by Kołakowski in a 1979 essay first published in Aneks, where he
writes that utopian revolution is an apocalyptic solution to all human problems.18 Beylin warns
in the same mid 1960’s piece mentioned above against totalizing ideas that fully reject or affirm
reality.19 In a similar fashion to the negative use of the term, Aleksander Smolar writes in in
1979 that “totalitarian” (i.e. totalizing) language is used to turn society into the likeness of a
utopia.20
Utopia can also be one imaginary out of a multitude of others. Published in Aneks for a
Polish audience in 1978, but originally appearing in the Socialist Register in 1974, is a reply by
Leszek Kołakowski to E.P. Thompson in which he criticizes the Englishman for thinking that huge
problems facing the socialist world were minor bumps on the road to Thompson’s particular
socialist utopia. Originally prepared for a 1978 conference commemorating Kristallnacht and
later appearing in the Australian journal Quadrant, a Kołakowski essay appears a 1981 issue of
Aneks where the philosopher writes that noble utopias can be used for negative purposes and
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that no system is above corruption.21 Ewa Bieńkowska, a pupil of Kołakowski, uses the concept
of utopia in this open way. In Aneks over the years she invokes utopia when writing about
Leszek Kołakowski as an anti-utopian, to describe May 1968 in the West as a utopia of youth,
and as longing for a specific future of their imagination.22
Western interlocutors often invoke utopia in the pages of Aneks as well. In an article reprinted in Aneks, the influential Raymond Aron is cautiously open to utopia. He writes that
utopia must remain an ideal, and that poorly defined utopias are dangerous.23 In a section of
articles in memory of the recently deceased Raymond Aron there appears an excerpt from his
Memoires, published a year prior in 1983, where the Frenchman wrote that Marxism as state
socialism turned nihilistic, forgetting its positive utopia of a classless society.24 Aron’s opinion of
utopia is lauded by Polish thinker Franciszek Draus in the same issue. Draus specifically supports
the Frenchman’s rejection of a utopia that works to form an imperfect world in its image—a
totalizing utopia.25
Like his mentor, the Aron protégé Pierre Hassner also uses utopia as a positive concept
in order to criticize state socialism, describing the USSR’s attempt at reform under Khrushchev
as an eutopic respite within a dystopian downward trend in a 1987 article.26 His writing
exemplifies a trend in Aneks of reticence toward the Western leftist intellectual scene. In his
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first appearance in the journal, Hassner writes that leftist thought in the West is based on
utopian pipedreams based on the League of Nations combined with the Brezhnev doctrine in an
attempt to imagine a bizarre socialist democratic order. He writes in conclusion that since some
kind of utopia is needed by people, they should look to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s Nobel prize
acceptance speech, in which he said that, “One word of truth is worth more than the whole
world.”27 There are many possible utopias, then, and some are worth striving toward. Hassner’s
is the search for truth.
Hassner writes in 1982 that in the Cold War, the victory of either side is a utopia of that
side, and both utopias are dangerous.28 He reinforces this in a later article, invoking utopia as a
future that can be imagined with different goals in mind, writing about socialism as a utopia of
the USSR, Mutually Assured Destruction as a Western utopia, and even the idea of realism as a
rule leading some to utopian folly if it is uncritically practiced.29 Hassner is one of the more
constant theorists of utopia in the journal, first invoking utopia in Aneks during its first year of
existence and, in his last appearance in 1988, using it to describe positive future aspiration.30
“The Left and Utopia”
Utopia is an explicit theme in several early thematic issues of Aneks. The second issue
contains a section titled “The Left and Utopia.” Under a pseudonym, editor Aleksander Smolar
introduced the section by noting that what interested the editors of Aneks was utopia as
conceived by the radical left.31 Smolar’s definition can be divided into two parts. The first,
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largely positive, a basic human drive. In this context, following the thinking of Bloch and
Kołakowski, utopia is no fiction but “a tool for awakening hope and human desire….” The
second, situated in history, ripe for folly: “….organizing mass movements with the aim of
destroying existing, considered bad, social relations and enthroning new ones based on human
reason, not offensive to the moral sense of modern man.” The socialist utopia was not just
supposed to be better. What made it dangerous to Smolar was the idea that this future was
supposed to solve all human problems.
Smolar wrote that 20th century traumas had destroyed the age of ideology in Europe,
thus heralding “the end of utopian thought.” And yet by the 1960s, the “cooling remains of
radical thought” had been revived in the West and in the Third World, where “traditional
rationality of the left was replaced by irrationality based on identity politics—“colonial nations,
students, national minorities, women, the lumpenproletariat.”32 In later public statements
Smolar expresses his discomfort with the radical left in Western Europe, experiencing post1968 radicalism firsthand upon his emigration to Bologna: “they represented views which after
Poland, I found intolerable because not only were they Marxists, communists of various
shades—Trotskyists, pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet—they also had a very ambivalent, not to say
positive, attitude toward terrorism…. I had a profound sense of loneliness.”33
This New Left “accepts utopia as utopia,” Smolar wrote, meaning that the end goal is
actually a utopian perfect society. He called French philosopher Herbert Marcuse the head

32

Tern, 75.
Aleksander Smolar, A Year in Bologna, 2018, 40, Web of Stories,
https://webofstories.com/play/aleksander.smolar/40.
33

234

ideologue of the New Left and said his adoption of the 1968 motto, “Be realists, demand the
impossible!” reflects this perspective.34
Smolar conceptualized a New Left in communist countries as well, but radical leftist
thought was shaped differently there, Smolar wrote. In the East, living under the failed
realization of absolute utopia, the New Left adopted belief in a relative utopia. A better society,
but not necessarily an ideal one. Here Smolar had in mind the idea of revisionism—reforming
socialism to deliver on its promises more than it had. But even this relative utopia had been
questioned since the 1960s, with the repression of the March 1968 protests in Poland being
“already only a black mass for a long-dead revisionism.”35
The crushing of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia, known as the Prague Spring,
was the end of ideology in Eastern Europe, wrote Smolar. The communist states had shown
their true face, relying on ideology less and less to justify their actions, while among the
opponents of the system, the only divisions into left and right were in relation to issues going
on outside of Poland. But Smolar did not believe that this was the end of ideology, because
every systemic crisis creates visions of the future (Smolar writes that a time would even come
when “a choice will really be possible and important for the future shape of Poland”). New
leftist ideas would appear too. Smolar wrote that this “new socialist utopia” would be “more
egalitarian, organized more rationally.”36
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The special section on utopia contains Leszek Kołakowski’s first appearance in Aneks,
reprinted from a 1957 issue of the Polish literary journal Po Prostu.37 Kołakowski used
revolution to link utopia and the idea of the left. He deconstructs utopia as a tool that—though
it could be used in “grotesque” ways—the left, broadly defined as a motor of progress, cannot
exist without. Published just after the breakdown of Stalinism in Eastern Europe, “The Concept
of the Left” was dressed in the language of someone that still did not want to leave the Marxist
camp because they thought that it could be reformed (i.e. a revisionist Marxist). The essay
however contains threads of thought that Kołakowski would not abandon when he stopped
thinking of himself as a Marxist. Most important for understanding utopia in Aneks is his
conceptualization of it here, which takes up almost half of the piece.
Kołakowski defined utopia “not in the derogatory sense that expresses the absurd
notion that all social changes are pipe dreams….” Rather, it is “a state of social consciousness, a
mental counterpart to the social movement striving for radical change in the world—a
counterpart itself inadequate to these changes and merely reflecting them in an idealized and
obscure form.” Utopia is “a tool of action upon reality and of planning social activity.”38
Utopia must remain in the “world of thought,” Kołakowski warned, lest it become “a
warped attempt to impose upon a historically realistic movement goals that are beyond
history.”39 A utopia implemented on reality would be used to justify things as they are, turning
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the left—an agent for change—into the right. Kołakowski noted that only at the extreme left
end of the left is the revolutionary left, which provides a total program—a totalizing utopia, in
other words—for changing reality.
A constant tension present in Aneks debates that situates utopia within them is the idea
that, as Kołakowski puts it: “It may well be that the impossible at a given moment can become
possible only by being stated at a time when it is impossible.” Ideas must be conceived before
they are acted upon. And utopia is a tool for imagining the future: “The existence of a utopia as
a utopia is the necessary prerequisite for its eventually ceasing to be a utopia.”40
Kołakowski dedicated the second half of this 1957 essay to translating utopia into a
program for the left. Because the left sought to change reality, it needed utopia in order to
decide in which direction to change it. Following from the above tension regarding possibility or
hope, Aneks will too will constantly investigate what kind of utopia should be imagined, aimed
for, planned. The last constant is a concern with where the border between realizing utopia and
merely realizing social change toward utopia is set: when does utopia become dangerous?
Thinkers in Aneks will often highlight the difference between Eastern Europeans and
Westerners who want social change in the categories describes above. Kołakowski applied his
definition of utopia to the idea of the left in communist countries, and Poland specifically
(where in 1957 he was still active in trying to reform the government from a leftist perspective).
He wished to inspire a left that would criticize empty language, whether it socialist, democratic,
or right-wing, when it is a cover for crime. In an effort to separate ideas and ideology, he
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defined the left based on the ideas it created and supported (ideas that can “compromise with
reality”) rather than its position in a political system at any given time.41 The Left to Kołakowski
was not a relative political position. It had a transformative effect on society, acting as “the
fermenting factor in even the most hardened mass of the historical present.”42 In 1957,
Kołakowski’s left was to endeavor to lift a veil of (likely Stalinist) lies wherever they were found,
and call for progress.
The editors of Aneks too would only move further from thinking that is radically leftist,
but when selecting this essay in 1973 they were unmoored from revisionism but had not yet
having found safe harbor elsewhere. The rationale behind Aneks in fact was to remain open to
many points of view. The Smolar brothers, especially Aleksander, always thought of themselves
as less radical than others in the Aneks milieu. They would personally move toward liberalism
more than any other sociopolitical position over the publication run of the journal—no doubt
partly as a result of the influence of the French liberal, Raymond Aron.
Utopia and Revolution
Utopia would be the topic of an early example of dialogue between 1968 émigrés and
Western intellectuals that appeared in Aneks: a debate between Zygmunt Bauman, Leszek
Kołakowski, Raymond Aron and others in the pages of Archives europeennes de sociologie in
1971 was re-printed in its entirety in the fourth issue of Aneks (Winter 1974).43 Aron would
become a mentor to Aleksander Smolar after his emigration, when Smolar was granted a
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research position under his supervision at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique in
1973. He would start Aneks shortly after gaining this relative stability in France. Kołakowski was
already busy making a name for himself in the West by 1971, having just begun publishing in
earnest after returning to Europe following his tenures at McGill and Berkeley in North
America. Bauman at that time had just accepted a position at the University of Leeds, where he
would rise to prominence as a public intellectual and live for almost half a century, until his
death.
The thematic section is titled “Eastern Europe: chances for revolution.” At its core, the
section is a debate on revolution between Kołakowski and the Polish émigré sociologist
Zygmunt Bauman in the Archives europeennes de sociologie. Utopia is not just a thread running
through this conversation, but a key concept underpinning thought and often breaching the
surface. Revolution is action that is to bring reality closer to utopia. The same questions about
limits remain: what is revolution? Where or under what circumstances does revolution take
place? Is revolution even necessary or desirable?
The thematic section does not include Leszek Kołakowski’s article, “The Revolutionary
Spirit,” but it is the first article in the fourth issue and the only article that precedes the section.
The editors of Aneks brought this late 1970 Spiegel article in conversation with the early 1971
Archives europeennes de sociologie articles (and western responses published in 1972) in this
early 1974 issue.44 In Archives europeennes de sociologie, the dialogue began with a Bauman
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essay, followed immediately by Kołakowski’s response, then with the responses of
Westerners—including Raymond Aron, the editor of Archives europeennes de sociologie. But
including the Spiegel article positioned Kołakowski as the inspiration for Bauman’s piece.
Considering Kołakowski’s oeuvre at the time, including the Po Prostu article published in the
second issue of Aneks, the philosopher appears as the keeper of a philosophical continuity
belonging to the Polish intelligentsia stretching back over a decade—to another time, place,
and a bygone point of view. Having fled Poland, Kołakowski and Bauman also left behind
revisionism, but sought to save what they could from the wreckage of their pre-1968 beliefs.
Their disagreement lies in what they choose to save: how they each re-define utopia after 1968.
While both Kołakowski and Bauman were concerned with making academic careers not
based on their infamy as émigrés but on their merit, Bauman was more successful at keeping
his distance from Polish issues in public life. Kołakowski was published in Aneks more than any
other thinker (20 pieces by Kołakowski appear in the journal over the years), while Bauman
appeared in the political quarterly only five times. A qualitative difference—but not one of
quality—is perceptible as well: Already in 1970 Christian philosophy starts to become integral
to how Kołakowski conceptualizes a way out of revisionism. Using Christianity as a positive
example for the left would have been unthinkable to Kołakowski in the 1950s. Bauman’s
scholarly focus, meanwhile, does not stray from his early career nearly as significantly, and it
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may be for this reason that a moderate difference in opinion on issues pertaining to Poland
emerges between the two thinkers.45
In “The Revolutionary Spirit,” Kołakowski investigated the millenarian temperament of
Christianity and then identified a similar current in Marxism. He argued that the Roman Catholic
church adapted to the human condition of imperfection whereas communist states had not
been able to. This messianic, millenarian, “all or nothing” attitude was a description of a
particular style of utopian thinking. Both Christianity and Marxism are totalizing ideologies,
Kołakowski wrote: total negation of the flawed existing world through revolution in one, and
total redemption versus total damnation in the other. But the Roman Catholic church
recognized and made room for human imperfection in order to survive in a world of flawed
people. Kołakowski wrote that without accepting humanity as it is, an “all or nothing”
attitude—no way of existing between an absolutely perfect and absolutely damned state—
would have been “suicide” for the faith.46
Kołakowski set his comparison up by positioning the Protestant Reformation as a
revolutionary moment for the Catholic faith. Luther attempted to take the church back to its
revolutionary messianic roots because he was uncomfortable with how it had accommodated
itself to the corruption of the world. He reinvigorated Christianity but was unable to overcome
the Roman Catholic church because wherever Luther applied his reform idea to create more
heavenly perfection on earth, his reformed church faced the same revolutionary criticism of
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being corrupted by the corporeal from more radical challengers, wrote Kołakowski. Both
Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism had survived because they evolved, but this evolution
allowed them both to be criticized as betraying the faith. This evolution was “simply the
condition of survival,” Kołakowski wrote.47
Kołakowski’s reading of Christianity was inspired by his experience as a Marxist theorist.
He called Marxism a theory of secular salvation, noting that it has the same “all or nothing”
mentality as early Christianity: the world is corrupt, irreformable, and must be completely
remade. A reform strain came to be in socialism, empowered by Marx himself, who saw the
romantic utopians of his time as idealizing the past.
Kołakowski noted that unlike Roman Catholicism, Marxism as ideology had still by the
time he wrote this essay resisted against straying from the messianic path. The crushing of
reform in 1968 is an example that did not need to be mentioned explicitly in 1971. Kołakowski
pointed out that Eastern European state socialist spokespeople had disparaged worker’s rights
reforms in the capitalist world as not totalizing—piecemeal reform as not enough. On the other
hand, similar to how Christianity evolved with the world, so those same governments at home
in Eastern Europe had to compromise with society as it existed by accepting a certain continuity
of culture (though subservient to Marxist goals) rather than risking a confrontation with nonMarxist ideas and traditions in an “all or nothing” revolution.48
Kołakowski noted that even though Eastern European state socialist governments had
given up on trying to follow Marxist ideology rigidly, revolutionary messianism was still believed
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in by “non-workers”: revolutionary movements of countries lacking significant industrial
economies, Western intellectuals and students.”49 He concluded that the revolutionary spirit as
such—"one of the most monstrous aberrations of the human mind”—is acceptable in religious
thinking because it contrasts worldly values with transcendent supernatural grace. It is
understood by all but the most zealous that heaven will not come down to earth—at least not
willed by humanity. But this outlook is outright dangerous in secular thought: “assur[ing] us
that we can with our own effort transport ourselves in one leap from the bottom of hell to the
peaks of paradise. This revolution will never be.”50
Kołakowski in 1970 was still critical of Christianity, but understanding of the decisions
made by its clergy. He understood Marxism, too, but now as a failed utopia. The “all or nothing”
moment of immanence had been attempted and failed to create the promised utopia. But he
was most critical of those in the West who had failed to learn from the playing out of the
Marxist project in Eastern Europe, specifically Western intellectuals and radical students, as if
there was some missing idea that the West possessed but the East did not which would allow
the same ideas to turn out differently.
But Kołakowski was not against all utopian thinking: at the end of this published
exchange, he pleaded with Bauman for revolution, after all. He was against pulling utopia down
from heaven onto earth. He was against the “all or nothing moment”—the immanence of
utopia—but supportive of its transcendent power. He was not a conservative in the traditional
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sense. Rather, he urged for a transcendent utopian vision to guide the left, versus an immanent
dystopia. This is the root of the idea of self-limiting revolution, or limited utopia.
Kołakowski had a profound influence on intellectuals of the generation coming of age
during 1968, specifically the group of students that called him their professor. He had utilized
the rigorous study of a branch of knowledge that he had battled as a Marxist theorist to move
away from the idea that more destruction will bring about a better world and into a tool to
create hope; from a revolutionary utopia of negation into a positive utopia of creation. The
alliance of church and the left that Adam Michnik wrote about in the late 1970s was being
created as the younger Aneks milieu inherited the thought of Kołakowski, their mentor, and his
generation of intellectuals.
Bauman in Archives
Bauman said in a letter to Kołakowski on September 26, 1970, that he was writing a lot,
but without purpose.51 He needed to feel an audience, to engage in dialogue. It seems that the
Kołakowski essay, which appeared in Der Spiegel two weeks later, was the medicine he sought.
Bauman’s article, “Social Dissent in the East European political system,” was not simply the
contribution to Sovietology that it was understandably taken for by the Western interlocutors
in the journal debate (their responses are published in the journal a year later). Appearing in
the first 1971 number of the European Journal of Sociology, edited by Raymond Aron, under
the heading “Permanent non-Revolution,” Bauman’s piece begins with the words, “I am not the
first to discover the pitfalls which surround the term ‘revolution’….”52 It is a thoroughly
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sociological dissection of the links between revolution, the world as it exists, and utopia (which,
as posited above, exists only in the future and in the realm of ideas), with Eastern Europe taking
the metaphorical role of the cadaver.
Contrary to Kołakowski’s thinking in “The Revolutionary Spirit,” Bauman wrote that
socialism didn’t want to be a utopia. Seemingly writing directly at Kołakowski, Bauman wrote
that “Critical scholars more often than not loftily dismiss the Marxian notion of the revolution
to end all revolutions as one further version of millenarian utopia.”53 Kołakowski had called
socialism a failed utopia, and ascribed a utopian attribute to revolution, but to Bauman, Marx
had an idea of revolution grounded in reality. Bauman and Kołakowski did agree that the idea
did not play itself out in the way that Marx thought it would. Bauman wrote that other states
had made the same social and economic movement as Eastern European states, but in a longer
period of time and without a revolutionary leap, making them immune to Marx’s idea of
revolution..
Revolution and progress had diverged in the twentieth century to Bauman. Progress
that is not defined as movement toward a perfect state of society but rather as social and
economic change through politics could be achieved by participation in the state in both East
and West, Bauman stated. No new utopia that a revolution could fight to realize had
materialized. Bauman thought that blaming the staying power of Eastern European states on
Soviet military presence could be neither proven nor disproven, and so he saw it fruitless to
consider that variable in his study.
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The New Left, their new colleagues and pupils, were singled out for vitriol in both
scholars’ critiques. Bauman made a dig at the New Left by first comparing the American
Weathermen cell to “conservative sociologists” (likely calling out Aron with the latter
characterization).54 Later in his article, Bauman likened the rationalizations of the former group
about capitalism to those of presumably right-wing “Kremlinologists” (hard-liners focused on
battling the communist system) about Communism.55 In a massive footnote that does not
appear in the Polish translation, Bauman wrote that “those who call themselves, with a
remarkable deal of historical ignorance, the ‘new left’” are most eager for revolution but one
that wants to achieve progress by seemingly rejecting all aspects of it: “technical
improvement… accumulation of knowledge… intellectual prowess… simultaneously… ascribing
an autotelic value to violence.” Bauman followed this by making a comparison that is so arcane
as to be recognized as tongue-in-cheek, likening the beliefs of the New Left to those of society
in the last century of the Western Roman Empire (pointing out perceived similarities): “a drive
to a voluntary solitude, escape from military and administrative service, fascination by Oriental
mystics and proliferation of weird fanatical sects, sexual laxity etc., all bearing a striking
resemblance indeed to what goes now sometimes for the « new left ».”56
Bauman concluded the half-page footnote by stating that, “[t]here is no way of
predicting revolutions other than the actual showdown of the pro and counter-revolutionary
forces. It was long ago pointed out by Antonio Gramsci that forecasting a change is in itself a
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change in the social reality, while self-organizing and acting towards an aim is the only
reasonable way of forecasting its achievement.” These parting words are ambivalent in
meaning. Depending on how one reads them in conjunction with the thrust of the article,
Bauman could be interpreted as pessimistic about hope for change in Eastern Europe or
concluding on an oddly optimistic note. With enough self-organizing and action, could the goals
of the opposition in Eastern Europe become reality?
On January 23, 1971, Bauman wrote to Kołakowski: “I am very curious of Your, Leszek,
opinions about my drivel for Archives.”57 Kołakowski’s “rejoinder” was printed immediately
following Bauman’s in the same issue. He called it “A Pleading for Revolution,” which can be
understood as a plea for the possibility of hope which, Kołakowski would develop further in his
“Theses on Hope and Hopelessness,” published shortly thereafter in the Summer of 1971.
Kołakowski read Bauman’s article as pessimistic, noting that the situation in Eastern Europe was
not as despondent as Bauman made it out to be. A new utopia is not the only way to conceive
of a systemic change that Bauman might deem revolutionary.
Bauman had mentioned that “insignificant and powerless” groups of intellectuals were
unable to inspire change in Eastern Europe, but Kołakowski pointed out that their meager
efforts had led the seemingly stable Soviet system to respond with “panic rage and horror.”58
He stated that Bauman was thinking according to the all-or-nothing revolutionary messianism—
in other words utopia—that Kołakowski’s criticized in his “Revolutionary Spirit” article: “an
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existing society is totally opposed to an imaginary one and the borderline between both is
marked by the great day of the one violent revolutionary break.” Kołakowski instead argued for
outcomes between stagnation and collapse. In other words: gradual change.
Writing a few years later, Adam Michnik would call it a new evolutionism. The new
preceding evolutionism indicated that what Kołakowski argued for is similar to the revisionism
that he and much of the opposition in Poland had divorced themselves from after events in
Poland and Prague in 1968. Kołakowski wrote that Bauman “seems still to be disheartened in
the fact of the Polish experience in March 1968, when the mass student riots, mostly with
political demands, found only weak response, or at most, few to support it actively among the
working class,” adding that December of 1970, when workers died without support from the
intelligentsia was even more disappointing than the failure of the students.59 Bauman in his
analysis pessimistically cited Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci with regard to the
impossibility of predicting the future, writing that “self-organizing and acting towards an aim is
the only reasonable way of forecasting its achievement.” Kołakowski gave this idea a positive
emphasis, noting that, “There is no ‘objective’ possibility of success completely independent of
the belief of people that success is possible. In social transformations what people can perform
depends in part on what they believe they can achieve.” This is an early formulation of the idea
of anti-utopia, or realistic utopia, in the context of ideas for change in Eastern Europe.
If one does not take his personal background into account, Bauman comes across as a
dispassionate analyst. In personal correspondence between Bauman and Kołakowski, however,
the former comes across as jovial. In light of their rather close relationship, it is likely that
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Kołakowski accurately read Bauman’s pessimism. Bauman remained attracted to the leftist
imaginary of his youth and indeed never abandoned it. At the same time, he was as disgusted
by it as Kołakowski when it was used by Westerners who he considered to have no knowledge
of how Marxism plays out as immanent utopia. Taking into account their backgrounds: Bauman,
the former commissar, would have a very difficult time escaping, like Kołakowski did, into
Christian philosophy. But their shared experience living socialism brought them together in
believing that immanent utopia was dystopian indeed.
Raymond Aron as the patron of these Eastern European émigrés in the West added his
observations in Archives a year later. Interjecting in the debate by virtue of being cited by
Bauman, the Frenchman’s 1972 commentary is highly critical of Bauman—whom he accused of
being “ahistorical.”60 Aron takes issue with Bauman’s claim that major structural change can’t
happen without violent revolution, using the major legal changes that took place in
Czechoslovakia in 1968 (before the country was invaded as a result) as a counter-example.61
Looking historically at Eastern European states, Aron also noted that there were at least two
occurrences that could be characterized as revolution there in a 25 year period, and so these
governments were not as intractable as they appeared at first glance.62
At the end of his commentary, Aron suggested that more contact with the West “would
undoubtedly have an impact on the party, the intelligentsia and the masses and would bring
changes inside the system (i.e. without liquidating the party's monopoly), changes more akin to
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Kołakowski's hope than Bauman's despair.”63 Aron here expresses a guiding principle of Aneks.
It is not a coincidence that a year later Aleksander Smolar, while working under Aron would,
with significant help from other engaged émigrés, publish the first issue of Aneks. The French
thinker ended his commentary with parting words for Bauman and his a-historicity: “Even if the
story we live in doesn't make sense, it does however have a few tricks in store and enough
cleverness in any case to teach modesty to followers of system analysis.”64
Bauman expanded on this article in his 1976 Socialism: The Active Utopia.65 In the book,
he argued that in attempting to realize utopia, socialist states created stable governing regimes
that, with no future horizon to move toward, would stagnate. With no utopia on the horizon,
there would be no revolution. The editors of Aneks were able to participate in society on
different terms than Bauman, likely because they were younger. It was easier for some of them
to look to Christian philosophy for inspiration—mediated by what Kołakowski read and what he
wrote. They were raised in a socialist world rather than being some of the last to participate in
its creation. The transcendent utopia presented by Christian philosophy, differing from the
totalizing ideologies that many of them were brought up with, was a fresh perspective on how
one interacts with the world around them. It was a useful philosophical tool and a rebellion.
Socialism, Christianity, and Utopia
Krzysztof Dorosz contributed engaging original work to Aneks that often invokes utopia
while reflecting on philosophy, religion, theology, and wherever these topics are intertwined.
Dorosz was first published in Aneks in a 1977 issue, his article appearing under a thematic
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section on “Christianity, socialism, the Church and politics.” Still writing under a pseudonym, he
compared the philosophical evolution of socialism and Christianity.66 From this first article,
Dorosz used utopia in two main ways: to signify an attempt to create a perfect world on earth
(always an attempt, always a dystopia), and a way of imagining a future that is better than the
present (a utopia to aim for but also recognize will never be reached—a limited utopia). Dorosz
used these concepts throughout the 1970s and 1980s, though by the middle of the 1980s he
began to consider jettisoning utopia altogether.
The key to understanding Dorosz is the idea of transcendence, the separation of the
world of man and the sacred. To collapse utopia onto earth is immanence, and the myths
mentioned above were in the mind of Dorosz a warning against the immanent desacralization
of utopian ideas which to him was a way of stating the critical problem that exists at the root of
state socialism. One way of thinking about the indictment of utopia in Aneks is as an indictment
of immanence and consequent desacralization of eutopian ideas. A transcendent utopia limits
itself by recognizing the primacy of the individual, whereas an immanent utopia is prone to
instrumentalization of human beings.
In his 1977 observations about Christianity and socialism, Dorosz wrote that the former
endured a crisis stemming from failing to put the human individual first that socialism also
blundered into. Like Kołakowski, he compared the mistakes of Christianity with those of
socialist ideology. Christianity is at its worst when it wishes to enforce its values on others
(Dorosz even uses the word “totalitarian” to describe the views of some churches), rejecting
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the humanist idea of respecting the agency of the individual. This same lack of respect is
exhibited by socialism when it treats individuals as subjects of history that are to be
manipulated in the name of progress. Dorosz invoked a concept that was named
anthropocentric humanism by the French philosopher Jacques Maritain—a utopian belief that
human endeavor can overcome any problem—as an example of the overreach of renaissanceborn humanism. Dorosz concluded by saying that maybe his optimistic musings about both
socialism and Christianity were his “private utopia.” But the humanist “value crisis… [that
socialism had blundered into] requires” consideration of such individual utopias.67
In his next appearance in Aneks the following year, Dorosz expanded on the negative
characteristics of utopia, positing that they are activated when utopia mixes with reality. Dorosz
built his argument using mythical stories, noting that myths themselves were created as
warnings against what he called “metaphysical utopia”—a utopia completely unfit for bringing
into earthly existence. He wrote about Adam and Eve & Prometheus and Faust, all of whom
endeavored to create “shortcuts to paradise.”68 Similarly in his 1978 Utopian Lights, Bronisław
Baczko claimed that “utopian ideas and images form the very condition making possible the
existence of certain historical discourse and myths.”69 In other words, (again, as Kołakowski
wrote about leftist ideology in 1957) utopia is an inalienable component of human society and
culture, but it can be dangerously misappropriated.
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Dorosz returned to utopia as a problematic but potentially useful concept in another
1978 article, reviewing Czesław Miłosz’s novel, Ziemia Ulro. Here Dorosz wrote that
“imagination is not the aim, but the road.” Imagination is synonymous with paradise, utopia,
but it cannot be treated as an end. To illustrate his point, Dorosz quoted Miłosz: “Imagination
indicates where succor may be found… in a completely different likeness of man and the
world….”70 Utopia described as imagination is a guide for action but cannot be the future.
In a 1980 issue, Dorosz explored what happens when people claim that utopia can exist
on earth. He described socialism as following in the long shadow of a search for utopia
stretching to the present from Columbus’s insistence on having found paradise in the New
World. In seeking earthly paradise, Christian Europe embarked on a path away from the sacred
(defined as recognizing the difference between the imperfect world and heavenly perfection)
and toward hubris. Dorosz wrote: “the immanent weakness of humanism in the face of spiritual
and political totalitarianism…. "the death of god” inevitably pulls behind it the death of man.”71
Tragedy follows when people think that they have acquired the key to paradise which,
according to Dorosz, does not exist in the world.
By 1981 Dorosz further challenged utopia, perhaps under the influence of theorists of
the Polish dissident movement. That year, Dorosz responded to two Polish dissidents: Piotr
Wierzbicki, who wrote a polemic called “Treatise on Maggots,” excoriating people who, by not
being openly anti-communist, were to Wierzbicki as supportive of state socialism as those who
genuinely supported it, and Adam Michnik, who wrote a response to Wierzbicki that focuses on
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the power of compromise over simplistic good-and-evil views of the world. Dorosz sided with
Michnik but with reservations, writing that he would not like to live in a society where all values
are consumed by compromise.72
He called the Manichean society of Wierzbicki a society of angels. This metaphor is first
used in issue 18 (1978) of Aneks, where Dorosz wrote about the Kabbalistic myth of fallen
angels disgusted by human imperfection, who were punished for teaching man sorcery after
their fall from heaven. This angelic society is a dystopian vision of utopia on earth, he wrote.
Rather, Dorosz conceived of humans as imperfect beings: each individual contains both good
and evil within themselves, and thus a never-ending responsibility to act toward the good
without excuses for negative actions that are sometimes made by progressive ideologies.
Dorosz implicated the idea, present in but not exclusive to Marxism, that society
influences a person’s development. In losing responsibility for their actions, the individual loses
freedom: “…man is a microcosm, a being carrying all of creation…. Responsib[le] not only for
himself, but also for the whole world. No action, no thought, no twitch of feeling [i]s without
impact on the course of the world,” Dorosz wrote.73 He returned to this idea in a review of a
book about the theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer by émigré intellectual Antoni Pospieszalski.74
Dorosz wrote—following Bonhoeffer—that only in a transcendent world (one where humanity
is alone) is man truly free, because all decisions must come from within and not from some
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other force.75 Utopia, then, can limit the imagination just as much as it can be imagination
itself.
In 1981, writing on “the conservative socialism of Paul Tillich,” Dorosz used utopia
pejoratively while describing Tillich’s idea of conservative socialism as overcoming a bourgeois
corruption of socialism that inculcated it with unrealistic (utopian) dreams.76 But in the
following issue, while applying Tillich’s ideas to Poland to explain the peculiar value of Polish
nationalism for leftist observers, Dorosz again argued that a limited utopia can be a positive
thing. He wrote that as long as the nationalist and Christian tendency for desiring sacrifice could
be controlled, religion and nationalism of a certain stripe can provide rootedness from which
people can reach for “the New Man, New Life, New Jerusalem”—in other words, a utopia that
looks forward but limits itself by simultaneously remembering where it came from.77
Dorosz finds a satisfying schema in consistently separating totalizing utopia from limited
utopia by 1983. That year, in a special section he compiled on the “return of the sacred” to
secular society, Dorosz used the legend of the holy grail as a metaphor for investigating the
West’s relationship to spirituality. The search for the grail is a search for paradise and, in the
legend, just embarking on the search “returned the king’s palace to its past splendor,” Dorosz
reminded the reader. The alliance of the church and the left in Poland that had provided the
theoretical underpinning for the Solidarność movement could serve here as a positive
example—a transcendent utopia healing society—though Dorosz oddly avoided explicitly
mentioning it in an issue where every other article is about the recently-suppressed movement.
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The rationalist liberal culture of the West and the communist states was a negative example, an
“uncompromising utopia,” as Dorosz put it, again using utopia pejoratively. At the end of his
essay, Dorosz expanded on his idea of a positive utopia, again likely with the rise and fall of the
Solidarność movement in mind. Even a “rather utopian model of culture [with] minor chances
of realization” could become real for a short period, he wrote. Perhaps only a single step
needed to be taken to counter the crisis of values being faced by Europe, Dorosz wrote,
returning to the metaphor of the grail, “for rivers to flow again on the barren land and for
flowers to bloom.”78
He returned to a more critical view of utopia in 1984, writing an article comparing early
Gnosticism to the socialist idea.79 He identified the concept of “acosmic utopia”—a
transcendent idea with no connection to reality—in both schools of thought. Both old and new
Gnosticism view the world in radical negation (Dorosz says socialism belongs in the latter
category), meaning that they each are disgusted with the world as it is and wish at any cost to
make it more like the acosmic, immanent utopia that they believe in.80 The utopia of the
Gnostics is a total or totalizing one, wishing for a perfect world on earth. Dorosz appears twice
in this 1984 issue. He closed it with a review of Alain Besançon’s book on Leninism. Dorosz
compared Leninism to Gnosticism—merging Besançon’s perspective with his own—writing that
the communist party was like an angel. Here he again used the metaphor against the pursuit of
immanent utopia that he developed in his 1978 article. Reminiscent of Walter Benjamin’s angel
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of history, the angel Dorosz described has, unlike Benjamin’s creation, escaped transcendence
and can influence history: “a disembodied force… whose destiny pushes the desire for what is
to not exist, and what does not exist to become reality.”81
Along with writing on Besançon, Dorosz had written an introduction to a chapter by
liberal theorist Friedrich Hayek for Aneks the year prior. In the brief piece, the Pole writes that
Hayek is “a sceptic that doesn’t believe man is capable of creating for themselves a brave new
world.”82 Polish émigrés in general seemed to have reservations about Hayek—Dorosz called
him controversial—but on the whole appreciated him as someone who purported to defend
the freedom of the individual.
Dorosz wrote about Polish dissident theorists again in 1985, sympathizing with the antiutopian philosophy of activists Jacek Kuroń and Adam Michnik. Defining utopia as “dreaming
about an ideal society,” he noted that it is absent from both of their philosophies.83 A similarly
consistent critic of utopia is Stanisław Barańczak, who reminded readers in 1983 that restricted
freedom of movement had always been a component of utopia: “Utopia has passports,”
Barańczak wrote in 1983.84 The stances of Polish intellectuals against utopia were becoming
more uncompromising.
In another 1985 issue, Dorosz, for good measure, criticized conservative utopia as well.
He wrote that visions of an immutable past that should be returned negate the values of the
present just as much as the future vision of communist utopia does. To relinquish utopia is to
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become open to reality, but not necessarily to approve of it. We can then perceive the course
of human events, but without turning them into “norms or signposts,” said Dorosz, again
evoking not only Tillich’s idea of conservative socialist myth of beginning but also Michnik and
Kuron’s anti-utopian pragmatism. A conscious, self-limiting, approach that balances utopia
(both of past and of future) and reality blocks the path to neglecting our present moment—our
fellow contemporary human beings—Dorosz wrote. Dorosz concluded this essay on religion,
freedom, and consciousness by encouraging “meeting with transcendence,” that is: accepting
the imperfection of man but also being open to change for the better. In this way, one can
reject earthly utopia but accept it as a metaphysical notion.85
But in his final appearance in Aneks in 1988 (issue 49), Dorosz seem to relinquish utopia
altogether. Writing about the relationship between faith and certainty, he picks up where he
left off when interpreting Pospieszalski and Bonhoeffer in 1985. There he identified that neither
thinker answered the question of how to exist in a world without transcendence as a guide—
that is, without even a utopian idea. He invokes the theologian Martin Buber, who wrote that
real faith
is not about professing what we consider to be the truth in formulas prepared in
advance. On the contrary: true faith means an inner openness to the unconditional
mystery that we encounter in every sphere of our lives and which does not give itself up
to enclosure in any formulas. True faith is the same as the being flowing from the
deepest roots of our self, constantly ready to live with this mystery, just as one being
interacts with another. True faith is the ability to bear life in the face of this mystery.86

85

Dorosz, “Wiara Pełnoletnia,” 124, 140.
Martin Buber, Israel and the World. (New York: Shocken Books, 1963), 49 in Krzysztof Dorosz,
“Wiara i Pewność,” Aneks, no. 49 (1988): 56.
86

258

Dorosz goes on to describe utopia as perfection of the world based on unnatural beauty—a
contradiction—and for a final time warns against the Gnostic idea of trying to make a perfect
world in the image of utopia.
After over a decade of writing about utopia in Aneks, Dorosz relinquishes it. Or perhaps
it is that his utopia is conceived as something playing out within each individual. At this point
the definition of utopia is very limited. Everyone has the choice and responsibility to create a
better world. At the same time, no one has the power to do it on their own. While writing
about Kuroń, Michnik, Tillich, Bonhoeffer and finally Buber, Dorosz grapples with the problem
of how a thinking being can go through life without utopian ideas to guide them. He finds a
potential answer in Buber. Utopia becomes a contradiction in 1988, only present according to a
very strict definition and maybe even no longer needed.
Conclusion
Bronisław Baczko writes in his Utopian Lights: “The opposition between history and
utopia, in which only a pure and simple denial of history is seen, is occasionally exaggerated.
Recently, this seems to have become nearly an intellectual mode. Things seem more complex
to us, however…. The opposition utopia/history is by no means absolute…. Beyond the utopian
images are found men whose social imagination is grappling with the realities of their times.”87
Baczko was critical of intellectual trends that he was a contemporary to, as were the authors
presented in Aneks. His utopia is ambiguous as well. In Aneks one finds the convergence of
Western and Eastern European thinking about the future of political theory against the realities
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of a particular period, delineated by the revolts of 1968 on one end and the collapse of Eastern
European communism in 1989 on the other.
Looking at it another way, these thinkers were engaged in the production of hope
during a time when utopia had stopped providing it. This effort occurred in large part outside of
Poland, with concepts from Western thinkers intertwining with those of Poles. This discourse,
when sent into Poland, had an effect on the intellectual climate there. Polish opposition
intellectuals were influenced by the émigrés and their Western interlocutors, and vice-versa, in
an ongoing process of imagination.
Even in the late 1980s, the idea of a positive utopia is not completely forsaken. In a 1984
issue, Michał Masłowski, an émigré and Solidarność activist in France, frames Solidarity’s
unrealized goals as an eutopia.88 Those contributing to or published in Aneks generally remain
loyal to utopia as conceived by Leszek Kołakowski: the motor of the left. Putting it another way,
Kołakowski’s onetime colleague Baczko wrote in 1978 that “in opening itself to history,
rejoining its time, and charging the latter with great promise… utopian representations are
renewed and remodeled.”
On the whole, Polish émigré writers appearing in Aneks grow critical of utopia in the late
1980s, perhaps not needing hope as much as they did in the mid-1970s; before large-scale
organized opposition, and after the crushing of Solidarity in the mid-1980s. By the final issues of
Aneks, utopia is mainly regarded as a delusion. In them, Stanisław Barańczak calls utopian ideals
blinding, while Ewa Bieńkowska describes utopia as a trick. In a 1988 issue on the theme of
East-Central Europe, Aleksander Smolar writes that after Solidarność was crushed in 1981, the
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Polish state could no longer believe that communism had a future, which sapped a great deal of
its legitimacy. With the communist utopia shattered there was no more hope for the ideology
(hope here conceived as a necessity for action). In another 1988 issue, Adam Michnik criticizes
socialism as a utopian project not fit for an imperfect world. Intellectuals Peter and Brigitte
Berger criticize socialist utopia as folly in an essay defining their conservatism, re-printed in the
final issue of Aneks in 1989.
Christianity, the subject of the next chapter, is central these revisions of utopia. The
Poles’ inquiry was shaped by non-Polish thinkers like Buber, Bonhoeffer, Tillich and Aron—
Christian democrats and liberals. In turn, Western colleagues and interlocutors of Polish
émigrés sought new ideas from the Poles to revitalize an intellectual sphere that was fractured
and weakened in the wake of 1968. In the West, cultural politics were seen as weakening the
left while in the East socialism was largely discredited. The mixture of intellectuals from both
East and West that appears in Aneks attempted to acknowledge both realities and create some
way forward in both the Eastern and capitalist world by synthesizing the ideas created by the
meeting of their different backgrounds and experiences. Their differing perspectives shared in
one publication together form a unique, highly critical, very liberal-minded way of looking at
the world.
The emigration experience of this group of intellectuals is at the root of their writing
about politics, society, and utopia as described in this chapter. That experience is tied to the
revolts of 1968, both in Poland and in the west. The concept of utopia lurks beneath the surface
of the themes discussed in Aneks over the years. Utopia becomes more and more limited in this
intellectual community as time went on, until it is barely a flicker or spark. But a spark is all that
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is needed to start a fire. Even those fires set by necessity can quickly burn out of control. Polish
thinkers published in Aneks tried to prevent this cleansing fire by setting limits, metaphysical
boundaries around utopia.
Baczko ends his Utopian Lights by describing a Goya painting: “In the center are flying
figures who escape from earth and head toward a City whose vague outline, seemingly a
mirage, takes shape on a lofty and distant rock. These flying men will not succeed in reaching
the City of their dreams…. from the earth they wish to flee… on which men kill one another.”89
Baczko begs us not to “superfluously add to the vivid metaphor a univocal sense that would kill
it.… crush it with comments as moralizing as they are futile…” Art historians have noted that the
rock in the painting resembles Gibraltar, a haven for Spanish liberals during the Napoleonic
wars. Below the flying figures are French soldiers firing at the fleeing refugees.
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Chapter Seven: Christianity & Socialism in Aneks
It is possible to say that there is neither Providence to help us nor infinite human self-creativity
to lead us towards perfection and that we have to face defeat as the ultimate outcome of all
human efforts.
-Leszek Kołakowski1
What is my feeling?
Ah, merely a spark!
What is my life-time?
A flash in the dark!
Yet, what is tomorrow’s thunderbolt today?
Ah, merely a spark!
What the whole stretch of time men’s books display?
A flash in the dark!
Whence comes the whole man—little world—oh, whence?
From a mere spark.
What’s death, that scatters my thought’s affluence?
A second of dark.
While He held the world in His Breast, oh, what was He?
Only a spark.
When He consumes the age of the world, what will it be?
A flash in the dark.
-Konrad in Part III of Dziady by Adam Mickiewicz2
The ex-1968 activist Adam Michnik, then harangued by antisemitic slogans, was perhaps
at his most remarkable when he was inspired to vocally support rapprochement between the
secular milieu he was raised within and representatives of the Polish Catholic church & Catholic
intellectuals. Michnik’s most lasting mark on Polish history might thus be the resulting call in his
1977 book, Kosciół, Lewica, Dialog (The Church and the Left in English), for his secular
intellectual friends to come to the same conclusions. The Aneks milieu played an important part
in the coming to fruition of Michnik’s book. Openness to Christianity among Polish intellectuals

1
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Leszek Kołakowski, Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 204.
Mickiewicz, Forefathers, 173.
263

acknowledged the Christian tradition as a core component not only of Polish culture but also a
cultural fact embedding Poland in Europe, rooting it in Western civilization. The tone and
purpose of engagement with Christianity in Aneks begins as curiosity and hope, blossoms to an
indispensable dialogue and concludes acrimoniously.
Writing on Christianity—especially but not exclusively in relation to socialism—appears
in Aneks from 1976 onward. Michnik’s book was published just after 1976-1977 issues of Aneks
on the topic of socialism and Christianity. These issues of Aneks played a dual role with regard
to Michnik’s book, serving both as theoretical inspiration and as a platform for dialogue and
discussion. Aneks was able to fulfill this role because it existed beyond the physical borders of
Poland, and this schema for intelligentsia activity was so natural to Polish politics that it is
largely taken for granted (though many of the people involved are well-known and so is the
fruit of their activity). The writing on Christianity in Aneks is thus some of the most important
content that the publication’s editors published (and in many cases also wrote).3
Christianity in Poland is strongly linked to both national identity and rebellion. The
events of 1968 in Poland were precipitated by increasingly nationalist rhetoric from the state,
which had as one of its causes the impending 1966 millennial anniversary of the birth of Polish

3

Publishing within Poland was not yet ready to sustain such heady public conversations about
the future and direction of activity in opposition to the state—the conversations were
happening in émigré publications. Critical responses to Michnik’s book appeared in the Londonbased Polish-language Myśl Polska and Wiadomośći. Meanwhile, as the two discussed how to
respond to what they perceived as conservative, pro-church and anti-intellectual attacks on
Michnik’s proposal for Church-Intelligentsia unity, Leszek Kołakowski wrote to Jerzy Giedroyc
about a desire for a counter-offensive in Kultura, Aneks, the London Trybuna or Tydzień Polski
(Giedroyc wrote back that the latter two were not conducive to independent thought—tied too
closely to institutions of the more conservative, traditional, wartime Polish emigration). See:
Letter 272. Giedroyc et al., Listy 1957-2000, 2016.
264

nationhood in 966. There was one problem with this for the communist state however, in that
what was actually being commemorated was the Christian baptism of a pagan Polish king and
his court. As tightly as Polish nationhood was bound to Christianity in the historical narrative, so
the Communist state tried in the run-up to 1966 to assert a Polish identity without Christianity
strong enough to untether the latter. This impossible task was made even more difficult by
Poland’s contemporary history. In the nineteenth-century drama Dziady, staged as a play in
1968 and quickly banned, the literary founder of modern Polish identity, Adam Mickiewicz,
refers to partitioned Poland as a “Christ of nations” which would save all of Europe from a
similar fate through its suffering. In the partitioned Poland that so captured the attention of
Mickiewicz, churches were keepers of Polish culture as against not just partitioning empires but
also ones with distinct cultures as signified by religion: the Eastern Orthodox Russian state and
Protestant Prussia (in Habsburg Poland local culture was less suppressed). Intellectual
rapprochement with Christianity in Poland should be thought about with this longue-durée
historical context in mind.
That there was a degree of rapprochement between secular and Catholic intellectuals in
Poland during the 1970s and 1980s has been well-known since Adam Michnik published his
book, but accounts have traditionally not sought out the origins of this phenomenon—its
philosophical underpinnings.4 This chapter explores those origins. Having served as a platform
for intellectual debate, Aneks now comprises a repository of evolving ideas about Christianity in
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Cultural historian Nina Witoszek comes the closest when she explores the cultural origins of
anti-authoritarianism in Poland in a 2018 work. In one chapter, she touches on the influence of
Christian philosophy on this group of secular intellectuals. See (especially Chapter 6): Nina
Witoszek, The Origins of Anti-Authoritarianism (New York: Routledge, 2018).
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Poland and beyond. Several issues contain special sections that have to do with this theme.
Ideas promoted by scholars in the West mix in their pages with Polish perspectives to form a
picture of what this influential group of Polish intellectuals thought about Christianity in the
wake of disillusionment with Marxism. The legacies of 1968 and of emigration permeate these
pragmatic and philosophical shifts because of the history of this milieu. This chapter begins by
describing rapprochement between Polish secular intellectuals and their Catholic counterparts
in the mid 1970s, then explores the former group’s engagement with Christian philosophy
which underpinned the process. In Aneks, the latter philosophical engagement is largely but not
exclusively interpreted by Aneks editor Krzysztof Dorosz, who compiled a thematic section on
Christianity in the modern world in 1983.
Much changed between 1976-1977—when Aneks first dedicated thematic sections to
religion coinciding with Michnik’s book—and 1983, when the aforementioned issue of Aneks
edited by Dorosz was published. The first set of issues (and the book) were written just before
(and the creation of the second half of the thematic section overlapped with) the founding of
the Committee for the Defense of Workers (Komitet Obrony Robotników or KOR), which was set
up to protect those arrested for protesting increases in the price of food in Poland in 1976.
Adam Michnik along with a group of intellectuals from his milieu took part in the creation of the
Committee.5 In 1978 Karol Wojtyła, a well-known Catholic clergyman from the south of Poland
(who was himself steeped in Christian personalist theology & philosophical existentialism)
became Pope John Paul II. His visit to Poland in 1979 broadly emboldened those opposed to

5

KOR is introduced in the same issue, number 13-14, as the second half of the 1976-1977
special section.
266

authoritarian Communist Party rule. The Solidarity movement gained power and popularity in
1980-1981, and the country seemed to be on the cusp of major changes. But martial law was
declared in 1981, ostensibly based on threats of invasion—as occurred in Czechoslovakia in
1968—if Poland’s communist leadership did not control the situation on their own.
Nevertheless, martial law could only drive the movement underground, and by 1983 the
opposition was well-established, popular in the West and supported by a large chunk of the
Polish population.
In 1976 and again in 1983, Christianity is seen as a key component of Western culture
that tied Poland to Western Europe while it was geopolitically a satellite state of the Soviet
Union. But at the same time as communism was considered to be a danger to Western
civilization (and imposed from the East), it was also seen as a consequence of a pan-European
Enlightenment-derived belief in infinite progress: “The totalitarian order of the East and the
spiritual confusion of the West flow from the same crisis of values which, to a greater or lesser
extent, covers all European civilization,” wrote Dorosz in 1983.6 Situating European civilization
in the Enlightenment, engagement with Christian philosophy by Polish dissidents is also part of
a broad but critical embrace of liberalism.
There are two approaches to Christianity in Aneks: institutional, organizational
considerations and spiritual, philosophical or theological ones. The pragmatic (or political) and
the philosophical are connected. Since the Catholic church is a major influence in Polish society,
the texts discussed in this chapter de facto deal with major Polish social and political issues.
While a number of Polish activists and intellectuals from before 1968 came to be guided or

6

Krzysztof Dorosz, “Ziemia Jałowa i Poszukiwanie Graala,” 122.
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inspired by Christian philosophy, those same people did not necessarily become devout
Catholics. But their worldview had changed, which allowed for dialogue with Catholic
intellectuals and certain clergy of the Polish Catholic church.
For Polish secular intellectuals, Christianity was an antidote to the dangerous aspects of
Marxist ideology, filling a void that Marxism had left behind. It represented some of the same
values without the disastrous potential for violent revolution. To what degree people’s
relationship to Christianity changed depends on the individual (and their particular
experiences). For most 1968 émigrés—especially those kicked out of Poland as Jews—aspects
of this shift were less acceptable than for those who remained in majority-Catholic Poland.
Aside from Krzysztof Dorosz, the core Aneks editors—especially Aleksander Smolar, who once
described Dorosz as “a good publicist, a bit religious”—supported the explorations of their
friends but saw a danger in moving too far down a path leading to ideas that too could have
unintended consequences for Polish politics and society, especially for groups traditionally
persecuted by people utilizing Christianity as rationalization for doing so.7
Michnik’s The Church and the Left: Dialogue between Historical Enemies
In 1977, Adam Michnik wrote, “the articles on ‘socialism, politics, and Christianity,’ sent
from Poland and published by my friends in the journal Aneks (issue no. 12) fully match my own
way of thinking.”8 Two issues, the 1976 one mentioned by Michnik and the following from early
1977, feature a two-part special section on religion in Poland which turned out to be critical for
the Polish opposition movement. The thematic section whose first half appears in the 12th
issue, from late 1976, was proposed to Aleksander Smolar by Michnik himself, along with one
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of Michnik’s mentors, Jacek Kuroń—both of whom were the Aneks editor’s activist friends in
Poland. Entitled “Voices from Poland on Christianity, Socialism, the Church and Politics” (rather
than “from Poland,” the title in Polish reads simply “from the country”), it spilled over into a
double-issue, 13-14, the first of 1977. Visiting France from Poland on a press tour for the
nascent Workers’ Defense Committee, Michnik was literally locked in a room by the Aneks
editor in order to finish committing his thoughts on the topic to paper, Aleksander Smolar’s
brother Eugeniusz recalls. Michnik’s book, Koscioł, lewica, dialog, was published on the Instytut
Literacki imprint of Paris Kultura chief Jerzy Giedroyc the following year.9
In the book, Michnik argued that while the Catholic Church and the left in Poland have
traditionally been enemies, the church had consistently defended Polish culture and human
rights in Communist Poland. Polish intellectuals—who historically were not in favor of the
church—were encouraged by Michnik to seek rapprochement with it. In the epilogue of his
book, Michnik mentioned that the special sections of Aneks were important to him. He again
mentions the issues in 1992, in a preface to the English edition of the book: “Our aim, together
with other contributors such as Jan Józef Lipski, Antoni Macierewicz, and Father Jacek Salij, was
to reexamine the complex relationship between the Catholic Church and the secular
intelligentsia. We wanted to shed light on the new way each side was looking at the other.” 10
Michnik recalls two other antecedent motivations for his book. One is Polish historian
Bohdan Cywinski’s book entitled Rodowody Niepokornych (usually translated as “Indomitable
Pedigrees,” but perhaps a better translation is “Genealogies of the Rebellious”), about the
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various—left- and right-wing—ideological backgrounds of turn-of-the-century Polish rebels
working to create an independent state, and the role of the Church within that process.11
Cywiński wrote that Christians and non-believers in Poland had to reconcile in search of
goodness and truth. “This book is intended to help approach this attitude. It wants to be a voice
in dialogue…. a mobilizing appeal to implement these values, which are inherent in our
ideological pedigrees. In common pedigrees.”
Michnik has also mentioned in interviews that between the 1971 publication of
Cywiński’s book and the Aneks special sections in 1976-1977, he received tape recordings from
his politically engaged émigré friends asking about whether or how the Church and religion
were being reassessed by the leftist intelligentsia in Poland that was opposed to the communist
government. This was another way in which the Aneks milieu was important in this dialogue.
Their questions, posed in 1973-1974 according to Michnik, were the prompts for the special
section that later also inspired the book. Reacting to the gesture from émigrés, one of the first
pieces in the 1976 Aneks section is a “Letter to friends” by Polish writer and friend of Michnik,
Teresa Bogucka (the text is examined in the following section of this chapter). “The many
questions you ask can be reduced to one thing: ‘what has Christianity become for you?’,”
Bogucka says in the opening paragraph.

11

“This book is an attempt… to show all the richness and entanglement of various ethical and
ideological threads that were manifested in the activities of people of that time, and it wants to
be at the same time a testimony of a conscious choice of ethical values, especially deserving,
according to the author, to be incorporated into the content of our quite contemporary
engagements… The difficult and painful problem of the conflict of a significant amount of the
most ideologically creative part of the Polish intelligentsia of those times with the Church
becomes in this perspective one of the basic issues for the history of ideology in Poland, as well
as for the history of attitudes in the field of social ethics.” Bohdan Cywiński, Rodowody
Niepokornych (Kraków: Społeczny Instytut Wydawniczy “Znak,” 1971), 10–11.
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Michnik had written about wanting to create this Catholic-secular intelligentsia dialogue
already as a youth, in the charter of his youth discussion club in the early 1960s—over a decade
prior to the Aneks issues. Bogucka had started meeting with Club of Catholic Intelligentsia
intellectuals already in 1969, including a Catholic intellectual from Warsaw: Krzysztof Śliwiński.
He became another important link between secular intellectuals and progressive Catholics.
Jacek Kuroń, an inspiration for Michnik and his 1968 activist friends, abandoned Marxism (but
not his concern with the working class) in prison. Once he got out in 1971, Bogucka introduced
Kuroń to Śliwiński, the latter of whom would also befriend Adam Michnik and others in the
Warsaw University milieu. The author of Rodowody Niepokornych, Bohdan Cywiński (who
became the editor-in-chief of the important Catholic monthly Znak in 1973) would come to
these meetings as well.
A plethora of thinkers, many of them from beyond Poland, appear alongside Cywiński as
inspiration for this group. Jacek Kuroń wrote an essay, Chrześcianie bez Boga or “Christians
without God” for Znak in 1975. The title of Kuroń’s essay originates from the selected works of
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, published by another Catholic journal, Więz, in 1970.12 Dietrich Bonhoeffer
is mentioned by a number of the writers across these thematic sections, and was a continual
inspiration for writing on religious issues in Aneks. Bonhoeffer was a German pastor and
theologian murdered at age 39 by the Nazi German government for his open resistance to it. He
argued for and lived out a religionless Christianity focused on conscious action based on
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Christian values rather than religious worship and saw in institutionalized Christianity a
phantom that was no longer effective or necessary in the modern world. Christian faith was not
to be based on heavenly reward but a deep feeling of responsibility for Christian values, which
were to be promoted at great personal cost. Though Bonhoeffer can be read in a number of
ways, including by religious conservatives as a defender of Christian values against a
threatening modern world, it was the above interpretation that appealed to the Polish secular
left.
Alongside Bonhoeffer as a guide for many of those published in these issues is Leszek
Kołakowski, who is himself also a participant in the dialogue. Dorosz in his first essay in Aneks
mentions the German-Swiss philosopher Karl Jaspers (Hannah Arendt, also often cited in Aneks,
was a student of Jaspers and wrote a dissertation about love in the teaching of Saint
Augustine), the Austrian-Jewish and Israeli philosopher Martin Buber, and the Romanian
scholar of religion Mircea Eliade—all of whom re-appear in his writing and that of others in the
publication over the years.
Śliwiński, the Catholic intellectual, taught at the University of Kisangani in Zaire between
1974 and 1979. Though Smolar disagreed with the sentiment of this dialogue at the time, he
met Śliwiński on the shores of the Mediterranean in northern Italy when the Catholic
intellectual was on the way to his post in the mid 1970s. Smolar was working in Aix-enProvence at the time: “I drove there. We spent the entire day there, swimming, talking on the
beach and he told me, among other things, about the convergence of these two groups”—
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Smolar here refers to traditionally leftist anti-church intellectuals and Catholic intellectuals—
"which didn't have a great deal in common with one another.”13
Smolar recalls tapes as well, but from friends in Poland: “We also received tapes
recorded by our friends with their interpretations. For me, however, their attitude sounded
neophyte. For the same [reasons] I also criticized Adam Michnik's book… when we spoke in
Paris in 1976, just before its publication.” Smolar didn’t believe dialogue on terms where one
group was erasing a part of its identity would be productive: “I saw a temptation to see their
own unbelief as a kind of handicap. I understood this attitude psychologically, but it was
unacceptable to me.”14 Smolar initially doubted whether an arrangement where secular
intellectuals were seeking value in religion could lead to a better Poland where free and
independent thought would be valued or even possible: “I believed that this aspect of the
rapprochement at that time did not allow for the formation of a completely independent, open,
tolerant - but secular thought.” In other words: when intellectuals bowed to an institution that
had historically held positions antithetical to theirs on core values—whose representatives had
in the past been openly antisemitic—were these intellectuals, often with ethnically Jewish
roots, not compromising both themselves and the potential for freedom of thought and
expression?
Through these communications and through Aneks, the émigré milieu surrounding the
publication played a role in the coming to fruition of Adam Michnik’s book and dialogue with
Catholic intellectuals. The latter process in turn shaped the formation of political associations
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beyond the Communist Party in Poland, most famously the Solidarność movement.15 Michnik’s
work precipitated a sea-change among the Polish intelligentsia as it represented the views of a
group of activists seeking meaning after Marxism (as historian Marci Shore put it).16 In a
retrospective interview, Michnik says: “There was indeed some kind of environment, anticlerical or non-religious. I circulated in it, talked to these people, in the end that is what I called
it. However, this left wing ceased to exist when… the book was published. Nobody wanted to
admit that they had belonged to it.” People did not want to see themselves as insular and
began to act on this sentiment. Michnik had simultaneously defined and shifted the perspective
of an intellectual milieu. Indeed, defining who was part of it and how this occurred takes up a
significant portion of his book (and necessarily of this dissertation). During the interview,
Michnik continued: “Apparently, Jacek Kuroń, when asked about it, sent [people] to me, saying:
"Let Adam explain, he knows."
In the same interview, Michnik is asked about the influential theologian Józef Tischner, a
participant in church-left dialogue. Tischner was one of the first critics of Michnik’s book but
also the author of a 1988 foreword for its first legally published Polish edition. While exploring
the complexity of defining a secular left in Poland, of defining himself (and the Aneks milieu
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Though it was impossible to form genuine political associations within the government and
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book side-stepped such descriptions.
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Marci Shore, “In Search of Meaning after Marxism: The Komandosi, March 1968, and the
Ideas that Followed,” in Glenn Dynner and François Guesnet, eds., Warsaw. the Jewish
Metropolis: Essays in Honor of the 75th Birthday of Professor Antony Polonsky (Leiden: Brill,
2015), 590–612; Adam Michnik uses the concept of searching for meaning with regard to the
transitions from communism in Eastern Europe in a 2011 book, edited by Irena Grudzińska:
Michnik, In Search of Lost Meaning.
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émigrés), Michnik notes Tischner’s treatment of a mentor to these Polish 1968 intellectuals,
Leszek Kołakowski, in a book by the Catholic intellectual: “However, it was amazing to me what
he wrote about Kołakowski. There was a sentence that Kołakowski lived in Poland, but did not
live Poland, because he never knelt in the crowd of pilgrims at Jasna Góra.17 I asked him if this
was really the essence of Polishness for him?”18 Michnik thinks that he was able to convince
Tischner otherwise (Tischner died in 2000, over a decade before this interview), thus leaving
open the possibility of Polishness that is other than Polish-Catholic—fighting for his right and
the right of his dear friends to be considered Polish.
It may be difficult for non-Poles to comprehend how the Polishness of people like
Kołakowski and Michnik might require defending. “How can one write without anguish about
issues that are so personal and at the same time so widely known in my country,” Michnik
asked in a foreword to the 1987 English translation of Tischner’s book about Marxism and
Christianity. He writes to his Western readers: “To people with different experiences, however,
these matters are surely not so obvious.”19 Michnik alludes in the interview decades later that
Tischner surmised that it could only be someone like him, a 1968er formerly of the left (and
from the student activist komandosi group), a part of the loosely defined Aneks milieu, that was
capable of translating the deepest questions surrounding Polish identity to a foreign audience:
“And I think it is no coincidence that Józek [Tischner] never re-published the book. And when it
was supposed to appear in English, he asked me to write an introduction.” Michnik’s view after
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many years was still conciliatory, unabashedly hopeful that Catholic elites were then as wellintentioned as he was.
But perceptions of identity rooted in the events of 1968 continued to haunt this
rapprochement. In that 1987 English foreword to Tischner’s book, Michnik wrote: “I am not
Catholic. I am not an apologist for Polish Catholicism.” Michnik here seems to be responding
directly to the criticisms of his friend Aleksander Smolar. Attempts at dialogue could amount to
an unrequited effort at assimilating to a Polish-Catholic nation on the part of Michnik and
others (those who supported dialogue, at least) who were persecuted during the antisemitic
campaign of 1968. Yet contrary to what Michnik consistently presents, it appears from what is
published in Aneks that by the late 1980s there was little dialogue left and little space in
Christianity-infused conceptions of Polishness for secular intellectuals like Michnik and the
Aneks editors.
Returning to the late 1976 and early 1977 issues of Aneks, there appears to be a
diversity of opinion and approaches to the paradox of a largely independent Catholic church in
a communist state. The figures representing the Catholic church in these early issues are
somewhat diplomatic in their outlook, writing as members of a church existing in an atheist
state, in dialogue with agnostic or non-believing intellectuals. The Catholic church in Poland
needed to compromise with the government to maintain autonomy. At the same time, this was
a level of autonomy that the political opposition would have been happy to possess. Both those
close to the church and so-called secular intellectuals are antagonistic to a government that
they see as not allowing people to live in dignity. Dignity is understood in a sense derived from
Christian philosophy. It is expressed both in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
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(suffused with the Thomist influence of Jacques Maritain) and in the Dignitatis Humanae
declaration written during the Second Vatican Council.20
Those with their roots on the left were not just open to having a tactical alliance with
the church. Rather, secular intellectuals in these early issues explored theology, spirituality, and
integrated it into their outlook on life. Like Aneks as a whole, these issues are representative of
the intellectual trajectory of a generation of intelligentsia deeply affected by 1968, having
completely lost faith in the potential for the government they lived under to improve and
moving toward a new way of conceiving not just politics but being and acting on the world.
Leading intellectuals like Jacek Kuroń and Adam Michnik were involved in the creation of this
collection of essays even if they did not appear among the authors. Most of those published,
including those writing from the perspective of the church, were roughly the same age, born
around the middle of the 1940s, coming of age politically with the events of March 1968.21 The
opinions of secular and Catholic members of this generation began to diverge as the authority
of the communist government in Poland grew weaker over the course of the 1980s but in these
issues, coming out of 1968 and toward the creation of the Solidarity movement in Poland in
1980, their trajectories intersected.
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Among those taking part in the council was the future pope, Karol Wojtyła, who himself was
well-read in the same progressive Christian and existentialist thinkers often invoked by Aneks
contributors. The young Wojtyła wrote his doctoral thesis on the work of German
phenomenologist Max Scheler. In the 1960s and 1970s he was part of the same catholic
intellectual world as the interlocutors of the friends of the émigrés who started Aneks.
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only three do not fit into this generational group, the youngest of the latter being Wiśniewski
who was born in 1936—ten years older than Michnik. The sections meanwhile end up not
containing a piece by Michnik at all.
277

The issues on Christianity and Socialism: Intellectuals Court the Church
Michnik recalls three authors from the Aneks 1976-1977 special sections later writing
detailed reviews of his influential book.22 The pieces represented a variety of opinions on a
spectrum from Catholic to radical leftist, all in dialogue. Leszek Kołakowski wrote an
introduction for the first issue, number 12, and contributed an essay re-printed from
Frankfurter Allgemaine Zeitung. A piece by KOR activist (and future right-wing politician) Antoni
Macierewicz followed. A friend and 1968 Warsaw University protest participant Teresa Bogucka
added a “Letter to Friends” under a pseudonym. There are two pieces by an activist priest,
Stanisław Małkowski (one written under a pseudonym). Two pseudonymous writers, Jerzy
Walecki and Piotr Łabowski, remain anonymous—though one of them may be the pre-war
socialist, historian and mentor to the Warsaw University student protestors, Jan Józef Lipski,
who Michnik later writes contributed a piece. The remaining works were by theologian (and
future right-wing politician) Jacek Salij, and the writer Adam Zagajewski. All but Małkowski and
Salij in the first section were in the 1970s secular intellectuals.
This 1976 issue also marks the beginning of Aneks editors signing essays with their real
names. Alongside thematic sections on religion, these two issues document the beginning of an
organized political opposition in Poland. Revealing the names of authors signaled a new phase
in the evolution of the political opposition in Poland.
Kołakowski writes as a critical secular intellectual and not a sympathizer of the Church
as he is often remembered. He recognizes the importance of the Catholic church for Poland but
also the dangers inherent in religious fundamentalism both for that institution and society. His
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introduction makes three points. The first is that the Catholic church in Poland is the most
powerful independent entity in the country, the second that this has allowed it to be a bearer
of national culture (Kołakowski uses the phrase Polak-katolik but emphasizes that it
encapsulates much ignorance alongside good). The third is that the Church persevered as a
force in Poland because it remained a faith rather than a political movement. And so according
to Kołakowski, it should continue to cultivate a belief in transcendent values—beyond empirical
arguments—rather than trying to prove itself in the arena of politics.23
Kołakowski sets the dominant mood among the post-1968 ex-revisionist intelligentsia in
Poland. No longer can an intellectual elite raised on Enlightenment values, worshipping reason,
simply see the Catholic church as a regressive organization that must be kept in its place:
“’Secular humanism in the fight against Catholic obscurantism’—this is not only an imaginary
situation, an empty cliche, an attempt at a fictional continuation of a non-existent world,” he
writes. This no-longer-existing world did exist once, and Kołakowski writes as one of its heirs. At
the beginning of his introduction, the philosopher writes that the famous Polish writer Antoni
Słonimski (“to whom we all owe so much,” Kołakowski adds, using “we” to describe the secular
intelligentsia) had just died. A fervent atheist, anti-Catholic scourge, baptized as a youth
growing up in an assimilated Jewish family, Słonimski died not quite a Catholic, but certainly a
friend of the church. How could this have happened? The sociopolitical framework in Eastern
Europe had been drastically altered by Marxism becoming the state ideology. Social conflicts
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that once appeared as a battle between religion and atheism began to be fought in different
arenas as a result, Kołakowski writes.
Lived experience had proven that existence was more complex than such a Manichean
vision. This change in thinking among the Polish intelligentsia occurred because of their bitter
personal experiences with this system. “[O]ld rationalist and progressive optimism shamelessly
exposed its naïveté… our religion of Reason experienced too many blows….”24 One no longer
had the luxury of choosing between faith and reason as polar opposites. Both reason and faith
have inherent value in a complex world where nuance is necessary to avoid situations like the
one that the Polish intelligentsia found itself in. But this was a warning to the Catholic
intellectuals participating in this dialogue as well: to avoid fundamentalism in their thinking lest
they fall for illusions as the secular intellectuals had.
Macierewicz meanwhile argues for a strong lay-left opposition independent of the
Catholic church. Aleksander Smolar describes the post-1989 evolution of Macierewicz as radical
right-wing in a 2018 interview, but in the mid 1970s he was on the other end of the political
spectrum: a guevarista greatly influenced by Latin American resistance movements.25 He
echoes Aleksander Smolar’s initial reaction to the alliance developing between secular
intellectuals and the Church. Macierewicz warns that to ally with the Church requires vast
concessions—playing by their rules—which makes the political opposition subservient to a
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much more powerful and experienced institution. “The replacement of the party by the Church
cannot have positive effects,” Macierewicz writes in his essay.26
Bogucka begins her letter to friends in Aneks by reminiscing about the Marxist
upbringing that her and her friends enjoyed in communist Poland. They were taught values that
she is not ashamed of, she writes: activism as opposed to indifference, to be on the side of the
oppressed, to fight for freedom and equality. But they came with a vision of the world divided
into either progress or backwardness, with no nuance and no choices in between. Being given
only two directions to choose from, they went left and it was a decision not to be regretted but
also a naive one. Perhaps most important, they saw themselves as true Marxists compared to a
system that had lost its way, not seeing the possibility that “evil… was now logically rooted
within [Marxism’s] great idea.”
Bogucka’s use of the term evil was a conscious choice rather than hyperbole. She is even
more explicit in the concluding paragraph of the first section of her essay, asking: “whether and
to what extent the left-wing, Marxist view of the world includes the predetermination of this
evil, which marks the path of it coming to reality.”27 She quotes Isaac Babel, an early Soviet
writer: “Mother in the face of revolution is an episode.” To most readers of Aneks, this quote
represented a questioning of Marxism and revolution. Did the attitude it represents—holding
revolution in higher regard than the person who gave you life—not lead straight to the gulag?
Furthermore, though Bogucka doesn’t mention it, Babel had been executed by the NKVD in
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1940 after a twenty-minute trial.28 The young Polish activists were finding it increasingly
difficult to separate the good ideals present in Marxist ideology and the tragic results of
communist rule.
In the second half of her letter, Bogucka answers the question from her friends that she
began her essay with: what does Christianity mean for her? She notes that Christian values are
not so much different from the values that she received during her Marxist upbringing. Her
convictions align with Christian personalism: she points to respect for the individual person in
Christianity that the collectivist philosophy she was raised with lacks. Bogucka supports a
pluralistic Christianity that focuses on individual responsibility for doing good for all people,
rooted in the philosophy of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, rather than what she calls a totalitarian
Christianity that focuses on saving one’s own soul by being good only to those immediately
around you. Alongside Bonhoeffer, Bogucka draws inspiration from Krzysztof Śliwiński—the
Catholic intellectual invested in dialogue with secular intellectuals—and Leszek Kołakowski.
Pluralistic Christianity is similar to the version of Marxism she appreciated, with its positive
utopian vision of doing good for all. The key differences highlighted are not losing sight of the
individual when thinking about society and expanding freedom and dignity for all rather than
fighting only for a certain people or—in the case of Marxism—a particular economic class.
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Bogucka wanted to let her friends know that she had not abandoned the values of her
youth. “This letter is not after all talking about conversion. It is about the paradox that the
values sought unsuccessfully on the left are found at the antipodes; and also about the fact that
if in one's view of the world sovereignty over the objective laws of history has been restored to
the human individual, then one must try to look differently at where this sovereignty has
always been defended,” she writes.29 Bogucka wanted to open her friends to the possibility of
seeing eye-to-eye with the Church, or at least accepting a Christian way of seeing the world—
because that is in large part how they had conceived the world already: “we have not changed
so much,” she concludes.
After opening with writing from three secular intellectuals, the editors print a sermon by
the priest Stanisław Małkowski. In the sermon, Małkowski encourages Catholics to consider the
poor and accept the intelligentsia—even if they are non-believers. He uses the example of Jan
Wolski, an old anarchist activist and intellectual, who Małkowski said exemplified Christianity in
his spirit. It is possible for the church to associate with secularism and anti-clericalism,
Małkowski says in his sermon. He draws on the thought of Saint Augustine, ending the sermon
with the notion that Christians should spread love in society. An essay by Małkowski is
published under a pseudonym later in the issue. There, he expands on the thesis of his sermon,
writing that the church should focus not on the potentially satisfied masses but the oppressed
poor and the restless intelligentsia—people on the social margins. Borrowing further from
Augustine, Małkowski suggests that rather than speaking about the poor and the intelligentsia
as marginal groups in society, traits like weakness and intelligence should be sought in every
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person. The priest and the intellectuals both seek common ground on which to unite to better
Polish society. While this common ground is based on Christian values, Małkowski explains that
people like the anarchist Wolski were Christian in spirit because his values overlap with those of
Catholics. So the priest echoes Bogucka, agreeing with her about core values and about the
need for traditionally antagonistic groups of people to find the strength for dialogue.
An anonymous non-believing intellectual writes under the pen name Jerzy Walecki that
the Second Vatican Council reforms (which, broadly, sought to bring the church up to speed
with the modern era by decreeing tolerance for other religions and for changes to Catholic
Christianity itself) had earned it respect among opposition intellectuals. Walecki appreciates
that some Polish clergy had followed suit by beginning to appreciate the contributions of radical
leftists to their shared heritage and that formerly anti-clerical leftists, likewise, began to respect
previously overlooked values championed by the church. Walecki does not mention it but
Małkowski’s sermon is an example of the trend he refers to among clergy. Teresa Bogucka,
meanwhile, exemplifies non-believing intellectuals’ newfound appreciation for certain values
kept alive by the church—namely respect for, or dignity of, the individual.
The pseudonymous writer Piotr Łabowski describes how Catholicism in Poland became
an act of political resistance and not simply religious practice in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Łabowski is a believer but argues for the separation of politics and religion. His essay
is an exploration of how secular thought and Catholicism can co-exist in Poland. Rather than
bring politics into religion, he wishes to bring Christian values into politics in the style of Dietrich
Bonhoeffer. He is critical of the traditional, intolerant nationalism represented by the phrase
Polak-Katolik. Instead he preaches tolerance for all and voices support for anticolonialism in the
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third world. Łabowski uses a passage from a Kołakowski essay, where the philosopher writes
that one cannot rationally defend the existence of humanity, the nation, or the individual—only
the belief that they should exist. Łabowski seeks to defend the nation in this instance, but he is
no chauvinist: he cites the French philosopher Simone Weil, writing that the concept of the
nation has value only when it accomplishes positive things like building community, but
possesses no value in itself.30
Theologian Jacek Salij represents a tougher position in dialogue between the church and
the left, more in the mode of Macierewicz above but writing from the side of the church. Salij
believes that the Church should support what he calls “good sociopolitical attitudes,” but this
support can’t just come as a cover for intellectuals—it must be rooted in actual religious
belief.31 At the same time, Salij agrees with Kołakowski and Łabowski about the Church not
being involved in politics lest it lose its sacred mission. Wishing for self-criticism by both
members of the church and the intelligentsia, Salij urges secular intellectuals to read Church
anti-socialist literature from pre-war Poland, and Catholics to read anti-clerical socialist
literature (while this sounds awkward, Salij is asking both sides to reflect on criticisms that the
other posed). He speaks to Catholics, writing that they must look in the teachings of the church
for ways to affect the social situation. Salij differs from others in this section in that he looks
East rather than to a dubious, liberal, West for outside inspiration. He cites the Russian
dissident (himself influenced by Russian Orthodox Christianity) Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s call to
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live in truth. This apprehension with regard to the West will become more pronounced in the
coming decade and beyond the collapse of communism.
The poet Adam Zagajewski, publishing under a pseudonym in 1977, five years before his
1982 emigration, on the other hand describes Christianity as an attachment to the West in his
essay. “…[T]hat for us is something that binds us with Latin culture, with the old tradition of
Western culture. It is not only believers and "practitioners" that benefit from this. All of us,
even self-declared atheists, warm ourselves to this fire,” he writes.32 Zagajewski notes that he
lost his faith as a teenager, but Christian symbols remain potent for him. Even Communist Party
members are influenced by this Western culture, he adds. Zagajewski echoes the belief of Salij
that Christianity can help Polish society regain independence from communist authoritarianism,
though Salij does not think about the religion as a connection to Western culture. This
conceiving of Christian heritage as a link to the rest of Europe becomes more widely discussed
in Aneks in the 1980s.
An essay by Kołakowski entitled, “On the so-called crisis of Christianity” closes the
thematic section in issue 12. Kołakowski again argues against reducing religion to a political
program, like Łabowski says explicitly and Salij implies. While political programs can reach crisis,
Christianity in his interpretation cannot. Echoing Małkowski, Kołakowski reminds readers that
Christianity makes mankind aware of their flawed nature. Kołakowski too asks people to look
inward as Augustine did: “Evil, in its original and proper sense, is in us, not in social
relationships.”33 Because Christianity is about our relationship to God, there can be no Christian
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political program or Christian system of government, Kołakowski writes. If Christianity is in
crisis, then it is a permanent crisis that began when man was chased out of paradise, he
concludes. This idea of a permanent crisis is a way of grasping Kołakowski’s anti-utopian theory
of man—the imperfectability of society.
Before this continuation of the thematic section in the following issue, the first of 1977
and numbered 13-14, there are over 100 pages of documents and programmatic essays to do
with the Workers’ Defense Committee. Two of the essays—“Thoughts about a program for
action” and “A New Evolutionism”—are authored by prominent activists Jacek Kuroń and Adam
Michnik respectively, who prompted the creation of the section on Christianity and Socialism.
They are the first explicitly political essays written by people in Poland that appear in Aneks
without a pseudonym.34
Christianity does not displace socialism in these issues. The two are intrinsically linked.
The same issue that contains the first special section on Christianity and socialism also contains
documents related to the outreach done to Western socialists by the Polish dissident
opposition. As intellectuals associated with Aneks cautiously move toward Catholic intellectuals
in Poland, they seek to communicate their broadened horizons to Western socialists whom
they still see as their most natural interlocutors (in addition, Western leftist politicians were in a
strategic position to influence the Polish government more than other political groupings).
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Aneks, like the intellectuals associated with it, represents a constant effort to broaden
intellectual horizons rather than to replace one ideology—or faith—with another.
The first essay in this second part of the special section is pseudonymously written by
the poet Stanisław Barańczak—his first appearance in Aneks of many. A poet from Poznań, cofounder of KOR and a number of literary journals, Barańczak would only a few years later leave
for a post at Harvard University that he would hold until complications from Parkinson’s disease
forced him into retirement. The title of his essay is taken from a Bertrand Russell piece: “Why I
am not quite a Christian” (to Russell’s “Why I am not a Christian”). Barańczak writes that seeing
people he had admired fall for the primitive antisemitism unleashed by the Polish government
in 1968 convinced him that good and evil exist in all people, not outside of us—another Pole
echoing Augustine. He too cites Dietrich Bonhoeffer, inspired by his nonreligious Christianity to
claim that ethics and a moral compass must come from within. That way they are still present
even when the starry sky above is empty, Barańczak writes, splitting Kant’s epitaph in two, just
as Bonhoeffer in his Ethics rejected Kant’s “grotesque” imperative to tell the truth no matter
what the consequences.35
The core of Barańczak’s own essay is the supposition that debate about religion
between believers and non-believers should not be about matters like the existence or
nonexistence of God but about ethics. Religion comes up in Aneks as one of the key arenas in
which ethics is considered. Barańczak’s personal lesson from 1968 was derived from the
inability of those around him to find an ethics of love, instead repeating antisemitic slogans
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despite being taught about the evils of xenophobia all their lives just as he had been. Barańczak
is not entirely uncritical of Christianity: “…someone who is irrationally induced to love his
neighbor may otherwise be induced to burn that neighbor at the stake,” he writes. But this is
why for Barańczak this faith in Christian ethics had to come from within, relegating him to “not
quite a Christian” in the eyes many believers.36
The intellectual foundation of the Polish opposition to communism after revisionism
(attempts to fix the system) and the post-1968 caesura is religionless Christianity, inspired
largely by Bonhoeffer and Kołakowski (both of whom borrow from Augustine). This Christianity
is indelibly marked by the Holocaust and the Second World War. The traumas of the twentieth
century were passed to and influenced the 1968 generation not only through their family
histories and their older mentors, but also through the writing of a religionless Christian
(Protestant) defender of Jews who was murdered in a Nazi concentration camp. At the same
time, religion, dialogue, Bonhoeffer, allowed these secular intellectuals to be both Polish
patriots—Poles concerned with an independent Polish state—and internationalists who
believed in universal values, like their nineteenth-century inspiration, the Dziady author Adam
Mickiewicz. Embrace of Christian philosophy brought these Polish intellectuals more in touch
with the Polish majority Catholic nation they were a part of. But they were doing it on a
contemplative, philosophical, basis and not based on ethnic conceptions of the nation or in
deference to religious tradition.
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Krzysztof Dorosz and Christianity in Aneks
The second part of the 1976-1977 thematic section of Aneks on Christianity contains the
first piece of writing by Krzysztof Dorosz. Writing on the topic of religion in Aneks would be
incomplete without mentioning Dorosz, who penned over a dozen articles for the journal in
addition to providing translations, compiling sections and doing editorial work. It was Teresa
Bogucka’s letter from the thematic section in the prior issue that provoked him to write an
essay, still under a pseudonym, for the 1977 issue. Dorosz was not raised in the Marxist
tradition, though his parents were agnostic and he sensed what he calls the “shoals” or
shortcomings of their contemplation when at university. He felt isolated in the community of
Marxist youth that he found himself in, and his essay was a response to his frustrations:
…how did you grow up in Poland, a Catholic country and not know about religion? You
may not believe, that is your business, but "not notice"? I sat down to write this text
with these feelings. I also criticized this group for still, already being twenty-something
years old, being stuck in Marxist mental matrices, instead of—as should be done at this
age—breaking with the traditions in which they were brought up.37
Revolt against—rather than for—a materialist interpretation of the world might seem
counterintuitive to how we think about rebelling against tradition. Marxism and revolution are
synonymous after all. Another point of potential confusion is that the way Dorosz describes the
evolution of this milieu is somewhat contradictory to how it appears through others’ texts, as
the authors published in these issues of Aneks are here doing precisely what he implores them
to do. His frustration may largely have emanated from the first half of his statement, about his
Marxist friends not considering religion earlier on their own before this crisis point. It also likely
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applies more to the émigré community—to the Aneks editors rather than their friends still in
Poland who at the time had been meeting with Catholic intellectuals for half a decade.
Dorosz at the time, like Kołakowski, was interested in religion more as someone who
believes that it is a component of human nature than as someone who personally holds a
religious belief. Similar to Kołakowski and Bogucka, Dorosz wrote that the faults of the
communist system in Eastern Europe were only in part caused by the errors of those who ran it.
All three thinkers instead argued that the system was flawed at its core: “an extreme
consequence of the belief in an objectively justified attitude and the immanent laws of history
that eliminate all transcendence, and thus individual freedom and responsibility,” Dorosz
wrote. An existence that believes in transcendence separates, in Christian terms, the sacred
and the profane. This is synonymous with blocking the possibility of human mastery of all
knowledge or, in Marx’s words (derived from Hegel), overcoming the opposition between
freedom and necessity (or being and consciousness, existence and essence)—thus blocking the
path to utopia on earth.
According to the Christian philosophy that Dorosz and others imbibed, immanence is
the opposite of transcendence. Immanence eliminates individual responsibility and with it
freedom in action, because a believer in History with a capital “H” has given their agency to
historical progress itself, thus only fulfilling a ready-made prophecy. Leaning on the GermanSwiss philosopher Karl Jaspers and Romanian exile Mircea Eliade, Dorosz directs his criticism at
this negation of transcendence by materialist ideology; on the belief in the infinite capacity of
man to understand and solve humankind’s greatest problems. The empowerment of humanity
to improve its lot is a great strength of Marx’s thought but these intellectuals who had tasted
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life in governments derived from his philosophy made a conscious choice to seek hope by other
means. In the 1970s they found motivation in the ideas of responsibility and human dignity as
conceptualized by Christian philosophy.
Put another way: Dorosz and his friends were shaped by 1968, their experiences then
causing within their milieu a collapse of belief in the possibility of Marxist states to reform,
which was simultaneously a collapse of belief in infinite progress. They came to a greater or
lesser degree to believe that freedom is given up and responsibility eschewed if one rejects
transcendence and believes in the immanent coming of utopia on earth. They did not develop
faith in a higher power—this would replace one immanence with another—but were instead
freed to explore new horizons in helping those that they felt responsibility toward (they were
also free to live their lives beyond a revolutionary call to action as predicated by Marxism). This
understanding of existence (exemplified by Bonhoeffer) assumes that no higher power will help
or act for us and we are therefore responsible for manifesting goodness in the world.
Dorosz criticized the authoritarian strain of Marxism that he had experienced for having
no regard for the individual, explicitly noting his agreement with Bogucka. He built on and went
further than other respondents in the special section by considering the long history of the left,
including Western European and American thinkers (Dorosz goes as far as to bring in the
thought of nineteenth century American anarcho-syndicalist Benjamin Tucker, who at the turn
of the twentieth century saw in socialism the negative potential that it could become a religion
propagated by the state). To Dorosz it was not just Soviet communism (referred to in his piece
as socialism) but European humanism as a whole, the concept of anthropocentric humanism,
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that bred totalitarianism.38 The human individual can be protected from dangerous ideologies if
religion is allowed a role in society, Dorosz said. At the same time, he did not want religion to
be fundamentalist: it could not encourage giving up life on earth in exchange for rewards in
heaven or ascribe to what he called transcendental egoism and Bogucka refers to as totalitarian
Christianity—being good, behaving as a Christian should to those around you, solely to ensure
saving your own soul. Dorosz and his friends however paid no mind to how vilification of liberal
humanism was instrumentalized by Western religious conservatives at the time, though in the
1980s and beyond it would be used in a similar fashion by Catholic elites in Poland.
Dorosz identified in the death of the god of socialism a crisis of liberal humanism as a
whole, though because he theorized with an understanding of the precarious position of Polish
secular intellectuals turning to Christianity, he at the same time suggested that even socialist
values can be preserved if worshipping socialism as an idol in the religious sense was avoided.
By idolatry he meant avoiding making the realization of the ideal or system the ultimate end,
rather than the problems it had aimed to overcome. Here too he borrowed from Bonhoeffer,
who theorized religionless Christianity as a guide for behaving ethically in a person’s darkest
hours. Dorosz suggested an openness or pluralism for both those largely influenced by secular
ideologies like socialism and for Christians: being tolerant toward other ways of thinking could
save these systems and make them useful for the problems of the modern world. Borrowing a
phrase from English economist E.F. Schumacher, Dorosz argued for a complete “metaphysical
reconstruction of the world”:
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Perhaps in the above considerations I allowed myself to dream, expressing another,
more or less private utopia. Yet I cannot help but believe that looking for a way out of
the current impasse and trying to overcome the crisis of values that affects both
socialism and Christianity today, requires us to at least think about and discuss this kind
of utopia.39
While rejecting immanent totalitarian utopia—either communism or a Christian kingdom of
heaven on earth—Dorosz suggested that both of these ideas do contain positive values. Dorosz
and the other respondents to this special section asked for a consideration of the human
individual and cultivation of ethics within each person that would foster freedom through a
feeling of responsibility in the world. In other words: for each person to cultivate their own
private utopia emanating from this conception of responsibility rather than a totalizing one
imposed from without through which a person absolves themselves of free will by obedience to
it.
Two other pieces complete the section; one by a secular intellectual and another by a
priest. Antoni Pospieszalski (introduced in Chapter Six) for years wrote a section for the Paris
Kultura titled “Religion without being anointed” and, like Dorosz would be after him, was
employed at the BBC Polish section from the 1950s until his retirement in 1975.
Characteristically, his first essay in Aneks had little to say about the spiritual aspect of
Christianity in the vein of Dorosz. Instead of writing about theology or ideology, he wrote on
the Church as an institution and on the Polish Communist Party. He pointed out that the Church
had never committed to changing the system in Poland and certainly not to implementing
Western liberal norms—which is to say that its leaders had been more pragmatic than
dogmatic. In fact the church had leaned on human rights to defend its own interests,
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Pospieszalski writes, positioning it as a defender not just of Catholics (and in a majority Catholic
country this largely means that it now also defended the secular opposition rather than people
who hold other faiths).
The much older émigré did not have much to say about the relationship of the Polish
opposition of younger secular intellectuals to religion or the Catholic Church. Rather, he
emphasized the importance of 1968 for the former group and pointed out that perhaps they
were still a bit too doctrinaire (he calls it “political maximalism”), which led them to emphasize
their opposition to continued attempts at revisionism and not recognizing that there were
people in the Communist Party which could be reasoned with.40 The Church, to Pospieszalski,
should be a lesson to the opposition in how to delicately increase ideological autonomy in
Poland vis-à-vis the Communist Party. He lauded the opposition for trying to change the
position of Western communist parties, because, he said, Soviet reform would never occur
from the top-down. Rather, it was changed from the outside. And so Poland to Pospieszalski,
being one of the most-free spaces in Eastern Europe and a major influence on Western
communist parties, represented in the late 1970s the best antidote to what many conceived as
totalitarianism—and thus also the best hope for a world beyond divisions between East and
West.
The final piece in the two-part special section was a re-print of an open letter written by
a Dominican priest, Ludwik Wiśniewski, to Edward Gierek, the First Secretary of the Polish
Communist Party at the time. The letter had been broadcast on Radio Free Europe in 1976. In it,
Wiśniewski took issue with Gierek’s claim that Poland was a secular country. Rather, the priest
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argued that it was an atheist country because religious practice was tolerated in secular
countries, unlike in Poland where the church was regularly persecuted. Understood in this way,
Gierek’s statement then gave Wiśniewski hope that the government would allow people to
practice their faith with the dignity afforded to citizens of secular countries. Just when the socalled secular left entered into a dialogue with Catholic intellectuals on the basis that the
Church should maintain a distance from rule—from the state—Wiśniewski used the concept of
secularism as an argument for tolerance of religion. Both areligious intellectuals and writers
representing Catholicism meet in these early issues of Aneks at the middle ground defined by
this Enlightenment concept.
Christianity and socialism in the 1980s: The Return of the Sacred
Soon after the triumphant ascent and sudden suppression of the Solidarność trade
union movement, religion was considered differently in Aneks. Aneks 29-30 in 1983 contained
pieces by philosophers Mircea Eliade, Jacques Ellul, Leszek Kołakowski, and the sociologist
Daniel Bell. Besides Kołakowski, other Polish émigrés were represented: Antoni Pospieszalski
returned, joined by émigré psychologist Marek Majorek and Aneks editor Krzysztof Dorosz.
Dorosz says in a later interview of his intellectual journey:
The return of the sacred ‘hung in the air.’ At least in the air that I was breathing. The
topic was in the culture and inside me. Breaking free from the agnosticism or atheism of
my family home, I was looking for a path leading to religion and faith.
Dorosz was not alone in feeling these sentiments. “And in the broadly understood Aneks circle I
sensed an interest in the subject of the return of the sacred… Leszek Kołakowski, who was to a
large extent our intellectual guide, was interested in it.” In this section, a return to God (for
these thinkers this means a Christian God) would pull back from the brink of disaster not just
Poland but Western civilization as a whole. The Christian explorations of Polish intellectuals

296

were thus seen both as something that Poland could offer the West and ideas that bound
Poland to the rest of Europe.
Krzysztof Dorosz with Wiktoria, who like Krzysztof was a scholar of English and a
translator, together curated this 1983 section, entitled “The Return of the Sacred.” 41 While the
section title places emphasis on the return of religious sentiment, Krzysztof Dorosz in his
introduction wrote that, actually, it was that atheistic humanism or rationalism had reached
their limits and now appeared less convincing by comparison. For Dorosz and his peers,
disillusionment with Marxism was the primary cause of this change in outlook. It must be noted
here that Dorosz especially often wrote in a mode that applied not only to Poland but Western
civilization in general, specifically revolutionary ideologies, which he associated with naïve
utopianism.
The special section in 1983 was no longer a debate about the terms or utility of an
alliance between the formerly leftist opposition intelligentsia and progressive members of the
Church in Poland, nor were Polish intellectuals explaining the benefits of certain Christian
values to unconvinced friends. In pondering Poland after Marxism, the Polish thinkers in this
section were redefining the liberalism they encountered in the West, attempting to fortify it
with their experiences. It was important for the émigrés that the possibility of a return to
radical leftist ideology from a liberal approach be prevented. Not economic but intellectual
liberalism, which is defined as an openness to a multiplicity of ideas and a celebration of
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ideological inconsistency. To Dorosz especially it is the concept of transcendence that is chief
among the ways in which liberal open-mindedness will be protected from revolutionary winds.
The first three pieces in this 1983 section are by academics of international renown: the
American sociologist Daniel Bell, the Romanian émigré Mircea Eliade (co-founder of the
influential “Chicago School” of religious studies), and French philosopher Jacques Ellul. Eliade is
considered as an authority on the role of religion in society, arguing for its importance in the
face of dehumanizing modern ideologies. He too was an émigré: Eliade did not return to his
home country after the war because a communist government came to power there. Bell,
Eliade, and Ellul taken together comprise a survey of Western academic writing on religion at
the time.
Bell argues that secularization taken as the retreat of religion to a private realm spurred
religious revival in the modern world rather than decreased fervor. Religion according to Bell is
an existential need, not a primitive trait of humanity that will disappear through social progress.
Just as for Dorosz and his peers, it is reckoning with Marxism that brought this argument to life
in this piece. Bell wrote about the conscious conversion of Hungarian intellectual György Lukács
to communism. He quoted an acquaintance of Lukács (this quote is not reprinted in Aneks):
I was a little surprised [at Lukács's presence], he who a few days earlier had published
an article in Szabadgondolat (Free Thought) in which he wrote with philosophical
emphasis that the communist movement had no ethical base and was therefore
inadequate for the creation of a new world. The day before yesterday he wrote this, but
today he sits at the table of Voros Ujsag editorial staff.42
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The Hungarian philosopher is used as an example of someone who had gone the opposite way
of the Aneks milieu: he was convinced by Marxism on a spiritual level. Still believing murder to
be the most grievous of sins, Lukács became convinced that in a corrupt world there was no
escape from being complicit in violence. One could only choose how to sacrifice their soul. The
Bell text as abbreviated by Dorosz shortened the American’s four-page treatment of Lukács to
only a couple of paragraphs. The spellbinding properties of Marxist ideology as imbued by
Lukács were perhaps thought of as too familiar to readers, whereas a conviction of the
enduring place of the sacred in the modern world seemed for this moment to be forwardlooking, useful, and of course also the topic of the thematic section.
In the Eliade selection that Dorosz chooses, the Romanian argued that de-sacralization is
just the transformation of enduring myths into new contexts—that most nonreligious people
still hold pseudo-religious beliefs because the world surrounding them is religious. Eliade was
happy to use Marx as an example (the Lukács anecdote that was not used by Dorosz also
exemplifies this claim). Eliade wrote that Marx took an ancient myth shared by many societies,
that of a Golden Age, and combined it with a Judeo-Christian motif of good and evil and a focus
on the oppressed. An interview with Eliade followed, re-printed from the journal Encounter.
There, Eliade was quoted as saying that the two great myths of the secular world are progress
and communism. Eliade writes that the First World War shattered the belief in technology (i.e.
progress) as a way to make the world a better place. The war showed him that the future would
not emerge from Western modernity.
Dorosz devoted the most time to explaining Ellul, the author of the following selection,
in his introduction. He noted that Ellul was a follower of Karl Barth, a Swiss theologian whose
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teachings came to be known as neo-orthodox Christianity (Neo-orthodoxy strongly supported
the idea of transcendence: the total separation of the human and the divine, the unreachability
of the latter by the former). Barth was a co-founder of the Confessing Church, and an
inspiration for Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Dorosz wrote that to Ellul, just as to Barth and Bonhoeffer
(though Ellul disagreed with how Bonhoeffer’s oeuvre was interpreted by others), religions are
man-made creations, thought up to replace direct knowledge of what is transcendent:
…[T]he Objective Reality of Revelation, is the abolition (Aufhebung) of all religions; a gulf
opens between faith in Christ, therefore, and religion as a purely human enterprise… .
Religion in this perspective is merely a human creation, an expression of disbelief and
disobedience…43
Ellul, who described himself as a Christian anarchist, argued that Western political or
secular religions (a phrase coined by Raymond Aron, Ellul added)—Marxism and Nazism—were
built on ground tilled by Christianity. The power of these ideologies combining with their
repressed religious roots had turned politics into a new religion (implicating Maoism, Ellul
characterizes—essentializes—the Chinese as the least religious people in the world and notes
that even they had followed suit). To Ellul Christianity, while still relevant, was only so insofar as
it involved itself in politics:
Politics has become the principal justification. Christianity no longer means much, but it
is restored like new, and reinvigorated if Christians get into politics. Now it is Christianity
which is justified by being legitimized in this way. Everything which carries the political
message, everything expressed in terms of political commitment, is now justified and
legitimized. This is the new soteriology.44
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To Ellul, religiosity was something people carry within them and apply to the world around
them. The Frenchman had arguably the most transgressive message of these three thinkers.
Religion is present—it is all around—because political ideologies have sacralized the secular
world.
The remaining four contributors to the 1983 Aneks section were Polish émigrés.
Pospieszalski wrote that with its strict ideology and its routinization, communism had become
the most sacralized ideology in the modern age. Pospieszalski saw possibility in Ellul’s
observation that politics had become religion. This ideological fundamentalism had caused
secularization, leaving people with no connection to a sanctum, meaning God. As desanctified
religions, twentieth-century ideologies thus seemed formidable until this ultimate weakness,
this inner emptiness, was revealed (Pospieszalski includes in this concept the Catholic Church in
the modern era because it had routinized faith by, for example, focusing on attendance at
Sunday mass rather than encouraging a deeper connection to God. This argument is
reminiscent of Bonhoeffer’s ideas about institutionalized religion).
Pospieszalski’s language when he wrote for the 1976-1977 sections was rationalistic,
calculating, congratulating the church for being politically astute. In 1983 however he focused
on Christian teaching itself, suggesting Bonhoeffer’s nonreligious Christianity as a way to go
beyond sacralization as meaningless routine. There was opportunity in the modern trend of
secularization (understood as separating religious sentiment from political institutions),
because it left a space for religion in which individuals could reconnect with a transcendent
sanctum. “No sacral system has authority over Christ,” Pospieszalski concluded.45 In 1977,
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Pospieszalski advised the young opposition to learn from how the Catholic church engaged in
pragmatic dialogue with the communist state. In 1983, the older émigré invited the secular left
to engage with Christian teaching rather than the church, because the former was itself a
bulwark against harmful political ideologies.
Marek Majorek contributed a book review to this section in which he asked whether the
sacred was returning from a most unlikely source: contemporary academia. He described a
West in crisis, society suffering from dehumanization through a pursuit of objectivity and
rationality—and proposed a way out of it in study of the sacred. He posited that scientific
thought did not cause desacralization, rather it filled the space that desacralization left behind.
An interest in the sacred from a scientific point of view was a genuine attempt to deepen
understanding of the world through openness to its cosmic wonder—a way of moving away
from an anthropocentric view of existence, Majorek argued.
Similar to Majorek, Dorosz in his essay contribution to this 1983 issue again identified in
both Eastern Europe and the West the same moral crisis—one that encompassed all of
European civilization. Already in his 1976-1977 essay he had written that liberal humanism, that
key concept at the core of European civilization after the Renaissance, contained the very
assumptions about man in the world that go on to corrupt Soviet Communism. A trend toward
the sacred was manifesting itself in European civilization as people became conscious of a lack
of moral imperative in rational thought, Dorosz now hypothesized. He skipped from the
thought of one philosopher to another among those selected to be in the special issue. From
Eliade he borrowed the idea that secular civilization has repressed religious underpinnings.
From Ellul, that politics is a modern religion.
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The broad range and vast number of thinkers that Dorosz cites is dizzying. A partial list
of the thinkers that Dorosz drew on to describe the aforementioned European crisis includes
German American philosopher and theologian Paul Tillich, German theologian Karl Rahner, neoorthodox theologian Vladimir Lossky, Austrian-Jewish and Israeli philosopher Martin Buber,
Trappist theologian Thomas Merton, Benedictines Bede Griffifths and Aelred Graham, the Jesuit
William Johnston, Catholic thinker Raimundo Panikkar, and Anglican monk Herbert Slade.
Reminiscent of Bonhoeffer’s concept of nonreligious Christianity, Dorosz noted that perhaps
the death of God in European civilization is the opening up to a closer relationship to the
sacred—one not moderated by idols, whether religious or secular, thereby overcoming a crisis
present both in the Soviet East and the liberal West. This post-death-of-God freedom opened
those living in European civilization up to existential dread as they take responsibility for their
own faith. By responsibility, Dorosz meant what Bonhoeffer did: that faith must rest in each
human person and not be sought in validation from others, or from institutions like the Catholic
church. This concept of responsibility imbues Christian Personalism and the existentialist
philosophy from which it is derived.
If post-God Europe was to overcome its flaws, people had to cultivate compassion for
the downtrodden within themselves—for their fellow man—Dorosz continued. This is the first
step toward God (Dorosz here notes that he is paraphrasing an Islamic maxim) that will result in
God taking ten steps toward you. Dorosz called his musing utopian, recognizing “the
imperfection of our world and the handicap of human nature.”46 But to be free is to embrace
responsibility in an uncertain existence: “We only know that taking the first step depends
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entirely on us, that nobody and nothing will protect us from the risk of [our] decisions.” Dorosz
here left the realm of scholarly analysis and argued that a Europe in which individuals overcome
their existential dread by embracing responsibility through compassion for others—through
love—was the only hope he could think of for a civilization (encompassing and so bringing
together Eastern and Western Europe) that had lost its way.
The only remaining piece in this 1983 thematic section is by Leszek Kołakowski. Back in
1966, just as he was beginning to take an approach to religion that he would refine over the
rest of his life, Kołakowski wrote an introduction for the Polish translation of Mircea Eliade’s
Traité d’Histoire des Religions. There Kołakowski writes that there are two types of people who
study religion: those who reduce its potency to materialist explanations, that it fills a social
need in society, and those who see it as a basic human need but not one that is reducible to a
mask on some more tangible, scientifically explained phenomenon. Rather, religion is worthy of
consideration in itself. Kołakowski put Eliade in the latter group but added that Eliade
approached his work as a philosopher rather than a theologian. This too will become the mode
in which Kołakowski, ex-Marxist philosopher, studied religion for the rest of his career. Eliade—
whose early fascist sympathies became well-known only after his death in 1986—thus belongs
to the intellectual history of the Polish opposition just as much as the victim of fascism, Dietrich
Bonhoeffer.47
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In Religion, Kołakowski argued that taboos—irrational beliefs—underpin not only
religion but through it the fabric of society itself (implying that they are ever-present, even, as
in Cold War Eastern Europe, in places where religion is not). “Mircea Eliade, to whom my
understanding of the problems arising in comparative religious studies owes a great deal…”
wrote Kołakowski in this 1982 work.48 There the Pole traced the contentious relationship
between Christianity and Enlightenment values. Because Christian teaching argues against the
idea that there are no limits to man’s perfectibility it is often described as anti-humanist. But to
be anti-humanist is not the same as being anti-human.
“…[E]mpirically it is far from obvious that humanism in its radically anti-Christian
version—i.e. that which implies that the human race does not find any criteria of good
and evil ready-made but may fashion them as it pleases—produces a better, less
aggressive and less suffering human community. Recent history seems rather to suggest
that attempts, in traditionally Christian societies, to achieve a perfect ‘liberation’ from
what radical humanists believed was man’s bondage under God’s imaginary tyranny,
were to threaten mankind with a more sinister slavery than Christianity ever
encouraged.”49
According to Kołakowski, Christianity in its anti-humanism saves humanity from totalitarian
bondage. He did not encourage blind faith, however. His claim was based on personal
experience, but it could not be reasoned empirically. Kołakowski, like Dorosz, straddled the
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spiritual and secular world: “It is possible to say that there is neither Providence to help us nor
infinite human self-creativity to lead us towards perfection and that we have to face defeat as
the ultimate outcome of all human efforts,” he wrote.50
While doubting humanity’s potential for self-actualization through rationalist ideologies
like that devised by Marx, Kołakowski (who wrote his doctoral dissertation on Baruch Spinoza)
retained a degree of religious skepticism. Since God’s existence could never rationally be
proven and the twentieth century had shown evidence of humanity’s inability to perfect itself,
Kołakowski suggested that the sensible thing to do would be to revert forward into some sort of
belief. He described how according to Pascal’s wager, a libertine (defined as a person living
without moral principles or a sense of responsibility) should begin to behave as if God exists
because this will lead to the development of real faith alongside a conscious acceptance that
this change has made their earthly existence more pleasant.51 Paraphrasing Pascal, Kołakowski
described how human will, imagination as freely cultivated belief born of responsibility would
lead the libertine to God (and on a broader scale could interrupt the perceived crisis of
European civilization). But it is up to us to want to save ourselves, rather than waiting for
irrefutable evidence that we can or should: “no intellectual contrivance, however ingenious,
can of its own power prompt us to such acts or to any acts whatsoever,” Kołakowski
concluded.52
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The same sort of self-actualization (so reminiscent as well of Bonhoeffer’s writing) is
seen already in Kołakowski’s influential 1971 essay, printed in Kultura, entitled “Theses on Hope
and Hopelessness.”53 The piece is an attempt at shaking off passivity in the face of a political
system that does not seem to work for or represent the people that it purports to serve.
Writing about what hope there was in Eastern Europe for creating a more just society, in the
early 1970s still described by him as a better socialist one, Kołakowski wrote:
To what extent a movement for the establishment of such a society is possible depends
to a considerable degree… on the extent to which society believes that it is possible. As
the nature of a given society is dependent in part on its own self-image, there cannot be
in social change a pure potential concealed in material circumstances alone and
independent of the degree of awareness of potentialities by the people.
Hope would come from belief or conviction. Like Pascal’s libertine, the Polish intelligentsia had
to take that first step on their own (as Dorosz too argued they should in his 1977 essay). A
better world had to be—must be—imagined before it can become reality; willed into existence.
In 1971, Kołakowski suggested that anyone who inspires hope is performing this actualization,
taking the first crucial leap of faith: “Thus in the countries of socialist despotism, those who
inspire hope are also the inspirers of a movement which could make this hope real—just as in
society’s attempts to understand itself, object and subject often coincide.”54 His call in 1971
should be understood as going out to both activists in Poland and (fellow) émigré intellectuals
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like the group of people who would start Aneks a couple of years after this essay was written.
Encouraged to have hope—belief that they could make a difference—by the likes of Giedroyc
and Kołakowski, the editors of Aneks were able to instill hope in others by the very fact that the
publication reached Poland. Decades later, Eugeniusz Smolar outlined the inner workings of a
“Circle of Hope”: the circulation of ideas between Poland and émigré publishers in the West.55
Smolar was likely not thinking specifically of self-actualizing belief when he conceived of the
“Circle of Hope,” but the spark to act against a sociopolitical system considered stable,
powerful—and totalitarian—emanated then from the existentialist, phenomenological
philosophies described above intermingling with Christian philosophy and theology.
In the introduction to his 1982 Religion, Kołakowski wrote that although he is
considered a scholar of the philosophy of religion, he struggled to define either of the two
terms. Through Hegel, among others, the continental tradition of the philosophy of religion had
focused on the effect of religion on thinking about history, Kołakowski said, “…on the way in
which various civilizations or mankind as a whole have expressed through religious symbols the
perception of their destiny.” This description understood the study of religion—if it is about the
perception of a society’s destiny—as a study of utopia. Or rather, reason in the minds of
Enlightened philosophers had turned the philosophy of religion into deliberations on utopia.
But Kołakowski insisted that they missed an integral part of the human experience: they treated
religion as something sterile and academic and not something embedded in “cultural contexts”
or “real worries of both religious and irreligious people.”56 To Kołakowski and others writing in
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this special section, religion had once again become something embedded in people’s lived
reality—a potential salvation from real problems in their peculiarly dystopian cultural context.
Having taken a keen interest in religion from the perspective of an unbeliever as a child,
to becoming disillusioned with Marxism but still describing a possible socialist future in 1971,
Kołakowski explicitly described a philosophical underpinning rooted in Christianity for the Polish
intellectual opposition in his introduction to the 1976-1977 special section on socialism and
Christianity. By this 1983 issue there was hardly any room for a rationalistic or “humanist”
understanding of what kind of changes needed to take place in Eastern Europe. Rather,
people’s spirits had to be rescued from indifference caused by an impoverished,
anthropocentric conception of being.
A sense of shared civilizational crisis rooted in a retreat from spirituality and embrace of
the belief in infinite progress was expressed in a number of the selections (most explicitly by
Eliade and Majorek). Moreover, it was hypothesized that the West (or Europe as a whole) now
had to look beyond or out of itself to find a way out of its crisis. To save European culture,
intellectuals would at the least have to seek novel positions created within European
civilization, like the peculiar thought of Bonhoeffer, or to study developments in Eastern Europe
like the short-lived Solidarność phenomenon (which had already by 1983 been crushed by
martial law) and the intellectual body of work that helped to shape it—of which these debates
in Aneks were a part. With this 1983 section, Dorosz argued that all of European civilization was
in crisis, not just Poland, and the West could learn how to overcome its purported civilizational
crisis from solutions proposed in Eastern Europe.
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Dorosz himself was influenced by thinkers that predated and so transcended the Cold
War dichotomy of Eastern and Western Europe: Karl Barth and Bonhoeffer (and influences on
them, like Kierkegaard), both associated with the Nazi era Confessing Church in Germany, along
with existentialists and those influenced by Eastern religions like Karl Jaspers. Alongside these
thinkers, Leszek Kołakowski had an influence on Dorosz, the Aneks milieu and many others of
this generation which is difficult to overstate. Kołakowski was influenced by existentialist and
phenomenological philosophers, theologians and scholars of Eastern religions, including those
referenced above. These constellations not only make up the intellectual web of Dorosz (and
Kołakowski) but underpin the philosophy of the Polish secular opposition who were the
theoreticians of the Solidarność movement. The 1976-1977 pieces by ordained clergy Jacek Salij
and Stefan Małkowski are represent a trend toward similar philosophical positions by at least
those members of the Church who were at the time open to dialogue with intellectuals. This
group of clergy, heavily influenced by phenomenologists, existentialists, radical Christian
philosophers and theologians could count among their numbers the Polish Pope himself, Karol
Wojtyła.
The historian Jan Józef Lipski presented a less spiritual appraisal in the same 1983 issue.
Lipski, a respected secular intellectual and mentor to Michnik, questioned the theory that the
Polish opposition had a Christian ethos in an essay which appeared in this issue but outside of
the thematic section on religion. Lipski wrote that the opposition is influenced by multiple
sources, including Christianity. The “Christian” ethos, exemplified by avoiding lies, hatred and
revenge—while promoting forgiveness—is important, he wrote, but Lipski cautioned that this
was only a part of the ethos of the opposition. “The entire sphere of macrosocial life—that is,
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the sphere that goes beyond the attitude of man toward his neighbors—is considered but little
in the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles,” he wrote, “so that those who wish to apply
Christian ethics to social life must make an effort of interpretation and adaptation.”57 In Lipski’s
interpretation then, the ethics of the Polish opposition did not come any more naturally to
Christians than they did to secular intellectuals.
Furthermore, there had been alongside Christianity genuinely secular values that
“enriched the Christian ethos,” Lipski wrote. Here Lipski built an argument centered on
Christianity’s tolerance of slavery which he understood broadly as taking away a person’s
subjectivity—their free will (Dorosz meanwhile argued that rejecting transcendence erases
subjectivity). The institution had to be convinced to move away from this position by arguments
from outside, though these outside arguments reinforced Christian ethics. Finally, Lipski asked
rhetorically if democracy is Christian and answered that it is but had not always been. The
subtext was that Christianity and democracy had enriched each other. This essay would go on
to appear as a chapter of Lipski’s 1983 history of the opposition, eponymously named after the
Worker’s Defense Committee acronym: KOR.
Connections between Polish leftists and Catholic intellectuals began to form
immediately after 1968. It is with this openness to ideas and specifically to Christianity that the
Polish émigrés associated with Aneks approached the Western left after emigration. The Poles
came from the left, felt comfortable with Western leftist intellectuals, but also criticized the
positions of many of these Westerners as naïve and orthodox—too orthodox in their Marxism,
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which had been discredited in Poland. The Poles had grown up with Marxism or even in it. They
had explored as many of its potential paths as anyone else but also its dead ends—and they
had suffered for that personally. In emigration, Polish intellectuals sought people with a similar
openness.
Even if Aleksander Smolar, editor of Aneks, maintained a critical detachment to this
novel turn toward Christian philosophy or even Christianity, he understood why it was
occurring and he supported his friends in Poland through it. For Smolar, it was the exploration
of new avenues of thoughts and careful consideration of all possibilities that was most
important. This was the ethos of Aneks. At the same time as his ex-Marxist friends were
expanding their horizons, he experienced from many of his Western interlocutors a continued
insistence on ideas that had betrayed his milieu. He found comrades with open minds in the
group of French liberals surrounding Raymond Aron (many of them also ex-Marxists), which
had its own connections to the same French Christian Personalist circles that had for decades
been in dialogue with their Polish counterparts in the milieu out of which in 1978 would come
the Polish pope. This transnational circle was increasingly concerned not just with Eastern
Europe but with communism as a symptom of a crisis of Western civilization. Poland was
simultaneously an extreme example of this crisis and contained solutions for it. As communism
collapsed, this position—as Smolar recognized—left both liberalism and non-Catholic Polish
identity vulnerable.
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Chapter Eight: Polish-Jewish Relations in Aneks
As a rule, only people who can look each other in the eye from equal footing tell each other the
truth.
-Rafael Scharf to Andrzej Szczypiorski
In 1986, one year before Jagiellonian University professor Jan Błoński’s well-known
essay on Polish-Jewish relations, entitled “Biedni Polacy patrzą na getto” (Poor Poles Look at
the Ghetto) and asking Poles to accept shared guilt for the Holocaust, was published in the
Catholic journal Tygodnik Powszechny, the Aneks editors published a special section entitled
“Żydzi jako Polski problem” (Jews as a Polish problem), reckoning both with the Holocaust and
long-held perceptions regarding Jewishness in Polish society.1 This chapter examines the
creation of this thematic section in which are published, among others, Jan Tomasz Gross and
Aleksander Smolar, who were then editors of Aneks. The chapter focuses on these two thinkers
while situating the section in a long-running debate about Polish-Jewish relations in the
twentieth century and considering its influence. In part because of the perceptions that the
issue addresses, this block of writing in Aneks did not elicit a broad public reaction like the
Błoński piece a year later, though its publishing did have an impact on leading intellectuals.
This analysis highlights the importance of identity in debates about Polish-Jewish
relations not as a simple Pole-Jew dynamic but rather Pole-émigré-Jew (of course any person’s
identity encompasses far more than this). These identities are considered as both contested
within a person and experienced from without. How do people conceive of their own identity
and how does this interact with how others identify them? The above components of identity—
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national, personal and cultural—are sometimes contradictory, sometimes complimentary and
almost always overlapping. Decades later, in 21st century Poland, Jews are still often considered
a Polish problem rather than integrable into Polish identity.
Discussions of Polish-Jewish relations often foreground pogroms and the Holocaust—
the past and death. Alongside this in the conversations summarized here is a conversation
about what components of a person’s identity are compatible with Polish identity. Thinking
about identity creates cracks that offer a possibility for theorizing life and culture—the future.
While some, most notably Adam Michnik, have consistently advocated forgetting the past to
focus on the future, both Smolar and Gross in their essays insist that the latter can only be built
on what has transpired. In their essays about the past they hint at the future by virtue of their
desire for Poland to be more tolerant or pluralistic (like the Western states in which they came
to live) and that Polish behavior before, during and after the war was rooted in intolerance. But
a more tolerant Poland cannot be created without sufficiently processing intolerant beliefs and
past behavior. Tolerance and pluralism necessitate the acceptance of a Polish identity that is
not homogenous and monoethnic. This thematic section was yet another way in which the
editors of Aneks worked toward the goal of keeping Poland’s intellectual life (and with it Polish
society and culture more broadly) in touch with the rest of Europe, in a sense importing
tolerance.
On the one hand Smolar and Gross were writing in Aneks about aspects of their own
identity which were deeply felt. At the same time, as émigrés they sensed better than those
against whom they built their arguments that it was prudent in the context of Cold War politics
(in addition to being morally right) to confront Polish antisemitic traditions and historical
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traumas rather than waiting for some future opportune time to work through them. Smolar and
Gross build not only on ideas from Poland but especially on the writing of Rafael Scharf in
Kultura, another exile writing in a publication created in exile. Scharf, Smolar, Gross and others
mentioned here are simultaneously part of Polish culture and the West. Because of these
authors and the publications they wrote in and edited, Polish culture too became—was—a part
of the West in the waning decades of the Cold War. The authors sought both to address
national issues and put them in a global context.
The special section begins with an introduction by the opposition activist and sociologist
Jakub Karpiński entitled “Asymmetry,” referring to the relationship between people considered
Jewish and the vast majority of non-Jewish Poles. This was a demographic and cultural situation
in which the majority held a higher order of agency and thus responsibility. Włodżimierz
Goldkorn, then a journalist in Italy, wrote about the differing perspectives on the Holocaust
present at the time—different for Jewish survivors, for Polish witnesses, and for Jews outside of
Poland. Goldkorn made two striking claims: one, that the Holocaust hardly changed Polish
perceptions of Jews because Polish antisemitism had its own unique roots (shared with other
Eastern European nations). Two, that (even if Polish perceptions of Jews were not already
seeded with this antisemitism) there was little that could have changed the outcome of the
Holocaust short of stopping the German war machine. As an émigré and because these very
texts were the bleeding edge of the conversation about the Holocaust among Polish
intellectuals, Goldkorn bases his essay on Western sources, beginning with a book about the
Jewish perception of historical time by Columbia University scholar Yosef H. Yerushalmi.
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Goldkorn mentions the Claude Lanzmann documentary Shoah and cites the German-Jewish
historian Dan Diner.
Gross-Smolar-Błoński
Beside Western perspectives, Smolar and Gross took inspiration from a select group of
Polish-language writers on Polish-Jewish relations, evident by the ample references to prior
texts in their two essays. Błoński’s piece is published soon after and the three essays cast
shadows on each other (though Błoński does not refer to Gross or Smolar). Gross and Smolar
expressed the need to address deeply rooted issues in the national narrative about Jewishness
in Polish lands and in doing so created an opening for evolving the notion of what it means to
be Polish. To what degree this opening was capitalized upon continues to be an open question.
One reason that Aneks did not have as profound an impact as Błoński piece is that the
circulation run of émigré publication was surely smaller. Tygodnik Powszechny was a legally
published journal in Poland while Aneks was smuggled from abroad, often into the hands of
acquaintances of the publishers. The Aneks issue was nevertheless popular. We know this
because it was re-printed by multiple underground publishers in Poland. It diverged profoundly
from the non-participatory ethos put forth in the first issue of the journal. Aneks in this case
was not above the fray but inside it. The editors hardly had a choice in the matter. The journal’s
position, declared in its introduction over a decade prior, was dictated by a controversy about a
piece that Aleksander Smolar and Jan Gross had written to inaugurate it. In the piece, they
wrote about belonging to the nation as a choice which enabled them and other émigrés to
remain just as part of Poland as people in the country. Their friends in Poland had found this
introduction unacceptable, however. They could not afford to be associated with such concepts
coming from a journal founded by people who were considered Jewish. As a result, that essay
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was scrapped and a very neutral one, in which the editors promise in a variety of ways not to
editorialize, was written to replace it (this is examined in Chapter Three).
Then in 1973 and again in 1986, Gross and Smolar were to some degree writing about
their own position in Polish society. When the “Jews as a Polish problem” section appeared
thirteen years later, Aneks was still a foreign and a “Jewish” journal to many people in the
country. The section was thus shaped by how they perceived Aneks to be received by the Polish
intellectuals who read the journal (which was at the same time how those readers perceived
them) and how Jewishness was perceived in Polish culture more broadly. As indicated by the
response Aneks received to its mission statement in 1973 and to this thematic section, the
authors were to many readers (judged from without), unlike Jan Błoński a year later, not
completely Polish. Their take on Polish-Jewish relations was seen as more dangerous as they
could do damage to the good name of Poland (including the reputation of the dissident
opposition)—a commonly voiced concern. This expectation that the authors would adopt a
critical stance toward the treatment of Jews and Jewishness in Polish culture because they were
considered to be a part of this injured minority group made their position more susceptible to
marginalization or even to being disregarded in the minds of those readers.
Unlike the introduction in the first issue of Aneks, Gross and Smolar did not self-censor
in 1986, though Smolar did attempt to tone down the Gross piece prior to its publication (Gross
instead included four pages of explanatory text before the body of his essay). The titles of the
section and the essays themselves speak volumes.2 Both essays (the content of which is

2
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analyzed later in the chapter) call for Poles to interrogate Polish behavior during the Holocaust
and bear some measure of responsibility for it. Gross titled his essay after Ten jest z ojczyzny
mojej (He is from my homeland), a book by writer Władysław Bartoszewski, who was a
founding member of the wartime Council for Aid to Jews, often referred to by its wartime
codename Żegota. Bartoszweski’s book documents aid to Jews by Poles during the Holocaust.
That Gross alluded to Bartoszewski was both a pragmatic choice and one in part produced by
the younger Pole’s personal history. Bartoszewski had been defended in court by Gross’s father
after the war for his underground activity in the Polish Home Army (AK).3 He was for a time
imprisoned in Auschwitz. The title of Bartoszewski’s book refers to a 1943 poem by the poet
Antoni Słonimski about solidarity with the oppressed whose last line reads “he is from my
homeland. A human being.” To this Gross adds in the title (only in the Polish-language version)
of his essay: “…but I don’t like him.”
Gross recalls that because of his essay the section’s creation was tumultuous and his
piece almost did not appear in it. By submitting his piece for publication in Aneks, Gross
inadvertently revealed fine fractures among dissident intellectuals based on identity (both
personal and perceived by others) and past trauma. Aleksander Smolar had asked Bartoszewski
to respond to Gross, along with the respected dissidents Jan Józef Lipski (Gross uses a Lipski
article where the latter decries Polish responsibility during the Holocaust as a foil in his essay)
and Jacek Kuroń. A Kuroń piece does appear in the Aneks section but is not a response to Gross.
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From that very activity Bartoszewski was well-acquainted with Gross’s mother. Gross and
Pawlicka, ......bardzo dawno temu, mniej więcej w zeszły piątek..., 9–10.
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Kuroń instead contributed a recollection of his from occupied Warsaw—a tragic story about a
Jewish orphan that the Kuroń family hid.4
While Błoński wrote metaphorically that God had stopped Poles’ hand from striking
Jews, Gross before him had argued that Poles actually struck eagerly. Gross recalls that it was
not only acquaintances in Poland but Smolar who, in large part due to the reluctance of the
Polish response, tried to convince Gross that his article was counter-productive: “He scolded
me in a four-page letter, tried to civilize me."5
All those asked to respond to Gross instead criticized his piece in private. The thrust of
the argument of each respondent is a familiar one that will shape the scholar’s career from that
point onward: that he had written something misleading, emotional and anti-Polish. At the
same time as Kuroń criticized Gross, he promised Smolar that he would defend his friend
against the attacks he was certain would come: “I will respond to those who will fling shit on
him and [all of] you.” Kuroń understood the perception of Aneks as a “Jewish” journal. He asked
Smolar if perhaps he couldn’t convince Gross to submit his piece for publication in the Parisbased Kultura instead.
Kuroń’s initial reaction exemplifies the continuation of a trend that Gross explicitly
wanted to break with his essay, which he ended by writing about a heartfelt gesture that was at
the same time inadvertently discriminatory. Kuroń was of course no antisemite. He was ready
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Some of Kuroń’s friends have commented that his young mind may have imagined the events
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to defend his Jewish friends against the shit that would be flung at them by other Poles. Rather,
he thought about the situation in an allosemitic mode. “This fear of society's antisemitism is
some kind of disease, I told myself, and I didn’t leave to continue to have to deal with it,”
Smolar remembers thinking when the original Aneks introduction was deemed too provocative
because it carved out too large a space within Polish culture for émigrés considered Jewish.6
While Smolar agreed with the thesis of the Gross piece, he already then found the tone with
which his friend presented his ideas to be provocative.7 Alongside Kuroń, Adam Michnik would
later criticize Gross for writing anti-Polish works.8
There are four pages of explanation at the beginning of the Aneks version of “He is from
my homeland… but I don’t like him” that are meant for Poles only. The English version in the
European Journal of Sociology does not contain them. They are meant for friends of Gross,
written in reaction to Kuroń, Bartoszewski and Lipski. In his chapter on Jewish migration from
Poland in his vast work about the events of 1968, the historian Jerzy Eisler credits the 1986
Aneks issue as the most important collection of texts on Polish-Jewish relations that was
inspired by Lanzmann’s Shoah, citing also special issues of Catholic publications Więz and Znak.9
Eisler follows the thinking of Kuroń, Bartoszewski and Lipski, all of whom who had credited
Shoah with eliciting an emotional reaction toward Polish-Jewish relations among intellectuals.
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Smolar still wholeheartedly supported Gross then and names Fear as the Gross work whose
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But Jan Gross specifically writes that Shoah had nothing to do with the realization of his
controversial article. He had already written a version of it for another Polish publication in
1979 but it had become defunct before the piece was published. His critics (some of whom
were friends and mentors) had agreed that “the blood of the Maccabees” within him—perhaps
agitated by Lanzmann’s film—had motivated his passionate interpretation. Gross responded
already in 1986 that it was rather the blood of the Piast dynasty, his Polish blood, that caused
him to write.10 His gentile mother was involved in the underground and during the war had met
his father, a Jew in hiding. Gross identified first and foremost as a Pole.
Gross revised his 1979 essay because he had been invited by the British historian Tony
Judt to give a lecture at Oxford in 1984. After British historian Antony Polonsky’s
groundbreaking conference on Polish-Jewish relations at Oxford that same year, Gross was
invited back in 1985 by the newly formed Institute for Polish-Jewish studies. Both Gross and Jan
Błoński had attended the conference. Błoński would go on to write his “Poor Poles Look at the
Ghetto” inspired by his time among Westerners at the conference and—according to
Polonsky—a paper presented there by prewar émigré Rafael Scharf entitled “Cum ira et
studio.”11 Błoński writes in his 1987 essay: “...likely everyone who has been abroad, let's say in
Western Europe, has heard the question, are Poles antisemites? Or more clearly: why are Poles
antisemites? I myself have heard this question many times...”12
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Aleksander Smolar thinks that it was not only the conference, not just Shoah, but the
Aneks issue that contributed to the publication of later articles like that written by Błoński.
Maybe we contributed to making it possible to talk about [Polish-Jewish issues] at all. I
remember a visit to us by an outstanding Catholic intellectual, a man of great class, who
wanted to tell me something about this issue of Aneks. I saw how terribly he suffered
when he had to say the word "Jew".13
According to this interpretation, Błoński’s breakthrough article would not have been palatable
to Polish intellectuals without the Aneks section that appeared a year prior. Instead it was Jan
Gross who took the initial intellectual criticism as Aneks broached the subject of Poles as both
victims and perpetrators a year before Błoński. And even then, though Błoński used a meek,
apologetic tone, Tygodnik Powszechny received hundreds of letters, many of them highly
critical of “Poor Poles Look at the Ghetto” for suggesting that Poles bore any guilt for the
Holocaust. Władysław Siła-Nowicki, a prominent intellectual and lawyer, published a response
accusing Błoński of being anti-Polish. The critical sentiment presented by Siła-Nowicki
resonated widely in Polish intellectual life at the time.14
Szczypiorski-Scharf
Both Gross and Błoński were inspired by Rafael Scharf. It was a 1979 polemic between
Scharf and writer Andrzej Sczczypiorski in Kultura that had inspired the original Gross essay.
There Scharf responds to a Szczypiorski essay published in May of 1979 entitled “Poles and
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country of witnesses,” in Piotr Forecki, Reconstructing Memory: The Holocaust in Polish Public
Debates (New York: Peter Lang, 2013).
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Jews,” which was written for publication in Germany.15 Szczypiorski had operated in the
underground during the occupation, participated in the Warsaw uprising and was sent to
Sachsenhausen concentration camp between the pacification of Warsaw and the end of the
war in Europe.
In his essay, Szczypiorski intended to combat the idea—calling it a myth—that all Poles
are antisemites. This notion was spread by “dumb Poles, dumb Jews and dumb Germans.”
Writing for the German press, Szczypiorski passed guilt about the Holocaust onto the shoulders
of the German people while at the same time recalling the idea that Poland was a bastion for
Western European Jews for centuries. But then came Jews fleeing Russian persecution that
were different and did not want to assimilate. These foreigners almost brought persecution
onto themselves as a result, especially in interwar Poland, Szczypiorski argued. This problem
was magnified when Jews—understandably, Szczypiorski added—filled the ranks of leftist and
communist organizations.
Antisemitism in Poland practically ceased to exist after the Holocaust, Szczypiorski
wrote. Most surviving Jews abandoned any remaining cultural & religious ties in order to
assimilate into the communist world of postwar Poland. An extremely effective way by which
younger cadres could push their older colleagues out of the way so that they could take up
positions in Party ranks was to accuse those that could be accused of Zionism when the 1967
Arab-Israeli conflict presented the opportunity. And even under these circumstances, Polish
people thought of the Israeli victory as Polish, Szczypiorski continued. It was rather the
leadership of the Soviet Union that was antisemitic. And the younger Polish cadres were merely
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exploiting this fact against older Polish communists with Jewish roots. According to Szczypiorski,
then, the events of 1968 in Poland were an internal battle that affected as collateral damage
young assimilated Jews raised as “leftists and internationalists.” They at the time demanded
real socialism. “Young people whose parents came from Jewish backgrounds suddenly felt
spurned by their homeland.” But Szczypiorski attacked even the youth whom he had just
expressed pity for. “When emigrating, they took with them love and compassion for the
country,” he wrote.16
At the end of his essay, Szczypiorski paradoxically asked for forgiveness but rejected the
bearing of guilt. “Among the exiles of 1968, the majority are those whom as a Pole for the rest
of my life I will ask for forgiveness, although I personally do not feel guilty for what
representatives of the party and state bureaucracy have done in my country…”17 In
Szczypiorski’s mind then, Jews had set up the system that they were now persecuted by. Poles
should ask those assimilated Jews whose Polishness was refuted in 1968 for forgiveness,
Szczypiorski said, even though it was only a certain group within the Party that committed this
wrong. He went on: “But there are among those exiles and those whom I will not give my hand
as a human because they have done too much harm to other people.” Szczypiorski meant
communists with Jewish backgrounds. “The fact that they have fallen victim to the mores of
their own political and moral environment may evoke sympathy but no respect.” The allimportant Polish hand had made its first appearance. While in Poland in 1968 there was indeed
a power struggle in the ranks of the Communist Party, Szczypiorski also to some degree relied
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on the antisemitic trope of all Jews being somehow connected and thus responsible for the acts
of others considered Jewish in order to refute antisemitism.
As Szczypiorski to a great degree shifted the blame for Polish antisemitism on Jews
themselves, Scharf’s essay was a refutation of many antisemitic tropes popular in Poland along
with a plea for Poles to accept a measure of responsibility for the prevalence of antisemitism in
Polish society. Scharf too needed help in order to shake Szczypiorski’s hand, though he used
other physical gestures as metaphor: “As a rule, only people who can look each other in the eye
from equal footing tell each other the truth,” he wrote in response. Exile had finally allowed
Poles and Jews the opportunity to speak more openly about their shared past.
Scharf immediately brushed aside the idea that Jews across the world were in
agreement with each other, noting that this thinking sounded dangerously like the myth of
“The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,” spread by Russian propagandists. Scharf noted as well the
growth of antisemitism in Poland during the interwar period but gave different reasons: the
story of the Jews being responsible for the death of Christ was spread by the Church and
political platforms were created based around the persecution of Jews. Nevertheless, this was
still much better than Germany after 1933, he added.
But the primary source of Jewish animosity toward Poles was the behavior of Poles
during the Nazi occupation, Scharf wrote. Only Jews went to the gas chambers solely because
they were Jewish and it was only Jewish children that were murdered in such a way. The Church
was silent as this horror occurred: despite personally acting to save Jews during the war, for
example, it was two decades later on his deathbed that Pope John XXIII was openly repentant
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and as a Christian begged for forgiveness, Scharf wrote.18 Poles were on the whole not simply
disinterested when it came to helping Jews but actually the main threat to the lives of the latter
in hiding, Scharf continued. This was because foreign occupiers could generally not tell a Pole
from a Jew but Poles could. Jews existed in a hostile society. Meanwhile, if Gentile Poles were
being exterminated in camps, other Poles would have ripped the railroad tracks to them up
with their teeth, Scharf exclaimed. Foreshadowing both the tone and reception of Gross’s
essay, Scharf asked whether in such a situation it was any surprise that people whose families
and friends were murdered “are not always in their pronouncements prudent and moderate,
meticulously counting their words so as not to offend someone?”19
Coming to the end of his essay, Scharf contested Szczypiorski’s claim that the events of
1968 were purely political. Jewish losses were not even met with sympathy in Poland when the
extent of the genocide was revealed after the war, Scharf continued. Assimilated Jews
continued to hide their Jewishness, “to not irritate their fellow countrymen with their Jewish
presence.” Then in 1968 antisemitism succeeded as a rallying cry again. In short, antisemitic
propaganda continued to reliably resonate in Poland.
Finally, Scharf added a note based on his perspective as an émigré: Poles like
Szczypiorski did not understand that global opinion was not interested in separating those
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émigrés with whom Szczypiorski would shake hands and those whom he would turn his back
on. Szczypiorski repeated arguments that both to Scharf and viewed from beyond Poland were
not convincing:
Poles' apologetics for their attitude towards Jews during the occupation are not
effective when they want to balance the general position of indifference and hostility,
which was the rule, with acts of generosity and sacrifice, which were the exception. It
must be accepted that Polish society did not emerge unscathed from the overtly tragic
moral trial to which fate put it.
The paths of “the two saddest nations on earth” had parted forever, Scharf concluded, citing a
1947 poem by Antoni Słonimski (out of whose mind too came the eponymous poem that
inspired the Bartoszewski book and 1986 Gross essay).
In a short response to Scharf, Szczypiorski went further in absolving Poles of
responsibility. There is a difference between being passive and bearing ill-will, he wrote, and
Poles during the occupation could for the most part be accused only of the former. How could
anyone expect anything else when a Jew knocking on your door meant the threat of death for
you and your family, Szczypiorski argued.20 He again mentioned that Russian Jews did not
assimilate, claiming that their difference made them easy to pick out and difficult to hide.
Szczypiorski even lobbed an accusation back: why did Jews not rip up the tracks to the
camps prior to being rounded up themselves and then they passively went to their deaths.
“Were they sufficiently active?” Szczypiorski asked. During the war Poles were “astounded and
irritated” by this purported Jewish passivity. Szczypiorski, like Scharf, pointed to the passivity of
Western powers when it came to stopping genocide. Though he agreed with Scharf about the

20

Gross writes in 1986 that many acts that Poles committed during the occupation were
punishable by death, but people did them without a second thought. See: Gross, “Ten Jest z
Ojczyzny Mojej... Ale Go Nie Lubię.”
327

silence of the Catholic church, he pointed out heroic exploits by individual clergy in Poland. As
for 1968: there was no violence—well, maybe a little—said Szczypiorski. Finally, Szczypiorski
would not cease being insulted by those who emigrated in 1968 and became anti-Polish—who
had thought of nations disparagingly (in a sense that encompasses both Polishness and
Jewishness) as something bourgeois—but had now suddenly embraced Jewishness. Szczypiorski
thus positioned himself as defending the good name of Poland in the eyes of the West as
Błoński would at the beginning of his essay years later.
While Błoński in his essay inspired by Scharf wrote in 1987 about God’s hand stopping
Poles from striking their Jewish brothers, Scharf had written in 1979 that Poles hadn’t lifted a
finger to help. The argument Gross works on in the intervening years is suspended between
these two sentiments temporally and metaphorically. This topic evokes the concepts of guilt
and responsibility, though a problem remained as these intellectuals debated collective
responsibility which was in the communist era anathema: part of the totalitarian formula and
saddled with erasing the individual. The debates analyzed in this chapter form a framework
erected in an attempt to write about an event for which literature is inadequate, as the Polish
poet Czesław Miłosz said. “So I will now abandon literature and refer to my personal
experience,” wrote Błoński early in his essay. Perhaps this inadequacy is why physical
metaphors were so prevalent in these texts; why authors evoked gestures made with the eyes,
the teeth and the hands. Leaning on personal experiences, authors also brought identity into
the debate.
Both Smolar and Gross cite Szczypiorski. His essay surely grated not only for its
argumentation about the Holocaust but because of the explanation he presents for the events
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of 1968 in Poland and the subsequent mass emigration that they sparked. He framed exiles as
traitors if they dared to criticize Poland or Polish behavior during the occupation. Szczypiorski’s
essay title, “Poles and Jews,” recalls Polish-Jewish sociologist Witold Jedlicki’s “Chamy i Żydy” or
“Oafs and Jews,” about infighting between two factions within the Polish Communist Party,
which was published in Kultura in 1962. Beyond the title, Jedlicki too described a political
struggle during which one side saw fit to utilize antisemitism as a weapon against the other
even though the political players did not ostensibly hold genuine antisemitic beliefs. Jedlicki
emigrated to Israel shortly before publishing his piece, coming close to fitting Szczypiorski’s
schema of an ex-communist émigré Jew that engages in denigrating Poland abroad. While
Błoński in 1987 still opened with the idea that Poles are looked upon as antisemites abroad, he
argued also that they had to accept responsibility for Polish acts of antisemitism.
It was not only those considered Jewish, like Smolar and Gross, who were writing about
their own identity; about the way that the Holocaust shaped the lives of those who were not
murdered. Those intellectuals defending the name of Poland wrote from a position of personal
trauma as well. They were some of the minority that had gone out of their way to act ethically
during the war. The likes of Bartoszewski and Szczypiorski experienced a concentration camp
from the inside. It must be noted in the spirit of Karpiński’s “Asymmetry” from this special
section of Aneks that they survived, but they themselves suffered more than many Polish
citizens not marked for death as Jews. And now they neither wanted to blame the more
fortunate nor look bad themselves after what they had been through. Theirs is a unique
position—they are some of the few who could say what they said and be considered worthy of
a response. It is understandable that the name of Poland being denigrated abroad would hurt
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Szczypiorski, a participant in the wartime underground who had survived internment in a
concentration camp. He was a philo-Semite, yet a gulf of misunderstanding lay between him
and Scharf—and between him and Gross.
Smolar, Gross, Past and Future
In his essay, Gross argued that the question of Polish guilt in relation to the Holocaust
had been phrased incorrectly. Poles were not and could not be expected to act heroically—to
risk their lives in order to save their friends, neighbors and acquaintances—only to act with
decency. But an unsettling percentage of Poles instead went out of their way to rob, betray and
even kill their neighbors given the opportunity. His essay is likely the most controversial one of
the six in the Aneks special section though not the most well-known. Aleksander Smolar’s essay,
entitled “Tabu i niewinność” (Taboo and innocence) closes the section. Here and in later years,
when Gross’s book Neighbors shook Poland, Smolar disagreed with the tone, if not aspects of
the content of Gross’s writing about Polish-Jewish relations. “He knows little about Jews,”
Aleksander Smolar would say in reference to Jan Gross decades later.21 Smolar in his piece
attempted to make sense of what Gross highlighted so starkly: why does an at best aloof
attitude toward Jews circulate in Polish society? How could it persist even as Jews were being
slaughtered? Even decades after the fact, when barely any who would call themselves Jewish
resided in Poland? It is Smolar’s essay that was likely the most well-known in Poland at the
time. Smolar recalls it being circulated independent of the rest of the section.
Aleksander Smolar would retrospectively say regarding intellectual discussions about
the Holocaust in communist Poland: “The best people were dominated by a sense of innocence,
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a fear of bringing up the subject, and a subconscious sense that the word "Jew" itself had
something obscene about it.”22 This was the motivation and context for Smolar’s “Taboo and
Innocence,” a more measured but equally as difficult piece as the one Gross submitted.
Smolar’s was the final article in the 1986 issue of Aneks. Rather than doing arithmetic (“Who
killed more?” as historian Timothy Snyder put it), Smolar’s essay is a “moral evaluation of the
attitude of Polish society towards the extermination of Jews.”23 It is a forty-page analysis of the
ways in which antisemitism had changed in Poland over the course of the twentieth century.
But the ways in which it metamorphosized are secondary to the point, which is that
antisemitism is ever-present in Polish society in the modern era. While many Polish intellectuals
painstakingly sought out moments of Polish tolerance of their Jewish countrymen, Poles of
Jewish background by virtue of identity (imposed or selected) and trauma saw in twentiethcentury Poland a constant: “antisemitism, antisemitism, antisemitism,” Smolar stated.24
Like Scharf, Smolar too wrote about the distance required to discuss Polish-Jewish
relations during and after the war. While Scharf evoked a physical distance from Poland, Smolar
emphasized the passage of time. Because they were further divorced from the horrors of
occupied Poland, a younger generation now demanded introspection. There was distance too,
Smolar continued, from a time that Poland was a bastion for European Jewry (an idea that
Szczypiorski invoked in 1979). As Western Europe secularized during the Enlightenment,
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conditions for Jews in Poland worsened because the Catholic church replaced the partitioned
state in binding Polish identity. This decline in conditions for Jews in Polish lands thus began
long before the Holocaust, though Smolar agreed with Szczypiorski that only the Western
powers could have effectively thwarted the latter. This unique historical root makes Polish
antisemitism distinct from the German antisemitism that fueled the Holocaust.
Smolar invoked Bartoszewski’s Ten jest z Ojczyzny mojej as well. He cited from
Bartoszewski’s book a 1942 pamphlet by the writer Zofia Kossak. Szczypiorski, Scharf’s
interlocutor, likewise had mentioned Kossak. She founded the underground organization
Żegota—which is honored as righteous among nations by Yad Vashem as Bartoszewski, himself
a co-founder, reminded the reader in his essay. In her pamphlet Kossak first condemned all who
stood idly by as Jews were murdered, then in the next breath (which Bartoszewski does not
cite) described Jews as the natural enemy of Poles and Jewish antagonism toward Poles as
being stronger than toward the Germans. Smolar used Kossak’s testimony to show that even
Poles like her who behaved most valiantly during the occupation often believed antisemitic
ideas too.
Polish antisemitism thus existed separately from Nazi propaganda and wasn’t tainted by
collaboration with the Nazis. Both Smolar and Gross cite a letter to the Polish government-inexile in London written by a general of the Home Army in Poland, Stefan Grot-Rowecki, in which
the latter stated that the majority of the population in Poland was antisemitic—even socialists.
As Goldkorn also wrote in this issue of Aneks, Poles drew on a tradition of antisemitism as it had
developed in Poland and surrounding Eastern European countries that had developed without
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Nazism.25 The Holocaust was seen as a problem between Jews and Germans that Polish relative
helplessness enabled an abdication of responsibility for. After the war came to an end, Poles
continued to be haunted by what had gone on before their eyes. They would escape the
ignominy of their Jewish brothers for Polish indifference only because of the massive crime that
the Germans had committed.
Moreover, many Poles would even benefit from having stood idly by, taking over
businesses, dwellings, and personal possessions of the murdered. Here Smolar developed an
argument about guilt that Błoński later referred to by invoking a “guardian mole” boring a
tunnel among the dead. Błoński took this image from the 1943 Czesław Miłosz poem “A Poor
Christian Looks at the Ghetto.” The mole is a metaphor reflecting the guilt built up inside those
who had known better and now had trouble answering for it. Miłosz had felt this guilt building
already during the war. What could explain the behavior of Poles who participated in pogroms
during the postwar years? Whether communist propaganda sparked it or not, regular Poles
murdered their own neighbors because the latter were Jewish. How could antisemitism be a
constant even in a country that was now largely without Jews? Polish intellectuals four decades
later met this phenomenon with “comforting formulas or silence,” Smolar wrote.
While some church leaders privately condemned antisemitism and the violence of
pogroms, those same persons publicly turned Jewishness into an expedient political category in
line with a centuries-old narrative of a Catholic Polish nation being persecuted by outsiders:
Żydokomuna (Jewish Communism). Under these auspices, antisemitism could be excused
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because Jews were seen as running the Communist Party. The reality was of course more
complicated: both people with Jewish and Gentile backgrounds were involved. And like Scharf,
Smolar mentioned that people with Jewish backgrounds were often eager to Polonize names
and family backgrounds after the war so as to blend into the new communist Polish nation.
Smolar described a Western consciousness and a Polish one. For the West, the
Holocaust was a shock because it had seemed to emanate from the pinnacle of Western
civilization and in the center of Christian Europe. As Scharf did, Smolar too quoted Pope John
XXIII and other Western Catholic authorities who since the Holocaust had expressed remorse
for inaction and accepted a measure of responsibility. Szczypiorski had not gone as far but
agreed with Scharf during their polemic years earlier that the Catholic church had accumulated
guilt through silence during the Holocaust. Antisemitism in the West had all but disappeared
since these embarrassing silences and attempts to accept responsibility, Smolar wrote. As an
émigré he could count his own experience as a testament to this difference between East and
West. But Poland’s unique pre-war flavor of antisemitic nationalism conversely was
strengthened by wartime experience. Polish nationalists had fought the Nazis, after all. And
Poles had suffered greatly as well, which allowed for the diversion of sympathy away from
millions of murdered Jews toward victimized Poles to continue a centuries old national
narrative.
The West was invoked by Smolar as a place where the status quo is one of tolerance—in
this case a positive example for Poles. Those that have to deal with public opinion in Poland
cultivate different sentiments than people conditioned by the West’s sensitivity toward
intolerance, he wrote. Antisemitism is an acute symptom of the broader problem of
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intolerance. Smolar wrote that the reader will find only three instances in Bartoszewski’s book,
a compilation of testimonies by Holocaust survivors and those who saved them, where the
authors voiced support for the respect of national minorities in Poland. He pointed out that
they were all émigrés.
While the fact that most Polish Jews had been murdered during the Holocaust had up to
this point been dominated by silence, Jews were painted as responsible for their own
victimization under communist rule. The purge of people considered Jewish from within the
Polish Communist Party in 1968 and protests by university youth (some of whom, like Smolar,
too were harassed by the party because they had Jewish roots) were portrayed by many
observers—like Szczypiorski in his Kultura essay—as a “family quarrel.”26 This quarrel resulted
in the remaining vast majority of people left in Poland who could be considered Jewish being
pushed out of the country. In 1968 Jews had been a political problem—either part of the ruling
elite or in emigration—and no longer an “economic, social, cultural” one, nor a part of Polish
society. By the 1980s Jews were no longer even a political problem, Smolar wrote, but a moral
one written into the history of the Polish nation. Smolar as an émigré both described and
embodied this “problem”.
Throughout the period of Polish history that Smolar described, Jews have in the eyes of
Poles been—whether they were communists, anti-, or anywhere in between—a burden or
problem. Yet among the Eastern bloc countries, an antisemitic purge only happened in Poland
after 1956 and after the Soviet shift in policy toward Israel, Smolar pointed out. And since some
young assimilated Jews with whom Smolar was well-acquainted were part of the opposition,
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antisemitism was invoked by the Polish state in propaganda against these activists in the 1970s
and into the 1980s. After Poland captured the attention of the world following the crushing of
Solidarność, Jewishness became an international problem for the government, Smolar wrote.
The Polish state did not want to look antisemitic in the eyes of a perceived influential
international (especially American) Jewry. And it helped the government that antisemitism was
present in Solidarność as well. Anti-communist Poles were annoyed about having international
sympathy for their cause ruined by the antisemitic government on the one hand and Jews
abroad (how many, after all, were left in Poland?) accusing even Solidarność of antisemitism on
the other. Karpiński in his piece pointed to this phenomenon as well.
Despite the unpleasant history, antisemitism was still a “matter of opinion” in 1980s
Poland, Smolar wrote; meaning that one could choose to be or not be antisemitic and remain
respectable or at least palatable to Polish society. Antisemitism was only bad if it led to
violence. Though there was a glimmer of hope, change—a sign of progress: Smolar wrote that
with the recent controversy created by Lanzmann’s Shoah, authors publishing in the
underground press (then still often printed abroad) had not resorted to the trope of Jews
ruining the good name of Poland in the international arena. He speculated that this was
because in the uncensored press people could write without the burden of government
censorship but also without the “national taboo” of publishing for an exclusively Polish
audience. The émigré press, as Scharf first observed when he wrote about being able to speak
about Polish-Jewish relations on equal footing in exile, provided this necessary distance.
Throughout his forty-page essay, Smolar as Polish intellectual guardian mole did not
allow what had taken place to be put out of mind. But he built on this analysis; he looked
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forward. Smolar described a younger generation that, free of the burden of wartime experience
and empowered by feelings of dignity stemming from the creation of a free sphere of
intellectual life in Poland, seemed to be embracing responsibility (and slowly rendering émigré
press like Aneks obsolete). Antisemitism in a country without Jews is a neurotic disorder, an
escape from reality in a state of powerlessness, Smolar concluded. There was only one cure:
“free public life, civic sense of responsibility for one's own destiny and faith in the liberating
power of truth.”27 In Smolar’s estimation, the neurosis of antisemitism would disappear in a
free Poland.
The Gross piece was both written (in its original form) before Smolar’s and published
before it in the Aneks special section. But the younger Gross wrote something more radical.
Both Smolar and Gross had their gaze set toward the future, but this future would be built on
the past. And this is why reckoning with the past was so important for them while others
preferred to let it be forgotten. Smolar saw a way for perceptions of Jews and other minorities
to evolve in Polish society and culture based on the intellectual life flourishing in Poland in the
1980s, while Gross was more pessimistic.
While the Polish version with its unique introductory pages (discussed at the beginning
of this chapter in order to frame this issue of Aneks) was given quite a revealing title by Gross,
the English version that is a word-for-word translation of the rest of the essay was innocuously
titled: “Polish-Jewish relations during the war: An interpretation.” Gross for his part did judge as
only a countryman can judge his own people: “It is rather ironic, but as soon as the Poles layed
[sic] their hands on the levers of a modern state… Virtuous qua victim Poland… turned into a
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victimizer.” Not twenty years earlier Gross had been imprisoned for acting as he thought a Pole
should, demanding liberty. But his idea of liberty was different than the liberty of twentiethcentury Polish nationalists. Gross in his essay on Polish-Jewish relations reached not for moral
judgment of antisemitism but the inclusive tradition of the Polish Romantic poets who equated
the Polish national liberation struggle with a universal struggle for the freedom of all oppressed
people. Poles had not lived up to the ideas of their (Lithuanian) national bard, Mickiewicz.
“Whereas the national liberation struggle is about rights of the majority to self-determination,
political liberty is about minority rights and in the Polish tradition the difference was never
appreciated.”28
Like Scharf and Smolar, Gross engaged fellow Poles who are not antisemites but
respected intellectuals, because even these people propagated a problematic conception of
Jews in Polish society. At the beginning of his essay, Gross quoted the celebrated nonconformist political activist and historian, Jan Józef Lipski. In remarks on the 40th anniversary of
the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Lipski spoke about Polish indifference to Jewish suffering while at
the same time asking for sympathy for Poles who had died while saving Jews or conducting
anti-Nazi activity. Here Gross too made a point similar to Karpiński about asymmetry. “What
strikes me in Lipski's statement… is his search for balance, for equivalencies,” Gross wrote. But
the position of Polish citizens with a Jewish background was not equivalent to Gentile Poles
either before Poland re-appeared on the map of Europe or during the interwar period—and
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certainly not as the Holocaust was taking place. Gross’s essay sought to answer why, even in
the mind of Lipski, Polish suffering had to be made equal to Jewish suffering.
Gross took issue with arguments that Szczypiorski and others had presented over the
years: that a Jew asking a Pole for help risked the life of the Pole and their whole family and
that we cannot demand that ordinary people act heroically. But if Poles feared helping Jews and
were subsequently burdened by guilt for wishing to do so and not doing it, why was there not a
plethora of writing by Poles working through that guilt (like the poetry of Miłosz)? Instead,
there appeared indignation both that Jews had dared to ask for help and that Poles were being
accused of behaving poorly. Gross again cited Lipski, who in a 1981 symposium about the
events of 1968 had voiced his frustration with accusations of antisemitism against Poles,
insisting that he shouldn’t have to put up with it because his family had helped save Jews. Lipski
too used a physical metaphor: being slapped in the face. To Gross, these were tired arguments.
He answered the question framing his essay in a similar vein to Smolar: “the Jew is the problem.
Hasn’t he always been a problem?”29 Indeed, these well-meaning Polish intellectuals were
bound by societal expectations, Gross wrote, to stick to what he called a “cost-benefit
explanation” for the wartime behavior of Poles. That there were expectations which precluded
serious discussion of the topic is another similarity between Gross and Smolar—another way of
conceptualizing the cultural taboo about discussing Polish-Jewish relations in the wake of the
Holocaust.
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The cost-benefit explanation is unconvincing, Gross wrote, because Poles could be
punished harshly for anything and everything during the war but it was only helping Jews that
they shied away from. Polish society’s negative opinion of Jews in fact made it easy and
sensible for the Nazis to mete out more harsh punishments on the few that dared to act to help
their neighbors. Gross insisted, like Scharf, that this state of affairs is why Jews are rightfully
angry about Polish behavior. And he offered evidence: underground Polish periodicals during
the war (which were under no censorship constraints) wrote of Jews as a problem. Those
reporting on the situation in Poland to the outside world, like Jan Karski and General GrotRowecki (also cited by Smolar), communicated that Polish society was on the whole antisemitic.
Like Scharf—and also based on testimonies from Bartoszewski’s book—Gross pointed out that
the people that Jews and those helping them feared most were other Poles: “their own
neighbors.”30
New Perspectives
Both Smolar and Gross built on the Kultura commentary of Scharf & Szczypiorski and
both invoked the work of Bartoszewski. Scharf had written about the ridiculous expectation on
the part of Gentile Poles of meticulously counted words—calculated so as not to offend—when
daring to speak about Polish behavior during the Holocaust. Gross consciously dispersed with
such a muted tone but his analysis was still that of a scholar. Though Smolar’s approach was
more dispassionate, this was the analytical influence of his mentor Raymond Aron rather than
the pressure of expectations from Poland. Smolar’s desire not to offend was rooted in
pragmatism. Like Scharf, both Smolar and Gross also perceived Polish society from their
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position as émigrés, looking from the outside in—aware of how the Western world perceived
Poland. But they remained Poles deeply engaged in the intellectual life of their country.
They were motivated to write because they wanted their fellow Poles to see what
others see when they looked at Poland—to look in the mirror and reflect. While writing about
Poles and Jewish Poles they both leaned on the idea of tolerance—of liberty for all citizens of a
nation. This idea does not come to fruition unless minority groups are included in the polity.
Smolar tried to show Poles that the West had moved beyond intolerance, or at least
antisemitism, while Gross reached back to Mickiewicz to emphasize that minority rights are
ingrained but remain unrealized in Polish culture and politics. “... A reckoning with Polish
nationalism and its xenophobia arises therefore as an important [component] of introducing
our society into the ranks of countries with a civic, libertarian and pluralist culture,” wrote
Gross, citing a passage from a Polish underground publication at the beginning of his essay in
the extra section that was meant only for Poles.31
The Aneks intervention on the topic of Polish-Jewish relations was quite shocking for
Polish intellectuals. Błoński wrote in his Poor Poles… about how difficult the Oxford conference
at which he heard Scharf’s paper had been both for “us,” meaning Gentile Poles, and for Jews
(still drawing an equivalency of the kind that Gross had criticized in Lipski’s speech and that
Karpiński too had identified). This difficulty was why, unlike the Błoński piece published the
following year, there was little desire among intellectuals like those asked by Smolar to respond
to the pieces in Aneks. As Smolar recalls, those that were asked refused to do so. But they
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surely pondered—digested—and by the time Błoński’s piece was published, an increased
capacity to discuss Polish-Jewish relations had been cultivated.
Perhaps no public response came because Smolar and Gross were émigrés—the type
that made Poland look bad abroad. An idea of the West was constructed by each of the
protagonists in this chapter and played a critical role in the formulation of their arguments.
Their relationship to the West was as much a part of their identity as their relationship to
Poland. Bartoszewski, Szczypiorski, Błoński and Lipski didn’t want people to think of all Poles as
having betrayed their Jewish neighbors. They wanted Westerners to see the real Poland, which
was more complex, ostensibly better. Gross, Smolar and Scharf writing as immigrants to the
West but still a part of Polish intellectual life wanted Poles to look inward, insisting that this is
what Westerners did in order to become more tolerant. When asked to respond to Gross,
Bartoszewski lamented over the fact that the former had delivered his piece to audiences at
Oxford.
A division later formed between Smolar and Gross too. Gross built on the essay
discussed in this chapter to create his book Neighbors, which documents a postwar pogrom in
the Polish town of Jedwabne, near Łomża. Aleksander Smolar thought the Gross book was
necessary—profoundly important. Nina Smolar for her part later regretted not publishing it
through her Wydawnictwo Aneks publishing house, though Gross had asked her to. Adam
Michnik too expressed reluctance: as Gross and others recall, he asked why the past needed to
be dug up. Why couldn’t people focus on the future of Poland instead? Smolar recalls that
Michnik told him that Neighbors would allow American Jews to make claims on Polish property,
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a perspective that shocked the Aneks editor.32 But Gross’s work after Neighbors is too radical,
Smolar writes: black and white, lacking depth and not asking essential questions.
There is a difference of opinion about the scale and depth of Poland’s shortcomings
among those who came of age in 1968 despite their similar and intertwined history. This
difference is in part based on distance from Poland—both geographic and temporal. Gross, the
most Westernized, never moved back to Poland. Michnik, seeking most to leave the past
behind, on the other hand never left. Aleksander Smolar split his time between Poland and
France as soon as he was allowed back into the country. Smolar raised well-judged points about
Gross but alongside them in his recollections there is a hint of the same desire to defend the
image of Poland and Poles as others from those (like Gross) that are too distant from the
country. Gross was raised to be “a person of the West,” Smolar recalls. “Janek’s house had
nothing to do with Jews.” On the contrary, Smolar writes, “he was distinguished by a kind of
salonicity—thanks to his mother, he spoke French very well….”33 A difference of opinion
emerges between Smolar and Gross similar to that which the former had recognized when
Michnik had raised arguments against Gross that only made sense when viewing the world
from Warsaw. “And so what I would like most is if everything that I have to say here turned out
to be pointless,” wrote Jan Gross in those four pages of his text not published in English.34 Gross
does not enjoy highlighting the ugly side of Polish nationalism. He revised the article analyzed in
this chapter because what he described pained him. His writing is no doubt in part inspired by
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his family history and his own experiences, which some would hold against him as a potential
source of bias.
Concern with identity permeates the postwar generation that is linked to 1968 and
Aneks. Both Gross’s childhood friend, the psychologist Aleksander Perski, and Aleksander
Smolar are convinced that the former writes not about Polish-Jewish relations but about Poles
and Polish history as it relates to the Holocaust.35 If it is true that Gross writes about Poles and
not Polish-Jewish relations, then thinking of his work through the lens of identity makes this
distinction particularly apparent. When leaving Poland he insisted that his identity was for him
to decide, and not the police-communist state that had imprisoned him.
Gross is inspired by what Smolar described as a Western sense of tolerance. Both Gross
and Smolar apply this to the Polish context because they feel responsibility for the country of
their birth. Émigrés often have their departure held against them: essentially that they are less
a part of the society they were born into because they have not experienced what those who
remained had in the time since their departure. To suggest as an émigré that your own people
should become more tolerant is a difficult position to convince non-émigrés from. Tolerance is
easier to appreciate if a person has crossed borders in their lifetime—especially if the crossing
was not particularly voluntary. In the case of Poland, demands for tolerance are put to a nation
which had been conceptualized by its greatest poets as a beacon for the oppressed. To be
tolerant is to respect the identity of others. This is simple in theory but complex in practice.36 It

35

Gross and Pawlicka, ......bardzo dawno temu, mniej więcej w zeszły piątek..., 266.
As historian Brian Porter-Szücs pointed out, inclusion is not simply good. Tolerance must
allow for potential members of the nation to choose whether they want to belong to it. See
Chapter One in: Porter-Szücs, When Nationalism Began to Hate.
36

344

means respect for all and at the same time acceptance that their relationship to a whole is just
as valid despite being different than your own. Gross argues for the contemporary concept of
tolerance just as much as he argues for the Polish nationalism of the nineteenth century
romantics. Gross wants his fellow Poles to move beyond a narrow conception of being that
valorizes exclusionary nationhood at the expense of those who do not fit into it. This is the ugly
side of national identity, in essence, which has defined the twentieth century. In Poland this
ugliness has largely been expressed as antisemitism, fitting an old pattern.
Moving past the Polish-Jewish dichotomy involves accepting that this dichotomy exists
and that it caused inconceivable harm, nearly destroying the nation so profess love for. Gross
and Smolar point for a way past Polish-Jewish relations as a mass grave by embracing tolerance
but in post-1989 Poland this has not proven to be a popular path. Polish identity must be
expanded to make room for Polish Jews and anyone else who wished to be considered Polish if
Poland is to be thought of as a place where people of many traditions lived for centuries and
not just where they were murdered. A part of this process is to admit that a minority within the
Polish nation was betrayed. That is not to say that Poland or Poles have the right to invoke the
memory of its Jewish citizens nor invite the relatives of the murdered or expelled back. But the
only Poland that has a future is a more tolerant Poland. Homogenous Poland, born of ethnic
cleansing masterminded by its neighbors, is not only unpatriotic—it would have been
unpalatable to the nineteenth century romantics—but at the same time an anachronism.
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Chapter Nine: Reticence
Whenever I want to raise my conscience in the West regarding Poland, I know that it will be
easier for me to do it with… socialists than with right-wingers or centralists.
-Gustaw Herling-Grudziński
To convince Western intellectuals that it was worthwhile to support Eastern Europeans
wishing to remove themselves from under the thumb of the Soviet empire, Polish anticommunist intellectuals had to communicate this predicament to the Western world. Émigrés
and their peers in Poland carried within them bitter lessons that they struggled to translate for
potential Western supporters. Czech dissident Vaclav Havel encapsulated the attitude of
Westerners vis-à-vis Eastern Europeans in a 1985 essay entitled “Anatomy of a Reticence.” To
Havel, reticence meant “caution… outright distrust and uneasiness.”1 Reticence stemmed from
a number of misunderstandings, but most shared the same root, which is the focus of this
chapter: Eastern European intellectuals worked to counteract the notion that Soviet
communism could be reformed, which further implied that communist states weren’t
conducting diplomacy in good faith.
Aneks documented two such East-West dialogues for a Polish audience. In 1976, despite
already finding a new language for their particular situations that was suffused with moral
philosophy, Polish dissident intellectuals agitated for support from Western socialist and
Communist parties in the language of (no longer willing) fellow travelers on the path to
socialism. On the other hand, reticence or misunderstanding between Western intellectuals
and their Eastern European peers reached its apogee on the topic of nuclear disarmament in
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the 1980s—just as the anti-authoritarian movement in Poland achieved success with the
Solidarność trade union (which was quickly crushed by martial law). Three perspectives appear
in Aneks and this chapter leading up to this moment: that of Polish and other Eastern European
émigrés, the point of view of their Western supporters, and voices from Poland. Aside from
publishing information about these public relations efforts, the Aneks milieu was also directly
involved.
In a 1981 issue of Aneks, Aleksander Smolar wrote that Eastern Europeans had to keep
track of what Westerners think of Eastern Europe, because Westerners’ preconceived notions
about events in the East would dictate Western action toward the region.2 Writing from a
Polish prison in 1985, Adam Michnik emphasized that émigrés were an enduring element of a
strategy to gain freedom for the country. Both Smolar and Michnik thought that keeping
Westerners appraised of uncensored news about events in Eastern Europe could be directly
beneficial to Poles.3 Michnik imagined informed Western politicians putting pressure on the
Polish government during official visits, for example. He understood Western public opinion as
something to be harnessed and guided toward their cause. In addition to promulgating Polish
causes for an international public, émigré activists could communicate with the diasporas of
other countries in a similar predicament. Michnik noted that the emigration was perfectly
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aware of its role, naming Aneks (as representatives of the post-1968 emigration), Kultura, and
Zeszyty Literackie (created by members of the 1980s martial law-era emigration).
While Westerners over the course of the 1970s and 1980s became important strategic
assets to Eastern European dissidents, Eastern European intellectuals sometimes felt that
Western leftist critics of the United States saw in them only naïve pawns in a larger game—
serving American interests without realizing it. “Only a few extremist groups, incited by Ronald
Reagan, storm the prison gates begging to be arrested,“ Adam Michnik wrote in his 1985 letter
from prison.4 Many émigrés likewise found Western leftists naïve when they seemed to be
enamored with the very same ideas that spawned the system being discredited every day in
Eastern Europe. Polish intellectuals often wrote of Westerners as too gullible and docile to be
able to help, not understanding the consequences of inaction as they lived comfortably in the
West.
Because of their experience with governments ruling by Marxist diktat, Poles were
inculcated against radical ideology. This did not turn them into right-wing ideologues; the antirevolutionary cautiousness of conservatism was attractive, but ideas rooted in nationalist
chauvinism or xenophobia repelled them. Likewise, they found the promise of law and order
implicit in police states abhorrent. Despite differences in opinion, Polish appeals were sent to
Western leftists not only for pragmatic but also for personal reasons—based on common
backgrounds and life stories. Kultura editor Gustaw Herling-Grudziński explains:
Whenever I want to raise my conscience in the West regarding Poland, I know that it will
be easier for me to do it with Italian socialists than with right-wingers or centralists.
Such sensitivity was probably at the root of the fact that someone once became a
socialist. And even if he left, like [Ignazio] Silone, who became a socialist without a
4
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party, he kept his old beliefs. In my opinion, this phenomenon actually remains - the
phenomenon of the socialist ethos. Orwell was especially touching and extraordinary for
me, especially in essay writing; at every step you can see that he mainly stuck to it.5
Herling-Grudziński himself is a link between Polish and Italian leftists. He and Lidia Croce, a
social activist and daughter of Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, married after he settled in
Naples in the 1950s.
This reticence between Eastern European and Western intellectuals—born not of
animosity but frustration with people who were in many ways so similar—was captured in
Aneks as early as 1975. In an unattributed article that was likely written by Aleksander Smolar,
the author writes that this tension results from a lack of understanding because of different life
experiences—of a lack of experience with totalitarianism on the part of Westerners. Merging
French and Polish political life, the article is a barometer of sentiment between Polish
intellectuals and Westerners after 1968 but before prominent dissident activity begins in
Poland in the late 1970s, in part supported by transnational connections. The author describes
the reception of Soviet dissident Aleksander Solzhenitsyn in the West from the perspective of a
fellow Eastern European interrogating Western ideological definitions. In France, Smolar was
welcomed by the French anti-communist milieu around Raymond Aron. Solzhenitsyn too had a
largely sympathetic reception and had participated in a televised debate with French
intellectuals on the then-barely three-month-old French show Apostrophes, hosted by
journalist Bernard Pivot.
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The author of the article is largely concerned with the French leftist intellectual Jean
Daniel’s efforts to get Solzhenitsyn to join in a common fight for decolonization, an effort to
atone for “the sins of the West” (implying that Eastern Europeans did not carry the same guilt).
At that point Solzhenitsyn had been in the West—exiled first to Frankfurt, Germany—for about
one year; the French public was quite familiar with him. While exiles like Smolar and
Solzhenitsyn were welcomed, they were not well-understood. The idea of a common fight
flattened Solzhenitsyn’s experiences, the Aneks author argued. The Russian was a witness, not a
politician. Western intellectuals, the author wrote, could not see eye-to-eye with Solzhenitsyn
because they had not witnessed and experienced what he had over a decade spent in Soviet
labor camps.
The article concludes: “Perhaps emphasizing this price [that Solzhenitsyn had paid]
hinders communication between people, [the latter of] which in this case both interlocutors
seemed to be aiming for. But at the same time, it prevents alliances that are too easy, limited to
the level of words.”6 In other words, dialogue between Eastern European and Western
intellectuals was possible but it could not be based on a shallow understanding of one another.
That the Soviet Union was an empire like France or Britain had been was true, but Solzhenitsyn
understood through personal experience what Western intellectuals only theorized. Daniel’s
proposition of a common platform was seen as self-serving. It would not be beneficial to either
Eastern European or Western intellectuals.
The author of this piece is not a conservative. Both Solzhenitsyn and Polish émigrés
however wanted to elude identities based on ideology: the author did not want the Russian to
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be burdened by simple ideological definitions. A footnote about conservatism reveals a struggle
that is as much about Solzhenitsyn’s place in Western ideological debates as it is about how
Polish political émigrés were defining their own worldviews. In the footnote, the author
separates conservatism from reactionary politics. Both terms were commonly used to deride
those who criticized communism or were insufficiently radical, but the author wished to
rehabilitate conservatism. “A reactionary wishes to return to a past that no longer exists,” the
author writes, while a conservative “distinguishes what remains or should remain in the process
of change… in a word, conservatism is a philosophy of history.” On the following page, a
footnote refers sarcastically to communism as “progressive ideology,” and is followed by a
Solzhenitsyn passage where he refers to it as the (sic) “LEADING IDEOLOGY.” While critical of
communism and rehabilitating conservatism, the author also reminds readers that the latter
concept as an ideology also has flaws, citing “the negative effects of conservatism in politics in
the political events of the 19th and 20th century.”
Three years later, the philosopher Leszek Kołakowski published his credo for this nonideological ideology, entitled “How to be a Conservative-Liberal-Socialist.”7 After their
disenchantment with Marxism, (the crushing of protest in Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1968
being formative events) Polish intellectuals wanted the freedom to investigate a plethora of
ideas and select the most useful ones. Alongside this openness however Aleksander Smolar also
emphasizes what he learned from one of his early mentors at Warsaw University: at the end of
such deliberation, one always has to make a choice.8 This way of being describes the
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perspective of the Aneks milieu. They sought to escape only describing the world rather than
participating in it, as well as the trap of blindly acting according to one particular ideology—the
latter a dangerous desire for consistency which likewise helps people to avoid responsibility.9
Many Westerners saw the United States as an empire and the Soviet Union as
problematic but still as a Marxist state representing the marginalized, which left little room for
maneuver for Eastern Europeans. Freed of ideological baggage, Polish émigrés did not
understand soliciting aid in the West for their dissident friends in Poland as a matter of helping
the Western world conquer the Soviet Union, as Westerners often viewed their efforts. Rather
than acting out grand ideas, their motivation was to help the friends and family that remained
in Poland. The émigrés writing in Aneks conceptualized Poland not as a place to be won for the
West, but one trapped between empires—a fate they shared with Western Europeans. In 1981,
an author with the initials A.S. (again likely to be Aleksander Smolar) wrote that the notion of
the West as a monolith obscured reality: the goals of European states were different from
those of the United States, after all.10 Poland was but one piece in a geopolitical power game to
the United States, the author wrote, and the American perspective did not include the best
interests of Poland or other Eastern European countries. It was only logical for Poles themselves
to agitate for the interests of their country just as countries like France did for themselves.
Poles in fact were obliged to, as they wished to share the fate of comparatively better off
Western Europeans.
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The United States taken as a whole was not a partner but a behemoth that could crush a
country like Poland just as easily as it could help it. As existed in Europe, there were
organizations, persons, and institutions within the political machinery of the United States that
could help restore autonomy to Poland, but there were others that would use it as a pawn in a
broader conflict—and this could be detrimental for Poles and Eastern Europeans as a whole. It
had happened before: these Polish intellectuals had not forgotten “Yalta,” a single word
synonymous with being sold out so that people elsewhere—including those same Western
Europeans criticizing Polish activists—could continue to live in peace.
Émigrés saw Western European activists as often supporting pacifism and neutrality
over sovereignty when faced with overtures from the Soviet Union, which the Poles viewed as a
mistake based on historical experience—a self-defeating absolution of responsibility. The
pseudonymous author in Aneks in 1981 mentioned the status of Finland with regard to the
Soviet Union as an example of a hard-fought position—a fight worth taking on.11 Otherwise, not
just Poland but Europe itself would become like Hong Kong, which the author saw as a place
subservient to a world power but without the autonomy of Finland. In this assessment Europe
as a whole was in crisis. Western Europe had the potential to seal the fate of Eastern Europe if
its states too became satellites of the neighboring Soviet Union.
“…a tragedy for the Polish people and… the failure of the whole European left.” Poles in
Conversation with Western Socialists
Socialism was thought to be the future of humanity by many, long after the ideologically
bankrupting revelations of communist state terror in 1956 and crushing of reform in Eastern
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Europe in 1968.12 The continued existence of socialist states—especially the Soviet Union—
made a leftward march for humanity imaginable and even likely. A passage from a book by
Czech Communist Party secretary-turned-dissident Zdeněk Mlynář, Night Frost in Prague,
reprinted in a 1981 issue of Aneks, dramatizes this sentiment: “Do you think someone will
speak up for you? No one. There will be no war. Comrade Tito and Ceausescu will have their
say, Comrade Berlinguer will also say something. And what. so what? You are counting on
communists from Western Europe, but they will mean little for another 50 years."13 To many in
1970s Europe, it was only a matter of time: the future of Europe looked red. Western European
socialist (and even communist) parties were at the time gaining ground in electoral politics,
accepting the rules of democratic governance. Lobbying these Western parties to cease turning
a blind eye to the authoritarian actions of Eastern European communist parties was thus seen
as the best hope by Eastern European dissidents and Westerners alike for a democratic future.
These pleas to so-called Eurocommunist parties (at the time, this referred to the
communist parties of Italy, Spain and France) to lobby on behalf of democratization in Eastern
Europe in response to the Polish government’s 1976 crackdown on protesting workers were
based on socialism as a shared set of values.14 The Polish intellectuals making them were hardly
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Marxists any longer; they addressed Western communist leaders with the hope that the latter
would continue to disavow authoritarian means and exert pressure on Eastern European
governments as well. The editors of Aneks compiled these communications in a special section
of the first issue published after the repression of Polish workers in 1976. Friends of the editors
were those making the appeals. “Appeals of this type directed to the West are perhaps
unprecedented in the post-war history of the Polish opposition,” wrote Aleksander Smolar in
this final quarterly issue (number 12) of 1976.15
The effort to spark dialogue with Western communist and socialist parties began with
the Italian Communist Party (PCI), which seemed to be the Western communist party most
amenable to overtures from Eastern European dissidents. Influencing the Italian Communist
Party to cease moving in step with the communist parties of Eastern European states became
an early success of this dissident diplomacy. The Polish pedagogue and activist Jacek Kuroń
penned an open letter in 1976, as he had done with Karol Modzelewski a decade earlier. This
time the letter was addressed not to the Polish Communist Party (PZPR) but to Enrico
Berlinguer, the leader of the PCI, to whom Kuroń recounted the spontaneous Polish worker
strikes of that year. Originally appearing in Italian newspapers on June 20th of that year, the
letter was reprinted in the twelfth issue of Aneks, published at the end of 1976. In the letter,
Kuroń described the disproportionately punitive reaction of the state which, he says, gave
people no other choice than to strike. There were no other functioning mechanisms by which
workers could voice their grievances.
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Kuroń connected the failure of the Polish Communist Party to leftist politics broadly,
warning that if the Polish communists committed further repressive measures, the result would
not only be bad for Poland but also signify “the political bankruptcy of the left in Europe as a
whole.”16 He asked for “public opinion in those countries where it is truly independent” to
lobby for Polish workers. The Italian Communist Party and Berlinguer were at the time well
respected both in Eastern and Western Europe, Kuroń wrote, as he pleaded with the Italian to
engage with the cause of Polish workers. Aneks documented the effect of Kuroń’s appeal on the
Italians. The editors reported that the PCI had sent a letter to the PZPR on the very same day
that they received Kuroń’s appeal. In it the Italians criticized the Polish communist party for
their repression of workers. Days later, wrote the editors, the Polish government attempted to
present an explanation for the mass arrests and trials it was in the process of conducting. But
Unita, the newspaper of the PCI, declared the explanations unsatisfactory.
Another letter from this July 1976 publicity campaign by the Polish anti-authoritarian
opposition, appearing in Aneks after Kuroń’s text, asked Western intellectuals to help return to
Polish workers their rights. This appeal frames their struggle as a “battle for democratic
socialism….”17 A Karl Marx quote follows. Westerners were asked to receive the appeal in their
capacity as public figures in order to spread news of repression in Poland—to defend the rights
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of working people and thus human rights. The appeal was addressed specifically to over a
dozen prominent writers and intellectuals, focusing on people identified with the left, including
Jean-Paul Sartre, Günter Grass, and Arthur Miller. It was signed by members of the Polish
opposition, including writer Stanisław Barańczak, Adam Michnik, and historian Jan-Józef
Lipski—all of whom had ties to the editors of Aneks and would appear in the journal over the
years.
These two appeals to the West rested on the idea that Eastern European governments
were denigrating the good name of socialism. But beginning with this issue of Aneks, a
discussion about Christianity and socialism develops alongside it (explored in depth in Chapter
Six).18 The issue also contains a special section on Christianity and politics from people who had
not emigrated, and Aneks would return to this theme on several occasions—including a
continuation of the section in the following issue. Rather than taking inspiration from Marxist
philosophy, many Polish dissidents were now inspired by the writing of Dietrich Bonhoeffer.
One of the most striking essays is by Polish intellectual Teresa Bogucka, who wrote
about the experiences of the 1968 generation—her generation—in a letter written under a
pseudonym and addressed to “my friends.” There she addresses the changing shared vision of
the world and changing values among this group: “we once jointly thought that we stand on the
left…. What does this actually mean—we stood on the left.”19 Bogucka wrote that as the first
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postwar generation, they were raised in communism and knew nothing else until their rude
political awakening in 1968. Alongside Stalinist lies they learned about injustice, internationalist
values, the evils of racism and antisemitism—lessons that shaped them as they grew older.
Over the course of the 1960s, as this generation came of age, the choice to not ignore
injustice was a choice for Marxism, Bogucka continued—meaning that it was not a false or
foolish choice, even in retrospect. In fact, to accept Marxism was at the same time to question
it—to submit it to dialectical scrutiny. Bogucka frames this as accepting the method but
rejecting the claims that came with it. And in 1968 it was the authorities that rejected Marxism,
not the protestors, whom Bogucka calls the last revisionists (those making the last major
attempt to fix communism) as a result.
But after the repressions of 1968 in Eastern Europe, this leftist Eastern European
generation had to ask themselves: “whether and to what extent the leftist, Marxist view of the
world contains in itself the predetermination of this evil, meaning the path of it becoming
reality.”20 Bogucka wrote that her essay was not a passage to being anti-leftist but an attempt
to disentangle oneself from a rigid ideological view of the world created by this generation’s
upbringing. She wrotes that she did not regret her experiences and that the same basic values
remain important, but they must be consistent with a respect for every human life (as opposed
to the Marxist drive to subordinate issues to class struggle at any cost). Bogucka wrote that
Christianity is often juxtaposed to all leftist values, but in this case—and at its core—it
preserves the human dignity she had just described. This moral core allowed it to be saved from
its intermittent entangling with injustice, while Marxism has no such failsafe.
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Writing about Christianity, Bogucka cited Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Leszek Kołakowski as
inspirations. She noted that Christianity does not necessarily have to lead to pacifism in the face
of evil. It can be one’s duty to do violence, but it can never be seen as morally just—only as the
lesser of two evils. Those doing the violence thus must accept—and cannot escape—
responsibility for it. She saw this state of affairs in opposition to the Marxist justification of
violence in class struggle. Bogucka proposed that the way to fight the leftist totalitarian systems
in Eastern Europe was to live by moral principles no matter the cost, thus proving the
righteousness of these values that were in opposition to state justification of violent means for
utopian ends. This was the value she saw being promoted by Russian dissidents like Aleksander
Solzhenitsyn. Even if in his politics he had ridiculous and unrealistic plans, Solzhenitsyn bore
witness to injustice and fought it by living in truth. Communist states, meanwhile, had lost all
their moral credibility: they were beyond reform because they were rotten at their ideological
core. Bogucka’s rhetoric thus contrasts with the public communiques to Italians by Polish
oppositionists like Jacek Kuroń and Adam Michnik (Michnik would in later years move further
from using socialist language to express his ideas).
At the end of her essay, Bogucka compared Eastern European states and the ideology
supporting them to the democracies of the West. To think freely and openly by publishing
poems, books and articles counteracted the total dominion of thought and action in communist
states: “they fulfill the functions and significance of the parliamentary opposition, platforms
where various concepts clash, independent press, expressing the postulates of various social
groups - in short, what in the normal world is called political action.”21 Bogucka envisioned anti-
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government opposition in Eastern Europe as creating a “normal” political world by living this
normality (an idea popularized a couple of years later by Czech dissident Vaclav Havel as living
in truth).
Bogucka ended by writing that maybe her generation had not changed so much in the
almost decade that had passed since their political awakening. They still wanted a free country,
one where people would be rewarded rather than punished for having talent and mettle. At the
same time, she warned that she was not thinking of an idealized “real democracy”—they could
not again strive to create an ideal system that would lead people to unfreedom. “It would be
simply and only to guarantee people the fundamental rights, those changed in the Declarations
and Constitutions, and to give everyone the opportunity to become free by their own efforts.
You cannot make a man happy - you can only give him the opportunity to do it himself,”
Bogucka concluded. She proposed nothing more than what she believed Westerners already
had. Polish intellectuals hoped to communicate to Western Europeans that speaking their truth
would not land a person in jail in the West (additionally, there was no single dominant ideology
to stand up to but rather a multiplicity of competing ones). Moreover, truth as Polish dissidents
imagined it—an antidote to ideology—had the potential to help a Western left weakened by
the continuing discrediting of Marxism in Eastern Europe just as much as it did these Polish
intellectuals.
The editors of Aneks returned to the relationship between Western intellectuals and
Polish dissidents in 1977’s last issue (number 16-17). Between the twelfth issue of Aneks and
this one, the communist parties of France, Spain and Italy (at a summit in Madrid earlier that
year) adopted the moniker of Eurocommunism and pledged to develop socialism within
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democracy.22 A special section titled “Eurocommunism” takes up almost half of this 1977 issue.
It reveals a public dialogue between Polish émigrés and dissidents in the country on the one
hand and Western socialists on the other.
Leszek Kołakowski put pressure on the Eurocommunists to remain true to their word in
a piece that not only appeared in this issue of Aneks but first in several Western publications,
the first of which was Der Spiegel in May of 1977.23 Kołakowski had just met some of those to
whom his essay is directed in March of that year. When it was published in Encounter, the essay
was accompanied by information about a trip that Kołakowski and Adam Michnik had together
taken to Rome and Bonn, Germany. In Rome they met Italian Socialist Party leaders as well as
the communist politician Giancarlo Pajetta, whom Kołakowski said they met with just to say
they tried to speak to communists and not with the hope of accomplishing anything: “he was
infuriated with me about an interview that I gave to Italian television… and anyway, he is an
unrepentant and hardline apparatchik from the Stalinist epoch.”24 While in Bonn the two Poles
spoke to Willy Brandt, leader of the German Social Democrats and thus a representative of the
left wing of German politics.25
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Kołakowski believed (like Bogucka expressed in the previous issue) that communism as
it existed in 1977 was not a degenerate form, but the logical trajectory of the ideology. He
wrote in this piece that the Italian Communist Party had to completely disavow the leadership
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. If they remained attached to it in any way, then
their social democratic goals would never be realized because the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union ruled a despotic state. Kołakowski concludes: “Let ‘Euro-communists’ first prove
that they really distrust and detest despotism and would resist despotism and imperialism
where despotism and imperialism are strongest.”26
During another European tour in November of that year, Kołakowski participated in a
program on dissent in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the Venice Biennale. Following
the Biennale, Kołakowski also participated in a conference organized by the Italian Socialist
Party. Mirroring and entangled with political currents, the Biennale was forced to choose
between support of anti-government dissidents in Eastern Europe and the governments
themselves—the latter which had been enjoying prestige in past years as the Biennale focused
on anti-fascist topics in response to the existence of fascist dictatorships like that of Augusto
Pinochet in Chile, Franco’s Spain, and its own past in Mussolini’s Italy. Two of the four exiles
chosen in the end to create the program on dissent had an influence on Aneks as well. One was
Jiří Pelikán, a Czech émigré intellectual residing in Italy, who took part in an interview re-printed
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in this issue of Aneks. The other was Gustaw Herling-Grudziński, a co-editor of the Paris Kultura
journal who had years earlier motivated the young émigrés behind Aneks to publish.27
A Western response to Kołakowski followed the Pole’s essay in Aneks, coming from two
Eurocommunists. The first was Santiago Carrillo, then the General Secretary of the Spanish
Communist Party.28 Carrillo still believed then that communism in Eastern Europe could be
reformed. Eastern European communism turned nationalistic because it felt threatened, he
argued, but Eurocommunism could help democratize it. Carrillo saw breaking ties with the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union as counterproductive. Eurocommunist political
development in the more economically advanced Western countries proceeded differently—to
an alliance with social democrats that would create a new social form and help democratize
Eastern Europe as well, Carrillo thought. He concluded by writing that he did not want to be
used as a weapon in the Cold War, neither by the governments of the East nor the West.
The Aneks issue also contains an interview with French Eurocommunist intellectual Jean
Ellenstein that appears in the same Spiegel thematic section as Carrillo’s response (there
entitled “Communism today”).29 Ellenstein was as defensive of the communist idea and the
Soviet Union as Carrillo but also said that he would not like to live in the Soviet Union and
neither would most French communists. He blamed the development of communism there on
the backwardness of the states that it took over though he, like Carrillo, believed that it could
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still reform itself. Unlike Carrillo, Ellenstein opined that reform would best be achieved without
external interference.
Polish dissidents framed their communiques in Marxist and socialist language. Even
though many Westerners were sympathetic to the efforts of the Polish opposition, Poles were
writing for an audience—in this case communist party leaders—still very much committed to
socialism, if not outright Marxism-Leninism. Lucio Lombardo Radice, a PCI central committee
member, voiced support for Polish dissidents in a 1977 interview, but only if the antigovernment activists continued on the socialist path.30 Poles could demand reforms but not
what Westerners would see as a turn backward toward capitalism. “It is entirely unhistorical as
well as unreasonable to suppose that they would want to turn the clock back,” Radice stated.31
To the Aneks editors, who had tried reform and gone to jail for it, Radice’s position—and his
idea of historical progress—sounded ludicrous.
Another set of responses was printed in Dissent, the social democratic American
magazine, accompanying Kołakowski’s essay. “Still another cause for the rise of
Eurocommunism, hard to measure but foolish to underestimate, is the influence the East
European dissidents have had upon at least some Western Communists,” wrote Dissent cofounder Irving Howe in an introduction to the section. Howe saw Eurocommunism as a
splintering of Communist ideology that pushed some of its adherents toward a “democratic
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spirit.”32 Howe’s democratic spirit was democratic socialism, which communism had
besmirched. He called Eurocommunism something new and promising. Poles however were
less impressed. Howe wrote, for example, that Spain’s Santiago Carillo had admitted that the
Soviet Union was not socialist but rather a “state capitalist dictatorship.” Kołakowski was at
this point convinced and had expressed in his writing that while this was true, the Soviet Union
was no deviation. “Communism is a matter of power, not of intellectual discussion,” he wrote
in the essay that motivated this Western soul-searching.33
The sociologist and Dissent co-founder, Lewis Coser, was sympathetic—for the
ideological pains being suffered by Italian Communists as they turned away from Soviet
orthodoxy. He was on the other hand bewildered as to why Kołakowski would be so dismissive
of the words of Eurocommunists thus far. As disappointed with Kołakowski as E.P. Thompson
had been when he wrote his open letter to the Pole almost half a decade earlier, Coser did not
on the other hand seem to understand the pain of people who were living or had lived under
tyrannical governments—even as he used the phrase “Soviet oppression.” Henry Pachter, a
lifelong socialist and the final respondent to Kołakowski in Dissent, had suffered under the Nazi
regime before being active in the resistance to fascism in Europe in the 1930s. Though they
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broadly agreed, Pachter could not forgive Kołakowski for understanding communism as a
philosophy and not a science of politics.
As Kołakowski wrote about power being the motive force of communism, so Pachter,
for example, noted that “[l]eaders who have been brought up in the tradition of MarxismLeninism look for guidance to the place they will receive in future history books: Have they
advanced the cause?”34 Pachter in the same essay writes both that communists only operate in
this mode and that their approaches toward parliamentary government should be taken in
good faith. But he frames this in realpolitik: their advances should be taken seriously because
having them in dialogue would assuage the grave threat of revolutionary action. Pachter and
Kołakowski were both wary of Western communist parties, but Pachter did not like the matterof-fact tone with which Kołakowski spelled this out. In closing, Pachter emphasized the one
remaining critical difference in opinion between Kołakowski and him about about Western
communists: “Communists have a right to be taken seriously.”
Each Dissent respondent had valid motivations for their variety of positions on
Eurocommunism and on Polish dissidents, from the graciousness of Howe to the defensiveness
of Coser and Pachter in response to Kołakowski’s piece. They all shared a belief with other
Western socialists in, as Dissent co-founder Stanley Plastrik wrote in Pachter’s 1980 obituary, a
better socialist future.35 A year later, in Plastrik’s obituary, Howe could only muster asking
“whether socialism can claim a moral basis apart from that of other humane persuasions,”
while writing about the passionate and sincere lifelong engagement of this generation of
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socialists (in Winter 1981 a photo of striking Polish workers graced the cover of Dissent).36
Already by 1977, however, this hope was long gone for Polish intellectuals, though like Howe in
1981 this did not necessarily mean that they abandoned the humane ideals socialism shares
with other ways of seeing the world.
Western European leftists beyond the communist parties themselves were more open
to overtures from Polish dissidents. A discussion about dissent in Eastern Europe with four
prominent Italian leftists and Jiří Pelikán, the Czech exile in Italy, was conducted by the socialist
monthly Mondoperaio in 1977 and appears in this 1977 double-issue of Aneks.37 “The
discussion presents the characteristic attitude of the Western Left towards Eastern Europe,”
the editors of Aneks wrote.38 The moderator, Federico Coen, editor-in-chief of Mondoperaio,
wrote that leftist parties in Western Europe that supported Eastern European worker
movements had to move from platitudes to “concrete political work.” The suppression of rights
in Eastern Europe made Western leftist parties look bad, compromised them, he went on to
say—echoing part of Kuroń’s argument from his 1976 open letter to Berlinguer.
The four Italian leftists agreed that Eastern European dissidents deserved to be listened
to and that communist states had serious problems but differed on how these points of
agreement should be translated to action. Riccardo Lombardi, who would become president of
the Italian Socialist Party three years later, stated that Italian Socialists were finally embracing
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dissidents like Pelikán as allies rather than considering them heretics to be ignored and dealt
with by the communist parties of their countries. Lombardi too framed the struggle of Eastern
European dissidents as the common struggle of the workers’ movement, as the Poles had in
their communications with Western Europeans.
Lucio Magri, an Italian communist who was kicked out of the party for dissenting views
and co-founded the non-aligned communist publication Il Manifesto argued, like Kołakowski,
that perhaps the problem with communism came from within the ideology itself (as opposed to
its corruption by people or material conditions in places where communist states were
founded)—specifically its inability to democratize. But he described this fault as the result of
“state capitalism,” thus redirecting his negative assessment to capitalism even while criticizing
Eastern European states.39 He went on to equate Eastern European dissidents (naming Jacek
Kuroń) with Westerners like himself, because they both critiqued the failure of the respective
systems they lived under to provide for the needs of their societies.
Lucio Colletti, ex-communist and Marxist philosopher, observed that a choice had to be
made between solidarity with the victim or with the oppressor—in this case between dissidents
and the official communist parties of Eastern Europe. It was not just intellectuals who were
oppressed in Eastern Europe, but workers themselves: neither liberal freedoms nor the rights of
workers were being respected in the people’s republics. But he too added that these countries
were not the logical end product of socialism and that this negative perspective on the
development of socialism was the trademark of anti-socialist elements in the West.
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Prominent PCI politician Giancarlo Pajetta called socialism in Eastern Europe an
incomplete process, his views here aligning with the rest of the Italian leftists on the panel. He
disagreed with the idea that one must side with either victim or oppressor—on the grounds
that it was difficult to tell what party occupies which role. Like Radice, Pajetta stated that the
PCI could not support an overthrow of the government but would support dissidents when they
asked for rights that appeared in the constitutions of their states or aligned with socialist ideals.
Even if the criticism was measured, these Italian leftists were deviating from the Soviet
party line. All to some extent criticized communist states or even communist ideology itself
(though sometimes with the idea of further purging it of capitalism). Dissidents broke through a
monopoly on dissemination of information to communicate dissatisfaction about life in Eastern
Europe to Western communists. Pelikán, though, noted a continued lack of understanding by
Westerners; stating that the leftists before him couldn’t possibly comprehend Polish activist
Jacek Kuroń wishing for Poland to have the same political status as Finland (that is, to be
somewhat subservient to the international politics of the Soviet Union but with its internal
politics free of Soviet control). Pelikán asked the Italian leftists before him to exert pressure on
the Soviet Union directly and not just on Eastern European political parties, the latter which had
little power by comparison. He implored that Eastern Europeans were trying to save Western
Europeans from going through the same bitter experiences as Eastern Europeans—experiences
that the former were heading for unless they accepted that it wasn’t just a factor like economic
backwardness in the states where communist parties took over which had led communism to
where it was in 1977. Pelikán too echoed the idea that Western Europeans preferred to come
under the control of the Soviet Union than risk military conflict.
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A Polish conversation about appeals to the West, between Kultura editor Gustaw
Herling-Grudziński and Adam Michnik, appeared in an issue of Kultura that same year.40 The
conversation partners took as their point of departure yet another appeal to the Western left
by Leszek Kołakowski—this one published in the Italian L’Espresso in February of 1977. The
Polish philosopher there too wrote that “the sympathy of the anti-totalitarian opposition in
Eastern Europe will be full of reserve” toward Western communist parties as long as they did
not completely disavow the leadership of the Soviet Union and its form of communism.41 To
Kołakowski, Eurocommunist parties warranted support only when they weakened Soviet
imperial ambitions by declaring independence from the Soviet Union.
Just as the Kultura editor had begun by quoting Kołakowski in L’Espresso, so Michnik
referenced an article by Kołakowski published in the London Tribune, a socialist magazine,
where Kołakowski argued against the possibility of a social-democratic dictatorship of the
proletariat.42 Michnik wrote that he believed the Eurocommunist parties were genuine in their
reform attempts, brushing aside accusations that it was a Moscow plot to take power in Europe
through legal means. Michnik likened these accusations to ones he faced, often accused of
being a Polish stooge of Western powers. He saw any change in the status quo as positive and
the policies of the United States exemplified by Henry Kissinger as wishing to maintain it. In this
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way, Western leftists were on the same side as Eastern European dissidents, whether either
side knew it or not. Michnik wrote that democracy and freedom were all he wanted for Poland
as the Eurocommunists did; he wanted human rights to be respected in his country so that the
opposition there could focus on concerns of the Western left like environmentalism (which
implied that these were problems of a lower order than fighting totalitarianism).
Michnik concluded the discussion with Herling-Grudziński by stating that the evolution
of Western parties toward democratic socialism should be celebrated as movement in the right
direction for all of Europe—East and West. Here again appeared a vision of the future where
the left had grown in power and where the fates of Eastern and Western Europe were
intertwined. Indeed, this forecast was supported by the evolution of these Western European
parties as they moved toward democratic practice with the urging of Eastern European
opposition activists like Michnik.43
This coverage of the opinions of Italian communists, widely discussed and re-printed in
Aneks—as well as the responses to European developments in Dissent—conveyed that the
appeals of the Polish opposition contributed to a profound change in the party line of the PCI
and other Eurocommunist parties.44 Invited to Moscow to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the
Russian Revolution a year after the publishing of Polish opposition activist Jacek Kuroń’s Open
Letter addressed to him, Italian communist leader Enrico Berlinguer declared that democracy,
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political pluralism, religious and all manner of other freedoms are universal values. He said also
that states should not be ruled according to any leading ideology.45 The speech was not
received well in Moscow but won Berlinguer praise in Washington, D.C. Polish dissident
intellectuals appealed to communist leaders in Western Europe who shared at the very least a
common language, if not a set of values—Poles had for the most part given up on socialism as
an ideology and a radiant future. Their efforts to communicate with Western socialist and
communist leaders highlight an overlooked aspect of Cold War East-West communication.
Socialism and Solidarność: Poland as civilizational antidote
Couched in socialist language, dialogue with Westerners does not reveal the full breadth
of what Polish intellectuals thought about socialism, Marxism and the future of the left. Writing
in Aneks that is largely addressed to other Poles revealed their fears and motivations and what
they really hoped to achieve. With a handful of important exceptions described below, Polish
commentators in their writing largely criticized Western intellectuals and leaders when writing
for this Polish audience. Two ideas are presented in this section. One, that Western leftists are
naïve about communism. The second idea, following from the first, is that Poles and other
Eastern Europeans must thus find a way out of their situation on their own. When the writing of
activists in Poland, émigrés and Westerners mixed in Aneks, Westerners acquainted with Polish
intellectuals expressed the same opinions as Poles.
Because Western leftists were seen as seeking to pursue peace at all costs, the West
was often thought of as becoming complicit in unfreedom in Eastern Europe, or at best not
interested in helping those who wanted to challenge it. Even if some Westerners did want to
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help, writers in Aneks often thought of Western Europeans and Americans as not able to. The
West was seen as weak, easily fooled, or interested in its own safety, security, and stability at
all costs. This was not necessarily expressed as blame. It was rather more the case that Eastern
Europeans possessed their own agency and ideas that were distinct from what they thought
was a soft, distant, and naïve West.
One way of expressing both the notions that Westerners were naïve and that Poles or
Eastern Europeans would have to fix their situation on their own was to imagine Poland as if it
was in an advanced and future state of political order compared to Western Europe. Maria
Hirszowicz, an ex-communist professor Poland who fled the country in 1968 for England as
other expelled Warsaw University professors did then, in 1977 compared the violent seizure of
power by communists in Eastern Europe to the Christian concept of original sin. To Hirszowicz,
this phenomenon was in the past for Eastern European societies while it was very much the
present, potentially about to occur in the West and the third world in the 1970s.46 The
implication was that Eastern Europeans would have to show Westerners the error of their ways
before they too were conquered by a dystopian political order.
Another common theme explaining Poland’s position, especially after the crushing of
Solidarność, was that inaction by the West was another betrayal (another Yalta). A common
sentiment among Polish intellectuals was that Westerners found it best to do nothing, no
matter what was happening in Eastern Europe. Many were frustrated to not feel support
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perceived to be given to peoples involved in the decolonization struggles of the global south.
But in saving themselves, Poles and other Eastern Europeans would also save the West.
Polish activist Jacek Kuroń, representing the perspective of a dissident inside Poland,
criticized the West harshly in one of his most famous essays, which appeared in—among other
places—a 1977 issue of Aneks. Kuroń presents a program for resolving the crisis of
undemocratic governance in Poland that does not consider the West as an ally. He instead
creates a framework for what the Polish political opposition must do on its own to create a
democratic Poland. Writing for activists in Poland, Kuroń notes that that the Soviet Union was
allowed to colonize the country after the Second World War with the approval of Western
powers, especially the United States and the United Kingdom. Kuroń did not see the
parliamentary democracy of the West as adequate for Poland’s future but only as a steppingstone to direct democracy. Kuroń ended this 1976 essay by writing—as Jiří Pelikán recalled in
Mondoperaio a year later— that the Polish opposition should push for Poland to become like
Finland: subservient to the Soviet Union in foreign policy but largely independent and enjoying
parliamentary democracy.47
Émigré and activist Jerzy Boniecki described the scale of the threat facing Western
civilization in an essay in which he cited the 1977 Kultura conversation between Michnik and
Herling-Grudziński.48 He observed that in Western Europe there was little doubt among people

47

There is a utopian hope as well: that this parliamentary democracy might one day become
direct democracy. Jacek Kuroń, “Myśli o Programie Działania,” Aneks, no. 13–14 (1977): 15–16;
Jacek Kuroń and Krystyna Aytoun, “DOCUMENT ON CONTEMPORARY POLAND: Reflections on a
Program of Action,” The Polish Review 22, no. 3 (1977): 58.
48
Boniecki in 1980 created Polcul, a foundation that supported Polish culture by giving grants
to Polish intellectuals.
374

concerned with such things that it was a matter of “when” not “if” Western parliamentary
democracies would transition to socialism or communism. As Westerners printed in Aneks
often awaited a socialist future even while criticizing Eastern Europe, it is not difficult to see
why Boniecki held this view. He wondered how this could be in societies where people had
“cars, color televisions, refrigerators, benefitting from heretofore unknown social benefits and
enjoying freedom….” To Boniecki and even moreso to those who came from Eastern Europe to
the West for only a short period of time, this was the height of absurdity. Émigrés, himself
included, had “experienced socialism ‘there,’ on their own skin,” and did not want to
experience it again.
Boniecki quoted Michnik, who wrote that “in the flood of nonsense that [Western
leftists] say, write and do, “there is a real passion to fight for a better world.”49 The émigré
Boniecki understood but did not agree that this passion translates to a better future.50 How was
it possible that in Italy, France and England Marxist parties—socialists and communists—
seemed to be gaining strength? Had they not learned from Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia, Boniecki asked. Marxism appeals because it fills a spiritual void created by
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turbulent times, he opined; it provides an escape from reality.51 Marxism was popular because
Western leftists needed slogans to battle “logic and common sense” in their quest for
egalitarianism, he concluded.
Like many Polish so-called secular intellectuals of the time, Boniecki emphasized that he
was not a right-wing anti-communist and did not ascribe to propaganda from that direction. But
he did not think that Marxism offered an enticing vision either. At the same time, he described
it working out in practice in the same way that Western right-wingers (by that point famously
referred to by Dissent editors as neoconservatives) had: promising more welfare and less
responsibility in an effort to sway the populace. Egalitarianism as an equal shot at individual
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success was sensible while egalitarianism in general was not.52 Boniecki called the latter
“unfair…. Equally from a biological and social point of view.”53
Similar to the sentiments above about the lack of utility provided by the West for Polish
problems, Polish labor leader Lech Wałęsa, quoted in a section of documents in a 1981 issue of
Aneks, said that the Solidarność trade union (which he at the time represented) did not want to
get rid of socialism and so had no intention of copying any structures suggested by the West.
The document was compiled by an office within the Polish Communist Party. The officials who
compiled it highlight Wałęsa’s statements for socialism, but a socialism with a Polish flavor. His
affirmation of socialism may simply have been paying lip service to the regime and its
appearance in a government document would have been evidence that his efforts were fruitful.
But the second component, about not seeking answers from abroad for Poland’s problems, was
consistent with Kuroń’s programmatic writing from years prior.54
In an article entitled “Attempting to Understand,” written while Solidarność was at the
peak of its influence, émigré philosopher Leszek Kołakowski summarized the position of the
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Polish political opposition between Eastern European communist governments and the
Western world. He noted that the opposition was told not to rock the boat by Western
observers as soon as it began to do things that were seen as unpalatable to the Soviet Union or
challenged the power of the Polish authorities—like organizing and asking for the legal
recognition of independent trade unions under the banner of Solidarność. At the same time,
the Polish movement was gaining global importance, according to Kołakowski, because it was
creating “a new language that would suit our issues and most burning concerns….” He did not
mean the concerns of just Poland or even Eastern Europe, but of the West as a whole. The
breath of fresh air provided by Solidarność was needed because the West was in crisis: “dogmas
and language habits” formed over decades sounded meaningless—“distant from the key
problems of our world.”55
Kołakowski believed that Eastern Europe was a part of Western civilization that had
been led astray by an ideology for which the Cold War West had no antidote. To him, the Polish
opposition movement was an answer to the West’s (understood as pan-European Western
civilization) post-1968 crisis of identity politics. Kołakowski derided “single issue” concerns like
the environmental and feminist movements as ineffective, because “important issues rarely let
themselves be taken care of as isolated cases.” The philosopher Ewa Bieńkowska reiterated this
sentiment in a critique of the work of Polish émigré intellectual Konstanty Jeleński.56 Jeleński,
who settled in Paris in 1951, appreciated May 1968 as a cure composed of anarchy and nihilism
that refreshed crumbling social structures. Bieńkowska, a pupil of Kołakowski, disagreed, calling
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the ideology of French student revolutionaries a mixture of “scraps of nineteenth- and
twentieth-century ideologies, cocktails of Marxism-Freudism-Maoism…. An infantile babble of
alternative culture, or worse, slipping into naked (literally this time) violence.”57 To Bieńkowska
as well, Western Europe was in crisis just as much—if not more than—the East. She called 1968
in the West failed, regressive, and accused the protestors of being unable to make a concrete
point.
The West could not help Poland. Rather, Poland would resolve great civilizational
problems for the West. Socialism of some sort or at the very least a convergence of the two
world systems was the most likely path forward for the West but this needed to be prevented.
To stop the spread of (leftist) authoritarianism in a world moving toward the left, and partly
because they felt comfortable in dialogue with leftists, ex-communists like Kołakowski
continued to pay attention to ideas and political issues in that area of the political spectrum
into the 1980s.
Writing about Poland during the heady Solidarność period—mere months prior to the
imposition of martial law in December of 1981—Aneks editor Aleksander Smolar too saw
unprecedented events that necessitated the rethinking of old concepts (he singles out
democracy and liberalism).58 The existence of the independent trade union, a novel movement
in a communist state, unsettled not just the East but all of Europe. Smolar, like many of his
peers, assessed that to many Westerners events in Poland seemed to put Europe on the
precipice of disaster: another war or even global nuclear annihilation. Poles within the Aneks
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milieu were on the other hand confident and proud of what they had helped to bring about as
Solidarność flourished in Poland. This perceived difference in assessing the actions of Polish
anti-government activists would foment bitterness as the 1980s progressed.
After Solidarność
Reticence between Eastern Europeans and Western intellectuals ascended to an all-time
high as events in Poland reached a boiling point with the suppression of Solidarność by the
imposition of martial law in December of 1981. After the crushing of Solidarność, long debates
occurred among Poles about what went wrong. Or had something gone wrong at all? Perhaps
what occurred was as good of an outcome as Poles could realistically have hoped for? After
analyzing immediate Polish reactions to the crushing of their hopes in December of 1981, this
section culminates in a long exchange under the title “Intelligentsia, “Solidarność, authorities,”
spread over three 1984 issues of Aneks. Themes of naïveté, dystopia and betrayal (as had
occurred at Yalta at the end of the Second World War) continued to frame Polish assessments
of the state of—and relationship between—Eastern and Western Europe.
Leszek Kołakowski in 1982 called those who stood by while Solidarność was crushed
contemporary appeasers: “aficionados of the Polish junta… [among them] politicians and
journalists.” These Westerners argued that imposing martial law in Poland prevented a worse
fate, that Solidarność went too far, and that direct Soviet invasion of Poland would be worse
than homegrown dictatorship, he wrote. Kołakowski compared the lives of Poles under a
communist military dictatorship to decolonization and anti-authoritarian struggles elsewhere:
In the same sense, Negroes who demand equal rights in South Africa go too far; the
government cannot accept it. People in Argentina inquire about the fate of those who
died in military hands go too far; this the rulers can no longer tolerate. Whoever in any
despotic country is not entirely satisfied with despotism goes too far. Serves him right.
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Excuses for inaction in these countries were to Kołakowski consistent with excuses that
Westerners provided for not acting to help Eastern European dissidents struggling against
Soviet imperialism—against the failure of communism—he concluded. “It is really a pity.
communism would be a great idea if only there were no people.”59 Similarly, the Polish
intellectual Stefan Kisielewski noted in 1982 that Polish communists agreed with confused
Westerners about why Marxism hadn’t been good for Poles. Both Westerners and Polish
communists said that it wasn’t Marxism but how his theories were implemented. Perhaps
Poland and Eastern Europe were too backward. That Poland had “specificities, abnormalities
and historical distortions” which prevented Marxism from flourishing there were excuses that
Kisielewski and other Poles found unsatisfying.60
Another Pole in Raymond Aron’s circle and frequent Aneks contributor, the sociologist
Franciszek Draus, also criticized Westerners for their appeasement. Draus highlighted a
statement by the editor-in-chief of Der Spiegel, Rudolf Augstein, who wrote that martial law
imposed in Poland in 1981 was a necessary evil. To Draus, Augstein was saying that Polish
reformers lacked moderation and reason, and had destabilized the Cold War geopolitical status
quo.61 An anonymous Polish commentator in a 1982 issue of Aneks similarly described the
reaction of West German leftists, specifically well-known writers Günter Grass and Heinrich
Böll, to the imposition of martial law.62 These Westerners were described as sacrificing Eastern
Europeans for the ideal of peace; or more tangibly for the comfortable lives that Western
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Europeans got to live in exchange. According to the author of the latter commentary, leftist
West German intellectuals characterized themselves as being responsible for world peace and
the wellbeing of the environment. For them and others, Polish current events only became an
issue worth caring about insofar as they threatened stability in Europe. The subtext of these
bitter summaries of sentiment was that the German left didn’t care to speak up for rights that
they themselves enjoyed, if that speaking up endangered their ability to enjoy the rights that
Poles were struggling for.
Andrzej Łodyński, an émigré that would go on to work for the Polish section of the BBC,
described the perceived attitude of Western European leftists, Western European
governments, and Western peace movements at the time in much the same way as the
anonymous author. He wrote that whether Westerners were disinterested or concerned about
Eastern European dissident activity, they always wished to maintain the status quo. Westerners
excused themselves from antagonizing the Soviet Union when it was perceived as strong and
from bothering to do anything about it when it seemed weak. Their attitude was “directed
against the struggling aspirations for freedom in the communist bloc,” Łodyński concluded.63
Jerzy Boniecki wrote again in 1984 that the West shared responsibility for Poland’s
geopolitical position, citing—as many others had done before and since—the Yalta conference
of 1945. At the same time, the West’s responsibility for the failure of the Solidarność
movement should not be overstated, Boniecki wrote, responding to what he felt was an
uncalled-for polemic against the West by Polish poet and émigré Stanisław Barańczak. In a
review of British historian Norman Davies’s voluminous work about Poland, God’s Playground,
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Barańczak had written that it frustrated him for Poles not to be able to enjoy the same rights as
the people of other, more lucky nations—and that those nations were not coming to the aid of
Poles. Boniecki countered that Poland after the crushing of the Solidarność movement had
received a profound amount of global sympathy which turned into millions of dollars’ worth of
material aid, but this was his only concession in favor of Westerners.
Anonymous participants in a discussion re-printed in Aneks from a Polish underground
publication printed a year prior largely echoed Boniecki’s assessment that Western attention
had been helpful for Polish dissidents as they explored the West’s fear that Polish dissidents
were destabilizing Europe.64 One interlocutor noted that Eastern Europeans should not bring up
potentially destabilizing goals like national independence—rather they should focus on
garnering support from organizations like Western labor unions who are more concerned about
labor issues. Another pushed back, writing that appeals to Westerners had recently led to
actions that pressured the American and French governments to voice support for Polish
activists, and independence was not as scary as it had once been. “We must play on this
politics,” the respondent said. Pressure on the West by dissidents had pushed official positions
on events in Poland in support of the anti-government opposition quite far. The most effective
way to stop Westerners from linking events in Poland to the potential for a third world war—
potentially a nuclear war—was to work with organizations that supported human rights and try
to associate those rights with the cause of peace in Europe instead, they concluded.
In the review that Boniecki criticized, Barańczak had written that the West had to
support democracy in the totalitarian part of the world because defending democracy there

64

“Co Dalej?,” Aneks, no. 32 (1983): 44–72. Re-printed from a Krakow journal called Arka.
383

preserved their own rights as well. Boniecki countered that democracy in Poland was not a
realistic hope at the present moment, but that the West was complicit in its un-democracy. Not
because Westerners had not provided adequate aid for Solidarność but because of Western
culpability in setting up the status quo decades earlier (Yalta). There was indeed in the West a
“spirit of capitulation,” Boniecki wrote, referring to the idea that Western countries, especially
in Europe, were not taking a hard enough stance or willing to risk armed conflict to stand up to
the Soviet Union.65 Boniecki had in fact written an article for Kultura In 1980 entitled “Western
capitulation,” in which he—like a number of other Polish dissidents already cited—called the
conflict between the Western powers and the Soviet Union “a historical test that contemporary
Western civilization is exposed to while in search of a new spiritual base.”66
Already then Boniecki had shifted into a mode that became familiar after the crushing of
Solidarność: Western powers could not continue to appease the Soviet Union, especially in the
realm of nuclear weapons. To cede ground was to endanger “the struggle of Western freedom
and civilization against an inhuman system of violence and slavery.” Thus Boniecki partially
agreed with Barańczak but saw the poet’s position as too focused on Poland when this struggle
was actually far broader: at stake was Western civilization itself. Western powers could be
doing more to help Poland directly, but that was less effective than standing up to the USSR in a
more general sense. Because the Cold War was a civilizational conflict, it was not about their
country alone.
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Criticizing Barańczak in 1984, Boniecki wrote that according to the logic of the former, in
which the well-off West must help Poles, they in turn have a moral imperative to help those
struggling in poverty in India and Africa (Boniecki, like Kołakowski, thus also uses decolonization
struggles elsewhere as a point of comparison). Barańczak responded that he was surprised to
read a fellow Polish émigré accusing him of wanting special privileges for Poles, when all he
desired was simply for the Polish government to follow its own laws. While Boniecki
emphasized the civilizational danger of Soviet totalitarianism, Barańczak focused on Western
lack of interest in helping Poland. But in Barańczak’s estimation too looms civilizational danger,
which he only alludes to at the end of his review. Beyond hypocrisy, the West was endangering
the freedoms it refused to defend in Poland by allowing them to be trampled in Poland,
Barańczak concluded.
Three key points frame a debate about Solidarność that unfolds over three issues of
Aneks between 1984 and 1985. The instigator, historian and 1981 émigré Andrzej Walicki, first
criticized the intellectual leaders of Solidarność.67 His criticism was attacked with the same
rebuttal that Poles had already used toward Westerners: that accusing Solidarność of missteps
or going too far signaled a failure of understanding what the movement was trying to achieve.
The topic turned in the second part of this three-part debate to Western leaders, intellectuals,
Poles abroad and Poles communicating with Westerners. Walicki pushed a third matter: that
Polish dissidents were coalescing around certain people & ideas, and excluding people like him,
who had different or critical views. The second and the third topics bleed into each-other, with
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émigré intellectuals implicated both in conversations about influence and about exclusivity
within the broad opposition movement in Poland.
Walicki starts his “Thoughts about the Political and Moral-Psychological Situation in
Poland” by writing that the system in place there was not an absolute evil and to claim that it
was cut off dialogue.68 Walicki was by no means a supporter of the Polish authorities but noted
that Poles had more freedom than citizens of other countries in the orbit of the Soviet Union.
The key point of disagreement for critics will be Walicki’s desire to not upset the Polish
Communist Party. Walicki is overall critical of his friends in the opposition. He argued that,
ideologically speaking, the Solidarność movement was too inculcated by socialist ideas (which
he equated with belief in magic) brought in by the intelligentsia. Walicki instead pushed what
he called classic liberalism, invoking the Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek. To Walicki, the
liberal idea of limited government was the only way to combat totalitarian ideas, and
Solidarność was a collectivist mass movement which implicitly placed it in league with the
dictatorship it was fighting.
Waldemar Kuczyński, a Polish economist and opposition activist, argued against
Walicki’s notion that the authorities should be brought into dialogue in the hope of reform. The
position was to Kuczyński tantamount to the idea of revisionism—reform of communism—that
many, especially the 1968 generation intellectuals, had abandoned more than a decade prior.
Kuczyński wrote that there was no possibility of winning liberals from dogmatists. Influential
Polish historian and activist, Jan Józef Lipski, also criticized Walicki’s idea of manipulating the
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authorities, calling it utopian. Krzysztof Pomian, a Polish philosopher and then a recent
immigrant to France, honed in on Walicki’s idea of reasoning with Polish authorities as well;
many in similar positions who thought that they were manipulating others were actually the
ones being manipulated, he stated.
Lipski wrote that Walicki confused cause and effect in his criticism of the Solidarność
movement, because a Polish government that is more independent of the Soviet Union would
not allow more freedom for society. Any freedom gained had been hard-fought by opposition
groups rather than negotiated for. For his part, Pomian criticized Walicki’s likening of
Solidarność to socialist praxis, pointing out that these so-called socialist values are also Christian
ones while poking fun at his classic liberal position.69 He called Walicki’s idea that a small group
from the intelligentsia could influence the Solidarność movement naïve. Kuczyński meanwhile
concluded his polemic with a simple summation of what the movement achieved and how:
“This mechanism is nothing new in human history. The basic causes of evolution or erosion of
dictatorship have been revolts. And they remain so.”70
After this first round of letters, Walicki was given a chance to respond to his critics. He
wrote that the banning of Solidarność was predictable and no one wanted to take responsibility
for this oversight; that idealizing disasters was particularly Polish in nature. He ended his
response by writing that one reason he was hesitant to return to Poland is because the
opposition movement refused to take responsibility for its failure (that failure being the
declaration of martial law in Poland and crackdown on Solidarność). The intellectual opposition
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which took part in this movement came from the same secular intelligentsia milieu of which he
was a part but had trouble seeing a place for himself in it now. Prominent intellectuals seemed
to not only be disagreeing with him but were upset that he said they had made mistakes and
celebrated failure. Walicki did still want to publish in Polish periodicals and asked if the
“intellectual leaders of this diaspora” would allow him the right to do so despite the views he
had expressed. He accused these leaders of becoming frustrated, sectarian and opposite to
liberal culture in which a person could “differ reasonably.”71
The editors of Aneks were of course amenable to Walicki’s plea that he be allowed to
express his ideas. Such a freedom was at the core of their mission. A short note appears after
this exchange, in which they write: “our role is not to warm hearts or encourage fights, but to
create conditions for free, not limited by any taboos, discussion of matters important to
Poland.”72 This discussion in particular, they wrote, would continue. Its aim was not to assign
blame but to strength the opposition movement in the future. The editors directly answered
Walicki’s question about whether he was welcome: “We don’t know who [Walicki’s] question is
directed to. By publishing Andrzej Walicki we have responded with our position on this issue.
This of course does not mean that we share his views or assessments.” The discussion
continued in the following issue (the final one published in 1984) with an essay by Polish
intellectual and 1968 protestor Jakub Karpiński, writer Stefan Kisielewski and the philosopher
Marcin Król. These responses turned to the relationship between the West and Polish politics.
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Karpiński carefully picked apart Walicki’s criticisms of Solidarność, with the central thesis
being that Walicki was engaging in victimology—blaming the innocent victim for a wrong
committed against them. While there was room for various interpretations of events, this space
faded when confronted with reality, he argued. His bitterness comes through in the final
paragraph: “Interpretations may contradict experience, but they then run into actual events.
Police, tanks, and bars are three-dimensional and they are rather distinct elements of social
reality.”73
Kisielewski appreciated that such a discussion of recent events in Poland was at all
possible. He expressed gratitude for Aneks and the participants—both Walicki and his critics—
and called the discussion both objective and critical. He sided largely with Walicki on the basis
of the latter writer’s thesis that Solidarność did not break out of the Marxist tradition—that it
maintained the collectivist ethos that is at the heart of communism. Kisielewski noted that his
statements were for an audience beyond Poland (which included émigrés like Walicki)—whom
he considered disoriented when it comes to understanding what was taking place in the
country over the course of the 1980s. Kisielewski sounded bitter about being represented in the
West by naïve young activists who, he wrote, had not felt the lessons of the past forty years of
communism on their own skin. To him as to many other Polish intellectuals, reticence began
with the selling-out of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union at Yalta. In 1984, all that Westerners
were giving to young Polish activists was what he called the propaganda of martyrdom: “we
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follow helplessly mixed-up Western notions… unable to convey to the West the essence of our
many years of experience,” Kisielewski lamented.74
Kisielewski saw the 1968 émigré intellectuals and those whom they helped in Poland as
disconnected from the reality of life in Eastern Europe. In a way, for Kisielewski they were no
longer Poles but members of another milieu: international intellectuals who may actually be
doing harm to the mission of anti-authoritarian activism in Poland. Polish dissidents were
sustained by Western leftists (those same leftists that supported pacifism and were against
nuclear proliferation). And the “dissidents” (Kisielewski puts the moniker in quotes) had
nothing but “beautiful words,” for a “free arena of intellectual discourse… existing only in the
West and for the West.” Billions in the East meanwhile could not raise their voice, he wrote,
meanwhile “we are represented by these romantic enunciations and ‘dissident’ chants, which
exploit one or another blast of political fashion in the West – but… our internal situation and
the significant information about it [presented] to the outside world… has little impact.”
Kisielewski’s goal was to get communist authoritarianism out of Poland, not posture before
Western European intellectuals. This posturing—these “beautiful words”—didn’t seem to be
getting through.
For the majority of Polish intellectuals, communism was a dystopia that had to be
abandoned completely. Like Walicki, Kisielewski wrote that Solidarność failed because it recreated the communist idea of the leading class being the working class, using and used by
leftist language, and supported by leftists in the West. Similar to the description of Aleksander
Solzhenitsyn’s reception in 1976 and Aleksander Smolar’s proud assessment of Solidarność in
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1981, Kisielewski wrote that the political concepts of left and right were anachronisms that
served only to mislead. The Solidarność movement could not be represented by these tired
concepts: it was a workers’ movement asking for rights from a workers’ state. This novel
situation was a constant source of reticence and misunderstanding. Kisielewski implored his
readers to stop being ruled by old words like left and right and instead to usher in a new era—
one in which people would rule words.
Leszek Kołakowski too once wrote a near-identical criticism of leftist language. Yet
Kołakowski had at the same time been one of the Polish intellectuals who visited Italy in years
prior and attempted dialogue with Western leftists. Kisielewski appeared not to value such
efforts. Kisielewski imagined an ivory tower in Warsaw populated by those reaching out to
Westerners (using the word nami, “us,” including himself in the group of intellectuals he was
criticizing). His criticism seemed to be wrapped in bitterness and his understanding of the West
general; the mere fact that self-described leftists existed there profoundly insulting. He
polemicized against Westerners just as much as he did against the younger activists who were
in dialogue with them.
Writing in the second round of responses, philosopher Marcin Król disagreed with
Walicki’s criticisms of Solidarność in general, because the existence of the organization did
change Poland for the better in the long term. Walicki’s opinion of the post-Solidarność
sociopolitical landscape in Poland was erroneous because he was now an émigré, Król wrote,
asserting that political strategy should develop “both in emigration and in the country… not
primarily in emigration.”75 Król here subtly argued for publications like Kultura to make way for
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already occurring homegrown political conversations.76 In Poland after the crushing of
Solidarność, it was possible to speak directly about politics—without putting issues into
communist language—as even the authorities no longer bothered to hide behind it. The
opportunity needed to be seized.
Émigrés did not have an accurate sense of what was going on in Poland (in Król’s
estimation), and neither Western Europeans nor Americans wanted to or could influence the
situation in favor of democratization. Król too mentioned Yalta, noting that Western powers
acted to maintain not just peace, but outright calm, in Europe—standing in the way of the
Polish desire to change the status quo:
The years 1980-1984 clearly revealed the absence of any serious, long-term political
conception concerning Poland. Neither the United States, nor Great Britain or France
formulated any proposals during this period that would attempt to find some "indirect"
solution to the Polish problem…. The policy of the USA and other Western powers
towards Poland was and still is only a function of their policy toward the Soviet Union;
These countries simply do not have Polish policy, because they are not interested in it.
In a nod to initiative by individuals and non-government organizations, Król added that he was
separating public opinion in the West from the actions of their governments. His assessment of
a disinterested West was shared by most writers in the pages of Aneks.
According to Król too, then, any hope for change in Poland lay with Poles themselves.
Though his Romantic (in the philosophical sense) view of the intelligentsia as agents of change
stands out—especially contra the pessimism of Kuczyński, Pomian and Kisielewski. Król wanted
to produce “rational hope” in Poland, and it was the task of the intelligentsia to produce it by
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educating Poles about their problems, and the choices & possibilities that were available to
them. More subtle was Król’s estimation that Poland was in a variety of ways backward and,
because it was under communist control, not part of Europe proper—a timeless sentiment
shared by Eastern European reformers and progressives. Król warned that without such action
by the intelligentsia, “Poland would be irrevocably doomed to an anachronistic existence
beyond the world of civilization, Europe and creative life.”77 Król adds to these thoughts in a
1987 essay. There he writes that Solidarność was misunderstood as a political movement—one
that gained power—whereas it intended to be a social one, creating citizens. He again writes
that both Polish émigrés and Westerners engaged in Eastern European issues misunderstood it.
Both Król and Kisielewski wished to lessen émigré influence in their mid-1980s
assessments, a sentiment that the editors of Aneks agreed with as well. Émigrés were too far
away to understand events in Poland, to Król too comfortable in the West—that simpler place.
For émigrés (Król singled out Kultura) the Solidarność movement did not go far enough. At the
same time, it scared many Westerners.78 Król here worried that their anti-political approach
could be mistaken by Westerners for either ethnic nationalism or dangerous naïveté. But
Solidarność did not want power; it wanted to create Polish citizens. Hope was key, but not the
abstract hope in a better world that inspired Western socialists. Hope had to be rational;
grounded in reality. Everything else would flow from there.
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This second round of responses to Walicki’s book highlighted core assumptions about
the West, however defined, and the people who inhabited that luckier land. There was as well
an effort to distinguish the perspective of émigré intellectuals from that of people in Poland—
with respondents even likening émigrés to Westerners. Karpiński was at the time living and
working in New York but would return to Poland in the 1990s. Kisielewski and Król never lived
abroad but published regularly in émigré journals. These journals were then sent to Poland to
inform and stimulate political conversation there. By the mid-1980s this function was perhaps
no longer needed, but émigré journals still served the purpose of dialogue, where émigré Poles
and other interested parties could read the opinions of anti-government opposition
intellectuals in Poland and engage with them, as this exchange exemplifies.
The third and final round of responses appeared in the next issue, which was the first of
1985. The respondents were Polish historian Jerzy Holzer, Leszek Kołakowski and Polish
intellectual Jerzy Surdykowski. Holzer, like Pomian, criticized Walicki’s rationalism. Perhaps it
led to looking for people to blame for the failure of the movement rather than recognizing that
sometimes there is no good way out: “better worse than worst,” Holzer quipped.79 Like Król, he
wrote that Poland was better for having experienced the rise and collapse of Solidarność.
Surdykowski too criticized Walicki for re-hashing revisionism. He too wrote that Solidarność
achieved progress despite being crushed, and that the government side was not acting in good
faith when it communicated with the opposition. Taking Walicki’s argument in good faith,
however, Surdykowski does credit him for urging the opposition to not act in “splendid
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isolation” (written in English), but rather to attempt more dialogue with reform-minded
elements within the communist government.80
Kołakowski split his essay between criticism of Westerners and of the strategy of
revisionism (or taking the government at its word). He wrote that Walicki used the same
argument as Western pacifists: “a cliche, widespread after December 13th among Western
(usually very poorly informed) supporters of appeasement, saying that Solidarność ‘went too
far’.”81 Kołakowski too equated lack of support for the Polish opposition to a false sense of
security among Westerners—a peace conducted at the cost of the rights of people who were
acting to better their lives. He also emphasized that Walicki was just rehashing the idea of
revisionism once more when he suggested that progressive-seeming communist party
functionaries should be courted and supported by the opposition. “We play chess with them,
they kick our butt,” Kołakowski quoted Polish writer Antoni Słonimski in response. The only
lesson learned by the opposition over the past four decades was that concessions from the
government would only be achieved by force (but not physical violence), he wrote.
Like other critics of Walicki, Kołakowski accused him of victim-blaming. The idea
presented by both Walicki and Kisielewski that Solidarność did not move far enough from the
socialist ethos was contradictory to the idea that the organization went too far. Kisielewski
shared with Kołakowski the idea that socialist language was outmoded. With Walicki,
Kołakowski shared the idea that totalitarianism hid behind radical egalitarianism. Nevertheless,
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Kołakowski noted that to criticize working people for supporting egalitarianism as they
organized against an exploitative system was misguided.82
Across these three issues, respondents criticized Walicki for appearing to rehash the
failed strategy of revisionism—the collapse of which is central to the narrative of 1968.83 While
ostensibly about Solidarność and Polish intellectuals, a large chunk of this debate is about
Western Europe and Western leftists—the West. Opinions about the West are often expressed
in the context of whether Western governments and intellectuals could be of use for the
opposition in Poland. Their utility, meanwhile, is judged according to whether they understand,
take an interest in, or have the ability to affect the situation in Eastern Europe. While opinion
about the situation in Poland is mixed, there is a general agreement that most Westerners have
little interest in—or understanding of—Eastern Europe. There is a common conviction that
Poles and Eastern Europeans more broadly must solve their own issues. At the same time, to
criticize the West is to acknowledge that Westerners could help Eastern Europeans if the will to
do so was present. The will to help and effectiveness of help would depend on understanding.
But Eastern Europeans would have to lead the way.
Solidarność and World Peace: Western Voices
Eastern European émigrés presenting their experiences and those of their friends to
Westerners profoundly affected the Western conversation about Poland in the 1970s and
1980s. Western leftists sometimes highlighted the influence of Eastern European opposition
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intellectuals on their thought. No longer were some Western leftists thinking solely about their
own experience when evaluating the bipolar schema of the Cold War, but also how these same
ideas had played out in Eastern Europe, the societies of the latter once thought to be the
sociopolitical future of all of Europe and perhaps the world. For Eastern European intellectuals,
the dialogue raised questions about whether the West could, or even wanted to help them.
This region with its governments based on utopian ideas now revealed a possible
dystopian future instead if its imperialist and totalitarian flaws could not be overcome. Its fate
and that of progressive thought, or at least the part of it buttressed by Marxism, was in the
hands of Eastern and Western Europeans together. Eastern European intellectuals were proof
that the practice of dividing political thinking into left and right was anachronistic. Their antiMarxist activism forced recognition that totalitarian or imperialist actions should be criticized
whether committed by leftist or right-wing governments. This focus on the experiences of
others (by both Eastern Europeans and Westerners) was a major step in reconciling or
entangling the parallel recent pasts of Eastern and Western Europe. Whether they were
beginning to understand each-other is debatable, but Westerners engaged with the problems
of Eastern Europe were at least beginning to grasp the experience that Eastern Europeans had
of living with the socialist idea at its furthest worldly realization.
World peace or pacifism set against nuclear proliferation became the central tension
creating reticence as the 1980s went on.84 This theme is explored in depth in a 1984 issue of
Aneks entitled “War and peace,” filled with writing about Western peace and nuclear
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disarmament movements and the implications of their actions for the Polish struggle for human
rights. It was not only Poles but those Westerners who recognized their struggle, many exMarxists themselves, who were frustrated by Western public opinion about Poland—especially
when it was similar to that which they themselves held prior to their own disenchantment with
Marxism. This section features Western voices moderated by Poles, exposing tensions between
the Polish opposition & their Western allies and left-aligned Western peace movements.
At this stage, the mid-1980s, a robust dialogue was taking place, sometimes through
Aneks but more often recorded in it—an East-West intellectual exchange attempting to foster
understanding. The aronistes with whom Aleksander Smolar was acquainted, along with some
British intellectuals, expressed the same critical ideas as Polish intellectuals. The Aneks section
begins with an original introduction authored by French political scientist Jacques Rupnik. It is
followed by a translated essay from Pierre Hassner, a Romanian born naturalized Frenchman
and Raymond Aron acolyte; a translated piece written by E.P. Thompson that is addressed to an
Eastern European audience; a response to Thompson by Czech intellectual Miloslav Bednar
(alias: Václav Racek); and finally a translation of an open letter drafted by French bishops. The
articles as they are compiled in Aneks are an argument against the position of Western
European anti-nuclear proliferation movements like that of Thompson’s European Nuclear
Disarmament (END).85
The French intellectuals published in this section are all from the circle of Raymond Aron
which Aleksander Smolar belonged to after his emigration. All write in support of the Polish
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anti-authoritarian opposition, arguing that Western peace movements mischaracterized the
fight for human rights that their Eastern European peers were conducting. The authors echo
the sentiment that the Western world is threatened with the same unfreedom that Eastern
Europeans are then experiencing. This argument now refers to a tangible problem: countering
the idea of nuclear proliferation leading only to nuclear annihilation. In the 1970s Thompson
was in dialogue but critical of Eastern Europeans for abandoning Marxism. By the 1980s he was
more sympathetic but urged them to work with Western leftists to maintain peace in a nucleararmed world. In the “War and peace” introduction, Rupnik highlighted the difference of
perspective between Eastern European popular movements like Solidarność and Western
peace movements like E.P. Thompson’s END. Rupnik leans especially heavily on Pierre Hassner’s
piece to do so.
Hassner himself argued for the necessity of a military (i.e., nuclear) balance of power,
thus not-so-subtly calling Western peace and anti-nuclear movements naïve when stating that
they were happy for their home countries to become Soviet satellites if it meant preserving
peace. A Soviet Western Europe would not be more peaceful and certainly not more free,
Hassner wrote. At the end of his article—in a section that does not make it into Aneks but
appears in the original Atlantic Quarterly piece—Hassner equated nationalism with pacifism
and neutralism on the basis that a France looking out only for its best interests had adopted the
latter two ideas, leaving Europe divided and in danger of annexation by the Soviet Union.86 By
virtue of wishing to curtail the American military and nuclear presence in Western Europe, the
French government and Western peace movements weakened Western militaries, Hassner
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wrote. While this position would weaken American empire, it also hurt Solidarność, which
Hassner referred to as the only genuine peace movement in Eastern Europe.
Hassner had also written a detailed analysis of East-West politics immediately after
martial law was declared in Poland at the end of 1981.87 This essay appeared both in the French
Esprit and in Aneks in 1982, a year prior to this thematic section.88 He was then sympathetic to
E.P. Thompson’s END, but nevertheless argued that a neutral Europe—one without a military
balance of power or nuclear parity—would be one under the control of the Soviet Union. He
differentiated an American position (concerned about global geopolitics more than specific
regions), a West German one (concerned with its self-preservation through détente or
neutrality), and a French one (vocal about rights and freedoms but not acting on its rhetoric). In
a 1985 issue of Aneks, he adds critically (as many Poles had stated over the years) that the West
had no consistent politics with regard to Eastern Europe—rather, governments and
organizations acted intermittently.89 But any engagement is positive, Hassner writes; it is good
for the West to be in dialogue with the East. While change is up to Eastern Europeans, Hassner
again adds that a strong Western Europe is preferable to a neutral one, and this entails
supporting a nuclear balance in Europe (supporting American nuclear missiles rather than
rejecting them in the name of peace). From his 1982 position to this 1985 op-ed, Hassner’s
opinion of peace movements had only soured.
E.P. Thompson’s piece appears in the “War and peace” section of Aneks after the Rupnik
intro and Hassner article. Thompson was not merely a foil. He was in dialogue with Eastern
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Europeans, after all, and the ethos of Aneks was to publish a broad range of positions—even
ones that the editors of Aneks did not necessarily agree with. Nevertheless, there are several
claims in his piece that exemplify why Eastern Europeans were reticent toward Western peace
movements. Thompson here generally advocated for peace movements and Eastern European
freedom movements to ally, for transnational connections and mutual understanding. This
perspective invited accusations of utopianism.
Specifically, he broadly refused to imagine that negative outcomes are possible even if
people act with the best intentions. “First, the Cold War can never be ended by the victory of
one side over the other side: there can be no such victory without war,” Thompson wrote. “It
can be ended only as a result of a 'people's detente'-a detente beneath the level of statescreated by popular initiative, above all by the young.”90 Further, Thompson did not consider the
tenuous position of Eastern European movements, whose right to exist was not respected,
ascribing to them power that they did not have. Such a right was a necessary precondition for
any sort of people’s alliance between East and West.
Instead, Thompson thought that East/West coalitional friction was the result of Eastern
Europeans misunderstanding Western peace movements as imperialist ventures, “seeking to
export into the East, along with the ideas of peace, a whole set of other ideas and demands,
some of which may be appropriate to your national conditions and some of which may not.”
Cut from the Aneks translation are key sections in which Thompson acknowledged disparities
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between East and West mass movements and his understanding as limited (he notes early in
the piece that he doesn’t know what the size of the Soviet nuclear armament is because of a
lack of openly published information about it). After asking Eastern European intellectuals to
show solidarity with Western peace movements, he plainly said: “I do not know your
circumstances.”91
In his response, which was published jointly with Thompson’s piece in an END pamphlet,
Bednar pointed out that Thompson and he lived in different realities, exemplified even by the
simple fact that Thompson was able to voice dissent with few repercussions. Bednar called
Thompson and other peace activists naïve for equating the lived realities of Eastern and
Western Europe, calling their anti-nuclear mission appeasement that could lead to catastrophe
just as appeasing Hitler did. Only on the basis of being rid of this naïveté could cooperation
between mass movements in Eastern and Western Europe commence, Bednar concludes. In a
reply to the Czech’s letter, Thompson acknowledged that misunderstanding was occurring but
insisted that Eastern Europeans were just as misguided when they put their own self-interest
before world peace.92 Thompson’s reply does not appear in Aneks.93
The final piece in the “War and peace” special section is a letter, or pastoral, from a
1983 meeting of French bishops in Lourdes, France.94 The comments of the bishops echoed
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Hassner’s from years prior. They disavowed absolute pacifism, noting that doing everything
possible to steer clear of war was prematurely self-defeating. Putting it plainly, the bishops
wrote that one-sided disarmament—like that being promoted by E.P. Thompson—would
encourage aggression from the other side. The bishops argued for what they saw as the lesser
evil in a world that does not operate according to Manichean principles: “we choose the lesser
evil without claiming that it is good!” The editors of Aneks emphasize this quotation. It appears
in the Polish publication with ellipses on either side, pulled out of a longer sentence. It is the
epitome of the principles that the Polish opposition operated according to (recall Jerzy Holzer’s
“better worse than worst” in response to the émigré Walicki).
In essays that appeared in Aneks the following year, Adam Michnik also expressed his
frustration with the peace movements of Western intellectuals who were disinterested or,
worse, critical of the Polish opposition. Michnik highlights the alignment of a negative Western
leftist narrative about Eastern European activists (that they were being used to promote an
anti-communist agenda) with the propaganda of the Soviet Union and Eastern European
governments. He wrote that those who accused Polish anti-government activists of going too
far should know that radical action on the part of Eastern Europeans was based on “a radical
rejection of lies.” Westerners living in countries that Michnik describes as being “governed
traditionally” had no basis for understanding the frustration of Poles wishing to move their
government to this “traditional” form.95 He noted that he personally stood accused of being an
asset of the American government who wanted to be arrested in order to make the Polish
government look bad. In a letter from prison, Michnik wrote that most opposition activists “do
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not expect any help from outside. They do not place their faith in Reagan, or in the Pershing
missiles-they have no hopes hanging on the outcome of negotiations in Geneva.”96 Michnik saw
the imposition of martial law by the communist government at the end of 1981 as a desperate
step by the authorities rather than a defeat; acknowledgment that things had changed
irreversibly in Poland in favor of liberalization. In the following issue of Aneks, Michnik again
emphasized the agency of Eastern Europeans, who he said were relying on their Western
supporters to make changes that were really up to them to accomplish: “… official
propagandists are telling the truth: Poles cannot count on any direct help,” Michnik wrote: “no
miracle will occur and no one will do anything for us.”97 This was not meant as a defeatist
statement: rather, it was a description of self-actualization on the part of Poles—a call to
action.
Michnik opined that few Westerners understood the events occurring in Poland in the
1970s and 1980s, naming British journalist and historian Timothy Garton Ash and Martin Malia,
American historian of Russia, among those who did. Alongside the French milieu surrounding
Raymond Aron, select intellectuals like the two mentioned by Adam Michnik expressed the
same frustrations as he did. Timothy Garton Ash was a frequent interlocutor on the topic of
Eastern Europe. Both original essays and re-prints of work written by the Englishman were
published in Aneks over the years. In a 1982 essay that appears to be written for Aneks, Garton
Ash warned Polish readers that even those Western government policymakers and engaged
intellectuals that cared about Polish affairs at all were not concerned with the well-being of the
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people of the country as much as achieving specific goals, such as hurting the Soviet Union or
preserving world peace and stability. Poland was a “pawn on a global chessboard” to American
policymakers, he wrote, and civil war in the country would be a positive outcome because it
would hurt the Soviet Union.98 He found it absurd that a British leader of the anti-nuclear peace
movement in the West, not named but likely to be E.P. Thompson, equated those movements
to the Polish Solidarność. The absurdity of the notion was proven, in the eyes of Garton Ash,
when martial law was imposed in Poland in late 1981: Western peace movements then
retreated from supporting the Poles because they feared upsetting European stability.
In a 1985 essay explaining West German Ostpolitik, Garton Ash attacked the “so-called”
West German peace movement and the Green party, for, in his eyes attempting to undermine
parliamentary democracy itself with their critiques. The essay as it appeared in Aneks,
shortened with the permission of Garton Ash, leaves out most of the critique of the Western
left. Only a summary statement remained: “Only a minority, albeit a significant one…
completely [rejects] the state, the "system" and the values that distinguish it from other
systems, including the Soviet one. Utopian idealism, political romanticism, overreaction to the
Nazi past, youth-style rebellion against the American stepfather” characterize West German
leftist politics.99 In the longer New York Review of Books essay, Garton Ash critiqued the
sentiment that “the system is the same” in both Eastern Europe and the West. “I wonder how
many people in Eastern Europe would agree?” he asked. Between Polish anti-government
activists and these Western left movements existed “a gulf of mutual incomprehension,”
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Garton Ash continued.100 The lack of understanding cut both ways for Garton Ash, but this
article—when published for a Western audience—focused on points that he thought his fellow
Western intellectuals got wrong. A postscript written for Aneks by Garton Ash appeared after
this re-print from the New York Review of Books. There, he expressed hope that the West
German government could act both within its logical self-interest and that of the prodemocracy movement in Poland. Likewise, British historian Hugh-Seton-Watson wrote in 1985
that to many Western intellectuals, firmly devoted to freedom in their own countries,
”European stability was far more important than the Eastern half of Europe enjoying the same
freedoms—the threat of which was “tantamount to preaching nuclear war.”101
In his 1985 essay about his old émigré friends, Michnik opined that Eastern European
dissidents made a more significant impact on the French left than anywhere else in the West.
Exemplifying this in early 1986 was the French 1968er André Glucksmann, who expressed being
pushed to the brink of, but not completely disavowing, the leftist imaginary in a conversation
with the German 1968 activist Joschka Fischer in the pages of Die Zeit. More important, the two
were now speaking about a European leftist politics inclusive of Eastern European issues. The
conversation was re-printed in Aneks and the American new-left journal, Telos.102 Glucksmann
wrote:
The French Left, not unlike the German, is in the midst of a huge crisis. I believe that this
crisis is a good thing. It means that now we have to question about 100 years of
100
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proletarian, leftist culture. It is not enough to pass judgment on Cambodia or Marxism;
the critique must be more fundamental than that.
Fischer’s self-criticism did not go as far: “It has always been our position that a revitalization of
Marxism is impossible without first self-critically coming to terms with the harm Marxism has
caused the labor movement,” he wrote.103 Glucksmann on the other hand went on to repeat (in
a section not re-printed in Aneks) the idea of categories like left and right being anachronisms
that Kołakowski and other Poles had been professing for years: “Those of us in France who are
anti-totalitarian believe that we have left behind the cold war alternatives of, on the one hand,
having to side with the Soviet Union, either deferentially or stubbornly, or on the other, having
to be marked as a defender of concentration camps.”104
The two Westerners were deeply inspired by Eastern European opposition movements,
by thoughts and ideas that had over the years been expressed in Aneks. Glucksmann noted that
in France there was “great respect and openness for everything that happens in Eastern Europe
and the socialist empire… the thoughts and ideas of Eastern European dissidents meet with the
most approval.” Fischer accused Glucksmann of going too far, of “old-fashioned anticommunism.” In explaining himself, he expressed ideas that aligned with and confirmed the
beliefs of Eastern European dissident critics of Western inaction: “You cannot help the
dissidents in Eastern Europe by foreign policy. You will not open up any new avenues for them.
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You will not attain any reforms in those societies.”105 The likes of Fischer and Michnik agreed
that the West could not help: though Eastern Europeans said that it was because the West was
naïve, while Fischer said simply that the West shouldn’t meddle there. Agreement on the idea
that Eastern European states were irreformable, however, was understood in the same way.
Fischer invoked the Yalta agreement as well, but he considered it to be something that Western
Europeans, specifically Germans, too were hurt by because it created a military confrontation
between rival superpowers on German soil.
While some Eastern Europeans believed that the West could not help them, this
sentiment often came from bitterness about lack of willpower to do some in the West. The
latter stemmed from a lack of mutual understanding. Glucksmann defended nuclear
deterrence, while Fischer argued for détente—a lessening of Cold War tensions on the pacifist
side of the spectrum of possible choices. The Frenchman had visited Warsaw. German
Ostpolitik, a major component of détente efforts during the Cold War, had reached its limits
with the crushing of Solidarność, Glucksmann said, and offered an idea for how to proceed:
“Now we need a new Ostpolitik. I suppose that the most important iron curtain is the curtain
that limits the flow of information.”106 That this interview appears in Die Zeit, Telos and Aneks
was a conscious effort at counteracting censorship through the spread of information.
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This conversation would not have occurred if not for dialogue between intellectuals
comprising the anti-authoritarian opposition in Poland, émigré intellectuals abroad and their
Western peers. The crisis in Eastern Europe forced Western leftists to confront not only a
postwar division of Europe that benefited them, but concomitant uncomfortable problems with
Marxist ideology in practice. Acknowledgment of these problems required addressing the
decades old status quo encapsulated by the word “Yalta.” While 1968 is commonly thought to
be a global phenomenon, the experience of it and the lessons learned differed greatly from
region to region, country to country. “We all believed that we understood each other. But in
reality we only grasped what coincided with our own experiences,” Glucksmann expressed.107
Glucksmann referred to the difference between French and German perspectives (Fischer, for
example, highlighted the peculiar position of a divided postwar Germany) but difference in
perspective was even more stark between Westerners and Eastern Europeans—this
acknowledgment thus rings even more true when re-printed in Aneks.
Western leftists might say that the issues in their societies were more insidious: as
Fischer argued, Hollywood was a more effective propaganda tool than anything the Soviet
Union possessed. Glucksmann’s response was pithy: “No.”108 A thought from Jakub Karpiński’s
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response to Walicki years earlier could be reworked for Fischer’s statement: being brainwashed
by Hollywood was far preferable to the lived reality of police, tanks, and prison bars.
The West had agency, but it would make the wrong choice. It could help Eastern Europe,
but it did not have the will to do so. Like Karpiński, Polish literary critic Stanisław Nowicki in
1988 issued a warning for Westerners who had the mindset of Fischer. Even then, in one of the
final issues of Aneks, the idea that the West is naïve about Soviet communism remained. This
naïveté translated to weakness: “And one day the East will come for the West because in their
weakness they did not want to know the truth and were deceived,” Nowicki writes about
Europe in the 1980s.109 This deception seemed, based on the analysis in this chapter, to be
largely one-sided—but so was the dynamic of these communications. The situation of
intellectuals in the East versus the West was not symmetrical (as E.P. Thompson tried to,
struggled, to comprehend).
But the Poles also achieved real results. This milieu contributed significantly to the
shifting of socialist and communist thinking in Western Europe in the mid 1970s and into the
1980s, when such parties represented vast swaths of voters. This in turn contributed to the
possibility of a mass workers’ organization in Poland (whose membership represented a
significant percentage of the workforce and of the whole population of the country). There is
no causal happy ending here—the movement was crushed by authoritarianism and Polish
intellectuals among themselves argued about how and whether the West could help. They
bitterly remembered the Yalta agreement that left the region in the hands of Stalin. Perhaps
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Western action or inaction could actually seal the fate of Poland and the Western world more
broadly.
Nowicki in 1988 was in fact reviewing a book of letters by a French visitor to Russia in
the 18th century: the Marquis de Custine. Much like the eighteenth-century visitor, twentieth
century visitors to Russia had deceived themselves into thinking that it had changed—that it
was “progressive, humanitarian, European.” This unwillingness to see would allow the Soviet
Union to swallow the West as it had swallowed Eastern Europe, in the eyes of Nowicki and
other critics of the Soviet Union. Eastern European intellectuals offered a consistent message to
Westerners from 1968 onward: the danger of misunderstanding Soviet Russia and Eastern
Europe, of disregarding the lived reality there, could result in Western societies and
governments soon suffering the same reality that Eastern Europeans were trying to escape.
Conversely, could continuing Polish efforts to find a way out of their predicament on their own
offer an antidote to what seemed like a dystopian future for Europe and the world?
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Chapter Ten: Normalność
This is why I believe that the underground also needs people for whom moral testimony is
more valuable than political efficacy, people who do not treat the underground as a school for
pretenders to the future power elite, people who understand that their political involvement
will end in "normal" times when an underground will no longer be needed, people who declare
that "normal" times will require other qualities, other characters, talents different from their
own.1
-Adam Michnik
Writers in Aneks compared communist Eastern Europe and the West constantly to make
sense of and reconcile the problems of the bipolar world they inhabited. When they dared to
dream, Polish intellectuals published in Aneks imagined a “normal” future. Poles wanted things
to be normal, rather than the way they were. They invoked the idea of normalność when
criticizing the lived reality in Poland. The former was thought of as self-evident, at times an
idealized or utopian vision—as imagined goals often are—but at the same time largely a
sensible assessment of life in Western Europe compared to Eastern Europe based on life
experience. By almost any metric of the time, life for most Eastern Europeans was indeed
worse. By the second half of the 1980s, Polish intellectuals were imagining an emerging EastCentral Europe free from Soviet dominion and fully enmeshed in the normal Western world.
Normal carried with it all the trappings of European civilization: liberal freedoms (many now
translated into the language of human rights), market economies, democratic governance, and
acceptance of the Christian culture in which these markers of normalcy were conceived. By the
end of the 1980s, the idea of Poland as a Christian nation emerged unimpeachable, however
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open-minded liberalism as a core component of the “normal” West proved problematic in EastCentral Europe.2
In 1989, Polish poet Stanisław Barańczak wrote of Czech dissident Vaclav Havel: ”his
politics result not from any fanaticism or pursuit of martyrdom but from his need to restore
normalcy to an abnormal world.”3 What was normalcy (normalność) to Barańczak and to his
dissident friends? Adam Michnik mentioned normalność often—boring, grey, normal life where
one does not have to sit in jail to maintain a measure of dignity.4 Poles generally wanted the
seductive propaganda of Hollywood that German politician Joschka Fischer described to the
French philosopher André Glucksmann in the previous chapter (i.e. the cultural critique of the
West popularized by the Frankfurt School), with its attendant non-existential problems—
comparing it to the reality of prison bars that many among the Aneks milieu had experienced.
Lack of appreciation on the part of Westerners for being able to live this normal life was a
source of reticence for Poles.
Polish intellectual Krzysztof Dybciak wrote in a 1984 issue of Aneks that the East would
never catch up to the West.5 The classic political economic question asking why the industrial
revolution happened in England—whether one sides with Landes or Samuel, i.e. whether it
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made possible by entrepreneurship or routinized exploitation—has consistently described
Western Europe as an exception to the global norm.6 Polish intellectuals thought that the West
was not only complicit in propping up the authoritarian Soviet empire but also setting itself up
for disaster by doing so. But the West would wait, Dybciak said. Those sympathetic to the plight
of Eastern European dissidents thus argued that rather than the communist East heralding a
bright future, Eastern Europe had to move to a normal developmental path or Western
civilization as a whole was in danger.
To say that Eastern Europe was abnormal demands a concept of normalcy—something
to compare against or move toward. To want Poland to be “normal” like Western Europe (to be
the country it became in the 21st century) is sensible and right but at the same time it is to want
the country to be exceptional from both a sociopolitical and an economic perspective in the
global picture. Prior to 1989 it was only during the interwar years that the country seemed to
be developing in tandem with Western Europe—a brief and tumultuous lapse into normality
when viewed with almost a century of distance. Poland successfully integrated into the
“normal” world over the course of the 1990s and early 21st century by joining the EU in 2004.
A thread of political economy runs through pieces in Aneks over the course of the 1970s
and 1980s, mainly as a result of the work of Polish émigré economists Stanisław Gomułka and
Włodzimierz Brus, economists dear and important to the editor-in-chief, Aleksander Smolar,
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who was trained as an economist (as was his brother).7 In 1976, for example, Gomułka noted
that the standard of living in Poland the prior year was on the level of Western Europe in 1950
and the United States in 1925.8 However, this section largely puts aside the economic
conception of normalność: store shelves with products on them (especially food and especially
meat), access to housing and appliances to place inside. This economic analysis of governments
that could not adequately or efficiently provide the consumer goods and resources that people
wanted buttressed dissident experiences of repression (that manifested itself as lack of
freedom to express oneself in speech or print). These perspectives combined created a Cold
War portrait of Eastern European backwardness in Aneks, drawn largely by Eastern Europeans
reflecting on what in the West was normal.
Though linking normalność to the idea of backwardness in industrial development offers
context, many writers in Aneks and in the broader writing of Polish intellectuals did not take
economic concerns as their point of departure. Normal wasn’t a specific standard of living.
From an economic perspective, it was at best a moving target. Eastern European writers were
perhaps most convincing when they focused on their lived experience in a communist state.
Conversely, while life in the West had its flaws, neither the ideal nor the attendant problems of
“normal” are often described by Eastern Europeans.
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A precursor to conceiving normality was likely the enduring concept of Eastern
European civilizational—rather than purely economic—backwardness.9 Intellectual historian
Larry Wolff notes that Winston Churchill’s speech about a Cold War divide was not only in part
a self-fulfilling prophecy but also a continuation of an enduring trend among European thinkers
dating back to the Enlightenment. Wolff refers tongue-in-cheek to the influential 1985 “Origins
of Backwardness in Eastern Europe” conference organized by sociologist Daniel Chirot as
exemplary of the idea that Eastern Europe is conceived by Western experts as an aid to defining
civilization.10 He too describes Custine’s oft-referenced travelogue, emphasizing its increasing
popularity during the Cold War, and how it was republished with support from Zbigniew
Brzeziński in 1987 (the very edition that I describe Nowicki reviewing in the previous chapter).
In his conclusion, Wolff lists engaged Westerners who shaped Eastern Europe, among them
R.W. Seton-Watson, a historian of Eastern Europe who advised the British during the post-WW1
negotiations at Versailles that created interwar Poland. R.W. was the father of the Eastern
European historian Hugh, mentioned in this and the previous chapter, who in the 1980s was
involved in shaping an East-Central Europe emerging from the Soviet sphere.
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While civilization is an intellectual concept, its corporeal parallel seems to be refugees
and exiles like the émigrés who are at the center of this work. Wolff notes Western anxiety
about refugees from the dark side of Europe during the Cold War and as it abates, citing
Czesław Miłosz as both a chronicler of this phenomenon and an example of it. Where
civilization is, exiles appear. After Poland’s EU accession, rather than fleeing their country due
to existential threats or simply for a better life, Poles joined the lucky part of the world facing
refugee crisis rather than being its source.
Eastern European backwardness indicated a lack of civilizational or economic
development but, with the rise of the Soviet Union, also a competing alternative development
path. In highlighting differences between East and West, the theme among authors in Aneks
was to describe the variety of ways in which Eastern Europe was inferior but not a simple
negation of the West. By comparison with the West, the Soviet world was not normal. The
following two perspectives appear in Aneks throughout its existence from 1973-1989: that
Eastern Europe was on a parallel but dystopian historical track (Western Europe and the first
world were on the other hand normal). Second, Polish intellectuals argued that Eastern Europe
was a warning about the future of the West; that Soviet communism would take over Western
Europe if Western intellectuals continued to associate the dominant Marxist strain of socialism
with progress. Eastern Europe’s police states were warnings of an Orwellian future.
In 1985, Polish historian Jerzy Jedlicki reviewed in Aneks the book Heart of Europe: A
Short History of Poland by British historian Norman Davies. The book seeks to explain an
“abnormal” Poland to people in more “normal” countries, Jedlicki wrote. Entitling his essay
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“cardiogram,” Jedlicki thanked Davies for trying to convince Westerners that Poland was again
at the heart of European affairs. Like Davies and just about everyone else sympathetic to
Eastern European dissidents, he bristled at the Yalta agreement signed by “appeasers.” Jedlicki
positioned Poland as the beating heart of Europe in the 1980s—but the imposition of martial
law in December of 1981 was akin to the country suffering a heart attack and “the recovery is
not going well.”11 Life in Poland was thus not normal, but events there were at the same time
critical for the rest of Europe—and even for global affairs—in the estimation of Jedlicki. He
argued that whatever way the political crisis in Poland resolved itself in the 1980s would dictate
the future of Europe and beyond.
While comparing Eastern Europe and the West, some writers described the Cold War
divide not necessarily as Eastern European backwardness but almost as an alternate timeline—
the East having branched off the West and experiencing a different twentieth century. The
Soviet world embodied a tension between backwardness and dystopia. To return to a normal
path had more than economic meaning. The East had moved down the wrong track of progress.
Eastern Europe was on a separate developmental track and regressive—experiencing a parallel
development to Western Europe that through the spread of communism potentially
foreshadowed the fate of the rest of the world. Eastern European intellectuals thought of
themselves as being at the forefront of progress (in a negative sense, toward dystopia). They
provided lessons that they had learned from living with communism to Westerners, showing
them directions in which they ought not go.
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Eastern European countries were not able to reach their true potential because they
were severed from the Western tradition politically, socially, culturally. The sociologist
Aleksander Matejko in 1978 echoed an idea Alain Besançon put into print in 1974, that the
Soviet Union had created a Potemkin village with a twist: Soviet leaders wanted to catch up to
the West in standard of living but were wary of what they perceived as Western decadence or
decay (this fear of Western decadence, also expressed by Polish Catholic clergy in the 1980s,
turns the Cold War into a reboot of the age-old Russian conflict between Slavophiles and
Westernizers). The only place where the Soviets were able to catch up, Matejko wrote, was in
armaments.12 Alain Besançon, acolyte of Raymond Aron, wrote that the only good parts of
Soviet rule were those appropriated from the pre-Soviet era.13 Besançon wrote that Westerners
were naïve, all too ready to fall for this deception. He described a friend’s positive reaction to
seeing a performance at the Bolshoi, which they attributed to the progress of the Soviet
system, while not recognizing what Besançon characterizes as its failures: “Then returning
home through the cold and the snow among the drunks and down-and-outs in Moscow he…
said to me: “There is still a lot to be done but they’ve had such a long way to come….”14
The Frenchman wrote in conclusion that Russia was at once backward in its constant
attempts to mimic the West, and modern through its novel embrace of authoritarianism (like
Stefan Nowicki years later, he leaned on Custine’s travel writing about Russia to highlight the
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naïveté of Westerners). The most striking part of Besançon’s article is his characterization of the
Soviet world as the golem of the West. Communist governments tried to imitate Western
society, he wrote, “not in order to resemble it, but in order to realise Utopia; in other words, it
wants to be at once the West and its opposite… the USSR can only be the synthetic and unreal
replica of the West, its Golem.” Eastern Europe was thus conceived as abnormal and on a
divergent path from a better world that was based in reality rather than utopianism.
In contrast to their life under a state with utopian dreams but dystopian ends, Polish
dissidents argued for this indispensable grey normality. The poet Stanisław Barańczak
mentioned normality in a number of essays published in Aneks. In a 1981 issue, he worked out
a concept of normalność based on the blossoming of uncensored press and literature in Poland.
Had the carving out of freedom of the press over the past decade not returned normality—not
just to the literary world but to life itself? Normalność in Eastern Europe was a “priceless
value,” compared to the absurdity of everyday life there. Barańczak offered examples that mix
literature, freedom and politics: he couldn’t read the country’s most famous poet, Czesław
Miłosz, in public without the book being taken from him and couldn’t write in his poems that
well-off people in Poland eat liver because it was considered a poor person’s food. Normalność
achieved in the literary sphere was about far more than literature: it had the potential to help
people regain an inner freedom and dignity through the ability to think clearly. Normalność to
Barańczak was about pushing absurdity out of lived reality. “That, in short, we can live, write,
read and think like free and normal people,” he concluded.15
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In the first issue of 1982 and the first after Solidarność was repressed by martial law,
Adam Michnik, from prison, echoed Barańczak’s thought: “Today Poles need normalcy and
ordinariness if they are to resist the rule of the military and the police.”16 Normalność to
Michnik here meant an ordinary life as it did to Barańczak—one without heroes and martyrs
who must sit in prison. He counterposed this ordinary state of being to a normality—
normalization—comprised of material stability that the communist government promised in
exchange for acquiescing to be ruled by it. True normalność is based on thinking and expressing
yourself without fear and is rooted in self-respect or dignity, Michnik said, a more fulfilling state
of being than material stability. Here Michnik rationalizes his choice to sit in prison but wishes
that he did not have to do so. Life would be truly normal in Poland once he could live a normal,
and dignified life without having to pay such a high price for it.
Normalność is a celebration of the mundane everyday to Barańczak too, compared to
the lived reality of protests and prison cells. In 1983, while employed at Yale University,
Barańczak was asked by his friends in Poland (who were living under martial law) to review a
book of poetry. Barańczak had trouble bringing himself to complete such a mundane task while
his friends were suffering but realized that this is precisely what they wanted: “After all, if they
themselves expect something from me, it is probably just that. For years, this is what we have
basically wanted, for the possibility to live normally in Poland.”17 This mundane task along with
others made up the living out of a normal, boring, life.
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Polish sociologist Ireneusz Krzemiński wrote in 1985 that what the working people participating
in Solidarność wanted was to “live normally,” which he juxtaposed with revolution.18 To live
normally was here to not be ruled arbitrarily by the state but rather to be responsible for your
fate, and to have an adequate standard of living. Revolutionary ideology had gotten Eastern
Europeans into a state of servility that necessitated the sacrificing of physical freedom to
pierce. Polish dissidents wanted to escape having to make a choice between physical and
spiritual freedom.
Christianity was a litmus test for, or antidote to, the Cold War civilizational crisis. Polish
intellectuals often emphasized Christianity and a secular society (a society that is both religious
and tolerant) as markers of European civilization. In Aneks already in 1976, the Catholic
intellectual Jacek Salij wrote that Catholics had accused socialists (in this case a catch-all term
for leftists, including communists) of preventing people from living normal lives by spreading
hate and ruining both material conditions and people’s spirits.19 In his influential book, The
Church and the Left, Michnik used greyness to describe a flawed but indispensable Christianity,
there quoting Leszek Kołakowski.20 He also uses the this chromatic symbolism to reflect
imperfect but democratic governance—synonymous with normalność. In both cases, greyness
is what is normal and expected.
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These Polish intellectuals were aware that the normalność they aimed for was imperfect
and yearned for Western problems. Taking as an example anticolonialism, which is mentioned
by a number of Polish intellectuals over the years, their assessment of Western problems could
be somewhat dismissive.21 This reticence toward the problems of the West had at its core the
notion that Westerners thought Marxism still provided solutions—while Poles were trying to
convince Westerners that the ideology was the very cause of a broad civilizational problem that
all of Europe had to escape. As alluded to above and described at length in Chapter Seven,
Christianity was one solution to this crisis, one link to the rest of Europe, one component of
normalność. The other was liberalism.
Liberalism as Scourge and Savior
With a Marxist position long-discredited, liberalism and Christianity mixed in the
intellectual discourse of Eastern European intellectuals and so also in the pages of Aneks in the
second half of the 1980s. But the Polish intelligentsia did not adopt liberalism uncritically as is
often assumed. Often in the 1980s, Christianity appeared as another tool with which to return
normalcy to Poland. Polish secular intellectuals in Aneks sought to use it to purge liberalism of
the negative aspects of socialism that they saw within it (i.e. Marxism)—guarding liberalism
against adopting collectivist principles that can lead to a loss of a feeling of responsibility in
individuals. Liberalism at the same time replaced communism as the secular enemy of rightwing Catholic Polish intellectuals in the 1980s; it was seen then as bringing in harmful Western
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social mores that threaten conservative Polish values.22 In this way, both former so-called
secular intellectuals and representatives of the Catholic church were then to some degree
critical of the legacy of the Enlightenment (those representing Catholicism much moreso).23 For
secular intellectuals, a definition of “normal” often involved both Christianity and liberalism.
Synonymous with Western Europe, this secularism was an Enlightenment legacy too and for
Eastern European intellectuals the only worthwhile assessment of it.
The dissident and historian Jan Józef Lipski conceptualized Europe as Christian and
liberal in his 1983 book on the Polish opposition:
One of the fundamental differences between communist and fascist totalitarianisms is
that the latter is less steeped in hypocrisy, and based on a narrower gap between the
law—a cruel law that often rejects without shame principles elaborated through
centuries of Christianity and later of liberalism in Europe—and an even cruder
practice.24
Totalitarianism was a deviation, while Christianity and liberalism were the norm. This is hardly a
controversial view of normality. Polish intellectuals did not seek a future for Poland dictated by
some yet-to-be-discovered, untested but theoretically superior ideology. To improve Poland’s
lot, they first wanted to realign it with Western civilization. Rather than conceiving their goals
as being liberal or promoting liberalism, Poles often argued for normalcy.
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In drawing inspiration from each other across the Iron Curtain, Polish intellectuals and
their Western interlocutors seem to meet in a purgatory of both infinite possibility and
misunderstanding, redefining liberalism as they go. A desire for liberal philosophical values
among the Polish intelligentsia was hardly anything new, though observers assuming a lack of
political sophistication among Polish intellectuals might think that liberalism was being
imported from abroad. The sociologist David Ost asserts in the 1992 introduction to the English
translation of Adam Michnik’s 1977 book that socialism for Michnik is essentially liberalism.25
Michnik uses the language that he was raised on to speak about his desire for a liberal order in
Polish politics—in fact for the traditional liberal values of plurality of opinion and secularism
(the presence of religion but its separation from politics) that socialists had traditionally fought
for in Poland. Ost is inspired by this mixture of socialism and liberalism.
Ost too picks up on the trend of Polish church representatives criticizing the Polish left
and the liberal West as corrupt antecedents to communism in the 1980s. To Polish conservative
Catholics, communism has its roots in the Enlightenment and so is an outgrowth of liberalism,
which is understood to emanate from that historical era. Documents publicized in the final
issues of Aneks (summarized at the end of this chapter) already position liberals as the church’s
new foes even before communism’s final collapse in Eastern Europe. The definition of
liberalism was contested by Polish intellectuals from the left and the right, though their views
sometimes aligned. Both sides saw in the ideological struggle against the Marxist values present
in liberalism, sometimes referred to as left-liberalism, the fate of Western civilization. Eastern
Europe was the place where the solutions for a West in crisis (the West now defined as
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including Christian Poland) would come from because the discrediting of communism
weakened the position of liberalism through the discrediting of portions of secular liberal
thought. Eastern Europe was once again a battleground but this time only an ideological one.
The philosopher Marcin Król—who had helped compile the thematic section on George
Orwell in an early issue of Aneks—similarly described socialism as the offspring of liberalism in a
1984 essay.26 He referred repeatedly to a concept of the “liberal minimum” that guarantees a
certain tolerance of perspectives that society must work to maintain—a beneficial ideological
void within liberalism that allows for the existence of multiple ideologies in the same society.
Liberalism had to be re-defined after the collapse of communism in order to save the West. It
had to shed any remnant of anti-clericalism as it rejected communism and at once be ready to
accept religious values but not be overpowered by them.
Król’s liberalism at once looms over perspectives by allowing each to exist but is
subordinate to them in that it limits itself from filling the void that makes the existence of
competing ideas possible. It makes no claims about salvation, Król argued. It proposes no
utopian visions. The only utopia is the one constantly being created in the existence of a fairly
impartial system. Describing the work of those conceptualizing the sacred in the era of
liberalism, Król wrote that what they were doing was offering a critique of liberalism with a
language other than its own; they were attempting to escape what Kołakowski would call the
language of humanism, of the Enlightenment. But they did so in a positive way, not by trying to
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destroy liberalism but by creating a dialogue with it that would allow a liberal minimum to
exist—supporting novel modes of thought.
Secular critiques of the liberal legacy of the Enlightenment could go further. In a 1986
obituary for Mircea Eliade, the philosopher Ewa Bieńkowska described liberalism as an
impartial and sometimes cruel arbiter that needs religion for guidance in moral matters.
Bieńkowska, an ex-student of Leszek Kołakowski, noted the extent to which Eliade inspired the
Polish philosopher. She summarized Eliade’s oeuvre as a testament documenting that the
sacred realm is an integral element of human consciousness. Eliade wanted Westerners to
reflect on their existence—“the essence of consciousness”—rather than try to escape into what
Bieńkowska called ideological subversions (“scientism, materialism, historicism,” she wrote).27
Eliade challenged Westerners as an émigré—the wrong kind of émigré—Bieńkowska wrote,
meaning that as a political exile from a communist country he was not welcomed by the French
intelligentsia during his exile in Paris between 1945 and 1956. She wrote this as a fellow anticommunist Eastern European, describing pro-communist French intellectuals.28
Bieńkowska continued according to the hypothesis that Eliade proposed, wishing to
make a naïve West think about the blind spots of its materialist civilization: “[o]ur civilization
knows well enough to transform its great discoveries (religious, philosophical, scientific) into
tools of destruction,” she wrote. Here Eliade was an Eastern European critiquing Western
civilization from Paris and then Chicago. In writing “our civilization” above, Bieńkowska
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positioned herself as tied to Western civilization as well. Western culture then did not
correspond to Cold War geography. Erudite in continental philosophy, she was part of this
civilization despite being on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain. She criticized the West as at
once an outsider and an intellectual that was integrally connected to it through culture. The
only difference between Eliade and her was his physical location in the world, in a noncommunist country: the geographic West as defined by geopolitics.
Religion was both a way by which to tame corrupt western liberalism and for Polish
intellectuals to situate themselves within Western culture—to be a part of Europe. Christianity
was an essential component of Western culture to Eliade, Bieńkowska wrote. Western culture,
based in a Judeo-Christian view of the world, had been self-defeating when it began to
desacralize existence during the Enlightenment, sending the West down a path to its present
spiritual crisis. Bieńkowska, like Eliade (and Dorosz), saw in Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s areligious
Christianity a philosophy with which to cope with this desacralized world.
Because they saw Poland as strongly linked to the West through its Christian history, the
revival of spirituality among its intelligentsia was a model that Poles the likes of Dorosz, Król
and Bieńkowska could present to Westerners as an antidote to this European civilizational
crisis. The idea of Poland as a Christian nation shaped, supported, encouraged, and was used as
an argument by Polish intellectuals of a variety of ideological backgrounds. That this Christian
civilizational heritage was suppressed by communist rule was another way in which Poland was
again depicted in the position of a victim among those belonging to European or Western
civilization. In fighting for a Poland free of Godlessness, the Polish intellectuals published in
Aneks—whether they imagined a secular or Christian Poland (their hopes for the future differed
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widely)—were at the same time reversing a trend that they saw as a danger to all of Western
civilization (to which they belonged).
Liberalism to both Król and Bieńkowska was not what liberalism was to Western
intellectuals at the time. Poles living in Poland wrote about it in comparison to the system they
lived under, which they saw at the best of times as arbitrary and capricious, lacking any
modicum of reason. Liberalism was often criticized for being overly reliant on the latter concept
(by Król and Bieńkowska, for example), but to this post-revisionist (post-communist)
intelligentsia it was simultaneously a next step and a starting point for making Poland and
Eastern Europe a better place to exist. But liberalism, as Król identified, shared with
communism key values and so could swing toward the latter if left unchecked. In these 1980s
issues of Aneks, writers at once appreciated liberalism as an alternative to socialism and decried
the way liberalism weakened the concept of truth, promoting relativism defined as giving
conflicting ideas truth values that are too similar. This is a problem that thinkers like Eliade and
Kołakowski identified, and Król attempted to overcome. Religion was supposed to provide a
check to the impartiality of liberalism. But even Bieńkowska criticized her compatriot Król for
being too sure of knowing in which direction European civilization should proceed in the future.
Krzysztof Dorosz, the Aneks contributor who most often wrote about religion, himself
later expanded on the theme of a liberal West in crisis needing to reconnect with Christianity,
with transcendence, as Polish intellectuals had started to do. In a 1985 issue of Aneks, he wrote
that the Polish secular opposition “swallowed the germ of Christianity.”29 He saw the Western
left on the other hand as still pining for revolution (a negative utopian notion), which to Dorosz
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could only lead to the morass that Polish intellectuals were trying to break out of. Polish
activists like Adam Michnik meanwhile were at this point foremost concerned with ethics. This
difference in focus was rooted in the divergent experience of Eastern Europeans in the
twentieth century, in experiencing both fascism and communism (Dorosz calls them “brown
and red totalitarianism”). Many among the Western left had no experience with such evil,
Dorosz wrote, and neither did the rest of “bourgeois liberal civilization” in general. He criticized
“liberal public opinion” in the West which misunderstood communism and was too tolerant of
it: “the evil of this system has no equivalent in the concepts and experiences of people who
have assumed that the world is basically good.” Dorosz admitted that Christianity and
conservatism were in the past used for harmful purposes, but in communist Poland they
provided the secular intelligentsia with tools against something even more insidious.
Like other 1968 émigrés, Dorosz found it hard to believe that people living in democratic
states in the West would still voluntarily look up to Marx, Lenin, Mao or Stalin, and their laws of
history. Dorosz jumped between criticizing the Western left and aspects of liberalism because
his argument rested on the idea that the system in Poland had its roots in a pan-European
tradition of Enlightenment thought from which both liberalism and Marxism came. To him, this
ideological category contained ideas that all led to that same end. But Dorosz was not writing as
someone on the right or as a conservative. Many of his colleagues would find it impossible to
consider themselves conservative or right-wing either: such ideas are often laced with
antisemitism, nationalism and xenophobia that make them completely unpalatable to secular
intellectuals once discriminated against by virtue of Jewish family backgrounds.
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But neither was this milieu broadly any longer on the left. The 1968 émigré compatriots
publishing Aneks, along with their friends in Poland, were post-ideological: not wishing to
ascribe labels to themselves, but rather free to be inconsistent and to apply labels only to
describe relativity in political views. They wanted to choose from a plethora of ideas whether
they were traditionally ascribed to conservatives, liberals, or leftists. In religious thought many
of them found a novel antidote to the social-political system that they were raised with and a
deep connection to the rest of Europe as well as to majority-Catholic Poland.
Dorosz ended his 1985 essay by writing that his secular friends had truly found God
without religion, living out a secular Christianity, while retaining socialism’s “most valuable
heritage… universal values: sensitivity to human harm and readiness to fight for social justice.”
Though Dorosz does not say this, it is these values that allowed them to most easily
communicate both with Western intellectuals, even though these communications were often
critical, and with members of the Catholic church who were inspired by the Christian
Personalist reforms that the Catholic Church undertook to modernize itself during the Second
Vatican Council in the mid 1960s.30 At the same time, the embrace of religion by many Polish
intellectuals made some Westerners uneasy, making ex-Marxists appear to turn into
conservatives. Rather than some sort of conservative return, Poles argued for normalność.
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East-Central Europe
In 1988, Aneks editor-in-chief Aleksander Smolar gave a speech at a conference
organized by the Woodrow Wilson Center on the position of East-Central Europe—a newly (re-)
discovered region defined by its liminality—a place at once at the center and at the periphery,
needing to rejoin civilization, foreshadowing either a radiant or dystopian future. The idea of
East-Central Europe would help Poland shift conceptually from the Soviet East to the West. To
become normal. The essay represents decades of musing not on the geographical but on the
civilizational position of Poland by intellectuals both in the country and in emigration that is
visible in the pages of Aneks and elsewhere. The concept of East-Central Europe appears in the
late 1980s as a way to bring normalność to Poland—to bring it from the East into the West.
Poland had shifted several hundred kilometers to the West after the Second World War,
but to many Polish intellectuals of the communist era it had been hijacked, steered into the
rough seas with its stern facing Western civilization itself. East-Central Europe was peripheral
because it was controlled by the Soviet Union but was spiritually and culturally connected to
the Western part of the continent. While geographically, politically and economically in the
Soviet orbit, many Poles labored to make or maintain cultural connections to the West. To
return to the West was to become normal again and to become normal was not only an
economic matter but a broader civilizational issue. Within this vision, the task undertaken by
émigré intellectuals to keep Western ideas flowing to their peers in Poland was critically
important.
Smolar began with a set of questions framing the mindset of Eastern European
intelligentsia as he saw it. Speaking for his fellow East-Central European intellectuals, he asked:
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How far have we moved from the West - in consciousness, in reactions, private and
public behavior? How Sovietized our economy and attitude to work? To what extent has
communism left its mark on us? Are we still part of Europe? These anxious questions are
often raised in Central European discussions.31
The anxious pondering of intellectuals from the region contributed to an inferiority complex.
Being connected to and controlled by the Soviet Union had placed their region on a track
diverging from Western civilization; a track which by 1988 it had been traveling on for over
forty years. Smolar saw Poland as part of an East-Central Europe culturally (or even spiritually)
connected to Western (Roman Catholic and Protestant) Europe, but materially connected to
Eastern Europe. He contrasted cultural similarity to the West with institutional similarities to
governments and societies East of the region.
Smolar noted that while Central Europe seemed like the future of civilization when hope
for fixing socialism was high, it now compared poorly to other parts of the world—especially to
Western Europe. The fear that the rest of the continent could be annexed by the Soviet Union
as the region comprising East Central Europe had been at the Yalta conference had largely
passed but so had the utopian hope that a novel socioeconomic model had been found, as
during the short-lived revolts in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, to some even
Solidarność Poland in 1980-1981.
Smolar pointed out that prominent Polish intellectuals had over the course of the past
40 years not only developed Poland’s Europeanness but sought to awaken European culture in
the West (being more appreciative of Europe than Western Europeans is implied or explicitly
stated in a number of the articles discussed so far in this chapter). Smolar understood such

31

Aleksander Smolar, “Perspektywy Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej,” Aneks, no. 50 (1988): 3.
433

efforts as fostering European unity, creating the groundwork which would make it possible for
Eastern European societies like that which existed in Poland to re-unite with Western Europe
and thus re-join the West. Of the six “East-Central European” writers Smolar mentioned, four
are Polish and three of those four émigrés (Gombrowicz, Miłosz, Kołakowski).32 Smolar also
cited the Polish Pope as someone who had worked to promote a pan-European spirit. Soviet
culture could not match that of the Christian West, Smolar said. Soviet culture functioned only
on a lower materialistic level rather than being concerned with man’s soul.
Because Poland through the efforts of its intellectuals culturally never left the West, it
had only to gain freedom in the material realm in order to flourish. The soul was more
important but Smolar, as an economist, concerned himself with the body: the material realm
and politics. He proposed that realizing efficiencies in the economy was of interest to the
government and such reforms could be spoken about in isolation from politics, thus giving
opposition reformers the greatest chance of success in pushing for tangible changes.
Transforming Poland’s economy from stagnant centralization to the free market could also
inculcate liberal democracy along with it.
Smolar outlined the various inefficiencies of Soviet communism and concluded that
reform was necessary but had no public support because it meant a long period of austerity for
most of the population:
At the same time, for wide swathes of the population, positive results of changes may
only be fully revealed after many years. Western stores often tempt customers with
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inscriptions: “buy today, pay tomorrow!” Touting reforms with a slogan: “pay today,
benefit (maybe) the day after!” won’t quite encourage support for reform initiatives.33
Smolar hypothesized in 1988 that what will come to be called economic shock therapy was
primarily only of interest to the young, the educated, and for the economic performance of the
state as a whole. To the rest of society, meanwhile, it was akin to taking on a debt that many
individuals may not be able to afford. But piecemeal reforms would only reinforce what Smolar
called negative freedom, as opposed to a positive freedom that rewards creativity and
entrepreneurship (synonymous with the cultivation of dignity in a normal society). At the very
end of his essay, Smolar returned to the question of Poland’s position relative to Western
Europe. Changes that implement economic liberalism brought Poland and the rest of EastCentral Europe closer to what Smolar called “a return to a historical line of development”
followed by the West, which Eastern European countries had diverged from.34
Smolar’s proposal for healing the body of Poland is supported by an argument about its
soul. While Smolar argued for rational economic reform, he noted that prior to facing a
movement so strong that it had to resort to implementing martial law, the Polish communist
party was seen as dependent on the maintenance of a utopian “ideological hyper-reality”: lies
about the lived present and promises of a radiant future. This perception of communist party
rule was challenged after it confronted the Solidarność movement with martial law. The state
could no longer maintain the ruse and began to rely on threats and naked force to contain the
demands of large parts of the population—the stick instead of a rotten carrot. By contrast, the
way out of the Polish crisis that Smolar proposed was in a way anti-utopian. Yet Smolar’s anti-
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utopianism was not devoid of utopia. While there was no wishful thinking, a better future
remained. But there was no utopian lie: rather, there was a realistic assessment of present
suffering if reforms were to be implemented, with the utopian promise of a capitalist free
market—and normality—if the requisite sacrifices were made. It would indeed be a tough sell.
The conviction that Poland was a castaway from the West, from European civilization, is
present throughout the publication run of Aneks. It has two recognizable pillars: religion and
the structure of the socioeconomic system. As Smolar puts it: spirituality and culture on the one
hand, and material circumstances or reality on the other. The Soviet system was thought to
have diverged from a Western culture and civilization that grew out of the Judeo-Christian
values. The purely material basis of Soviet communism was sometimes seen as a more
advanced—dystopian—development of Western civilization; it surpassed liberalism as the
furthest progression of the Enlightenment (a negative strain of Enlightenment thought) and
threatened the rest of Europe.
In writing about Central Europe, Smolar was no doubt influenced by the Polish-American
diplomat Zbigniew Brzeziński, who he by now was well-acquainted with. Brzeziński made an
argument for the delineation of a space called Central Europe in a 1988 policy paper re-printed
in Aneks. “The region represents a distinctive part of Europe. It is European. Yet it fits neatly
neither into Europe's East nor its West,” Brzeziński says.35 The Polish-American blamed not the
plight of Eastern Europe but the concept of the region itself on Yalta: “a political arrangement
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that reflected the power realities of the mid-1940s.” The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was
at best Eastern European, he said, but also “much influenced by its long exposure to oriental
despotic traditions.”36 Brzeziński’s Central Europe was thus coming out from under an oriental
yoke of Marxism imposed by the USSR upon it.
Brzeziński gave this speech at an annual lecture in honor of the British historian Huge
Seton-Watson, a supporter of Eastern European dissidents. Seton-Watson in a 1985 Aneks
article (a re-print of one of his lectures) echoed a common sentiment among Polish intellectuals
when he noted the hypocrisy of “enlightened Western men and women,” who enjoyed
freedom at home but at the same time denied it to “a hundred million Europeans,” with the
justification that changing this status quo was “tantamount to preaching nuclear war.”37 SetonWatson developed the idea of a European cultural mystique above politics. Similar to what
Aleksander Smolar would say a few years later, Seton-Watson noted that in the 1980s it was in
the countries between the West and the Soviet Union that a pan-European culture was most
abundantly cultivated. Eastern Europeans were the most European of all.
In a section that was cut from the Aneks translation, Seton-Watson identified a postcolonial “guilt complex” that Poles had sometimes pointed to as well:
For a long time the word "European" was associated with arrogant assertions of
cultural, and racial, superiority. But if "Europe" is associated with this arrogance in Asian
and African minds, does this mean that Europeans should reject their own heritage?
And if the history, arts, and literature of Europe are richer than those of sub-Saharan
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Africa, do we have to pretend it is not so? Can we not simply study honestly the African
cultures, and help Africans to study their own?38
Decolonialization and anti-imperial struggles by indigenous third world populations—"the sins
of the West” as it was put in an early issue of Aneks—the plight of the Argentinians and South
Africans mentioned by Leszek Kołakowski or Africans and Indian nationals by Boniecki in the
previous chapter were worthy causes for Western intellectuals. And yet Eastern (or Central)
Europeans were discouraged from agitating for their rights? Was it because they were fighting
for the idea of Europe itself—a concept that was seen as too hegemonic to support? They
should especially be supported, Seton-Watson argued. The British historian thus placed
decolonization in opposition to the will to render aid to Eastern Europeans. To support the
dissidents was to support Europe. To support others risked rejecting one’s common European
heritage.
East-Central Europe was thus a rejection of dystopia and a celebration of Europe. That
same year, Frenchman Alain Finkielkraut in a 1985 conference address in a Hungarian
apartment (re-printed in Aneks that year) also noted that Western Europeans had failed to
comprehend that the problems described by Eastern European intellectuals were European
problems and thus threatened an idea of European civilization that both Eastern Europe and
the West shared:
At that time, these two notions of “European” and “oppressed” were not compatible….
Thanks in part to such writers as Milosz, Kundera, Kołakowski, and among the
participants in our debate György Konrad and Danilo Kis, the misunderstanding is not so
acute any longer. We, French and Western writers and intellectuals, take into
consideration the concept of Europe. It is part of our agenda again, as we can see from
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this meeting, among many other symptoms.39
Though the conference took place in Budapest, two Polish émigrés are among those that
Finkielkraut credited above with changing these perceptions about European culture among
Western intellectuals. This change applied not only to perceptions about Eastern Europe (or
East-Central Europe as it would soon be called) but to the importance of the concept of
European culture for Western civilization. While Western critics had long decried Western
culture as responsible for reprehensible oppression throughout the world, Eastern Europeans
sought support from Western Europe in order to overthrow oppression at home, on the very
same continent. Moreover, Western Europe was a model of what Eastern Europeans too should
expect for themselves: not only certain rights but a high standard of living by global metrics.
The economic was never far from the political, not just as the goal of overcoming communism
in favor of the free market, but as an expectation of a “normal” way of life.
Polish intellectuals had been frustrated trying to communicate the grey dystopia of
Soviet communism to Westerners for decades by the end of the 1980s. The grey mundanity of
Western normalność was far preferable to the totalitarian society all of Europe could be
heading for if their warnings were not heeded. An influential group of Polish intellectuals often
printed in Aneks became disenchanted with Marxism over course of the 1960s, with 1968 in
Poland and Czechoslovakia being a pivotal moment. Yet in the late 1970s they were speaking to
the PCI, asking the Polish and Soviet governments to practice their own values and the laws
derived from them. After Solidarność was crushed in Poland, Polish intellectuals argued not
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only against Marxism but for a return to “normal” democratic governance as it worked in the
West—flaws and all.
Communist utopia had not materialized. It turned out that there was no third way. The
only way to move forward was to first back up. But it was difficult to convince people that the
best they could—the best they should—hope for was that their life would be normal, with its
multifarious meanings often based on the expectation of a Western European standard of
living. Aleksander Smolar recalled asking Raymond Aron how there could be enough profound
dissatisfaction in wealthy country like France for the mass protests of Mai ‘68 to have occurred.
Aron responded that France had achieved more in the 25 years prior to 1968 than it had in 150
before that, “but people are like that.”40 Smolar continues: “And the question that I ask
myself… ‘Is this all there is? And so this is all there is?’ In the face of all of the dreams they had.”
Speaking from the 21st century, Smolar compares France then to Poland after the 1989
transition from communism: “people, I think, realize… that their situation has improved
greatly... At the same time, they are disappointed for many reasons – because that’s all there
is.”
Postscript: The Revenge of the Sacred
“Is it possible to be responsible, like me, [for being] a citizen of as many as three
countries: Poland, Italy and America (because I have these three citizenships),” writes historian
Marta Petrusewicz, a friend of the Smolars. “I told myself that even though one has less time
for individual countries - it is possible," she writes. The Polish student activists of 1968 who
became dissidents years later believed in this middle ground between internationalism and
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patriotism—a world (or at least a continent) of nations coexisting peacefully. Such a world had
not come to be by the time Aneks stopped being published. One of its central ideas was
however to endeavor for the best outcome while being rooted in the reality of the present.
The Soviet Union melted into air between December 25-26th of 1991, while an independent
Poland applied to join the European Union in 1994 (becoming a formal member a decade later).
Aneks existed in a middle ground as well—a transmission belt to be kept at a constant
tension. It was meant for Poland but its goal was to gather relevant articles from the world
outside of Poland and transmit them to intellectuals there. In its show of solidarity for Russian
dissidents and in the way that its editors wrote about Polish-Jewish relations it strove to bring
Polish society and culture to parity with its Western neighbors: to make it more tolerant, less
cloistered (though not necessarily less Catholic)—to be European. In 1989 the tension seemed
to dissipate and with it a need for the publication.
Yet as Europe seemed to be pulling back from the civilizational crisis these intellectuals
feared, Polish politics retreated to more familiar terrain. Though they had hoped for something
better when their émigré friends criticized their rapprochement with the Polish Catholic church,
the new situation was within the boundaries of what intellectuals like Michnik had expected.
However, the intensity of the vitriol against them again came as a shock. Published in 1989, the
final issue of Aneks contains a section concerned with the Catholic church in Poland. The
position presented in this thematic section, composed of writing by representatives of the
Catholic church, is fundamentally illiberal. Aleksander Smolar wrote in a short introduction that
the importance of the Catholic church to Poland necessitated that the words he was publishing
be analyzed with great care, since the church has an influence on Polish government, society
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and culture that is difficult to overstate. Here Aneks is a free-thinking, liberal platform par
excellence, publicizing for the sake of informing others about positions that are antithetical to
its editors.
There are two pieces in this section, entitled “The Bishop of Poland and his advisors,”
both commentaries on a third document, drafted by a committee created to advise the leader
of the Catholic church in Poland called “The Bishop’s Social Council.” First created in 1981, this
council was reformed in 1986. Its goal was to create policy positions for the bishop on social
and political questions in Poland. The document in question is entitled “Respect for world views
in state and society,” written on June 6, 1988.41 One of the documents was written by Maciej
Giertych, an Oxford-educated dendrologist who returned to Poland in the 1960s (and would go
on to become a conservative politician in the post-communist country). The other was by
Cardinal Józef Glemp, Primate of Poland, then the most powerful Catholic clergyman in Poland.
Aneks editor Aleksander Smolar explained in his introduction to this, the final thematic
section in Aneks, that the Catholic church was entering the battlefield of politics as a partisan in
Poland—as the communist authorities loosened their grip on the country. The documents
Smolar presents in this section were thus intended to inform readers about the position of the
church in Polish politics in 1989, a church “openly speak[ing] out in favor of certain ideological
and political Polish traditions and against others.” Here Smolar implied the embrace by a Polish
Catholic church that had in the 1980s worked with secular intellectuals of an exclusive
definition of Polishness, reserved only for Catholics and explicitly opposing those very same
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intellectuals. Smolar noted that Cardinal Glemp had endorsed candidates opposed to the new
Solidarność party in the first free elections. Solidarność was represented by Lech Wałęsa (who
became Poland’s first president) and advised by Adam Michnik & Jacek Kuroń, whom Smolar
described as liberal-left members of the opposition. However,“[t]he voters did not follow the
recommendation of the Bishop.” Smolar here insinuated that liberalism had kept religious
fundamentalism in check.
Both Glemp and Giertych expressed the same criticisms of what must have been a very
conciliatory document, though the latter did so with more bluster. Giertych promoted a rightwing version of the conviction that Eastern Europe was preserving Europeanness through its
adherence to Catholicism. He stood opposed to what he perceived as Western norms and
wrote from an explicitly Polish position. He opposed to liberalism, which he equated to
materialism, hedonism, and—literally—AIDS. In addition to thinking about the AIDS public
health crisis as the result of a “western liberal” failure to inculcate appropriate values through
education and the media, Giertych warned about freemasonic conspiracies and Satanists being
allowed in a future secular, westernized Poland (he also mentions Jehovah’s Witnesses as a
danger to Poland).
Glemp was only slightly more measured than Giertych in his response to the council’s
document. He emphasized the social category of Polak-Katolik but acknowledged the presence
of other minorities. He denied that Poland could be a country where church and state are
separate, equating freedom of conscience to atheism, which is “abnormal”. The bishop wrote
that religion was not a private matter. Glemp’s whole response was a rejection of the so-called
secular left in Poland that had previously built an alliance with church figures. His posture
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asserted that the church would be doing itself a disservice—limiting itself—if it did not reach
for the privileges that it believed in for itself and for the Catholic majority of Poles. Atheists, the
so-called secular left, deserve no rights, he said.
The last piece in this section is a book review written by Solidarność activist Wiktor
Kulerski, who criticized a work by Catholic intellectual Andrzej Micewski, another member of
the Bishop’s Council. Micewski’s book was supposed to be an unbiased account of the relations
of the Catholic church in Poland and the Solidarność movement during the period of martial law
in Poland—the latter enacted by the authorities in December of 1981. Micewski argued that the
Church was misled and manipulated by Solidarność leaders (Micewski uses the phrase “liberal
circles” to describe those doing the manipulating); that the independent union was majority
Catholic but this was not represented in its leadership (of which Kulerski was a part); that
Solidarność, whom he called the opposition, was as much to blame as the Communist Party for
the enactment of martial law in Poland in 1981.
Kulerski—the reviewer—warned that Micewski, himself a participant in those events as
an advisor to Cardinal Glemp, had written a partisan and inaccurate work. Kulerski pointed out
specifically inaccuracies about émigré intellectuals and the so-called secular left: “An unaware
reader may take Micewski's exaggeration at face value when he writes about the "anti-church
campaign" of the Paris Kultura, about not only "murmurs,” but "even intrigues" on the part of
the "political opposition" apparently resulting from the fact that the Church "did not agree to
be an instrument of politics and politicians.”42 Kulerski wrote that Micewski’s book was full of
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inaccuracies that often supported the author’s fears and biases and even did the Cardinal—who
Micewski defended throughout—no favors.
All four pieces thus depict, in one way or another, a fracturing of the political space in
Poland as the Communist Party retreated from it. This section, the final special section in Aneks
and followed only by a eulogistic piece by the poet Stanisław Barańczak, creates a vivid picture
of the destruction of the utopian unity of the first Solidarność—the now seemingly miraculous
alliance of church, workers, and lay-left intellectuals that for a brief moment in time created a
public space at an unlikely time in an unlikely place in the world. This space was wiped out, yet
the multiple and often contradictory ideas it awakened remained.
The reprise of Solidarność in the late 1980s as a political party in a larger space of
freedom (whereas before the trade union was itself a space of freedom in a repressive political
climate) was as chaotic as the unmoderated exchange of positions and ideas can be. Newly
found freedom allowed positions that were buried in shallow graves by decades of vying with
communist rule to be re-animated (it is not that communism suppressed them, but rather that
opposing it created an enemy to rally against). These radical positions confronted what both
detractors and supporters of religious fundamentalism conceptualized as a left-liberalism
blowing in from the West—liberalism and leftist ideology conflated. This liberalism had key
positions in common—reproductive rights, secular government, at least theoretical ethnic and
cultural tolerance—with the communism it was replacing. Harnessing Polish nationalism and
exceptionalism against purported foreign—Western—ideas, these representatives and
supporters of the Catholic church were following the same playbook as Polish communist
nationalists had after 1968. This time, instead of communism and nationalism embracing, it was
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Catholicism and nationalism—Polak-Katolik—and it did not have a place for intellectuals like
those associated with Aneks. That Aneks published these pieces reflects the belief of its editors
in the free exchange of ideas as a positive force—in liberalism.
While Polish intellectuals largely wanted to return Poland to a “normal” course, which
included the presence of the Catholic church, critics of rapprochement among them, like
Aleksander Smolar, too had a point when they said that their friends were going too far.
Swallowing the germ of Christianity through Bonhoeffer was one thing but vilifying the
Enlightenment as Eliade did (through Kołakowski he was a major influence on this Polish
intellectual trend) was another matter. After 1989, the liberalism and secularism that socialists
in Poland had traditionally defended remained in crisis as the Catholic church reveled in
newfound influence.
The very last piece in Aneks, the only work that followed the section about the politics
of the Catholic church, is a review of a book of collected essays by Czech dissident and future
President of Czechoslovakia—soon to be Czechia—Václav Havel. Written by a fellow poet, the
Pole Stanisław Barańczak. The review, much like the collected works it is about, feels like a
tribute or retrospective; a dissident intellectual victory lap. Havel was respected by Polish
dissident intellectuals, Barańczak wrote from his post at Harvard University in the piece (which
was also published in the American journal Salmagundi).43 The Czech had a deep influence on
(and in his phenomenological outlook sometimes parallel philosophical beliefs to) Polish leftist
intellectuals. Alongside writing about the content of the book, letters from prison from Havel to
Olga, his partner, Barańczak addressed Havel’s philosophy. The Pole traced the Czech’s
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philosophy through the thought of Jan Patočka to Martin Heidegger. Havel’s phenomenology
focused on individual freedom through accepting one’s responsibility—a philosophy based on
action that was guided by morality.44
This book review, closing almost twenty-five years of the publication of Aneks, is a
testament to the success of these beliefs—which the milieu around the publication contributed
to developing and spreading. Barańczak ended by qualifying his laudatory statements:
“[Havel’s] point is not pragmatic, short-sighted vision of success or victory. Or, rather, its vision
of victory is of a much more long-run sort and lies on a different plane than politicians are ever
likely to imagine.”45 Havel, future president, did not seek political victory—just as Solidarność
intellectuals stated that neither they nor the union wanted to gain political power. But both
Havel and the trade union came to possess vast popular support. This support, Barańczak
claimed, was society’s genuine conviction and was not based on deception or cynicism: “In fact,
‘the power of the powerless’ is just a human manifestation of something ultimately
irrepressible and indestructible… confirmed and fortified by every individual act of human
responsibility.”
Barańczak’s essay stands in stark contrast to the defensive and divisive statements
published in the special section on Catholic church in this final issue of Aneks. At first glance and
in most works published on the end of communist Poland, the narrative in Barańczak’s essay
dominates. The transitions away from communism were a moment of joy and triumph made
possible by self-limiting revolution. But something else was happening in Poland at the same
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time, now that a space existed for partisan politics and not just anti-communist activity. Just as
Aneks published works the editors did not agree with or ideas they did not ascribe to, the
liberal space created in Poland quickly began to spawn illiberal notions such as those
summarized above. The content of Aneks reflected the changes and nuances in society and
politics over the almost two decades of its existence and its final pieces contrasting secular
philosophy and an ugly rejection of their ethos make for a fitting end for the journal. With the
country now on the brink of self-rule, would Antoni Słonimski’s interwar Poland where secular
humanism battled Catholic obscurantism return? With a civilizational threat averted, would a
normal Poland come to be? "As long as there is no global citizen passport, it is good to have
several citizenships," Petrusewicz adds.46
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